The American Political Science Review

Articles and Essays by R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, David Resnick, Shlomo Avineri, Helmut Norpoth, Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine, Russell Hardin, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Colin S. Gray

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.
Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies

Thomas L. Pangle
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*

Robert W. Jackman
Politicians in Uniform

Neil R. Richardson
Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.
Primates and Political Authority

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXX December 1976 No. 4

what's new



KENNETH PREWITT and SIDNEY VERBA

PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

SECOND EDITION

The Second Edition of PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, the shortened paperback version of the authors' AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT has undergone thorough revision. Chapters on political parties and elections, congress, and the presidency have been extensively rewritten and updated to incorporate key developments through the 1976 elections. The new edition also reflects the changes heralded in last year's revision of the longer text—including six new descriptive sections on how governmental institutions work. Tentative: 416 pages; $8.50/paper. February 1977. ISBN 0-06-045282-X. *Instructor's Manual.*

REO M. CHRISTENSON

CHALLENGE AND DECISION

POLITICAL ISSUES OF OUR TIME, FIFTH EDITION

Widely adopted and consistently acclaimed through four editions, the Fifth Edition of CHALLENGE AND DECISION is concise and provocative in its treatment of major domestic political issues.

Presenting a well-rounded range of viewpoints to stimulate classroom discussion, the author analyzes the origins, development, and future course of current political problems. New to this edition are chapters on energy, the economy, the budget, the feminist movement, and pornography. Over 50% of the book constitutes new material. 244 pages; $5.50/paper. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-041267-4.

VERNON F. ANDERSON and ROGER A. VAN WINKLE

IN THE ARENA

THE CARE AND FEEDING OF AMERICAN POLITICS

Facts, analysis, insights, and commentary are candidly revealed by political participants and seasoned observers in this unique book on running for public office. The smoothly integrated text and readings show how the serious game of politics is actually played in local and national arenas and how the campaign process fits into the broad scope of American government.

Special features of the book include a class-tested campaign simulation and boxed inserts presenting unusual or interesting aspects of politics. 425 pages; $6.95/paper. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-046811-4.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, **Dept. 354.** Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

1817 *10 East 53d Street, New York, N.Y. 10022*

Harper & Row

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXX December 1976 No. 4

CONTENTS

1030 Editorial Comment

1033 Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies — Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.

1059 The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws* — Thomas L. Pangle

1078 Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World — Robert W. Jackman

1098 Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance — Neil R. Richardson

1110 Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective — Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.

1127 Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government — R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard

1136 Crude Communism and Revolution — David Resnick
  Comment — Shlomo Avineri
  Rejoinder — David Resnick

1156 Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes — Helmut Norpoth

1172 Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria — Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook

1185 An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining — James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine

1202 Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition — Russell Hardin

1215 Communications

1234 Book Reviews and Essays

1234 Government and the Media — Ithiel de Sola Pool

1242 Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT — Colin S. Gray

Index to Volume LXX

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1976 by the American Political Science Association.

New Instructions to Contributors

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720; and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including quotations). Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

The footnote form is that used by most scientific journals. Explanatory notes only will be permitted for most manuscripts (see below); references will be listed alphabetically at the end of the manuscript and in-text references will be made by inserting author or title, year, and page number, if appropriate. For illustration see Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Note: authors of manuscripts on the history of political thought may, if they prefer, use the traditional footnote form when referring to the individual theorist's work; the reference form should be used when referring to secondary works.

All manuscripts will be examined carefully for length. Referees will be asked to recommend where cuts might be made, without affecting the principal contribution. Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Except in extraordinary circumstances, manuscripts over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be prepared as noted above, double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, and references will be included in the page count.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must be brief and to the point.

Figures should be drawn on white paper with India ink and the original tracings or drawings retained by the author (for transmission later to the printer). Copies only should accompany the manuscript. Tables should be typed on a separate page. Insert a guide line, e.g., "Table 1 about here," at the appropriate place in the manuscript.

ARTICLES

1033 **Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies.** This study focuses on strike activity during the 1950–1969 period in ten industrial societies, The first section of the paper deals with issues of strike measurement and introduces a three-dimensional characterization of strike activity which forms the basis of the subsequent statistical analyses. The next section examines postwar trends in industrial conflict in order to evaluate the argument that strike activity is "withering away" in advanced industrial societies. Time plots of the aggregate volume of industrial conflict show that there has been no general downward movement in strike activity during the postwar period.

The third part of the paper develops a number of theoretically plausible statistical models to explain year-to-year fluctuations in the volume of strikes. The empirical results of this section indicate that (1) there is a pronounced inverse relationship between strike activity and the level of unemployment, which suggests that on the whole strikes are timed to capitalize on the strategic advantages of a tight labor market; (2) industrial conflict responds to movements in real wages rather than money wages, which indicates that labor is not misled by a "money illusion"; (3) Labor and Socialist parties are not able to deter strike activity in the short-run despite their strong electoral incentive to do so; and (4) the volume of strikes does seem to be influenced by the relative size of Communist parties, which suggests that such parties remain important agencies for the mobilization of discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages.

By Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Associate Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1059 **The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*.** This paper explains Plato's conception of the relation between politics and "political religion" (ideology) in a nonliberal participatory republican system. The discussion is in the form of a commentary on the drama of a part of Plato's *Laws*. The underlying methodological assumption is that Plato presented his political teaching not so much through the speeches as through the drama of the dialogue, and that he held this to be the most appropriate form for political science because in this way political science can most effectively stimulate thought about its subject matter, the psyche involved in social action.

Following Plato, we focus first on the psychological needs such a political system generates and attempts to satisfy through civil religion. We then move to a consideration of how political "theology" serves to mediate between science and society, or the philosopher and the city.

The essay is intended to contribute to the Montesquieuian project engaging the attention of more and more political theorists: the endeavor to help contemporary political science and psychology escape from the trammeling parochialism of exclusive attention to twentieth century theoretical categories and empirical experiences.

By Thomas L. Pangle, Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

1078 **Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World.** This paper examines three arguments about the impact of military regimes on social change (i.e., economic growth and social reform) in Third-World countries. The first asserts that military governments are progressive; the second claims that they are conservative or reactionary; while the third states that the impact of military regimes on social change varies by level of development. An analysis of covariance model is specified and used first to reanalyze data previously examined by Nordlinger. The results provide no support for any of the three hypotheses, but limitations of the data prevent this from being a convincing test. The model is therefore tested with a second set of data covering 77 politically independent countries of the Third World for the decade 1960 to 1970. Again, the estimates are inconsistent with all three hypotheses and suggest instead that military regimes have no unique effects on social change, regardless of societal type. The paper concludes that the civilian-military government distinction is of little use in the explanation of social change.

By Robert W. Jackman, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

1098 **Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance.** This study examines influence relations between the United States and countries that are dependent upon their foreign trade with it.

The hypotheses are concerned with political compliance expected of these dependencies as a consequence of their economic vulnerabilities to pressure from the U.S. Informed by trade-related variables and U.N. General Assembly voting behavior of the mid-1960s, the hypotheses find some support. The evidence shows that its dependencies, especially those in the western hemisphere, agree with the U.S. in General Assembly roll calls to a greater degree than do other countries. This compliant behavior, however, is confined to votes that pit the United States against the Soviet Union; when the superpowers are in partial or complete agreement, U.S. dependencies are no more in accord with the U.S. than are other countries. Throughout the study, dependencies are proposed to be vulnerable along four dimensions of their economic circumstances. Interestingly, the respective effects of these four factors are not as hypothesized. Their relative weights in contributing to compliance are largely as expected, but the nature of their partial associations is not. Finally, it happens that most of the dependencies turn out to be Latin American and Caribbean countries, a fact that complicates the interpretation of the statistical results.

By Neil R. Richardson, Assistant Professor of Government, The University of Texas at Austin.

1110 **Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective.** This paper presents an evolutionary-biological perspective on the stratification of political authority, power, and influence. The rudiments and relevance of a biobehavioral approach are indicated, particularly in regard to study of the behavior of subhuman primate species. Dominance-deference behavior patterns in four species—rhesus macaques, savanna baboons, gorillas, and chimpanzees—are described and compared, followed by discussion of some stratification concepts that have been derived from primate studies and applied to human societies. The possible continuing influence on man's behavior of his evolutionary history is considered through discussion of a zoologist's attempt to reconstruct it, and through tentative reinterpretations of social psychological conceptions of leader-follower relationships and dispositions to obey authority figures. Finally, it is suggested that the modern conception of political authority *per se* as contingent and contrived may be empirically untenable, and, if so, that certain implications may follow concerning theories of political obligation and constitutionalism.

By Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Professor of Political Science, Coe College.

1127 **Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government.** Studies attempting to predict public expenditures using political variables have generally incorrectly assumed that political, like socioeconomic, variables function as determinants of policy levels and types. If one assumes, however, that the function of the political process in representative government is to translate citizens' demands for various levels of services as accurately as possible, then political variables must be conceptualized as mediating in character. In the absence of knowledge of whether public services are being oversupplied or undersupplied in relation to citizen demands, the effects of political variables can therefore, be better tested by moving beyond single-equation regression models.

An alternative method for examining impacts of political variables is presented by integrating them with conventional theories of political representation. This leads to a concept of "translation error," and ways of examining relationships between this concept and political variables are explicated. Finally, the greater theoretical utility of this reformulation for the study of public policy is examined, and empirical studies which indicate its validity are cited.

By R. Kenneth Godwin, Associate Professor of Political Science, Oregon State University, and W. Bruce Shepard, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Oregon State University.

1136 **Crude Communism and Revolution.** The paper is an examination of the relationship between Marx's theory of communism and his theory of revolution in the early writings. Avineri's claim that the *Paris Manuscripts* contain a two stage theory of future society is critically evaluated. It is argued that by crude communism Marx meant an incorrect theory of communism and not a description of the next stage of society. Confusion results from taking Marx's discussion of two stages in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* and reading the more sophisticated analysis of the later works back into the early writings. A discussion of the relationship between revolutionary theory and practice as formulated in the early writing is offered in order to substantiate the claim that Marx never *thought* that socialist society had to pass through the stage of crude communism.

By DAVID RESNICK, Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University.

Comment. By SHLOMO AVINERI, Herbert Samuel Professor of Government, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Rejoinder. By DAVID RESNICK.

1156 **Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes.** Partisanship has often been noted as one of the most conspicuous factors in legislative voting in the U.S. Congress. This paper attempts to trace party voting to shared policy goals. After the mean attitudes of congressmen belonging to the same party were ascertained for a number of policy domains, the effect of mean party attitudes on roll-call voting was estimated by regression analysis, taking into account the deviation of individual congressmen from their respective mean party attitudes. The results demonstrate that in all three policy domains examined, i.e., social welfare, civil rights, and foreign policy, shared party attitudes leave a strong imprint on individual roll-call decisions. The voting decisions of congressmen, in fact, are found to owe more to the shared party attitudes than to their own individual attitudes. The paper also explores the communication process through which shared policy attitudes are translated within Congress into partisan roll-call votes and points to a way of reconciling the "predispositional" and the "interactional" approach to legislative decision making.

By HELMUT NORPOTH, Research Associate, Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne.

1172 **Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.** The assumptions imposed in spatial models of election competition generally are restrictive in that they require either unidimensional issue spaces or symmetrically distributed electorate preferences. We attribute such assumptions to the reliance of these models on a single concept of a solution to the election game —pure strategy equilibria—and to the fact that such equilibria do not exist in general under less severe restrictions. This essay considers, then, the possibility that candidates adopt mixed minimax strategies. We show, for a general class of symmetric zero-sum two-person games, that the domain of these minimax strategies is restricted to a subset of the strategy space and that for spatial games this set not only exists, but if preferences are characterized by continuous densities, it is typically small. Thus, the hypothesis that candidates abide by mixed minimax strategies can limit considerably our expectation as to the policies candidates eventually advocate. Additionally, we examine the frequently blurred distinction between spatial conceptualizations of two-candidate elections and of committees, and we conclude that if pure strategy equilibria do not exist, this distinction is especially important since committees and elections can produce entirely different outcomes.

By RICHARD D. MCKELVEY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University, and PETER C. ORDESHOOK, Professor of Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University.

1185 **An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining.** Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.

From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations.

By James L. Perry, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Administration, University of California, Irvine, and Charles H. Levine, Associate Professor, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

1202 **Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition.** The proof of Riker's size principle is inadequate for the general class of zero-sum bargaining games (whether symmetric or asymmetric), and the principle is valid only for a very restricted class of games—the supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. Butterworth's modification of the size principle (the maximum number of positive gainers principle) can be extended to cover games which are only approximately symmetric. Roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives overwhelmingly violates the size principle; hence, the House does not generally play a supersymmetric zero-sum bargaining game. More generally, both Butterworth's and Riker's principles seem inapplicable to large bodies.

By Russell Hardin, Associate Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park.

1215 **COMMUNICATIONS**

From Bradley C. Canon and S. Sidney Ulmer, Richard Funston, Chester Spatt, Guillermo Owen, Stephen V. Stephens, John E. Hunter and T. Daniel Coggin, Theodore S. Arrington, Christopher Achen

---

1234 **BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS**

Government and the Media. Chris Argyris, *Behind the Front Page;* James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio* and *The Press and the Cold War;* Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media;* Lee Brown, *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America;* Robert Cirino, *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion;* Edith Efron, *The News Twisters;* Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere: Television and the News;* Robert E. Gilbert, *Television and Presidential Politics;* John Hohenberg, *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause;* Joseph Keeley, *The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television;* Richard W. Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press;* John Luskin, *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press;* Lester Markel, *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion;* John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy;* Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, Lee M. Mitchell, *Presidential Television;* William Rivers, *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press;* Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials;* William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World;* Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents;* Charles W. Whalen, Jr., *Your Right to Know,* George F. Will, ed., *Press, Politics and Popular Government.*

By Ithiel de Sola Pool, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1242 **Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.** Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race;* Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *SALT: Problems and Prospects;* William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's;* John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT;* Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System;* Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.*

By Colin S. Gray, Hudson Institute.

1257 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**
A. J. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage.* David Berlinski, p. 1257
David Caute, *Frantz Fanon;* and Peter Geismar, *Fanon.* Bernard S. Morris, p. 1258

William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?;* Richard J. Regan, S.J., *Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience;* and Elliot M. Zashin, *Civil Disobedience and Democracy.* Robert F. Sasseen, p. 1259
S. N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change, and Modernity.* Marion J. Levy, Jr., p. 1261
The Fabian Society, *Socialism and Affluence,* and *The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals.* Della Nevitt, p. 1264
Werner Fuchs et al., eds., *Lexikon Zur Soziologie.* Gianfranco Poggi, p. 1265
A. James Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism.* Stanley G. Payne, p. 1266
Louis J. Halle, *The Ideological Imagination.* Lawrence A. Scaff, p. 1267
Donald W. Hanson, *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought.* Paul E. Sigmund, p. 1268
G. C. Harcourt, *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital.* Leland B. Yeager, p. 1270
Robert Havemann, *Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist.* Paul Breines, p. 1271
Frederick Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature.* Paul Piccone, p. 1272
Elliot Jaques, *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice;* Staffan B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class;* Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Work in America. Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare;* and Yves Simon, *Work, Society and Culture.* Sebastian de Grazia, p. 1273
Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950.* Hans Speier, p. 1276
Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics.* Gabriel A. Almond, p. 1278
Leonard Krieger. *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition.* James J. Sheehan, p. 1279
Vincent Lemieux, *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans.* Kenneth McRoberts, p. 1281
Eugene Lunn, *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer.* Carl Landauer, p. 1282
Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class.* E. V. Walter, p. 1283
Philip Mason, *Patterns of Dominance.* M. Mushkat, Jr., p. 1283
J. S. McClelland, ed., *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras);* Michael D. Biddis, ed., *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings;* John Carroll, compiler, *Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own;* Alfred Rosenberg, *Race and Race History and Other Essays.* Eugen Weber, p. 1284
Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them.* Alan Stone, p. 1286
A. E. Keir Nash, ed., *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes.* R. Kenneth Godwin, p. 1288
Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* Douglas Rae, p. 1289
Nicholas Rescher, *Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective.* Charles E. Gilbert, p. 1291
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland.* Richard B. Carter, p. 1292
Hans A. Schmitt, ed., *Historians of Modern Europe.* Robert Woito, p. 1294
J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden;* Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods;* Wendell Glick, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* David M. Atkinson, p. 1295
Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor, eds., *Politics and Deviance.* Martin Plax, p. 1297

1298 American Government and Politics

David W. Adamany, *Campaign Finance in America.* John R. Owens, p. 1298
James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* Arnold A. Rogow, p. 1299
Steven B. Canby, *Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis.* Gary L. Wamsley, p. 1301
Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* Justus D. Doenecke, p. 1302
Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman, *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks;* and Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds., *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* Thomas F. Pettigrew, p. 1303
Chandler Davidson, *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South.* Richard Murray, p. 1305
Vine Deloria, Jr., *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties;* and Theodore W. Taylor, *The States and Their Indian Citizens.* Frances Svensson, p. 1306

Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* John H. Kessel, p. 1308
Louis S. Gerteis, *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865.* William S. McFeely, p. 1309
Richard Hellman, *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study.* Harry M. Trebing, p. 1310
Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, *The Politics of Electoral College Reform.* Laurin L. Henry, p. 1311
Neil R. McMillen, *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964.* James D. Thomas, p. 1313
Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees.* Allen Schick, p. 1313
Martin H. Seiden, *Cable Television U.S.A.;* and Harvey J. Levin, *The Invisible Resource.* Frank Wolf, p. 1315
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of U.S. Political Parties, Vol. I: 1789–1860, From Factions to Parties; Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change.* Austin Ranney, p. 1316
David G. Temple, *Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia.* Chester W. Bain, p. 1316
Hanes Walton, Jr., *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis.* Carolyn Sue Williams, p. 1317
Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress.* Paul E. Peterson, p. 1318

1320 Comparative Government and Politics

Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946.* J. A. C. Mackie, p. 1320
Shlomo Avineri, ed., *Israel and the Palestinians.* Amos Perlmutter, p. 1321
Brenda E. F. Beck, *Peasant Society in Koṅku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India.* Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., p. 1322
Ralph Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.* Lawrence Ziring, p. 1323
Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922;* and *Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922,* Alan J. Ward, p. 1324
Shahid Javed Burki, *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965.* Benedict Stavis, p. 1326
Derek Channon, *The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise.* Stephen Blank, p. 1326
Ian Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria;* and Gérard Duprat, *Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie.* Clement Henry Moore, p. 1328
Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings, eds., *Comparative Political Socialization.* Roberta S. Sigel, p. 1329
Ronald Dore, *British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations.* George O. Totten, p. 1331
Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* Jean-Claude Vatin, p. 1332
Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh, *Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem.* Geoffrey Lambert, p. 1334
Natalia Gorbanevskaya, *Red Square at Noon.* Frederick C. Barghoorn, p. 1335
Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970.* Linda L. Lubrano, p. 1336
D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.* Robert Kelley, p. 1337
Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* Rex Mortimer, p. 1338
Robert N. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon.* Calvin A. Woodward, p. 1339
Lorenzo Kent Kimball, *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971.* Glenn Perry, p. 1341
Enver M. Koury, *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary–Progressive States.* Subhi Abu-Gosh, p. 1341
William M. Lafferty, *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis.* Joseph B. Board, p. 1343
Aprodicio A. Laquian, *Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development;* and Colette Pétonnet, *Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project.* E. V. Walter, p. 1344
Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France;* and Alison Patrick, *The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792.* Roy Pierce, p. 1345
A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971.* Aaron Segal, p. 1347
R. William Liddle, ed., *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia.* Donald Hindley, p. 1348

John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society.* Ian W. A. C. Adie, p. 1349
Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World;* and Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds., *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* W. Scott Thompson, p. 1351
Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* Malcolm H. Kerr, p. 1353
Lloyd D. Musolf, *Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective.* Roger W. Benjamin, p. 1354
Clark D. Neher, *Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* David Morell, p. 1355
Donald L. Niewyk, *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933.* Vernon L. Lidtke, p. 1356
Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* Joseph LaPalombara, p. 1356
Stephen E. Palmer, Jr and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* John C. Campbell, p. 1358
Gianfranco Pasquino, *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico* and *Militari e Potere in America Latina.* Torcuato S. Di Tella, p. 1359
Frederic L. Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., p. 1361
Barry M. Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China.* Thomas W. Robinson, p. 1362
Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918.* Gordon A. Craig, p. 1363
René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle.* D. B. Goldey, p. 1365
Elie Adib Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience.* Manfred Halpern, p. 1365
Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China.* David M. Lampton, p. 1366
James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption.* William B. Gwyn, p. 1368
A. H. Somjee, *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study.* Ralph H. Retzlaff, p. 1369
Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes. Trans. by Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., p. 1371
Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier, *Angola.* John Marcum, p. 1372

1373 International Politics, Law and Organization

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s.* Lawrence A. Veit, p. 1373
Hedley Bull, *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation.* Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., p. 1374
Lucius C. Caflisch, ed., *Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4—1973.* Robert G. Wirsing, p. 1375
John Lewis Evans, *The Communist International, 1919–1943;* The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., *Outline History of the Communist International;* and Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy.* John W. Strong, p. 1377
Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, *Regionale Verflechtung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme, Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,* e. V. Bonn, Band 33. Henri J. Warmenhoven, p. 1380
Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution.* Whittle Johnston, p. 1381
Ray Jones, *The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History.* Keith Wilson, p. 1382
Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present.* Nils Ørvik, p. 1383
John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution.* Charles A. Joiner, p. 1384
James A. Rahl, ed., *Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict.* M. A. Adelman, p. 1384
Ram Rahul, *Politics of Central Asia.* Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 1385
James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics.* Davis B. Bobrow, p. 1386
Henry G. Schermers, *International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order.* Charles H. McLaughlin, p. 1388
Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics.* Richard A. Falk, p. 1390
Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.* H. Bradford Westerfield, p. 1392

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$25
$12,000–14,999	$30
$15,000–19,999	$35
$20,000–24,999	$40
$25,000–29,999	$45
$30,000 and over	$50
Student and Retired	$12
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$50 domestic $52 foreign

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $3 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

Address books intended for review to Paul A. Beck, Book Review Editor, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review,* Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720; and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, *American Political Science Review,* Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including quotations). Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

The footnote form is that used by most scientific journals. Explanatory notes only will be permitted for most manuscripts (see below); references will be listed alphabetically at the end of the manuscript; and in-text references will be made by inserting author or title, year, and page number, if appropriate. For illustration see Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Note: authors of manuscripts on the history of political thought may, if they prefer, use the traditional footnote form when referring to the individual theorist's work; the reference form should be used when referring to secondary works.

All manuscripts will be examined carefully for length. Referees will be asked to recommend where cuts might be made, without affecting the principal contribution. Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Except in extraordinary circumstances, manuscripts over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be prepared as noted above, double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, and references will be included in the page count.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must be brief and to the point.

Figures should be drawn on white paper with India ink and the original tracings or drawings retained by the author (for transmission later to the printer). Copies only should accompany the manuscript. Tables should be typed on a separate page. Insert a guide line, e.g., "Table 1 about here," at the appropriate place in the manuscript.

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: Nelson W. Polsby, *Managing Editor, University of California Berkeley;* Charles O. Jones, *Managing Editor Elect, University of Pittsburgh;* Philip Siegelman, *Book Review Editor, San Francisco State University;* Shlomo Avineri, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* Lucius Barker, *Washington University;* Brian Barry, *University of British Columbia;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* Samuel D. Cook, *Dillard University;* Elmer E. Cornwell, *Brown University;* S. Rufus Davis, *Monash University;* Robert J. Jackson, *Carleton University;* Robert Jervis, *University of California, Los Angeles;* Dale Rogers Marshall, *University of California, Davis;* Russell D. Murphy, *Wesleyan University;* Joan M. Nelson, *Washington, D.C.;* J. Roland Pennock, *Swarthmore College;* Samuel L. Popkin, *University of California, San Diego;* Robert D. Putnam, *University of Michigan;* Douglas W. Rae, *Yale University;* Austin Ranney, *American Enterprise Institute;* Giovanni Sartori, *University of Florence;* Michael J. Shapiro, *University of Hawaii;* Jay Starling, *Southern Methodist University;* Stephen V. Stephens, *Baltimore, Maryland;* George E. Von der Muhll, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri;* Richard Winters, *Dartmouth College.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** Ellen Y. Siegelman. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Betsey Cobb. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** Robert Arseneau, Jonathan Bendor, Kennette Benedict, Beth Capell, Don Chisholm, Shai Feldman, David Flanders, Stephen Genco, Evelyn Deborah Jay, John Q. Johnson, Elaine Kamarck, Paul D. Karps, James I. Lengle, David B. Magleby, David Richman, Jenny Ring, Steven Rosenstone, Stuart A. Ross, Serge Taylor, Philip J. Wilson, John Zaller.

Editorial Comment

Defining Our Audience. No political scientist who sits astride a channel of communication in our discipline can fail to consider the dilemma created by the disparate modes and traditions in which we work. In literary circles it is permissible to think of a generally cultivated participant in the civilization as the proper addressee for critical commentary. The notion of the "gentle reader" presupposes an audience wider than the cult or the clique or the purely academic circle; yet it implies not so common a denominator as to fail to call forth the best and most concentrated effort at analysis, appreciation, or imaginative writing by serious practitioners.

The question is whether such a construct provides a suitable model for political writing. Is there an audience sufficiently wide, yet sufficiently sophisticated, of "gentle citizens" to which a professional journal of political science might address itself? In fact we believe such an audience exists, and is served, variously, by such publications as *The Public Interest, Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. Purely political analysis written to a high standard is occasionally featured in these publications. In addition, it can be found among a wide number of other magazines and journals, frequently appearing in amongst work of far less merit.

So the opportunity is there for the grasping. It remains to be asked whether the *American Political Science Review* is the suitable vehicle for the satisfaction of this clear need. Our reluctant conclusion has been in the negative. And this is because we believe the filling of the clear need for a journal of general political analysis could come only at the expense of another need of even higher priority for us. This is the need for a means by which professional political scientists can reach one another with the work that they regard as their most important and ambitious within the context of a community of co-investigators, no matter how inaccessible that work might be to general readers who are themselves not in hot pursuit of the problems addressed.

It is this fundamental divergence of interest and focus that marks a crucial boundary around a community of scholars and defines the responsibilities of the editor of a journal that aspires to communicate the fruits of scholarship.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis"

John B. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Paul Allen Beck, University of Pittsburgh, "Partisan Dealignment in the Post-War South"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A & M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U. S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Paul Burstein, Yale University, "Social Cleavages and Party Choice in Israel: "A Log-linear Analysis"

Melissa A. Butler, The Johns Hopkins University, "Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy"

George W. Carey, Georgetown University, "Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Cutler, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Richard K. Dagger, Arizona State University, "What is Political Obligation?"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, University of Texas, Austin, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting"

Dante Germino, University of Virginia, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, "A Critique of 'Democratic Administration' and Its Supporting Ideation"

George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr and Bruce C. Vladeck, University of Michigan, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research"

John G. Gunnell, State University of New York at Albany, "The Myth of the Tradition"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Bryan D. Jones, Saadia Greenberg, Joseph Drew, and Clifford Kaufman, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Barbara Kellerman, Tufts University, "Mentoring in Political Life: The Case of Willy Brandt"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

James H. Kuklinski, Wichita State University, "Representativeness: A Policy Analysis"

Arthur J. Lerman, St. John's University, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey, Carnegie-Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University. "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Abraham H. Miller, University of Cincinnati, Louis H. Bolce, Fordham University at Lincoln Center, and Mark Halligan, Northwestern University Law School, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavorial Correlates of Political Support"

Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "On the Meaning of Political Support"

Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

David E. Price, Duke University, "Policy Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of 'Environmental' Factors"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

Steven J. Rosen, Institute of Advanced Studies (Canberra, Australia), "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Subatra K. Sen, University of Rochester, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, and John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Lars Schoultz, Miami University, "The Socio-Economic Determinants of Popular-Authoritarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Donald D. Searing, University of North Carolina, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons"

Goldie Shabad, University of Chicago, and Sidney Verba, Harvard University, 'Workers' Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

Donley T. Studlar, Centre College of Kentucky, "Policy Voting in Britain: The Colored Immigration Issue in the 1964, 1966, and 1970 General Elections"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies*

DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Labor strikes have long held the interest of economic historians, social scientists, industrial relations specialists, and statisticians. The reason is that secular movements and short-term fluctuations in strike activity are an invaluable source of quantitative information about the state of labor-capital relations, working-class militancy, and general socioeconomic unrest. In part because strike participation was commonly viewed during the nineteenth century as a form of criminal activity, but also because strikes are overt, dramatic expressions of discontent, data on industrial disputes have been carefully compiled over long time periods in most industrial nations. The size, duration, and frequency of strikes are of course not the only indices of working-class grievances. Chronic absenteeism, high labor turnover rates, pilferage, work slowdowns, outright sabotage, as well as various kinds of political protest and rebellion, are also significant manifestations of discontent which, unlike strikes, have unfortunately not been recorded with any regularity. Nevertheless, strikes remain an important instrument of collective working-class economic action, and they pose a direct challenge to the authority of management, capital and, increasingly, government in industrial societies.

This study focuses on strike activity during the 1950–1969 period in ten advanced industrial societies: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two considerations motivated the selection of these nations for investigation. First, working-class economic and political organizations, have on the whole been free of direct repression in these societies since World War II, and patterns of labor-management confrontation can therefore be meaningfully compared. Second, reliable data on socioeconomic and political variables necessary for the empirical evaluation of theoretical arguments are available for each of these countries during most of the postwar period.

The main body of the paper has three principal parts. The first section deals with issues of strike measurement and introduces a three-dimensional characterization of strike activity which forms the basis of subsequent statistical analyses. The next section examines trends in industrial conflict in the postwar period and is designed to dispose of the argument that strike activity and labor militancy are "withering away" in advanced industrial societies. The third and most important part of the study develops a number of theoretically plausible statistical models to explain short-term fluctuations in the volume of strikes. The models investigated in this section incorporate a variety of economic and political factors that are commonly believed to influence strike activity. The economic factors include (1) movements in real wages, which are given an expectation-achievement theoretical rationalization; (2) the demand for labor, as indexed by the unemployment rate; and (3) changes in the ratio of aggregate profits to total employee compensation, that is, changes in the relative share of labor vs. capital in the national income. Among the most important political influences evaluated in these models are (1) the incentive of labor-oriented Socialist parties to discourage strike activity on the part of their working-class constituencies, which is posited to be a function of the competitive position of labor-Socialist parties in the political system; and (2) the relative size of Communist parties, which are viewed as significant agencies for the mobilization of labor discontent. A fourth and concluding section of the paper reviews the evidence concerning the impact of economic and political factors on fluctuations in industrial conflict and develops some implications of the statis-

---

* This research has been supported by National Science Foundation Grant GS 33121. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the IXth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, Canada, August 19–25, 1973. This revision has benefited greatly from the comments of Hayward Alker, Donald Blackmer, Daniel Lerner, Charles Myers and Joseph Quinn of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Benjamin Page and Adam Przeworski of the University of Chicago, Robert Jackman of Michigan State University, Domenico Mastrangelo of the University of Wisconsin, Peter Lange of Harvard University, and Douglas Smith of Carleton University. I am also grateful to John Chandler and Arthur Neff of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Everett Kassalow of the University of Wisconsin, M. Lacroix of the International Labor Office, Geneva and E. Paltig and A. Suchinsky of the Office of External Research, U.S. Dept. of State for providing advice on data sources and supplying a variety of data series. Finally, I am pleased to acknowledge the heroic efforts of Robert Berrier, Rhonda Crane, Giustina Mastrangelo, James Short, Marie Taylor and Nicholas Vasilatos in assisting me with data collection, analysis, editing and typing.

tical results for labor militancy in advanced industrial societies and working-class rationality in the use of the strike weapon.

Strike Measurement

The International Labor Office compiles and publishes data on three basic components of industrial conflict that are supplied by national labor ministries: number of strikes, number of workers involved (strikers), and number of man-days lost. Annual data on these components are reported for economy-wide totals and for nine separate sectors of economic activity. Since strikes rarely occur in the agricultural sector (and those that do are not recorded with great accuracy), it is sensible to exclude agriculture from international and intertemporal comparisons. The mining sector has also been excluded from this analysis because of the rather special character of labor-capital relations in that industry.[1] Hence this study focuses on aggregate strike activity outside of agriculture and mining.

Following the earlier, seminal work of Forchheimer, Knowles, and Goetz-Girey, and the more recent work of Shorter and Tilly, the basic industrial conflict components are used in conjunction with data on employment to form three theoretically distinct strike dimensions — size, duration, and frequency:[2]

Size: Strikers per strike

Duration: Man-days lost per striker

Frequency: Strikes per 1,000 civilian wage and salary workers.

Each of these dimensions is suitable for cross-time, cross-country analysis; however, it is advantageous to array them into a three-dimensional solid or cuboid that represents the profile or "shape" of strikes in a particular nation during a particular time-period. Figure 1 displays two distinctive, hypothetical strike shapes. 1 (a)



(a) (b)

Figure 1. Hypothetical Strike Profiles

---

[1] The well-known political leftism of miners is paralleled by their atypical militancy in economic confrontations with management. See, for example, Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison," in *Industrial Conflict*, ed. Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

[2] See K. Forchheimer, "Some International Aspects of the Strike Movement," *Oxford University Institute of Statistics Bulletin*, 10 (January, 1948); K.G.J.C. Knowles, *Strikes — A Study in Industrial Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952); Robert Goetz-Girey, *Le Mouvement des Grèves en France 1919–1962* (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1963); and Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly. "The Shape of Strikes in France, 1830–1960," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (January 1971), 60–86.

Small proprietors, entrepreneurs, *rentiers* and other self-employed persons are on the whole not relevant to industrial conflict but constitute a significant fraction of the civilian labor force in some nations and time periods. Therefore they have been excluded from the frequency ratio. The self-employed do of course occasionally strike (witness, for example, the strikes by independent French shopkeepers over the government's profit and price controls in 1973, or the strikes by independent truckers over fuel pricing issues in the United States). However, such events are not included in the industrial conflict data reported to the I.L.O. and are in any case not germane to the line of analysis pursued here.

depicts the profile shown by Shorter and Tilly[3] to describe nineteenth and early twentieth century strikes in many industrial nations. The typical strike during this initial stage of industrialization was comparatively small in size (few strikers per strike) reflecting the small scale of early establishments; of long duration (many man-days lost per striker) evidencing the bitter, protracted resistance that newly-formed unions encountered from employers; and relatively low in frequency (few strikes per 1000 workers), indicating the rather weak organization and mobilization of the labor force.

Figure 1(b) represents a "modern" strike profile which Shorter and Tilly suggest was more common in the mid-twentieth century. It shows a vastly increased average strike size which was in part produced by the consolidation of industrial establishments, somewhat higher frequency corresponding to the heightened mobilization and organization of the working class, and markedly reduced duration. Hence what might be called the "trench warfare" pattern of infrequent, long, but relatively small strikes that typified disputes between capital and newly organized labor in the nineteenth century seems to have been supplanted by a "guerrilla warfare" pattern of frequent, short, and relatively large "lightning" strikes in more recent decades.

Aside from the structural changes that undoubtedly contributed to this historical evolution of strike profiles (growth in firm size, the extension of labor organization, and so on), there appears to be a rational basis for labor's abandoning the trench warfare pattern of Figure 1(a) in favor of the guerrilla warfare approach of Figure 1(b). Although the evidence on this score is slim, Knowles's study of industrial conflict in Great Britain and Peterson's analysis of work-stoppages in the United States indicate that strike outcomes were more likely to be favorable to employers when conflicts were infrequent, long in duration, and small in size, whereas the probability of worker's victory was enhanced when strikes were frequent, short in duration, and large in size.[4] Thus, the long-term change in strike profiles may partly reflect a working-class learning process informed by the historical experience of labor-capital struggles.

Contemporary cross-national patterns provide some additional evidence that rational working-class behavior may underlie observed differences in aggregate strike shapes. For example, in France and Italy where the most important unions are essentially Leninist organizations with relatively small memberships and slender financial resources, the guerrilla warfare strike profile of Figure 1(b) is pronounced. Organized labor in these nations could not well withstand long sieges or tests of strength against management and therefore the relatively large, brief, and frequent "lightning" strike prevails.[5] The strike profiles of the United States and Canada, on the other hand, more nearly resemble the trench warfare pattern of Figure 1(a). Unions in these countries have large dues-paying memberships and as a result command the substantial strike funds necesary to engage in comparatively long trials of strength against management.

Although comparative time-series analysis of strike profiles is a potentially useful line of inquiry, the primary purpose of this paper is to develop statistical models explaining short-run postwar fluctuations in overall strike magnitudes. What we need is a single series that captures the net "damage" or impact of strikes. Perhaps the most suitable index of overall strike activity is the volume of the three-dimensional strike profile. The volume of any cuboid is of course the product of its three dimensions. Accordingly we calculate a quantity akin to the physical concept of volume:

$$\textit{Strike Volume} = \begin{array}{l}\text{Man-days lost}\\ \text{per 1000 wage}\\ \text{and salary workers}\end{array} = \text{Frequency} \times \text{Duration} \times \text{Size}$$

$$= \frac{\textit{Strikes}}{\text{1000 workers}} \times \frac{\textit{Man-days lost}}{\text{Striker}} \times \frac{\textit{Strikers}}{\text{Strike}}$$

---

[3] Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, "The Shape of Strikes in France."

[4] Knowles, *Strikes,* and Florence Peterson, *Strikes in the United States, 1880–1936* (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 651, 1937).

[5] The contrast between the traditional, war-of-attrition strike familiar to most Americans and the guerrilla warfare strategy described in the text is put into even sharper focus by the description of the latter pattern given by Blumenfeld: "Italian unions, which have no strike funds, have developed a whole range of disruptive activities. Among these are the 'chessboard' strike, involving only selected departments; the 'paybook' strike, in which every worker whose paycard carries an odd number engages in disputes on odd days of the week, while workers with even numbers fight out their claims on the even days; and strikes in which blue-collar workers lay down their tools in the morning but return to work after lunch, only to find that the white-collar clerks are out — thus stopping work for an entire day with the loss of only a half a day's pay." See Yorick Blumenfeld, "Industrial Strife in Western Europe," *Editorial Research Reports,* 21 (June 1971),

Man-days lost from strikes per 1000 wage and salary workers not only has substantial theoretical justification, being the volume of a three-dimensional profile that characterizes strike activity at any time or place, but also has obvious intuitive appeal as a comprehensive index of industrial conflict. Since it represents the net impact of a nation's overall strike profile it permits comparative, dynamic analyses that are not confounded by changes in a single conflict dimension. Erroneous conclusions about the "withering away" of industrial conflict, which can arise by focusing exclusively on one strike dimension and mistaking decreases in it for decreases in overall strike activity, are therefore avoided. Notice, for example, the reduction in strike duration but not in overall strike volume between Figures 1a and 1b.

A Withering Away of the Strike?

Perhaps the most influential comparative investigation of strike activity is Ross and Hartman's *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict* (1960). One of the principal conclusions of this study is that industrial conflict has (with few exceptions) virtually "withered away" in advanced industrial societies. Ross and Hartman attribute this decline in strike activity to changes in employer policies, dispute-settlement techniques, governmental functions, and union programs, as well as to the persistence of full employment, the decline of ideology and class bitterness, the improvement of living standards and *embourgeoisement* of the working class, and to the enormous growth in white collar, professional and service class employment that has accompanied the shift from industrial to "postindustrial" socioeconomic formations.

The following section evaluates a number of these propositions more formally — here we focus directly on the "withering away" thesis. Ross and Hartman construct a large number of strike indices in the course of their analysis, but unfortunately the withering away argument depends heavily on only two measures: man-days lost per union member ("Membership Loss Ratio") and man-days lost per striker ("Duration"). The former ratio is a particularly weak index from which to draw general conclusions about the time path of industrial conflict. For some countries union membership data are notoriously inaccurate (e.g., France and Italy), and the meaning of unionization differs so greatly across nations that international comparison of a union membership ratio is highly suspect. More important, the general temporal decline Ross and Hartman observe in man-days lost per union member is at least in part an artifact of the union membership rate of growth exceeding that of the total wage and salary labor force during the period of massive labor mobilization treated by their study (1900–1956). In other words, if union membership was growing with respect to time more rapidly than the total wage and salary labor force, then it is possible for man-days lost per *union member* to exhibit a downward time trend, while man-days lost per *worker* was holding steady or even increasing through time. Indeed, the data series reported by Ross and Hartman in the appendices of their study indicate this was true in many industrial societies.

Decreases over time in the second index, man-days lost per striker (duration), are of course not artificial, but do not necessarily imply a declining strike volume, as the reduction in strike duration but not overall strike volume between Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrates. The most direct way to evaluate the secular evolution of aggregate strike activity is to examine the volume of strikes over time. Figure 2 presents graphs of strike volumes — man-days lost per 1000 wage and salary workers — for each of the ten nations investigated in this paper.

It is apparent from these graphs that despite the substantial growth of postindustrial, service-oriented sectors of economic activity in all of these nations, and notwithstanding the supposed decline of ideology and *embourgeoisement* of the working-class, there has been no general "withering away" of the strike in the postwar period. The strike volumes of most of the nations in Figure 2 simply do not exhibit any pronounced downward trend. Indeed, *long-run* time trend analyses of a more formal sort (not reported here) reveal that substantial declines in aggregate strike activity are found only in the smaller democracies of Northern Europe and Scandinavia.[6] The evolution of postindus-

---

409–426. Sartori provides an interesting, although exaggerated, assessment of the leverage that "guerrilla warfare" strike strategies (known as *scioperi articolati* in Italy and *débrayages* or *grèves tournantes* in France) gives labor in service-dependent, "postindustrial" societies. See Giovanni Sartori," "Il Potere Del Lavoro Nella Societa Post-Pacificata," *Revista Italiana Di Scienza Politica,* ANNO III (Aprile 1973), 31–81.

[6] An extensive analysis of twentieth century trends in industrial conflict is given in my paper "Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity in Comparative Perspective," mimeo., 1976. Aaron's thoughtful review of the evidence for six European nations, and Erickson and Grofman's preliminary analyses of long-term trends in fifteen industrial societies also square with the conclusions drawn here. See Benjamin Aaron, "Methods of

trial social structure, then, does not seem to have resolved the grievances or reduced the militancy of wage labor. As the French sociologist Alain Touraine has observed, "A purely consumer society in which the industrial sector would be very much restricted and the problems of work no longer of interest to leisured wage-earners is sociological fiction. . . . The chiefs of the industrial complex would not be so preoccupied with the problems of labor if they were not worried about new protests and socio-political militancy in a milieu they had judged conservative."[7]

Although the graphs in Figure 2 give no evidence of a general downward movement or "withering" of strike activity, the conflict series do show substantial cross-national variation and year-to-year fluctuation. The next section develops some statistical models designed to account for the short-term fluctuations casually.

Statistical Models of Industrial Conflict

A survey of the literature on industrial conflict suggests that most of the factors believed to influence intertemporal and international variaions in strike activity can conveniently be partitioned into two broad categories. These are (1) the state of the economy, particularly, movements in real wages, profits, and the demand for labor; and (2) the configuration of parties in the political system, especially the competitive position of labor-oriented parties on the non-Communist left and the extent of Communist Party influence in the work force. This section briefly develops the relevant theoretical arguments, attempts to specify the appropriate structural equations, evaluates the capability of contrasting models to account for postwar (1950–1969) fluctuations in the volume of strikes in

BELGIUM



Figure 2. The Volume of Strikes (Man-Days Lost Per 1000 Workers) in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies 1950–1969

Industrial Action: Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Legislatures," chapter 2 in *Industrial Conflicts: A Comparative Legal Survey*, ed. Benjamin Aaron and K. W. Wedderburn (London: Wm. Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 1972); and K. Erickson and B. Grofman, "A Comparative Longitudinal Analysis of Strike Activity: Applications to Industrialized and Industrializing Economies," Paper delivered at the International Political Science Association Meeting, Montreal, Canada, August, 1973.

[7] Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Random House 1971), p. 16.





Figure 2. Continued





Figure 2. Continued





Figure 2. Continued





Figure 2. Continued

UNITED STATES



Figure 2. Continued

the ten-nation sample, and tests the stability of model parameters across institutionally diverse industrial relations systems.

Unemployment, Profits, and Real Wages. It has frequently been argued (although not without qualifications) that the strike is a more effective weapon during periods of general prosperity than during periods of widespread economic hardship. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that strike activity tends to follow the business cycle, increasing at cycle peaks and dropping off during business downturns.[8] Business cycle hypotheses and related propositions are best articulated in terms of unemployment, profits, and real wages.

The level of unemployment is perhaps the most sensitive indicator of general business conditions (countercyclical), and it is natural to expect working-class militancy to vary inversely with it. Low unemployment offers great strategic advantages to an aggressive labor force. A tight labor market means that management will have difficulty replacing potential strikers, who in any case can anticipate good prospects for securing permanent employment elsewhere if employers are able to replace them successfully. Opportunities for temporary or part-time employment during the course of a strike are also likely to be good. The situation is reversed when unemployment is high and there is an excess supply of labor. Strike-breakers are more easily recruited by employers and alternative job opportunities for strikers are reduced.[9] Faced with decreased product demand, capital is unlikely to be affected adversely by a prolonged work stoppage, and may even welcome an interruption of production in a period of receding profits and excessive inventories.[10] Hence, potential strikers are more vulnerable and militancy is discouraged. Letting SV and U denote strike volume and the level of unemployment, respectively, we therefore would expect $\partial SV_t/\partial U_t < 0$.

---

[8] See Jean Bouvier, "Mouvement Ouvrier at Conjonctures Economiques," *Le Mouvement Social* (Juillet-Septembre, 1964), pp. 3–30; Robert Goetz-Girey, *Le Mouvement des Grèves en France;* Knowles, *Strikes;* F. S. O'Brien, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations: A Comment," *Journal of Political Economy,* 73 (1965), 650–654; Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations," in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, *Industrial Conflict;* and Andrew Weintrub, "Prosperity Versus Strikes: An Empirical Approach," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* 19 (January 1966), 231–238.

[9] It is not really necessary that employers *actually* replace strikers with great regularity — it is the *psychological* threat that is important, and this is heightened during periods of high unemployment. For example, after the 1970–71 recession in the United States, *The Wall Street Journal* ran a front page article on the "conciliatory mood" of U.S. workers. The story read in part: " . . . across the country at large and small companies, workers are choosing to be more conciliatory when faced with the threat of losing their jobs. This is

The effect of profits on strikes is more problematic. From the perspective of working class aggressiveness, the relevant quantity is returns to capital as a ratio of returns to labor, that is, Aggregate Business Profits/Total Employee Compensation. It seems reasonable to assume that when the profit ratio is increasing, workers will escalate their demands and press them more militantly. Other things being equal, this should produce an upward movement in the volume of strikes. However, management is more likely to yield to labor demands in such situations because of the severe opportunity costs of absorbing a strike when markets are expanding and profits are potentially high. As Hicks put it in his classic *The Theory of Wages*, ". . . when trade is good, the cost of a strike to the employers will be immensely enhanced. Once an employer is making large profits, and expects those profits to continue in the near future, he is an easy mark for union demands. He will nearly always be prepared to make some concession in order to avoid a strike."[11] The net impact of changes in profits on strike activity is therefore uncertain. Letting ΔC denote the rate of change of the profit ratio, we have $\partial SV_t/\partial \Delta C_t \lessgtr 0$.

My specification of the influence of real wages[12] on industrial conflict is based on expectation-achievement theory. The thrust of the theory is that aggressive, violent, or protest behavior is caused in part by a gap between expectation and achievement. Variants of the theory have appeared in all branches of social science. For example, writing of civil violence, Gurr observes: "The fundamental cause of civil strife is deprivation-induced discontent: the greater the discrepancy between what men believe they deserve and what they think they are capable of attaining, the greater their discontent. The more intense and widespread discontents are in society, the more intense and widespread strife is likely to be."[13] Similarly, James Davies has argued that collective disorder ". . . is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickenly widens and becomes intolerable."[14] In a statement of the theory closer to the topic of this study, the psychologists Krech and Crutchfield have written: "A wage rate is psychologically inadequate, no matter how large in absolute amount, if it results in a wide discrepancy between the worker's level of aspiration and his level of achievement."[15]

Although expectation-achievement theory has not received consistent support from empirical studies and tends to understate or ignore altogether the importance of structural factors for conflict behavior, the basic thesis provides a plausible theoretical framework within which to specify the impact of real wage movements on strike activity. Since labor-management conflict

---

in sharp contrast to the labor scene of recent years (i.e., when unemployment was low), both union and corporate officials agree. Not long ago, they say, rank-and-filers . . . would probably have been angered by the thought of concessions . . . many manufacturing executives have openly complained in recent years that too much control had passed from management to labor. With sales sagging . . . they feel safer in attempting to restore what they call "balance" (January 26, 1972, p. 1, cited in Raford Boddy and James Crotty, "Class Conflict and Macropolicy: The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 7 [Spring, 1974], 1–19).

[10] For a contrary argument which contends that strikes have greater disutility for firms when economic activity is low (unemployment high) see John Vanderkamp, "Economic Activity and Strikes in Canada," *Industrial Relations*, 9 (February 1970), 215–230.

[11] Sir John Hicks, *The Theory of Wages* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), p. 156.

[12] "Real" wages refer of course to money wages deflated for price increases, that is, $R = W/P$ where R, W, and P denote real wages, money wages, and a price index, respectively. A following section deals with the "money illusion" thesis that labor militancy responds to money wage increases alone.

[13] "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in *Violence in America*, ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: New American Library 1969), p. 590.

[14] James C. Davis, "The Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr, p. 671.

[15] David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 542. Economists and industrial relations specialists also have used expectational explanations of worker unrest and militancy. See, for example, *Trade Union Government and Collective Bargaining: Some Critical Issues*, ed. Joel Seidman (New York: Praeger Publishers 1970), particularly the essays of Barbash and Wirtz.

typically centers on proportional wage increases rather than wage levels,[16] a reasonable functional form in the present context is

$$(1)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) + \text{other factors}$$

$$\partial SV_t/\partial(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) < 0,$$

where SV = strike volume (man-days lost per 1000 workers)
ΔR = actual percentage rate of change of real wages
ΔR^* = expected percentage rate of change of real wages.

Strike volume in the current period is therefore hypothesized to be (partly) a function of the disparity between actual and expected real wage changes in the recent past. When ΔR_{t-1} exceeds ΔR^*_{t-1} strike activity should decrease, whereas if the gap between actual and expected real wage changes runs the other way, strike volume is anticipated to increase.[17]

As things stand ΔR^* is unobserved and Equation (1) is not estimable. Since attitudinal (survey) time-series data on labor force real wage expectations do not exist, we need a plausible model that specifies ΔR^* in terms of observed quantities. The theoretical and statistical literature on the formation of expectations (expectation generating functions) presents several reasonable alternatives.[18] Consider first the so-called "extrapolative" expectations model:

$$(2)\quad \Delta R^*_t = \Delta R_{t-1} + \gamma(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}).$$

The extrapolative expectations model asserts that the expected change in real wages in the current period equals the actual change in the previous period plus a correction to allow for the trend observed over the preceding period. If $\gamma>0$, the labor force expects past trends to continue (extrapolative expectations), whereas if $\gamma<0$ a reversal of past trends is anticipated (regressive expectations). If $\gamma=0$, real wage expectations are static.

Collecting the hypotheses regarding unemployment, profit ratios, and the gap between actual and expected real wage increases yields the following theoretical model:

$$(3)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Substitution of the extrapolative model of (2) for ΔR^*_{t-1} in (3) produces an estimating equation that is composed entirely of observed variables.

$$\begin{aligned}(4)\quad SV_t &= \beta_0 + \beta_1[\Delta R_{t-1} - (\Delta R_{t-2} + \gamma(\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}))] \\ &\quad + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t \\ SV_t &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta R_{t-1} - \beta_1 \Delta R_{t-2} - \beta_1\gamma\Delta R_{t-2} + \beta_1\gamma\Delta R_{t-3} \\ &\quad + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t \\ SV_t &= \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) - \beta_1\gamma(\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}) \\ &\quad + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t\end{aligned}$$

A second model for expectations is the "adaptive" scheme. As initially formulated by Cagan and Nerlove, this model is

$$(5)\quad \Delta R^*_t - \Delta R^*_{t-1} = (1-\lambda)(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) \qquad 0 < \lambda < 1.$$

The conventional adaptive model posits that expectations are revised linearly each period in proportion to some fraction of last period's forecast error. Hence, current expectations are formed by adapting or modifying previous expectations in the light of previous experience. This implies, however, that if real wage increases are accurately anticipated in the past, expectations are static, that is, when $\Delta R_{t-1} = \Delta R^*_{t-1}$, $\Delta R^*_t = \Delta R^*_{t-1}$. For our purposes it seems more reasonable to allow for a systematic escalation of labor-force real wage expectations over time. Accordingly, the standard adaptive expectations model is modified to provide for a trend:

---

[16] Even the massive strikes of May–June 1968 in France (which were viewed largely as spontaneous "political" events in many popular and academic accounts) centered in the overwhelming majority of cases around traditional demands for wage increases and were called, promoted, and directed by the usual labor organizations. (See Claude Durand, "Revendications Explicites et Revendications Latentes," *Sociologie du Travail* (October–Décembre 1973), pp. 394–409 and George Ross, "French Working Class Politics After May–June 1968: A New Working Class?" Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 1973. Such strikes of course have important political implications in the sense that they challenge state economic policies designed to hold down the rate of increase of wages and prices.

[17] In the current period ΔR is likely to be influenced by SV and so the model in (1) should be viewed as an abbreviated form of a larger system within which ΔR and ΔR^* are lagged endogenous variables.

[18] See Kenneth J. Arrow and Marc Nerlove, "A Note on Expectations and Stability," *Econometrica*, 26 (April 1958), 297–305; Phillip D. Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money*, ed. Milton Friedman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Allan C. Enthoven and Kenneth J. Arrow, "A Theorem on Expectations and the Stability of Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, 22 (April 1956), 288-293; Josef Hadar, "On Expectations and Stability," *Behavioral Science*, 13 (November 1968), 445–454; Marc Nerlove, "Adaptive Expectations and Cobweb Phenomena," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 72 (May 1958), 227–240; and Steven J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price Expectations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 65 (December 1970), 1441–1454.

$$(6)\quad (\Delta R^*_t - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) = (1-\lambda)(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) + \delta \Delta R^*_{t-1}$$

$$0 < \delta < 1$$

$$0 < (\lambda + \delta) < 1.$$

This model permits current expectations to escalate (or de-escalate) by the trend factor $\delta \Delta R^*_{t-1}$ even if actual and expected real wage increases in the recent past are identical.

Rewriting the modified adaptive expectations model of (6) yields

$$(7)\quad \Delta R^*_t = \Delta R^*_{t-1} + \Delta R_{t-1} - \lambda \Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1} + \lambda \Delta R^*_{t-1} + \delta \Delta R^*_{t-1}$$

$$\Delta R^*_t = (1-\lambda)\Delta R_{t-1} + (\lambda + \delta)\Delta R^*_{t-1},$$

which upon repeated substitution gives

$$(8)\quad \Delta R^*_t = (1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(\lambda+\delta)^i \,\Delta R_{t-i-1}.$$

The theoretical model for strike volume in (3) corresponding to the revised adaptive expectations scheme in (8) can now be written:

$$(9)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1\left[\Delta R_{t-1} - \left((1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(\lambda+\delta)^i \,\Delta R_{t-i-2}\right)\right] + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t.$$

The infinite, geometrically declining lag in ΔR_{t-i-2} means that (9) is not estimable in its present form. This is readily circumvented by applying the so-called "Koyck transformation." Lagging (9) one period and multiplying through by $(\lambda+\delta)$ we obtain

$$(10)\quad (\lambda+\delta)SV_{t-1} = (\lambda+\delta)\beta_0 + (\lambda+\delta)\beta_1\left[\Delta R_{t-2} - \left((1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(\lambda+\delta)^i \,\Delta R_{t-i-3}\right)\right] + (\lambda+\delta)\beta_2 U_{t-1} + (\lambda+\delta)\beta_3 \Delta C_{t-1} + (\lambda+\delta)\epsilon_{t-1}.$$

Subtracting this expression from (9) produces an empirical estimating function with finite lag.[19]

$$\begin{aligned}(11)\quad SV_t = {}& \beta_0(1-\lambda-\delta) \\ & + (\lambda+\delta)SV_{t-1} \\ & + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) \\ & - \beta_1 \delta \Delta R_{t-2} \\ & + \beta_2 U_t \\ & - (\lambda+\delta)\beta_2 U_{t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \Delta C_t \\ & - (\lambda+\delta)\beta_3 \Delta C_{t-1} \\ & + (\epsilon_t - (\lambda+\delta)\epsilon_{t-1}).\end{aligned}$$

Our final expectation-achievement function has a theoretical basis somewhat different from that underlying the previous models. In this specification, strike activity is determined by the gap between actual real wage changes over *several* recent periods and the expected *long-run* increase in real wages.[20]

$$(12)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R' - \Delta R^*) + \text{other factors}$$

$$\partial SV_t / \partial(\Delta R' - \Delta R^*) < 0,$$

where $\Delta R'$ = actual real wage changes over several recent periods
ΔR^* = the expected long-run increase in real wages.

Thus, the volume of strikes is hypothesized to increase or decrease depending on whether the rate of change of real wages during recent years has exceeded or fallen short of labor's long-run expectations.

---

[19] For those who prefer elegance, the result in (11) follows directly from lag algebra. Let B equal a backshift operator such that $B^i Y_t = Y_{t-i}$ and rewrite (9)

$$(a)\ SV_t = B_0 + \beta_1 [\Delta R_{t-1} - ((1\text{-}\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}((\lambda+\delta)B)^i \Delta R_{t-2})] + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \varepsilon_t. \sum_{i=0}^{\infty}((\lambda+\delta)\beta^i)$$ may be viewed as a convergent geometric series with solution $1/1-(\lambda+\delta)B$, and thus (a) implies:

$$(b)\ SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 [\Delta R_{t-1} - \frac{(1-\lambda)}{1-(\lambda+\delta)B}\Delta R_{t-2}] + \beta_2 U_t + B_3 \Delta C_t + \varepsilon_t.$$

Clearing $_{(b)}$ of the denominator $1-(\lambda+\delta)B$ yields the estimating equation given in (11).

[20] This model is adopted from Orley Ashenfelter and George E. Johnson, "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity, *American Economic Review*, 50 (March 1969) 35–49. I am grateful to Robert Solow for helping me derive the implications of various lag functions which led to the interpretation given here.

The mechanisms for $\Delta R'$ and ΔR^* are as follows. Recent experience, $\Delta R'$, is defined simply as a finite moving average of previous real wage changes.

$$(13) \qquad \Delta R_t' = \sum_{i=1}^{J} \alpha_i \Delta R_{t-i}$$

$$\Sigma \alpha_i = 1.$$

Long-run expectations, ΔR^*, are formed as the weighted sum of a constant (very long-term) increase parameter (L) and a finite moving average of previous real wage changes.

$$(14) \quad \Delta R_t^* = (1 - \rho)L + \rho \sum_{i=1}^{K} \phi_i \Delta R_{t-i}$$

$$\Sigma \phi_i = 1$$

$$0 < \rho < 1.$$

The theoretical expectation-achievement model in (12) can now be expressed in terms of observed variables by substitution of (13) and (14).

$$\begin{aligned}(15) \qquad SV_t &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left[\sum_{i=1}^{J} \alpha_i \Delta R_{t-i} - \left((1 - \rho)L + \rho \sum_{i=1}^{K} \cdot \phi_i \Delta R_{t-i} \right) \right] + \text{other factors} \\ SV_t &= [\beta_0 - \beta_1 (1 - \rho)L] + \beta_1 \cdot \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} (\alpha_i - \rho\phi_i) \Delta R_{t-i} \right] + \text{other factors.}\end{aligned}$$

Rewriting, we have

$$(16) \qquad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \text{other factors,}$$

$$\text{where } \beta_0' = \beta_0 - \beta_1(1 - \rho)L$$

$$\mu_i = (\alpha_i - \rho\phi_i).$$

The lag functions determining the behavior of (13)–(16) are likely to have the following properties. The weighted average of real wage changes defining $\Delta R'$ ("recent experience") will depend heavily on the outcomes of the latest periods, perhaps peaking after a few lags, and the experience of more distant periods will be rapidly discounted. Hence the α_i coefficients forming $\Delta R'$ should be governed by a low-order polynomial lag distribution with a steep rate of decay. In contrast, it is reasonable to anticipate the moving average component of long-run real wage expectations (ΔR^*) to be weighted more equally by current and past experience, which implies a linear or quasigeometric lag distribution with a relatively slow rate of decay in the ϕ_i. The difference of these lag functions (μ_i) is therefore likely to exhibit an inverted U-shaped distribution, which is conveniently estimated by the polynomial distributed lag method of Shirley Almon.[21]

To sum up at midstream, the discussion thus far has developed three plausible models specifying the impact of unemployment, business profits, and real wage changes on the volume of strikes:

Expectation-Achievement Gap: Extrapolative Expectations

$$\begin{aligned}(17\text{a}) \quad SV_t = \beta_0 &+ \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) \\ &- \beta_1 \gamma (\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}) \\ &+ \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t\end{aligned}$$

$$\beta_1 < 0, 0 < \gamma < 1, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 < 0$$

Expectation-Achievement Gap: Adaptive Expectations (with trend)

$$\begin{aligned}(17\text{b}) \quad SV_t = \beta_0&(1 - \lambda - \delta) \\ &+ (\lambda + \delta) SV_{t-1} \\ &+ \beta_1 (\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) \\ &- \beta_1 \delta \Delta R_{t-2} + \beta_2 U_t \\ &- (\lambda + \delta)\beta_2 U_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta C_t \\ &- (\lambda + \delta)\beta_3 \Delta C_{t-1} \\ &+ (\epsilon_t - (\lambda + \delta)\epsilon_{t-1})\end{aligned}$$

$$0 < (\lambda + \delta) < 1, \beta_1 < 0, 0 < \delta < 1,$$
$$\beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 < 0$$

Expectation-Achievement Gap: Long-Run Expectations (polynomial distributed lag)

$$(17\text{c}) \ SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$$

$$\beta_0' < 0, \beta_1 \Sigma \mu_i < 0, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 \lessgtr 0,$$

where ΔR = the percentage rate of change of real wages,
U_t = the percentage of the civilian labor force unemployed, and
ΔC_t = the rate of change of aggregate profits/total employee compensation.

Table 1 reports the estimation results for Equations (17a)–(17c). Notice that the estimation

---

[21] Shirley Almon, "The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropriations and Expenditures," *Econometrica,* 33 (January 1965), 178–196.

Table 1. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a]
Estimation Results for Equations 17a, 17b and 17c

Equation	U_t	U_{t-1}	ΔC_t	ΔC_{t-1}	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$	$[\Delta R_{t-1}-\Delta R_{t-2}]$	$[\Delta R_{t-2}-\Delta R_{t-3}]$	SV_{t-1}	ΔR_{t-2}	R^2
(17a)	−74.2 (−5.1)		484.9 (0.5)			3.3 (0.5)	6.5 (1.1)			.52
(17b)	−47.8 (−1.7)	−39.1 (−1.4)	792.7 (0.8)	−573.2 (−0.6)		−7.3 (−0.8)		.006 (0.05)	−13.7 (−1.1)	.52
(17c)	−94.1 (−5.0)		452.5 (0.4)		−44.7 (−2.0)					.53

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. U_t is the % of the civilian labor force unemployed. R_t is average hourly money earnings deflated by the consumer price index. ΔR denotes the % rate of change: $[R_t - R_{t-1}/R_{t-1}] * 100$. C_t denotes the ratio of profits to total employee compensation. ΔC is the rate of change: $[C_t - C_{t-1}]$. SV_t is the volume of strikes outside of Agriculture and Mining and is defined as Total Mandays Lost per 1000 Wage and Salary Earners. The TROLL/1 system was used for estimation.

Sources: Strike data are from I. L. O., *Yearbook of Labor Statistics,* various years. Unemployment and labor force data are from OECD, *Manpower Statistics 1950–1962; Labour Force Statistics 1958–1969.* Employee compensation and Profits data are from OECD, *National Accounts Statistics.* Consumer Price Index data are from *U. N. Statistical Yearbook,* various years. Money earnings data were provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor.

strategy is to pool all observations (20 year time-series, 10 nations), so that strictly speaking the functions should be indexed $SV_{nt}=f(\Delta R_{nt-i}, U_{nt}, \Delta C_{nt})$; $n=1 \ldots 10$, $t=1950 \ldots 1969$. Furthermore, all parameters except the constant term are constrained at this point to be invariant through time and space. This amounts to replacing the general intercept constant, β_0, with a series of country-by-country dummy variables, $\sum_{n=1}^{10} \alpha_n$, which pick up the net effects of nation-specific, time-invariant, structural-historical factors not captured explicitly (causally) in the equations.[22] Therefore the models are geared to explaining fluctuations in strike activity in the presence of a location parameter or ignorance term that varies across countries.

The estimates for (17a) and (17b) in Table 1 indicate that neither the extrapolative expectations model nor the adaptive expectations model performs very well in this body of data. The coefficients of the real wage change (ΔR) terms are without exception statistically insignificant and in several cases have the wrong sign. The extrapolative equation (17a) was estimated both linearly (by ordinary least squares) and nonlinearly (along the lines proposed by Marquardt)[23] with the constraint that the parameter γ lie in the interval 0 to 1. The adaptive expectations function (17b) was similarly estimated by ordinary least squares and by a nonlinear-instrumental variables procedure designed to preserve consistency in the presence of the lagged endogenous SV_{t-1} term and potentially autocorrelated disturbances.[24] The constraints imposed in this nonlinear regression were $0<(\lambda+\delta)<1$ and $0<\delta<1$. Despite great efforts to maximize the success of these models, it appears that strike activity in advanced industrial societies during the postwar period is not well explained by expectation-achievement gap functions of the extrapolative or adaptive variety.

---

[22] A fixed, dummy variable approach to the pooled estimation problem is taken here in preference to the alternative random variables, "error components" approach because of computational ease, and also because an important assumption necessary to preserve the consistency of the latter method — that "specific ignorance" be independent of regressors — seems unreasonable. Extensive analyses of pooled estimation strategies are given by G. S. Maddala, "The Use of Variance Components Models in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data," *Econometrica,* 39 (March 1971), 341–358; Marc Nerlove, "Further Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Economic Relations from a Time Series of Cross Sections," *Econometrica,* 39 (March 1971), 359–382; and T. D. Wallace and Ashig Hussain, "The Use of Error Components Models in Combining Cross Sections with Time Series Data," *Econometrica,* 37 (January 1969), 55–72. Note also that the long-run increase expression (1-ρ) L in (15) is necessarily embedded within the nation-specific intercepts of (17c) and therefore is effectively "lost" for inferential purposes (i.e., these parameters are underidentified).

[23] Donald W. Marquardt, "An Algorithm for Least Squares Estimation of Non-Linear Parameters," *Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics* 11 (June 1963), 431–441.

[24] Note that even if the disturbance of the original adaptive expectations function in (9) is "white noise," application of the Koyck transformation introduces a first-order moving average error process in the estimating equation (17b). As it turned out, however, the errors displayed negligible serial correlation in all equations and so instrumental variables as well as the rather complicated estimation procedures required to secure efficiency in a pooled data model proved unnecessary. A discussion of the estimation problems

The regression results in Table 1 do, however, provide evidence in favor of the "long-run" (polynomial distributed lag) expectation-achievement gap model of (17c).[25] Recall that this model asserts that if actual real wage increases over several recent years exceed labor's long-run expectations, then the volume of strikes should decline. The significant negative estimate for the $\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$ lag coefficients clearly supports the long-run expectations hypothesis, and suggests that labor has a "memory" extending many periods back through time in the sense that a change in real wages influences strike activity (negatively or positively) for several subsequent years.[26]

The level of unemployment (U_t) consistently displays a significant and sizable negative coefficient as hypothesized. This indicates that the strategic considerations outlined earlier govern labor's use of the strike and that strikes should be viewed as tactical weapons in struggles against management and not as poorly timed, spontaneous protests. Moreover, this relationship suggests that labor grievances are, as Rees[27] put it, "durable" or at least "semi-durable," and that industrial conflict therefore represents a rational translation of working class discontent into overt action.

The parameter for the rate of change in profit ratios (ΔC_t) is insignificant in all regressions. This probably reflects the contrasting effects attributed to profits earlier—increasing labor's demands and aggressiveness on the one hand, but decreasing capital's incentive to resist on the other. Thus, profits do not appear to have a very important influence on fluctuations in industrial conflict and the profit term should therefore be deleted from a revised model.[28]

Industrial Relations Systems and Strike Dynamics. The validity of previous conclusions concerning the impact of real wages, unemployment, and profit ratios on strike activity rests in part on the assumption that the structural coefficients are more or less constant through time and space. Although there is little reason to suspect systematic time-wise shifts in these coefficients during the postwar period, there is cause to question whether the parameters are equivalent cross-nationally, given the diversity of national institutional arrangements.

When considering the importance of institutional diversity in explaining cross-national differences in strike activity, industrial relations specialists have given great attention, not surprisingly, to contrasting systems of industrial relations. (Certain features of the political system are also considered important, but this is taken up later.) The usual argument is that centralized systems of collective bargaining, in which labor and management organizations impose real behavioral constraints on their respective clienteles (with or without government coordination), serve to diminish or contain the level of industrial conflict. As Ross and Hartman put it: "Just as unions in centralized systems eliminate improvident emotional gestures

---

posed by auto-correlated disturbances and lagged endogenous variables is provided in Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Casual Inference in Time-Series Regression Models," in *Sociological Methodology 1973–74, ed.* Herbert Costner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1974), pp. 252–308.

[25] The best fitting model was a second degree polynomial constrained to drop-off to zero after a five period lag. Similar results are reported by Ashenfelter and Johnson, "Bargaining Theory," and John H. Pencavel, "An Investigation into Industrial Strike Activity in Britain," *Economica,* 37 (August 1970), 239–256, for quarterly models of strike frequency in the United States and Great Britain respectively. The estimation technique used here was initially proposed by Shirley Almon, "The Distributed Lag." A comprehensive review of distributed lag formulations generally is given by Phoebus J. Dhrymes, *Distributed Lags: Problems of Estimation and Formulation* (San Francisco: Holden Day, 1971).

[26] A plot of the lag distribution coefficients is presented in a following section, after several additional hypotheses are incorporated into the strike volume model. The real wage data used here are average hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector deflated by the consumer price index. Movements in manufacturing wages are presumed to reflect closely economy-wide changes (cf. Orley Ashenfelter, George E. Johnson and John H. Pencavel, "Trade Unions and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in United States Manufacturing Industry," *The Review of Economic Studies,* 39 (January 1972: Appendix). Analyses using total annual employee compensation per civilian labor force member produced results virtually identical to those in Table 1.

[27] Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations."

[28] Although the profits result is theoretically plausible, the statistical insignificance of this variable may stem from excessive measurement error. Profits data are easily subjected to the artistry of corporate accountants, are well-known to be "hidden" as costs via accelerated depreciation tax laws, and are difficult to determine for unincorporated businesses. Furthermore, a significant fraction of the labor force in all economically advanced societies is employed in nonprofit activities. The profits-to-wages ratio is also correlated with real wages and unemployment. However, excessive collinearity is not a problem here: the multiple R^2 of profits/wages with the remaining independent variables is .17.

by the rank and file, likewise employer associations exclude reckless or primitive attitudes to which small businessmen in particular are subject. . . . The knowledge that any strike will be large and expensive serves as a deterrent to both sides. . . . Furthermore, employers within an industry do not have to worry about suffering a competitive disadvantage when all of them are subject to the same demands. . . . At the same time unions tend to be less aggressive since different branches are not competing to make the best showing within an indutsry."[29]

There is less than unanimous agreement, however, that centralized labor-management bargaining systems contain strike activity quite as effectively as Ross and Hartman and others have suggested. Malles, for example, expresses doubt as to whether "there is any correlation at all between a particular type of industrial relations system and the incidence of industrial warfare."[30] Sturmthal has even argued that highly centralized labor organizations and bargaining structures can lead to heightened grass roots unrest because of the "distance" created between the rank and file and the level at which decisions are made.[31]

Three modal types of collective bargaining systems are readily identified in the descriptive literature:[32]

(1) *Decentralized systems* characterized by firm-level bargaining (e.g., Canada, Japan, and the United States) or by anarchic labor-management relations embedded within a formal superstructure of multi-employer bargaining that imposes few constraints on the principal actors (France, Italy).

(2) *Centralized systems* typified by industry-wide bargaining or by multi-employer bargaining with industry-wide constraints (e.g., Belgium until 1959, the Netherlands after 1963, and the United Kingdom throughout most of the postwar period).

(3) *Highly centralized systems* within which economy-wide bargaining, or industry-wide bargaining with economy-wide constraints, prevails (e.g., Belgium after 1959, the Netherlands prior to 1964, Norway, and Sweden).

Simple calculation of strike volume means for each type of bargaining system leaves no doubt that during the postwar period the average level of strike activity covaried with the degree of centralization: mean man-days lost per 1000 wage and salary workers are 425, 172, and 67 for decentralized, centralized, and highly centralized systems, respectively. In this paper, however, interest is focused primarily on the stability of the structural (regression) coefficients of real wages, unemployment, and profits across these diverse systems of industrial relations. Recall that the most successful equation in Table 1 was the "long-run" expectations model of (17c):

$$(18)\quad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Let D_1 denote a binary or dummy variable equal to unity for centralized collective bargaining systems and equal to zero otherwise, and let D_2 denote a dummy variable equal to unity for highly centralized bargaining systems and zero otherwise. (Decentralized systems comprise the null case.) It is now possible to specify an alternative, unconstrained model that permits the parameters to vary across the three types of industrial relations systems. (The intercept-constant, β_0', already takes a unique value for each country and so is not affected by this respecification.)

---

[29] Arthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 49-50.

[30] Paul Malles, *Trends in Industrial Relations Systems of Continental Europe* (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, Task Force on Labour Relations, 1969).

[31] Adolf Sturmthal, *Comparative Labor Movements: Ideological Roots and Institutional Developments* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1972).

[32] A great many studies were consulted in developing these categories. Among the most useful of those not already cited were: W. Albeda, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the Netherlands," *International Labour Review*, 103 (March 1971), 247–268; Robert F. Banks, "The Pattern of Collective Bargaining," chapter 3, *Industrial Relations: Contemporary Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Ben C. Roberts (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1968); Roger Blanpain, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Belgium," *International Labour Review*, 104 (July–August 1971) 111–129; Donald E. Cullen, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United States," *International Labour Review*, 105 (June 1972), 507–529; Yves Delamotte, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in France," *International Labour Review*, 103 (April 1971), 351–377; Gino Giugni, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Italy," *International Labour Review*, 104 (October 1971), 307–328; Bruce W. Heady, "Trade Unions and National Wages Policies," *Journal of Politics*, 32 (1970), 407–439; Gunnar Hogberg, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Sweden," *International Labour Review*, 107 (March 1973), 223–238; David L. Horowitz, *The Italian Labor Movement*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Val R. Lorwin, *The French Labor Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Val R. Lorwin, "Labor Organizations and Politics in Belgium and France," in *National Labor Movements in the Postwar World*, ed. Everett Kassalow (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Tadashi Mitsufuji and Hagisawa, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Japan," *International Labour Review*, 105 (February 1972), 135–153; Ben C. Roberts and Sheila Rothwell, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United Kingdom," *International Labour Review*, 106 (December 1972), 543–571; and Adolf Sturmthal, *Contemporary Collective Bargaining in Seven Countries* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1957).

$$(19)\quad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \alpha_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \pi_i(\Delta R_{t-i}{}^*D_1) + \gamma_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \omega_i(\Delta R_{t-i}{}^*D_2) + \beta_2 U_t + \alpha_2(U_t{}^*D_1) + \gamma_2(U_t{}^*D_2) + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \alpha_3(\Delta C_t{}^*D_1) + \gamma_3(\Delta C_t{}^*D_2) + \epsilon_t.$$

Table 2 reports the estimation results for the respecified long-run expectations model of (19). Clearly, these estimates lend support to the earlier presumption of parameter equivalence across contrasting industrial relations systems. More formally, the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are common across bargaining systems, i.e.,

$$\beta_1 \Sigma \mu_i = \alpha_1 \Sigma \pi_i = \gamma_1 \Sigma \omega_i$$

$$\beta_j = \alpha_j = \gamma_j \ (j = 2,3),$$

may be evaluated by computing the following F ratio:

$$F = \frac{[RSS_{(18)} - RSS_{(19)}]/r}{RSS_{(19)}/T - K},$$

where

RSS denotes the residual sum of squares in the respective equations,

r denotes the number of restrictions or constraints in (18), and

T - K denotes the number of degrees of freedom of RSS (19).

Computation of this test statistic gives $F(8,113) = 0.9$, which is insignificant at any conventional level. Therefore, although the mean level of strike activity during the postwar period covaries strongly with the degree of centralization in collective bargaining, estimation of the unconstrained model yields results which do not challenge the earlier assumption that the structural parameters governing the impact of real wages, unemployment, and profits (the latter being of little importance) are approximately equivalent across institutionally diverse systems of industrial relations.[33]

The Money Illusion Hypothesis. In addition to the presumption of parameter equivalence, the analyses of previous sections also tacitly assumed that labor's propensity to strike is influenced by changes in real wages as opposed to changes in money wages. Therefore before incorporating certain features of the political system into the strike volume model it is important to dispose of the so-called "money illusion" thesis. The money illusion hypothesis holds that since movements in real wages are less perceptible than changes in money wages, working-class attention focuses largely on the latter, and hence workers are deceived by increases in money wages alone. Knowles's study of strikes in the United Kingdom, for example, concludes (albeit with considerable hesitancy): "Arguments based on the level of real wages are relatively unimportant at the level of strikes, even though they may have some importance at the level of negotiation, since (a) a rise in real wages is less evident and 'tangible' than a rise in money wages, and (b) a fall in real wages, even where it is immediately apparent, is less likely than is a cut in money wages to be taken as a deliberate act of the employers . . . and therefore is less likely to meet with immediate resistance."[34]

Table 2. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a]
Estimation Results for Equation 19

$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}{}^*D_1$	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}{}^*D_2$	U_t	$U_t{}^*D_1$	$U_t{}^*D_2$	ΔC_t	$\Delta C_t{}^*D_1$	$\Delta C_t{}^*D_2$	R^2
−49.3 (−1.7)	−22.7 (−0.4)	6.9 (0.1)	−102.9 (−5.1)	119.7 (1.4)	67.6 (0.7)	994.3 (0.7)	−7140.4 (−1.4)	374.4 (0.2)	.56

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. Variables are defined in Table 1 and in the text.
Sources: See Table 1.

---

[33] Analogous tests for parameter stability were undertaken for equations (17a) and (17b), and for various other subsets of nation-year observations, but the results add little to what already has been reported.

[34] K. G. J. C. Knowles, *Strikes — A Study in Industrial Conflict* (1952), p. 227. The idea that workers

Although it has been true historically that decreases in money wages have been vigorously resisted by labor, recent quantitative studies of postwar industrial conflict in Canada, Great Britain and the United States indicate that movements in prices and money wages act essentially as "mirror-images" with regard to strike activity.[35]

Since $\Delta R = \Delta W - \Delta P$[36]—where ΔR, ΔW and ΔP denote the percentage rate of change of real wages, money wages and prices, respectively—the money illusion hypothesis is tested simply by replacing $\Sigma\Delta R_{t-i}$ with $\Sigma\Delta W_{t-i}$ and $\Sigma\Delta P_{t-i}$ in a revised version of (17c). Accordingly we estimate the model (which omits the nonsignificant ΔC_t term)

$$(20) \qquad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \pi_i \Delta W_{t-i} + \beta_2 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \omega_i \Delta P_{t-i} + \beta_3 U_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Confirmation of the hypothesis requires that movements in money wages have a greater effect on strike activity than movements in prices, that is, the (negative) sum of the lag coefficients for ΔW_{t-1} should be significantly larger in absolute value than the corresponding (positive) sum of the ΔP_{t-1} lag coefficients. Table 3 reveals that if anything, just the reverse is true. The difference, however, is neither theoretically nor statistically important; the standard F-test of the null hypothesis,

$$\beta_1 \Sigma \pi_i (\Delta W) = -\beta_2 \Sigma \omega_i (\Delta P),$$

yields $F(2,120) = .06$, which is insignificant at virtually any test level.

Table 3. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a] Estimation Results for Equation 20

$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta W_{t-i}$	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta P_{t-i}$	U_t	R^2
−44.5 (−2.0)	53.3 (1.4)	−93.3 (−4.9)	.53

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficients are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. Variables are defined in Table 1 and in the text.

Sources: See Table 1.

The evidence clearly demonstrates, then, that labor does not suffer from a money illusion, but, on the contrary, takes price changes as well as money wage changes fully into account in the use of the strike. This again suggests that strike activity is governed by a rational and rather sophisticated calculus.[37]

Strikes and the Political System. Beyond the economic factors appearing in the previous models, certain characteristics of the political system are also commonly believed to influence the magnitude of industrial conflict. The most important are the relative status in the political system of labor-oriented parties on the non-Communist left, the presence of governments controlled outright by Labor or Socialist parties, and the extent of Communist party influence in the labor force.

It has often been noted in comparative studies of industrial conflict that where Labor and Socialist parties are serious contenders for political power, the use of the strike weapon is restrained. The argument that Labor parties act to discourage worker militancy is well summarized by Ross and Hartman: "Why is labor political action a deterrent to strikes? First, strikes are injurious to the political fortunes of the labor party. Middle-class votes must be attracted if the party is to be successful, but the middle-class voter is antagonized by strikes. . . . Second, worker unrest is channeled off into the political sphere. Demands that would otherwise be made upon the employer are directed against the government instead."[38] There are numerous illustrations of this line of reasoning. For example, anticipating good prospects for a Labour Party victory in the British general elections of 1964, Harold Wilson urged railway union leaders in the spring of 1963 to prevent a

---

suffer from a money illusion apparently originated with John M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1936).

[35] See Ashenfelter and Johnson, "Bargaining Theory"; Pencavel, "Strike Activity in Britain"; Vanderkamp, "Economic Activity and Strikes in Canada."

[36] Actually the continuous time equality $\frac{1}{W/P}\,\frac{d\,W/P}{dt} = \frac{1}{W}\frac{dW}{dt} - \frac{1}{P}\frac{dP}{dt}$ is only approximated by the discrete time relation $\Delta R = \Delta W - \Delta P$. However, for our purposes the difference is negligible.

[37] It is worth noting here that Kramer found percentage changes in prices and per capita monetary income to act as "mirror images" in their effects on fluctuations in the partisan division of the vote for the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1896–1964 period. Kramer interpreted this, quite properly, as evidence of rational mass electoral behavior. See Gerald Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964, "*American Political Science Review*, 65 (March 1971), 131–143.

[38] Ross and Hartman, *Changing Patterns and Industrial Conflict*, p. 69.

scheduled work-stoppage because "such a strike would damage Labour severely in public eyes and jeopardize its position in the elections." *The New York Times* observed, "Fresh in every Labour politician's memory is the six-week London bus strike of 1958. The strike has been considered a major reason for Labour's overwhelming defeat by the Conservatives a year later."[39]

How might this argument be incorporated into a formal model of strike activity? First, an index is needed that permits specification of a plausible incentive function governing the inclination of Labor or Socialist parties to deter strike activity on the part of their constituencies. It would then be possible to evaluate the success of Labor-Socialist parties in actually diminishing the volume of strikes by relating the incentive function to the variable SV_t.

In terms of the theoretical argument briefly outlined above, the incentive of Labor-Socialist parties to discourage strikes in order to attract the middle-class votes deemed necessary for electoral success is likely to hinge on their competitive position in the party system. Following Przeworski and Sprague,[40] two things are assumed with regard to party competition: (1) the goal of party competition is electoral victory, and victory is defined as becoming the largest party; and (2) the goal is perceived in terms of the outcome of the last election. Victory, then, may be as little as ¼ of the vote in a multiparty system and greater than ½ the vote in a two-party system.

For simplicity, parties are classified in four political blocs or *tendances:* Communist, Non-Communist Labor-Socialist, Center, and Right. The competitive position of Labor-Socialist parties can now be defined as the difference or distance between their percentage vote share and that of the largest *tendance* in the system:

$$(21)\quad LD_t = \max(V_{t-1}) - LV_{t-1},$$

where: LD_t = Labor-Socialist % vote share distance

LV_{t-1} = Labor-Socialist % vote share in the preceding election

$\max(V_{t-1})$ = % vote share of the largest *tendance* in the preceding election.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the incentive of Labor-Socialist parties to dampen industrial conflict in hopes of attracting (or retaining) the marginal middle-class votes necessary to achieve (or maintain) plurality status in the party system would depend nonlinearly on their vote share distance (LD_t). Figure 3 depicts a likely form for this relationship. It suggests that the incentive (LI_t) should be very large when Labor's distance from its principal rival(s) in the party system (LD_t) is small or nil but should quickly decline (asymptotically approaching zero) as the distance increases. In other words, Labor-Socialist party elites have substantial motivation to restrain working-class



Figure 3. Theoretical Incentive Function

---

[39] Cited in Everett M. Kassalow, *Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: An International Comparison* (New York: Random House 1969), p. 52.

[40] Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, "Concepts in Search of Explicit Formulation: A Study in Measurement," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 15 (May 1971), 183–218.

militancy when electoral victory is very close at hand, but this incentive subsides rapidly with small increments in LD_t (especially at the lower ranges) given the risk of unnecessarily antagonizing hard core supporters or losing them to more radical competitors on the left. The most appropriate formalization of the model depicted in Figure 3 is a slightly modified reciprocal function. Accordingly, the Labor-Socialist Incentive index is defined:

$$(22) \qquad \begin{aligned} LI_t &= 1 \text{ if } LD_t \leq 1 \\ &= LD^{-1} \text{ otherwise.} \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the theory at hand seems best articulated by positing an inverse, linear relationship between the volume of strikes (SV_t) and the incentive index (LI_t):

$$(23) \qquad \begin{gathered} SV_t = f(LI_t, \ldots)\ f \text{ linear} \\ \partial SV_t/\partial LI_t < 0. \end{gathered}$$

In conjunction with the decrease in strike activity ascribed to sharply competitive Labor-Socialist parties, an additional influence on working-class militancy is often attributed to the presence of Labor governments. It is argued that, other things being equal, workers, or at least union leaders, are much more reluctant to see a Labor or Socialist government embarrassed by severe strike activity than a Conservative one. Consequently, "if the labor party comes into power, the deterrent effect is even stronger. The trade union officials, having invested heavily in the party, are disinclined to do anything that would have the effect of sabotaging its program . . . and will show maximum restraint in the use of the strike."[41]

This hypothesis is evaluated straightforwardly by including in the model a Labor-Socialist Government dummy variable (LG_t) taking a value of unity when a Labor or Socialist party was in power and a value of zero otherwise. (Coalition governments were coded 1 only if Labor or Socialist parties had a plurality of key cabinet posts.) If workers as well as trade-union elites in fact respond to the partisan character of the government in the way that this argument suggests, strike activity should be lower during the tenure of Labor or Socialist administrations than it is during the tenure of Centrist or Rightist ones. Hence we have:

$$(24) \qquad \begin{gathered} SV_t = f(LI_t, LG_t, \ldots) \\ \partial SV_t/\partial LG_t < 0. \end{gathered}$$

The model or mini-model in (24) presumes that the effects of LI_t and LG_t operate continuously in time. Perhaps it is more plausible to assume that these influences are activated only in election years. Unions, for example, might make a real effort to minimize industrial conflict during the crucial election year period but are far less likely to relinquish the strike during the entire tenure of a Labor or Socialist administration. Similarly, party officials may find it infeasible (if not unnecessary) to attempt to discourage strikes in nonelection years no matter how close they are to "victory." These qualifications suggest revising (24) such that

$$(25) \qquad SV_t = f(LI_t{*}E_t, LG_t{*}E_t, \ldots),$$

where E_t is a dummy variable equal to unity in the year preceding an election and zero otherwise. The specification in (25) therefore constrains the effects of the Labor-Socialist Incentive index (LI_t) and Labor-Socialist Governments (LG_t) to be zero in nonelection years.

Finally, the strike model should also incorporate a term representing Communist party influence in the labor force. Communist parties in most advanced industrial societies are of course no longer revolutionary in the traditional Marxist sense. Indeed the French and Italian parties and their union affiliates (by far the largest in Europe) have in recent years exhibited caution, if not moderation, in the use of the strike and related protest activities in order to avoid unnecessarily alienating less radical or militant segments of society.[42] However, despite the significant tactical variations exhibited by Communist movements during the postwar period in confronting dynamic sociopolitical environments, it seems clear that in contrast to other major political actors in industrial societies of the West, Communist parties remain important agencies for the mobilization of discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages. Presuming that there is nearly always a certain reservoir of latent grievance or discontent which is not manifested in overt conflict unless mobilized and channeled by radical agencies on the left, it is anticipated that sizable Communist parties will have a systematic impact on strike activity beyond that attributable to the economic variables considered previously and opposite to that of Labor parties and Labor governments.

---

[41] Ross and Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*, p. 69.

[42] See Donald L. M. Blackmer, "Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's," *Problems of Communism*, 21 (May–June 1972), 41–56, and George Ross, "French Working Class Politics After May–June 1968: A New Working Class?", Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 1973.

Using Communist party membership as a fraction of the civilian labor force (CP_t) to index the relative extent of Communist organizational mobilization, the preceding discussion suggests the function

$$(26)\qquad SV_t = f(CP_t, \ldots) \qquad \partial SV_t/\partial CP_t > 0.$$

The precise form of (26) is unspecified; it is unlikely that a conventional linear formulation will adequately capture the response of strike activity to variations in Communist membership. In particular, a plausible argument can be made that Communist parties cannot effectively mobilize labor discontent and thereby influence industrial conflict appreciably unless membership size (relative to the total work force) reaches a certain "critical mass" or threshold. Increments in CP_t above the critical threshold might lead to substantial increases in industrial conflict until an upper bound or "grievance exhaustion" point is reached beyond which further growth in party size has little or no additional effect on strike activity. A nonlinear relationship of this sort is shown in Figure 4 and is given formally by the function

$$(27)\qquad SV_t = e^{\alpha - \lambda/CP_t}.$$

To recapitulate: Figure 4 and Equation (27) simply articulate the idea that beyond some initial threshold, strike activity moves rapidly upward with increases in Communist party size (the rate of response being greatest at the point of inflection $\lambda/2$) but then levels off, asymptotically approaching an upper bound or grievance exhaustion level e^{α}.

Combining the political hypotheses of this section with the most successful economic model developed previously yields the following equation for the volume of strikes:

$$(28)\qquad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 LI_t{}^*E_t + \beta_4 LG_t{}^*E_t + e^{\alpha-\lambda/CP_t} + \epsilon_t$$

$$\beta\Sigma\mu_i < 0, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 < 0, \beta_4 < 0, \alpha > 0, \lambda > 0.$$

Table 4 reports the estimation results for three versions of the basic model in (28). Clearly, both the Labor-Socialist Incentive index (LI_t) and the Labor-Socialist Government dummy (LG_t) exhibit negligible influence on strike activity. The estimated coefficients of these variables oscillate in sign across specifications and the *t*-statistics are inignificant at any conventional test level. Moreover, this is true whether the hypothesized (negative) effects are permitted to operate in all years (28a) or are restricted to election years only (28b).

Interpretation of the Labor government (LG_t) result is straightforward: during the postwar period left-wing governments have been no more successful than center or right-wing governments in discouraging short-run upward



Communist Party Membership as a
Fraction of the Civilian Labor Force (CP_t)

Figure 4. Hypothetical Relationship of Communist Party Membership and the Volume of Strikes

Table 4. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a] Estimation Results for Equation 28

Equation	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$	U_t	LI_t	LG_t	$e^{\alpha CP_t}$	$LI_t{*}E_t$	$LG_t{*}E_t$	R^2
(28a)	−58.6 (−2.8)	−89.1 (−4.9)	−62.1 (−0.4)	81.9 (0.9)	0.08 (27.1)			.58
(28b)	−60.1 (−2.8)	−89.4 (−4.9)			0.08 (27.1)	16.9 (0.1)	−80.8 (−0.6)	.58
(28c)	−59.2 (−2.8)	−89.3 (−5.0)			0.08 (27.2)			.58

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. ΔR and U_t are defined in Table 1. LI_t denotes the Labor-Socialist Party Incentive index and equals unity when LD_t is $\leq l$ and LD_{t-1} otherwise, where LD_t = max vote share minus the Labor-Socialist vote share. LG_t and E_t are Labor Socialist Government and Election year dummy variables, respectively. CP_t is Communist Party membership per 1000 civilian workers.

Sources: Electoral data and Communist party membership data are primarily from U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations,* annual volumes 1950-1970. See Table 1 for the sources of other variables.

movements in strike activity, notwithstanding the electoral ties of the former to the working-class.[43] From the workers' point of view, the correspondence of interests with Socialist party elites is simply less than perfect. As Ernest Bevin put it when leading the strikes of dock and tramway workers in Britain just after the first Labour government came into office in 1923: "There is work to do in the industrial field as well as in the political arena. While it is true that the two are to some extent part of the same effort, we must not lose sight of the fact that governments may come and governments may go, but the workers' fight for betterment of conditions must go on all the time."[44] Subsequent Labour government leaders have been no more effective in deterring labor militancy and strikes than the first Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.

The implication of the Incentive index (LI_t) result, unlike that of the Labor government dummy variable outcome, is not unambiguous For example, it is possible that the incentive function presented in Figure 3 and in Equation (22) is poorly specified, or that its definition in terms of vote share distances in (21) is too simple. However, alternatives to the incentive function developed in the text, elaborations of the basic specification in (24), and analyses permitting the coefficients to vary across subsets of countries produced results no better than those reported in Table 4.[45] Thus, it is plausible that Labor-Socialist party attempts to discourage strike activity are indeed governed by a model akin to that outlined previously, but that such attempts, on the whole, have been unsuccessful.

---

[43] Similar conclusions with regard to Great Britain are reached by John E. T. Eldridge, *Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology of Industrial Relations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); and Herbert A. Turner, *The Trend of Strikes* (Leeds: Leeds University Press, 1963). It should be understood that the results associated with the political party terms apply only to nations experiencing oscilliations in Labor-Socialist rule. The effects of long-term leftist rule on labor militancy (e.g., in Sweden, Norway and Denmark where the Left has governed almost continuously during the postwar period) are absorbed by the country-specific constant terms. The consequences of such long-standing political and institutional differences are discussed in great detail in my paper "Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity in Comparative Perspective."

[44] Cited in Kassalow, *Trade Unions and Industrial Relations,* p. 50.

[45] Several of these alternatives are worth mentioning. First, since the translation of electoral votes into legislative seats is by no means direct [see Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, revised edition, 1971), for an exhaustive analysis], the incentive function of Labor-Socialist Party elites in (22) was also defined in terms of seat shares as opposed to vote shares. Second, Equation (23) was revised to incorporate the capability as well as the motivation of party elites to discourage strike activity; where capability was measured in terms of the size of the Labor-Socialist political constituency (voters). Third, the Labor-Socialist vote share distance in (21), as well as the seat share variant described in the first point above, was modified to include (a) the vote or seat share of the U.S. Democratic party — following Greenstone's argument [J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969] that American labor and the Democrats have become interpenetrated in a way that is at least partially equivalent to party-union alliances in much of Western Europe — and, (b) the vote or seat share of the French Communist Party (PCF) during the period of the left alliance. As noted in the text, none of these modifications led to empirical outcomes significantly different from those reported in Table 4.

This apparent failure of party elites to reduce the use of the strike may stem less from the unresponsiveness or "irresponsibility" of top union leadership than from the fundamental radicalism and militancy of the rank-and-file. In Great Britain, where there is a close, organic relationship between trade union and Labour party elites, the vast majority of strikes during the last decade have been unsanctioned, "illegal" conflicts typically led by left-wing shop steward militants.[46] Although the British case is probably the best documented, wildcat strikes, contract rejections and other manifestations of grass-roots rebelliousness have also become serious issues in Canada, the United States, and continental Europe.[47] Strikes, then, not only are weapons in disputes with private capital, but can also serve as instruments of rank and file rebellion against union authority, and in some situations, state authority. Hence, the conclusions of Ross and Hartman's influential study that "labor political action, labor parties, and labor governments have helped pave the way toward renunciation of the strike," and that political action is "more in line with the middle-class orientation of workers in advanced industrial societies,"[48] seem to be seriously at odds with the empirical data.

Although the results in Table 4 give no evidence in favor of arguments concerning the impact of Labor-Socialist parties and governments on short-run fluctuations in strike activity, they do substantiate the anticipated effect of Communist party influence in the labor force. The initial specification of a "critical mass"/"grievance exhaustion" model represented by the function $SV_t = e^{\alpha - \lambda/CP_t}, \ldots,$ however, produced coefficient estimates that were statistically insignificant, unstable in sign, and unreasonable in magnitude. (A standard nonlinear algorithm in conjuction with reasonable initial parameter guesses was used.) An alternative, unbounded exponential function of the form $SV_t = e^{\alpha CP_t} \ldots,$ which preserves the idea that strike activity should increase (decrease) rapidly and nonlinearly with growth (decline) in Communist mobilization, proved to be far more successful in describing the relationship of industrial conflict to Communist membership over the range of variation observed in the latter variable in this body of data. The highly significant estimates[49] for this revised exponential model (reported throughout Table 4) support the original proposition that sizable Communist parties are associated with levels of industrial conflict that cannot be attributed to such economic factors as changing rates of increase in real wages ($\Sigma\Delta R_{t-i}$) or fluctuations in the demand for labor (U_t).

Conclusions

The evidence developed in this study supports several tentative conclusions. Time plots of the volume of strikes presented in the first section indicate that arguments about the withering away of industrial conflict and related statements concerning the vitiation of labor militancy in advanced industrial societies are not compatible with the empirical data. There simply is no sign of a general downward movement in the aggregate volume of strikes during the 1950–1969 period. To push the implications of this a bit further and in a more general direction, the trends in strike activity tend to complement other streams of evidence contradicting macrosociological arguments about the "integration" of labor in advanced capitalist

---

[46] J. F. B. Goodman, "Strikes in the United Kingdom: Recent Statistics and Trends," *International Labour Review,* 95 (May 1967), 465–481; and Michael Silver, "Recent British Strike Trends: A Factual Analysis," *British Journal of Industrial Relations,* 11 (March 1973), 66–104. The situation was reversed, however, after the passage of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which was bitterly resented by the British trade union establishment and which stimulated the normally moderate Trades Union Congress (the peak union organization) to join the shop stewards in pressing the militant position. Consequently, nearly 80 per cent of the man-days lost in strike activity in the years after 1971 were due to "official" disputes. A detailed analysis is given by Gerald Dorfman, "An End to Producer Group Politics in Britain?: The Industrial Relations Act of 1971," paper delivered at The 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 1973. The dynamics underlying differential responsiveness of union leadership and the rank-and-file to the wider political interests of Labor-Socialist parties is of course an important problem, which the simple models developed here cannot address with any authority.

[47] See John S. Greenbaum, "The Rebellious Rank and File," *Personnel,* 49 (March–April 1972), 20–25; Stuart M. Jamieson, *Times of Troubles Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900–66,* (Ottawa: Economic Council, Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968); Seidman, *Trade Union Government and Collective Bargaining;* and Stanley Weir, "Rebellion in American Labor's Rank and File," in *Workers' Control,* ed. Gary Hunnius, G. David Garson and John Case (New York: Vintage Books 1973).

[48] Ross and Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict,* p. 58.

[49] The t-statistics in this nonlinear model should be interpreted with caution since strictly speaking they have meaning only in terms of the linearized equation at the solution point. There is no question, however, that the exponential form given in Table 4 outperforms all reasonable alternative functions.



Figure 5: Distribution of Real Wage Lag Coefficients (from Table 4, 28c)

societies and the *embourgeoisement* of workers in the face of unprecedented affluence.

Patterns in the fluctuation of industrial conflict also suggest that the working class exercises considerable sophistication in the use of the strike weapon. The pronounced inverse relationship between the volume of industrial conflict and the rate of unemployment demonstrates that on the whole strikes are timed to capitalize on the strategic advantages of a tight labor market. What Hobsbawm has called "the common sense of demanding concessions when conditions are favorable" indeed seems to prevail.[50] Moreover, labor does not appear to be misled by a "money illusion." The empirical results clearly show that price changes are no less important than money wage changes in their effects on strike activity. Industrial conflict therefore responds to movements in real wages rather than money wages, which is further and rather persuasive evidence that rational behavior underlies observed strike fluctuations.

The real wage function that proved to be most successful empirically was a polynomial distributed lag in $\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$ (graphed in Figure 5). The general form of this lag distribution was deduced from a formal specification of a "long-run" expectations variant of the basic expectation-achievement hypothesis, although the lag function does not depend in any essential way on this particular theoretical rationalization. Without becoming very firmly attached to the precise shape or exact coefficient values of this lag distribution,[51] it can be said that labor militancy appears to be governed, in part, by a "memory" persisting several periods back through time, in the sense that a change in real wages affects strike activity over a number of subsequent years. More specifically, the estimates indicate that an equilibrium reduction of 1 per cent in the rate of change of real wages is associated with a strike volume increase on the order of 59 man-days lost per 1000 workers, which is distributed nonlinearly over about 5 periods.

Finally, the analyses in the last section of the paper reveal that Labor-Socialist party elites are, on the whole, unable to deter short-run increases in strike activity despite their strong incentive to do so (especially when the prospects of electoral victory are good) and notwithstanding their political ties to organized labor. Similarly, industrial conflict exhibits no consistent tendency to drop-off during the tenure of governments controlled by Labor or Socialist parties. The empirical evidence for the postwar period suggests, therefore, that left-wing parties and governments relying upon symbolic, electorally expedient appeals to political solidarity, which are not accompanied by tangible rewards to labor (wages, hours, fringe benefits and so on), have had little success in discouraging working-class militancy. In contrast, strike activity does appear to vary (nonlinearly) with the relative size of Communist party membership. This lends support to the earlier proposition that Communist parties in advanced industrial societies remain important agencies for the mobilization of latent discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages.

---

[50] E. J. Hobsbawm, "Economic Fluctuations and Some Social Movements Since 1800," *Economic History Review*, Second Series, 5 (1952), 1–25.

[51] Since the real wages variable is undoubtedly measured with significant error, one should not place great confidence in the exact values of the individual lag coefficients or in the lag distribution. This follows from the results of a recent paper by Grether and Maddala which shows that measurement error in an exogenous variable typically leads to the appearance of a *longer* lag distribution than is actually the case, but at the same time produces a *better* estimate of the total response. In the case at hand, this means the $\beta_1\Sigma\mu_i = -59.2$ in (28c) of Table 4 is probably a good estimate of the total response of SV_t to $\Sigma\Delta R_{t-1}$ (the total multiplier), although the lag distribution index $i = 1 \ldots 5$ may be too long. See David Grether and G. S. Maddala, "Errors in Variables and Serially Correlated Disturbances in Distributed Lag Models," *Econometrica*, 41 (March 1973), 255–262.

Extensions of the simple single-equation strike models presented in this study have obvious implications for public policy. One of the most important problems confronting industrial nations during the postwar period is the trade-off that appears to exist between unemployment and the rate of wage-price inflation (the so-called Phillips curve). If labor militancy or strike activity in the current period influences wage movements in current and subsequent periods independently of market conditions, then this implies a lagged reciprocity between strikes and wage changes, and more important, means that strike activity affects, perhaps crucially, the unemployment-inflation dilemma. This seems clear enough intuitively, although conventional economic formulations of the problem rarely consider labor aggressiveness explicitly.[52] In any case, an adequate treatment of the economic and political dimensions of these linkages would extend this paper far beyond its present length and requires empirical analyses not yet completed.

---

[52] The work of Hines and Ashenfelter et al., are important exceptions to the restrictive treatment of the employment-inflation problem found in the bulk of the empirical economic studies. See A. G. Hines, "Trade Unions and Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom 1893–1961," *Review of Economic Studies*, 31 (October 1964), 221–252; and Orley Ashenfelter, George E. Johnson and John H. Pencavel, "Trade Unions and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in United States Manufacturing Industry," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 39 (January 1972), 27–54. Also, see my forthcoming paper "Labor Militancy and Wage Inflation: A Comparative Analysis."

The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*

THOMAS L. PANGLE
Yale University

Introduction

Why is it important that we turn our serious attention to Plato's *Laws?* How will the study of this antique work help us to come to grips with the dilemma of modern democracy? We find ourselves citizens of rich and powerful regimes which administer enormously dynamic societies; yet the accelerating pace of change, the increasing sense of motion, go together with a dramatically decreasing sense of purpose and direction. We can openly wonder what our prosperity and freedom are for. What kinds of men and women, what ways of life, are intended to be the "users" of this liberty and wealth? Given the predominance in the twentieth century West of a version of liberalism which seeks to relegate such questions of purpose to the subpolitical sphere of private or "social" decision, it is not surprising to find, in reaction to the quandary, considerable speculation about alternatives to liberal democracy. But speculation of this kind is not, or should not be, limited to partisans of revolutionary change. In fact, this speculation is the proper task of political philosophy, which is almost by definition nonpartisan. The investigation of alternatives—the reflection on the merits, the strengths and weaknesses, the possible future improvements or dangers of contemporary democracy — will be productive of real political knowledge only if it is conducted in a spirit not of commitment but of open-minded and imaginative intellectual experimentation. We wonder about human needs, political, social, or personal, that may be frustrated or even unknown in the contemporary political universe. And yet prior to the investigation itself we have no way of knowing whether these needs can be answered in the modern context without risking even greater dissatisfactions. It may be that the philosophic inquiry into alternatives may only make clearer the essential limits of all political aspiration in modern, technological mass society. On the other hand, it is likely that such investigation will lead to some improvement in our understanding of the best direction in which to move to secure at least small improvements in our public life.

If we decide to undertake a serious inquiry into republican alternatives to liberalism we are led necessarily toward historical studies, for these alone expose us to the full range of republicanism—a range that extends far beyond the bounds of present-day varieties of liberal, plebescitarian, and Marxist systems. Now perhaps the most appealing of historical republican regimes, the one which has attracted admirers in almost every generation, is the classical city. It is easy to entertain the suspicion that in some *poleis* men had experiences and exercised capacities whose lack in our social lives today underlies a good part of our frustration and purposelessness. Still, the very suspicion that stimulates our intense interest may cloud our vision. In our desire to find a concrete embodiment of what we feel to be missing from our public life we are too prone to brush aside those elements of the *polis* which we find immediately unattractive. Yet the features that seem most alien may be so only because they are unintelligible to us; and their lack of intelligibility may be the surest sign that these are the elements of political life which we have lost sight of. In meditating on things that the classical theorists praise and that we find repugnant, we may discover politically relevant aspects of the soul, needs of the soul, which are now only dimly visible to us.

It is in the light of these considerations that we turn to a study of the Platonic dialogue which contains the most detailed classical presentation of the best city. I believe the chief reason why the *Laws* is so rarely studied by political scientists, and that when studied it seems so alien, is the emphasis on the gods and "religion" which pervades the work. The laws put forward by Plato's chief interlocutor (an old "Athenian stranger") are surely not revealed by god; but, just as surely, they are proposed with an eye to god at all times. The *Laws* is the only Platonic work that literally begins with the word "god." The occasion of the dialogue is a pilgrimage made by three old men to a sacred cave, and the conversation seems to take the place of the homage to the god of the cave (see 625a, 643a).[1] To extend this contrast with the *Republic*, one may say figuratively that in the *Laws* Cephalus never leaves and that his sons arrive only in the tenth book. The more one reads the *Laws* the more one is tempted to think that for Plato political science and a kind of theology are inseparable.[2] The full significance of this for us becomes apparent when we contrast the attitude toward religion held by the philosophic sources of modern republican theory. Whether one thinks of the first wave of modern theory (Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu) or of the second (Kant, Hegel, Marx), it is apparent that the "theological-political problem," or, to speak practically, the reduction of religious influence on politics, is considered to be the key preliminary task of political science. It is true that both the thinkers who founded and those who radicalized the Enlightenment directed their critique mainly against Judaeo-Christian political theology; it is also true that they often used the Greek and Roman philosophers as allies in their struggle against the "Kingdom of Darkness." And they were correct to the extent that they detected a greater concern for politics in pagan reflections on the relation between politics and religion. But we need not rely on Fustel de Coulanges, we need only peruse with care the classical texts themselves, to see that the enlightenment separation between theology and political theory is in the final analysis directed against classical as well as against medieval or Biblical thought.

---

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, numerical references are to the standard Stephanus pagination of Plato's *Laws* and other dialogues. All translations are my own. I have used the edition of John Burnet, *Platonis Opera*, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).

Plato no less than Thomas denies the modern thesis which holds that political life becomes more healthy when citizens are "liberated" from the "myths" of religion. But why does he do so? Plato's reasons are surely not the same as the Christian reasons, nor even the same as Rousseau's,[3] though all may share some common ground. A more satisfactory way of asking for Plato's reasons is to ask for his explanation of what he would understand to be the best relation between religion and politics. Now this is precisely what Plato attempts to give through the dramatic exchange he presents in the tenth book of the *Laws*. By meticulous attention to the drama of this section we can hope to bring to light Plato's reasons (psychological, political, suprapolitical) for what is to us perhaps the strangest feature of his political theory. In accomplishing this we may even be introduced to a new way of approaching some of the greatest political ills of our century, for if Plato is right, all modern thought has overlooked or distorted an absolutely essential dimension of political life.

Given the importance of the theme of Book Ten for our acceptance or rejection of the teaching in the *Laws* as a whole, and given the fact that Klinias himself, the prospective legislator, calls the discussion in Book Ten "the best prelude to all the laws" (887c1), it is not inappropriate to begin by virtually ignoring the first nine books. Nonetheless, we must give some consideration to the immediate context. The Athenian gives his defense of "civil religion" near the end of his elaboration of the penal code — a rather odd place, it may seem at first sight, for Plato's most extensive treatment of theology.[4] But the context is in fact one of the keys to the interpretation of the theology: the primary function of the three proofs in Book Ten is the support of the penal code. In Book Nine it had been frequently noted that penal law is effective only if the criminal is caught. But magistrates cannot look into the hearts of men, and therefore cannot detect all crime (not to speak of the possibility that they may punish the innocent). If the potential criminals are to be properly fearful and if the citizens are to believe the penal code is truly just, there must exist divine sanctions in this life or after death.[5] Book Ten's central proof is the proof that a Hades exists where the gods punish the unjust. The further "psychological" implication of this punitive character of the theology will emerge presently.

For now it is more important to note that the Athenian's interest here goes beyond the prevention of crime in the general populace. He focuses on a minority, the impious and hubristic young. He almost brings these rebels to life, and by speaking through them creates a dialogue within the dialogue whose only participants thus far have been the very old. The Athenian's theology seems meant to redeem the young whose minds have been corrupted by impiety. Their impiety is of three types, based on three erroneous opinions: 1) the gods do not exist; 2) the gods exist but have no care for men; 3) the gods exist, have a care for men, and are bribable (885b6–9). From this threefold distinction the plan of Book Ten emerges as the Athenian refutes each of these beliefs, in this order. Prior to the first refutation, however, there is a section devoted to removing certain obstacles which stand in the way of any argumentation about the gods.

---

[2] Avicenna goes so far as to say that the *Laws* is a work on prophecy: *On the Divisions of the Rational Sciences*, in Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds., *Medieval Political Philosophy, A Sourcebook* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963), p. 97.

[3] I have tried to bring out the difference between Rousseau's treatment of "civil religion" in the *Social Contract* and Plato's in the *Laws* in "Politics and Religion in Plato's *Laws*: Some Preliminary Reflections," in *Essays in Arts and Science, III* (1974), 19–28.

[4] According to Vanhoutte, the peculiarity of the context is one convincing sign that Plato failed to revise properly this work: Maurice Vanhoutte, *La philosophie politique de Platon dans les "Lois"* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954), p. 17.

[5] See 865d, 870e, 871b, 872, 874, 880–1, 913d, 917a–d, 931e, 958d–959e; cf. Jules Simon, *Etude sur la theodicée de Platon et d'Aristote* (Paris: Joubert, 1840), p. 269, and Victor Martin, "Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois," *Studia Philosophica* II (1951), 105–6.

Prolegomena to the Refutation of the Atheists

885c1–886a5: The Abandonment of Zeus. Having heard the Athenian introduce the young upstarts in a fitting tone of disrespect, the old Cretan statesman Klinias breaks a silence of nine pages (876a–885c) to ask indignantly what should be "done or even said to them." The Athenian replies with a soothing term of address, requesting that they first listen to what he "prophesies" the "joking and contemptuous" young men might say. He presents the young men addressing the old men as "strangers," calmly reminding Klinias that they are not now sitting in judgment. The young men demand to be convinced by reasonable persuasion, and ascribe their delinquency to the influence of the best poets, orators, prophets, and priests, who all teach that the gods can be bribed. Gingerly, without uttering a word in his own name, the Athenian has reminded Klinias of the enormous difficulties in all the traditional theological authorities.[6] At the same time, we begin to realize that the Athenian intends to teach us his own art of theological rhetoric; could it be that his real theological adversaries are not the young rebels but the old guard?

In this second characterization the Athenian has described the impious as mostly young men with unjust desires and no well-developed theories (he is silent about the group who hold the central opinion — see 899d6ff). Klinias is in consequence rather scornful and offers to prove the gods' existence. But he abandons without a struggle the defense of the Homeric gods and bases his proof instead on the earth and sun and other stars and the natural orderliness of such things. Klinias is thus induced to set the tone of Book Ten: except for two oaths "by Zeus," the name of an Olympian god is never mentioned (891c7, 895d1; cf. 904e4). Although he probably recalls what the Athenian said earlier about the divine orderliness of the heavens and even the "planets" (820aff.), his refraining from mentioning the Olympian gods need not stem from "philosophy" or even from disbelief in the Olympians. As Klinias here indicates, when a prudent man of any nation is called upon to demonstrate the existence of the gods he turns to the visible order and visible "highest things." The reasonableness of this step causes a kind of unanimity among all peoples and the unanimity reinforces the appearance of reasonableness.[7] The natural theology of the astral gods emerges from the common sense of the nonphilosopher.[8]

886a6–887c4: The "Apology of the City." The Athenian stranger next startles Klinias with the first of several surprises. Contrary to the impression he originally gave, he begins to express respect for the arguments of the impious and denies that their motives are all base. Klinias suddenly is told that his ignorance of certain books familiar to all Athenians has led him to underestimate the profound reasonings which support the point of view of the impious young — reasonings which Klinias has unwittingly committed himself to refuting. Since the Athenian praises here the "virtue of the regimes" which make Spartans and Cretans ignorant of the strong arguments for atheism (886a11), we are forced to wonder why he introduces these corrupting arguments into the code of laws for the new Cretan regime. The Athenian seems to be the corrupter of the young as well as their redeemer (cf. 680c and 634d-e). The Athenian's civil theology is meant to defend the opinions necessary for dedication to good citizenship; but he is willing to risk weakening that defense in order to move the city's opinions in the direction of truth. The wise fathers who rule the city, men with natures like Klinias' and Megillus', cannot face such a challenge without gradual and extensive preparation. The long introduction to the arguments themselves is in part the model of such preparation — a model that future young citizens with natures like the Athenian's must listen to and learn to follow.

---

[6] Cf. 636d, 886c, 941.

[7] Compare 887e2–7, *Apology of Socrates* 26d, *Cratylus* 397d, *Epinomis* 987a; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II ii; Aristophanes, *Peace* 406; and above all *Deuteronomy* 4:19. See also Edwin Bourdieu England, *The Laws of Plato*, 2 vols. (Manchester: University Press, 1921), at 887e2. William Guthrie's discussion suffers from his failure to consider these passages in the *Laws* as well as the passage cited from the *Apology*: see *The Greeks and Their Gods* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 211–14.

[8] Space does not permit us to do more than note the absence in Klinias's proof of all sense of the uncanny, the mysterious, the *holy* — what Rudolph Otto called the "numinous." This absence characterizes Book Ten as a whole. We must leave open the question whether the absence indicates a flaw in Plato's attempt to understand the "religious experience" and all that it implies for politics. An answer would require, among other things, coherent reflection on the contrast between "the holy" and what Plato's Socrates speaks of as the "daemonic" (cf. 885c3). The first steps in such reflection are prepared by Otto's discussion of Goethe's notion of the daemonic: *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John Harvey (London: Oxford University Press [1950], 1972), pp. 150ff. Consider here Gershom Scholem, *On The Kabbalah and Its Symbolism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), pp. 88ff.; and Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), chapter 10, especially pp. 250-5.

The most serious writings which stand behind the impious young "Athenians" belong not to ancient poets but to "new and wise" men who assert that the heavenly bodies are mere stone and earth. These men and their pupils do not of course imply that the gods are bribable. We have almost insensibly left behind "most" of the impious young (cf. 885e) and have had our attention turned to a small minority of radical atheists. Confronted with this opposition Klinias understandably expresses some dismay.

So at this point the pious old Athenian raises for the first time the suggestion that they give up. He asks whether they should defend themselves (*apologeomai*) in court against the atheists' accusation that they, as representatives of the city, are doing "terrible things" or whether they should simply institute penalties without further ado. This way of putting it gives the impression that the atheists speak from a position of moral or even legal superiority. The Athenian mentions only *one* problem in continuing: the discussion will have to be rather long. He has presented the situation in a way calculated to make Klinias urge him to continue — to continue with the "apology of the city" before the tribunal of the "wise" and their students.[9]

By expressing reservations about the length of the speech required the Athenian induces Klinias to remind them all vigorously of the agreed-on form for the preludes — lengthy, reasonable persuasion suitable for free men rather than curt speech (mere law) fit for slaves (719c–723d, 857d). He goes on to portray with passion the political need for belief in gods; he mentions "persuasion" twice but no longer "the truth."[10] It is this pious passion that the Athenian is ready to confront and attempt to subdue.

887c5–888d6: "Thumos." Instead of proceeding with his proofs, the Athenian, in his longest speech in all Book Ten, pleads for moderation in both the old and the young men. The greater part of this speech is a very sympathetic suggestion that the older men moderate their *"thumos."* (*Thumos* means primarily anger or, more broadly, "spiritedness": 717d, 731aff., 863b, 866d, 934d.) After noting that Klinias has spoken with such eager spirit *(prothumōs)* as to seem to call for prayer, the Athenian asks them to consider how they might speak without *thumos (mē thumō* — 887c7; *athumos* — 888a5), quenching *thumos (sbesantes ton thumon* — 888a6).[11] He thus indicates that the greatest obstacle to "dialogue" (888a6) about gods is *thumos*. His anxious concern seems to point to *thumos* as the core of what we would call "religious zeal." It appears that the prolegomena to the refutation of the atheists is more than a model of theological rhetoric: it is an exploration through drama of the psychological reasons why such rhetoric is necessary.

Why does the Athenian stranger imply that *thumos* is that element in the soul which is at the root of religious zeal? How and why can Plato's "psychology of religion" trace the root of religious passion to anger or *thumos?* Let us begin by thinking of what anger looks to as its goal, namely, punishment, and recall our remarks about the context of this theology. Keeping in mind the present passage, we realize that the fact the gods are invoked above all as a support for the penal code is not merely or even mainly the result of the legislator's wish to restrain the wicked. The moral indignation of all the decent citizens cries out for gods who will avenge injustice. The legislator bows to this fact of political psychology. Earlier in the *Laws* we have learned that *thumos,* as the source of moral indignation, is practically the heart of good citizenship: "he who helps the magistrates as much as he can in punishing, he is the great man in the city, the perfect man; let this man be proclaimed as the bearer of victory in virtue . . . " (730d5–7). Now we learn that the Athenian places this desire to punish at the heart of zealous piety.[12]

But even this can be only part of the story, for the desire to punish is only part of what

---

[9] Consider here Plato *Apology of Socrates* as a whole and Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 32–3. The note of Diès to this passage is charmingly naive: Platon, *Oeuvres complètes,* vol. XII, ed. and trans. A. Diès (Paris: Société d'edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1956), p. 144.

[10] Contrast 887b6 and c3, with 885e7, and see England's comment on the latter passage.

[11] *Thumos* and words of the same root occur five times in this speech (887c6, c7, 888a4, a5, a6), making it one of the more extensive references to *thumos* in Plato. Of the two most extensive references in the *Republic,* the first occurs just prior to the elaboration of the theology (*Republic* 375a–376c).

[12] Cf. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: New American Library, [1903] 1964), p. 341: "Pragmatically, the most important attribute of God is his punitive justice."

Plato means by *thumos*. First we need to return to the surface to observe just what the Athenian does here. In a passionate speech he demonstrates by example the power of the reason for anger or *thumos* at the young unbelievers. What is implied in the denial of the gods, he shows, is the denial of one's own parents who nourished and educated one from birth — nay, not only of one's own parents but of all parents everywhere in the world. The Athenian, apparently blind to facts he showed us earlier, speaks without reference to the traditional Olympian gods; indeed he speaks as if the only gods worshipped anywhere in the world were the heavenly bodies. He goes so far as to say that "even a half-wit would agree there is not one sufficient reason" for denying the gods of one's fathers (887e8). Continuing in this abusive tone, he declares that the unbelievers are motivated only by "gluttonous desire for pleasure" (888a3).

The Athenian is not "letting himself go." He is rather revealing, for Klinias and all to see and ponder, the blinding force of the indignation that supports the submission to the gods of the fathers. By bringing *thumos* before us in all its living power he makes us perfectly aware of what we have to overcome. If we are to understand the connection between piety, *thumos*, and the family — if we are to comprehend fully in what sense *thumos* is the source of the gods — we need to reflect on this speech in the light of Plato's other presentations of *thumos*.

According to the *Republic*, *thumos* is one of the three parts of the soul, distinguished from reason and desire. It is understood primarily as anger but it represents, or is the source of, a range of phenomena including high spirit, competitiveness, love of honor, courage, and shame. The analysis of *thumos* in the *Republic* is somewhat obscured because of the parallelism Socrates insists on between the city and the soul. The high place of *thumos* in the city distorts the discussion of the place of *thumos* in the soul.[13] To arrive at an undistorted understanding we do well to follow Plato's hints and start from an analysis of a simple and common form of anger.[14] Anger follows upon frustrated desire. When we desire a good, move toward that good, and are then thwarted, an emotion appears which urges us to overcome the obstacle to the fulfillment of our desire. The same emotion is present when in moving away from an evil we are thwarted in flight. That emotion is *thumos*. It is first of all an impulse to overcome, or as Thomas Aquinas puts it, a response to arduous good, a response which serves desire.[15]

The second moment of this emotion is a sense of *self*. In moving toward a desired good our attention is focused on the object of desire: we tend to forget ourselves. But when we are thwarted, we are made painfully aware of the separation between the object and ourselves. We become conscious of ourselves as deprived and become directly concerned not only with achieving the object but also, and perhaps even more, with restoring ourselves to a good situation. This strong awareness of self develops further in the effort to overcome the evil or to have revenge. We can easily forget the original object of desire and become absorbed with a new goal, involving a sense of self which is not identical with simple self-love, for *thumos* and its sense of injustice may well lead us to risk our lives. *Thumos* gives birth to self-love in the sense of self-esteem, esteem for oneself as compared first with "the enemy" but soon with all other men and things.

A third moment of *thumos* is the mysterious tendency to assign complete responsibility to that which frustrates desire. *Thumos* even personifies lifeless objects — our impulse is to kick back at the chair on which we stubbed our toe; and in the *Laws* the penal code includes punishments for animals and stones (873e-874a; cf. *Exodus* 21:28–32). This assigning of responsibility gains added impetus from self-esteem, for injury that results from some intention endows us with more significance than injury that results from blind chance. These three fundamental moments persist in varying degrees in the more complex manifestations of *thumos,* in the courage that overcomes danger, in the proud firmness and sense of shame that overcomes base temptation, and in the sense of honor that leads a man to overcome all obstacles in order to be first.

---

[13] See the discussions by Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 110–2, 129, 138; and Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 968), pp. 353–8, 375–8, 436.

[14] Cf. *Republic* 439d–440a, and especially 439e5. The strange example of Leontius should be considered together with the story of Cyrus in Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia* I iv 24, as well as other similar war stories. See also Aristotle *On the Soul* 432a24ff.

[15] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* Ia ques. 8 art. 2, ques. 81 art. 2, Ia IIae ques. 23 art. 2; *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 803–6. For a proper understanding of the teaching about *thumos* in the *Republic*, it is necessary to consider the order of topics which forms the context of the first emergence of *thumos* in the city: (1) the "city of sows," (2) frustrated desires, (3) war and *thumos*, (4) theology (*Republic* 369ff.). William James (pp. 210–11) devotes a paragraph to an unusually vivid and helpful sketch of what Plato would call *thumos*; his failure to link this insight with his general theme, however, is only one of many inadequacies in his discussion of the varieties of religious experience. Since James wrote, there does not seem to have been much progress in overcoming, let alone recognizing, the parochialism of his approach. See, e.g., Donald Capps, "Contemporary Psychology of Religion," *Social Research* 41 (Summer, 1974), 362–83; Geoffrey E. W. Scobie, *Psychology of Religion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), chap. 4.

If we focus on the second aspect, self-esteem, which shows itself most clearly in the sense of honor and love of glory, we see that this passion extends also to possessions, to the things that are one's own. This fact is strikingly manifest in the *thumotic* warrior class of the *Republic* who, like "philosophic dogs," love their fellow citizens and hate foreigners. In his discussion of them Aristotle is led to say that *thumos* is "the power by which we love *(philoumen)*" *(Politics* 1327b38–1328a17), meaning apparently that *thumos* is the source of the love of *one's own.* This manifestation of *thumos* becomes difficult to separate from desire. Provisionally we can say this: pure desire or love *(erōs)* seems to make us forget ourselves in the attraction to the thing loved; the more love is love of something as one's own, the more it seems to involve *thumos.* One sign is the fact that we are more apt to get angry at friends and brothers than at the beloved who has not yet accepted us. The part of our love which demands that those we love should reciprocate comes from *thumos (Politics* 1328a1ff.; *Laws* 717d). And this attachment to one's own calls for the belief that there are gods who watch over our city, our family, our property. In alliance with the gods one might overcome the hostility or indifference of the rest of the cosmos and implant on it one's indelible mark.[16] Such a belief implies that the actions of each individual are of importance to the gods. It leads to the notion that the gods as well as men are thumotic and are concerned with their own things; and that the gods' things include men and things that can be affected by men. It is the basis for the view that the gods call each man to account for what he has done and punish or reward him accordingly.

This self-esteeming part of *thumos* demands that each man be in control of his actions, and thus it goes hand in hand with the third part, the tendency to assign full responsibility. Even more important, the personifying tendency of *thumos* is one great source of man's capacity to imagine that the natural forces that act on him are the acts of responsible beings.[17]

The Athenian points to all these elements when he emphasizes that the atheists are men who turn against all parents, all family everywhere (see also the reference to the threat of incest at 886c and 890b). When he asks Klinias to subdue his *thumos* he is calling on him to subdue this irrational longing that his own people have cosmic significance. This begins his attempt to introduce Klinias and others to the possibility that the gods or highest things are untouched by the injustice of human beings and have disdain for the affairs of men.[18] In so doing, he prepares us for a civil theology which will to a considerable extent loosen the ties between the gods and the love of one's own. Another way of stating the Athenian's demand for the quenching of *thumos* is to say that he asks Klinias to be open to the possibility that the highest good for man, like that of the gods, cannot be taken away by others, or is not dependent on our having it as our private possession.

There is, finally, one other ingredient of *thumos* which leads to piety. The view of the world which *thumos* encourages is always in conflict with painful but obvious facts. It therefore has a tendency to become a tragic view of the world, as Homer's account of Achilles shows; the very regime of the *Laws,* according to the Athenian, is "the most beautiful tragedy" (817b). *Thumos* itself can sustain this view, however, in the form of hope. The passion which responds as anger or courage to immediate and near opposition also responds as hope to opposition seen in the distance.[19] *Thumos* as hope may even include hope for an afterlife or for divine intervention in this life. One of the meanings of the word *athumos* that the Athenian stranger uses is "faint-hearted." The Athenian asks Klinias to enter into the argument without *thumos,* and therefore without a heart full of hopes.

It is difficult to say how much Klinias understands of what the Athenian means here, not to speak of other parts of the *Laws.* It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Klinias as proud legislator for his new city could overcome his thumotic attachments without even knowing of other attachments to replace them.[20] It is even more doubtful whether the citizens who will listen to this prelude will overcome their *thumos*. At the end of this whole discussion, the Athenian makes it clear that his demand has not been satisfied, even by himself. The proof is not adequate, he says, because "it has been spoken rather eagerly somehow, out of a love of quarreling . . . on account of this an eager *thumos* (*prothumia)* has filled us so that we spoke rather vigorously" (907b10–c5; cf. 890el). The whole proof must then be read with a view to the fact that the conditions the Athenian insisted on as essential to a "dialogue" have not been entirely fulfilled. Given the inextinguishable thumotic passions of good citizens, the Athenian cannot dispense with authentic religious passion in his exposition of civil religion. On the contrary, he must generate in himself a level of *thumos* which will in some degree match the temper of the city. This is indicated not only by the tone of the present speech but also by his use of oaths, a characteristic of angry talk (cf. 922d). The Athenian swears more often in Book Ten than in any other part of the *Laws*.[21] The theology of the *Laws* will occupy a middle ground between strict civil theology and a truly philosophic theology.

---

[16] This is perhaps the place to note more precisely the context of the theology: it interrupts the discussion of penal laws intended to protect property (884a, 913aff.). The differences between the theology of the *Republic* and the theology of the *Laws* are due in part to the very different status of property in the two works.

[17] Consider, for example, Achilles' relation to the river in *Iliad* XXI 233ff. (cf. *Republic* 391b and Bloom, 356).

[18] Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1408a16–17) indicates the commonsense source of the two possible postures toward the gods when he discusses the appropriate language to be used to describe evils. The appropriate language for *hubris* is anger, while for impiety (*asebeia*), disgust is fitting. The former implies injury, the latter contempt.

The thumotic attachment to self is an obstacle not only for the old men. Turning to a representative young atheist, the Athenian admonishes him to recall "first of all one great thing" — that his argument is not new. The love of truth alone, not the desire for one's own originality, qualifies a young man for "dialogue." After this the Athenian urges him to await the superior wisdom age will bring; he thus provides a soothing balm to any hurt the old men may have experienced in the admonition expressed to them (see Klinias' reaction at 888d6). Yet the authority of the old is tempered. The youth is not told to submit passively to lawful opinion but rather to "investigate" *(anaskopeō*—888c9). This is only the first sign of the common ground shared by the Athenian and the atheists.

888d7–890a9: The Pre-Socratic Science of "Nature." The most theoretical section of the *Laws* now begins as we learn that the serious atheists derive their conviction from a comprehensive account of all the things that "come into being," an account based on the distinction between nature, chance, and art.[22] The Athenian does not discuss how these terms or this distinction emerged, but according to the order of presentation it seems that the "wise men" began by recognizing a dichotomy between things made by art (human creation) and things not made by art, and drew attention to the priority in time, and therefore in rank, of the things not made by art. Every transformation made by art in a material is limited by the pre-existing characteristics of the particular material and of the artists. Therefore the things not made by art "are" more truly, are "the greatest and noblest things," while the things made by art are "lesser things" (889a4-8). The things not made by art are "by nature." But "nature" must be further analyzed. The things which set the bounds for art are themselves "produced" from more fundamental things. Fire, water, earth, and air are the most fundamental things, the only things which are not said to "come into being" but only to "be" (889b1-2; cf. a7).[23]

Fundamental here means prior in causal power or responsibility. In the initial presentation, which we are inclined to call the most profound, the atheists are not said to call the

---

[19] Thomas brings out with impressive clarity the intimate psychological connection between anger (the "irascible faculty") and hope: *Summa Theologiae* la ques. 82 art. 5, la IIae ques. 23 art. 2, 3, 4, ques. 25 art. 3; *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 806.

[20] Cf. 890el where the Athenian again characterizes Klinias as "most eager-spirited." Certainly Klinias will have to ponder this as well as other parts of Book Ten, using the notes he says he took during the conversation (*Epinomis* 980d).

[21] The oaths in Book Ten are at 89lc, 895d, 905d. The Athenian swears only six other times in the rest of the *Laws* (662c, 683e, 691b, 720c, 721a, 858c). Consider here also the Athenian's momentary sense of near shame (886a7). In contrast to the Athenian, Klinias never swears in Book Ten (he has five oaths in the rest of the *Laws* — 660b, 715d, 814b, 821c, 965e). This is a sign that Klinias is less passionate than usual, or that his *thumos,* while it has not disappeared, is more quenched than at other times.

[22] Note that the passage we are about to investigate represents the only contemporary account of pre-Socratic philosophy which has come down to us in unfragmentary form. For the best discussion of the moral and political import of pre-Socratic philosophy, see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 3. See also Strauss, *The City and Man,* pp. 14–17.

[23] Something close to the four elements to which the atheists ascribe all the beings seem to be treated by the Athenian in the context of farming (water, earth, the sun, and wind — 845d); with regard to an interest in farming there may be more agreement between the Athenian stranger and the pre-Socratics than meets the eye. See 889d6 and Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 195–6.

four elements the "first things"; they use the word "first" only when they speak of the relation of the products of nature to the products of art (889a7). Does this mean that the atheists do not necessarily assign temporal priority to the four elements? Do they perhaps hold, for example, that heavenly bodies of some sort have existed always, forever coming into being and passing away, without there ever having been a time when the four elements existed "pure" and unmixed (cf. Aristotle *On the Soul* 405a28ff.)? If this were so, then "nature" in the most fundamental sense would mean not the four elements, but "the eternal productive and destructive action of the four elements" (or, perhaps more cautiously, "the coming-into-being and passing-away connected with the four elements").

Here the Athenian does not give this or any other definition of nature. Instead, after pointing to this possibility, he veils it by supplying several pages later (891b8–c5) a definition which is so clear that we are tempted to read it back into the original presentation. The visible hesitation with which he presents the definition does not by any means take away the temptation. His words are: "The one who is saying these things comes close to holding that fire, water, earth, and air are the first things, and comes close to naming these things nature" (891c1–3). This definition promotes an impression that the atheists assign strict temporal priority to the elements and can conceive of them as existing unmixed — although the sense of priority intended by the word "first" is ambiguous. Still later, in a final presentation of the atheists' definition of nature, the Athenian steps back a bit toward the definition implicit in his first and fullest presentation of the atheists' views: "nature, they mean to say, is the coming-into-being connected with the first things" (892c2–3). Neither of his stated definitions is downright misleading, but the Athenian seems strangely reluctant to bring out the possible eternity of the generative action or motion of the elements, and strangely eager to equate causal priority with priority in time. The reason will begin to appear shortly.

The four elements which are preeminently nature exist as bodies in motion; they are without soul; this means, to say the least, that they lack all of the properties we see to be specifically human — they are indifferent to "humanity." They move, meet, and sometimes form composites, new bodies. When the atheists speak of the elements existing "by nature *and by chance*" they seem to refer to the way in which the elements, nature, works or moves: the motions of the four elements and hence the composites which result from this motion, are purely random. The randomness, the atheists say, exists "from necessity" (*kata tuchēn ex anangkēs*—889c1). By this they mean that the randomness arises out of the unchangeable properties of the motions of the four elements. Each of the elements will have certain constant properties, such as speed and mass; and the motion of fire cannot suddenly become the motion of water or exhaust itself altogether. But although the motions and composites are thus determined, they are no less random, for none of the particular composites are any more or less necessary than the infinite other composites which may come into being and pass away. Since according to the atheists all things are such composite bodies, no new thing is needed to explain the emergence of life (889c4).

Each kind of composite, although it comes into being by chance and is not external, has its own particular characteristics. With a view to the mode of expression used a little later, we can call these characteristics its particular "nature" (889d5ff.). Nature in the most fundamental sense, i.e., the activity of the elements, is indifferent to the existence or disappearance, prosperity or failure of any sort of composite being. But the particular nature of each composite can provide a standard for the natural good and bad for it. Seen from the perspective of the elements, all situations of composite beings are equally natural and equally by chance. But seen from the perspective of a composite being, some situations are in accord with its natural function and are therefore natural, while other situations are not in accord with its natural function and therefore happen to it by chance.

Man is one of these later, composite beings. But he differs from all other beings in that he is characterized by the power to mold himself and his environment through *art* (889c6–d1)—hence the amazing variety in the ways of man, in contrast to the unvarying ways of other things; hence the ability to make things *seem* different to man than they truly are by nature (889d1–3). The outstanding example is man's creation through art of a way of life in some city which then coercively claims that this way of life is the only way good for human nature. Art's power of deception or self-deception is at the root of the atheists' depreciation of art as opposed to nature. The arts can be divided into arts more and less natural. As unnatural arts the Athenian has the atheists point especially to painting and music (889d3). These arts, they say, change the appearance of things so as to make men believe things are other than they truly are. They can give man needs, fears, and concerns which he does not truly have, which are in no way required for his successful functioning. They achieve this in great part by creating images of men, of things, or even of wholly imaginary beings which can never be yet which we fear or long to imitate. Since the products of these arts do not refer to or imitate anything that exists, they are arbitrary; what they turn out to be is, from the viewpoint of human nature, a matter of chance. There can also be "serious" or natural arts, however, arts which follow and work according to the natural working of things, composite bodies. Medicine, for example, corrects the human body with a view to its true needs and nature (889d6).

But according to the atheists, the art of politics and even more the art of legislation are not natural arts. We discover here that the denial of the gods is only the most immediately shocking part of a much broader attack on the validity of all law and the naturalness of all political life and aspiration. As the Athenian presents it, the dispute about the gods leads directly and necessarily to the dispute about the existence of "natural right" (*ta dikaia phusei*—889e7). In order to understand why and to what extent this is so, why the natural basis for justice stands or falls with a natural basis for civic gods, and vice versa, we need to remind ourselves of the Athenian's earlier analysis of law and "the regime" (*politeia:* 625a6–7, 689e–701b, 712b–715c, 886b11).[24] According to his argument law is not the fundamental political phenomenon. Law is given its order and direction by the decision as to the human type which will constitute the ruling group in the city. This decision sets up and defines the "regime." The way of life of the authoritative group determines the way of life, the specific virtues and excellences, to which the whole city looks up and is dedicated. In every regime the beliefs about the gods or the most revered things, however much they may be adopted from tradition, are transformed to become the crowning expression of the morality that is the regime (890b6–c2): the gods are "such as the laws say they are" (885b4, 890a6,b7, 904a9). As we shall see, the Athenian himself would seem to hold that the opinions about the gods in some cities may be perceptions of the truth about the nature of man and the cosmos; the more just or in accordance with nature the regime, the more truth in its opinions, up to a certain point. What makes the atheists' critique so thoroughgoing and profound is that they deny all truth to every regime's opinion about justice and the proper way of life. As we often hear said today, these opinions are mere "ideologies"; the cities have no idea of the way things really are.

In each city, say the atheists, there is a never-ending dispute about what is just. Each city is continually changing its laws, even its most fundamental laws and its regime. Each of the opinions about justice which it legislates is given with the same authority (889e7–8). This clear sign of the arbitrary character of the laws and the just things points to the truth about them. Each decision about what is just or noble can be traced to essentially chance circumstances which precluded the consideration of other notions of what is just, and the circumstances which made one individual or group the strongest and hence able to impose its interest and opinion.

But such a description of the establishment of law in most cases would not be a sufficient proof of the *impossibility* of nonarbitrary, reasoned legislation based on what is good by nature for all the men in a city. The core of the atheists' rejection of natural justice must depend on an analysis of the natural good for man. The following analysis is barely visible in the Athenian's presentation here. "Justice" is equivalent to "the common good." The notion that there is a true or natural basis for justice depends then on the assertion that what is truly good for man can be common, common to a whole city. The atheists deny that the naturally good for man can be common. This follows from the assertion that man, like all other things, is soulless composite body in motion. Each man is nothing but body; the good for man is the good for his body, and as the Athenian some time earlier has conceded, the body with its pleasures and pains cannot be shared, at least not by any group as large as a city (739c–d).[25] Goods which please the body can be "shared" in the sense that they must finally be divided up and consumed or enjoyed by each; but they cannot be shared together, in the sense that their enjoyment, like that of seeing the sunset, for instance, does not require being divided up and parceled out, and hence does not induce competition.

---

[24] Klinias seems at first puzzled by the connection between the dispute about the gods and the denial of a natural basis for law and politics: see his reaction at 889e2 and the Athenian's response, "O blessed" (i.e., for your ignorance — cf. 831c1 and 886a6).

[25] This shows why the theoretical position of the atheists can with some justice be equated with the view that the good is bodily pleasure: 886a9, 888a3, 908c2.

According to this analysis of the human good we see that in each of the cities most men obey the law because they are deceived into thinking it represents some common good greater than many tempting private goods. In fact, the regime and its laws almost always exist for the sake of some private good — of some class alliance or of some individuals. Those who are privately benefited may or may not be aware of the deceptiveness of the claim of the regime to exist for the sake of the common good.[26]

Having proceeded thus far in the elaboration of his opponents' views, the Athenian creates a slight break in his account by pausing to address his two interlocutors as "my friends" (890a2–3).[27] He thus reminds them of the political projects which is the only known basis of his friendship with them, and calls them to attention, preparing them a bit for the immediate sequel. Prior to the slight interruption they had just heard an account of the nature of things, an account almost entirely hostile to all political life. Now they will hear a political teaching with recommendations or imperatives drawn from the teaching about nature. Those who draw these political conclusions are "men (*andres*) considered wise by young people (*anthrōpoi*—cf. 891c8)." It is not immediately clear whether these men are those who developed the natural philosophy or whether they are men who repeat what others have developed and add a political teaching; but they are said to include poets[28] as well as "prose writers" (890a4). Is the political teaching which follows not a "corruption," or at any rate a problematic derivation from what the thinkers about nature hold? True, the natural philosophers, while denying all natural status to the art of legislation, conceded "some small bit" to the art of politics (889d): politics is by nature good to the extent that a man promotes his security by engaging in political life and taking advantage of the deceived multitude who do not recognize the falseness of the common good. But the "poets and prose writers considered wise by the young" go further. They say there is a kind of justice according to nature. The "most just thing is victory by force"; "the right life according to nature is ruling over the rest and not being a slave to others according to the law" (890a4–5, 8–9. We note that this "art" of the natural rule of the stronger over the weaker imitates or accords with the natural predominance in the cosmos of the stronger bodily motion over the weaker. It is clear that the ultimate aim of such political activity would be the overthrow of the existing regime in order to rule as tyrants in the open (890a7).

In his explanation of their views the Athenian has blurred with remarkable ease several different kinds of atheists and atheistic opinions. He has in this way indicated for us the variety of his opponents even as he compelled us to focus on the politically most relevant or active type. The atheists last described certainly do not believe that the philosophic or even the simply private life is superior to political life; philosophy and the philosophic life are never mentioned in Book Ten. It is even more curious that in describing their opinions the Athenian never mentions "the good" or "good things," although he mentions "noble things" and even "noble things by nature" (889e6). He also never mentions pleasure here (contrast 886a9, 888a3, 908c2). We are compelled to ask whether the atheists see the nobility of rule merely as a means to private (bodily) pleasure and private good or whether they are attracted by the noble splendor of rule and public honor for their own sakes. To the extent to which the latter is true, their good would seem to become dependent on bowing to the notions of "service to the city" and "the common good," notions which they claim are wholly false. This is the general direction that Socrates takes in refuting Callicles and Thrasymachus. But in this discussion the Athenian only hints at such a problem because he is interested more in confronting the sophists' opinion about the gods and the account of nature which underlies and supports them.

890b1–893a9: The Socratic Science of "Soul." The description of the atheists' arguments leaves Klinias a bit stunned. Whereas before he predicted that the argument would be "difficult" (886e2), he now says this argument is the "ruin of young people in their public affairs and in their families" (890b1–2). The Athenian does not try to reassure Klinias; instead, he tells him that he speaks the truth and then asks for the second time whether they should give up. Before he had asked, "What should *we* say, what should *we* do," Now, just after addressing Klinias alone by name for the first time in Book Ten, he aks, "What do you think the legislator should do?" (886e6, 890b3–4); Klinias is handed the responsibility of dealing with the atheists. The use of the word "do" but not "say" characterizes the remark as a whole — the Athenian devotes much more of it to asking whether they should stop talking and institute penalties than to asking whether they should continue to try to persuade the atheists. By this he leads Klinias to urge even more strongly that they continue; having seen the full gravity and complexity of the sophisticated arguments, Klinias realizes that punishment alone cannot ward off so strong an attack; he cannot let the Athenian give up while a hope of refuting the opponents remains. But in contrast to what he said when he first suggested giving up, this time the Athenian no longer holds out the hope that it will be possible to refute the atheists: they "have been prepared from old" (887a5–6, 890b4).

---

[26] It is possible that with a view to war, the citizens as a whole form an alliance of selfish interests set over against the rest of men. This was the interpretation of Sparta and Crete held originally by Klinias (625e–626a). But as the Athenian showed, this understanding does not give adequate support to the city's claim about the common good. Such an alliance only holds as long as it is not to the advantage of groups or individuals to desert; the alliance does not support the city's claim to have the right to sacrifice the goods and lives of citizens. And it quite fails to provide a basis for the sense of sanctity of the city: nothing makes this group, "our" group, intrinsically better than any other group (626–30).

[27] I owe this observation and part of what follows to David Bolotin.

[28] Especially the poet Pindar, who seems to have taught the Athenian that by nature strength gives a right to rule (690b–c, 714b–715a). Cf. England on 890a5.

Klinias's reply shows that the Athenian has successfully moderated without dashing his hopes for refutation, and has drawn his attention to his extreme need for help. Klinias has not, however, lost his alertness; he sees that "nature or something not less than nature" must be the standard, and he understands that the Athenian's argument will turn on the relationship of law and art to mind (*nous*—890d6–7; cf. 886a2–4, 889c5). But the Athenian is not yet satisfied with the still "most eager-spirited Klinias" (890e1). He raises a new difficulty, the problem of giving as refutation complex arguments in a legal prelude that is addressed to the multitude, and reminds him "again," but in stronger terms, of the "enormous" length the argument requires (890e1–3).

Since Klinias had already answered once before the objection about length and considers it the lesser problem, he answers it first with a mildly admonitory question that reminds us all of the spirit in which the whole dialogue began. The discussion of drunkenness with which the Athenian opened the conversation served to loosen the tongues of the old Spartan and Cretan by reminding them of forbidden pleasures and perhaps of youthful transgressions; it made all three "vicariously drunk."[29] The Athenian here has made it necessary for Klinias to recall to them the beginning and hence to reinvigorate the freedom of speech and thought, the youthfulness, that the beginning produced.

Klinias then deals with the new objection, the difficulty of speaking before a multitude. He readily concedes that the multitude of citizens will include many who are not intelligent enough to understand the argument about the gods, but he argues that the prelude, as something written, exists for the slow learner to study over and over. Klinias agrees that the public pronouncement of the most important prelude — the best prelude for all the laws — will be unintelligible to many of the citizens. He thus frees the Athenian from a limitation that has characterized all the other preludes (cf. 718bff., 857bff.). The Athenian has correctly counted on Klinias's gentlemanly contempt for the multitude to make it possible for the city's opinions about the highest things to be above the level of understanding of most. The inegalitarian nature of Klinias's concession is one of the most obvious reasons why such a defense of the gods as the Athenian gives could not be given in a democratic regime.

At this point, just after Klinias has said that the written prelude will be available for the slow learner to study, Plato has Megillus speak a few approving words, his only words in Book Ten (891a8, b7). The *Laws* is not as lacking in wit as many scholars maintain.[30]

Having left behind the multitude and even Megillus, the Athenian feels called upon to invoke more strongly than ever before the "partnership" between him and Klinias. He proceeds to restate the atheists' position with the clear definition of nature that we have discussed, and adds that according to this understanding "soul" is derived later from the four elements (cf. 889b5). He then says, swearing by Zeus, that they have found the source of error of all those who have ever investigated about nature (891c7). The Athenian's refutation of the atheists begins with an assertion supported (at first) with nothing but a passionate oath; he secures a sense of certainty in the hearer before presenting any arguments. But oaths are not needed to support assertions whose justifications are clear and as Klinias's response shows, the meaning of this assertion is not at all clear: above all, we have not been told what is meant by "soul." The Athenian says he cannot explain without using "rather unfamiliar arguments." Klinias fully senses his need for help; he has in addition the Athenian's assurance that the source of the error of the atheists has been discovered; he cannot possibly let the refutation stop now. With understandable reluctance, and addressing the Athenian as "you amazing man," Klinias agrees that the Athenian can go outside the sphere of legislation to use "unfamiliar arguments" (891e1–3) — unfamiliar, we may add, not only to the multitude but to the legislator himself. It turns out that the same criterion which first persuaded Klinias to rank himself above the multitude of citizens now makes him rank himself closer to the multitude than to the Athenian. The distinction between the philosopher and all the nonphilosophers proves to be more important than the distinction between the statesman-founder and his people. Will there be anyone in this city (except perhaps some of the redeemed young) who knows who the gods of the city are?

---

[29] See Strauss, *What Is Political Philosophy?*, pp. 31-2. Cf. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, 6 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956) III, 240–1.

[30] A full understanding of Book Ten would require further consideration of Megillus's role. Throughout the *Laws* his importance is out of all proportion to the number and length of his "laconic" utterances; but in Book Ten he takes on a special importance. This is shown by the mild apology the Athenian makes to him here (891b2–6) as well as by the fact that the Athenian addresses him relatively frequently in Book Ten (he addresses "Megillus and Klinias" at 888d and 899c; Megillus alone here at 891b; and "Klinias and Megillus" at 900c. I believe he addresses the two together about thirteen times in the rest of the *Laws* and Megillus alone about six other times). Megillus rather than Klinias has shown the capacity to keep the Athenian from straying away from human affairs toward the truly divine things (803b–804b); he is closer to the human type which will constitute the ruling majority, the "regime" of the new city. By making the discussion of the gods acceptable if not comprehensible to Megillus, the Athenian assures that the theology is acceptable to the multitude of the citizens.

Adopting "unfamiliar" or philosophic language, the Athenian begins his explanation by saying that the atheists have not properly understood what is "the first cause of the coming-into-being and passing-away of all things" (891e5–6). He does not, however, proceed to say what is the first cause; instead he indicates that his predecessors have failed to understand nature because they have failed to understand the soul, "what it happens to be, what power it has, and above all how it comes into being." "Soul," he says, "comes into being among the first things, prior to all bodies, and is, more than anything else, the cause of changes in bodies and of all reordering of bodies" (892a2–7). He thus leaves us in the dark about what might be the other "first things" which may not come into being, and which may cause the coming-into-being of bodies (and perhaps even of souls).[31] A greater cause of dissatisfaction is the Athenian's continuing failure to define "soul." We suspect that he means something more or less like the human soul (cf. 891e7, 886b1), and when, a few lines later, we hear that opinion, supervision, mind, art, and law are "things akin to soul," our suspicion seems confirmed. But if these five things are only "akin," then none of them *is* soul. Could soul be understood here as principally the passions (*erōs* and *thumos*)?[32] Could a misunderstanding of the passions — more than a misunderstanding of mind *(nous)*, art, or law — be the source of the pre-Socratic misapprehension of nature (cf. 967a–c)? At any rate, if soul is prior to body then the things akin to soul are prior to the things belonging to body. Passing over the obscurity about the first things besides soul and especially about whatever might be the cause of the coming-into-being of soul, the Athenian asserts that the deeds of art and mind must be "the great and fair deeds" and that "it must be most correct almost (*schēdon orthotata*) to say that soul is preeminently by nature."

But what does all this have to do with the gods? The nerve of the Athenian's argument seems to be this: something like what we call "the soul" in man, with its power to use art and mind, is prior in time and hence in dignity and causal power to all the bodily phenomena the atheists called nature. Therefore the city which reveres something resembling the human soul as the oldest and most powerful thing is much closer to the truth than are the atheists. The city is also nearer the truth when it honors arts and laws which promote the good of the soul above arts which serve the good of the body. A great deal turns, then, on whether "someone can show that soul is older than body" (892c6).

But even this achievement would not entirely vindicate the city. In the first place, if the city is truly to revere the soul it must know what the soul is; secondly, if the city's claim to be devoted to and to promote a common good is to be justified on the basis of the soul, the good for the soul must be shown to coincide with the common good. It follows, by the way, that once we establish what soul is and what is good for it, we have a natural standard for judging which arts, laws, and opinions are better and which worse. It must be admitted that at this point the Athenian hardly draws attention to these latter issues. He focuses on the issue of the soul's priority in time. Indeed, he seems to assume that *all* art, law, and opinion, as well as mind and supervision, is equally "akin to soul."

---

[31] Certainly, according to the Athenian, soul is not the only thing that causes changes in bodies: after all, do not bodies cause changes in bodies?

[32] Compare R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 76: "It is significant that the two dialogues in which the moving function of soul is prominent — *Phaedrus* and *Laws* — are the only two in which the passions (emotions) and desires are clearly attributed to discarnate soul."

If we refer to the distinction originated by the atheists, we may say that whereas they made chance the principal part of nature and denigrated art, the Athenian makes art the principal part of nature and is altogether silent about chance. To leave it at this, however, would not do justice to the remarkable degree of agreement between the Athenian and his opponents. For the Athenian, as for the atheists and for the Platonic Socrates, the key question is "what is nature," nature understood as the first or fundamental cause. Contrary to the Platonic Socrates, and in agreement with a certain (exaggerated? — see above) version of the atheistic view, the Athenian holds that the first causes are the first things *in time*: priority in rank is the same as priority in time. To bring out more clearly the implication of the agreement between the Athenian, the atheists, and the city, in opposition to Socrates, we may say that the thesis is "the oldest (*presbutaton*) is the best."[33] Closely related to this is the un-Socratic forgetting of the ageless things which do not come into being or pass away. We are told by the Athenian that soul and the things akin to soul (including mind) all "come into being" (892a4–5, 8), and he accepts the notion that "nature is the coming-into-being connected with the first things" (892c2–3). Book Ten as a whole is silent about the *ideas*.[34]

Before finally beginning his refutation of the atheists, the Athenian raises one last difficulty (892c9–893a7). Klinias has had a taste of the "unfamiliar" arguments, but the Athenian now makes it clear that he can have no active part in the "dialogue" about the gods. He and his Spartan friend can only listen in silence as the nameless Athenian proceeds alone, both speaking on behalf of a nameless atheist and responding to that atheist's questions, until the "whole" argument about the priority of soul is completed. For engaging in this argument is like fording a swift-flowing river — dangerous for old men lacking in strength. The simile of the river softens the Athenian's attack on the old by focusing on the age of their bodies, a proper excuse not to ford such a river. After all, it is not the superiority of old body but of old soul that is essential to the city. But what the old men actually are warned not to wade into is no river but an argument which only the Athenian can put forward (cf. England ad loc.) and which only the Athenian can master, through the strength of his youthful soul: the argument that soul is oldest and therefore best can be defended only by the youngest soul — the Athenian soul open and eager for new and strange things (contrast 888c1ff.).

The Athenian's remark here is the culmination of the drama which has prepared the way for a theoretical defense, based on nature, of the city's gods. The preparation of the legislator has been at the same time a demonstration to us why such a defense is necessary, a demonstration of what the function of civil theology is. We now understand that that purpose goes beyond answering the political and psychological (thumotic) needs of the citizenry. In the case of attentive citizens, the preparatory section begins to make them self-conscious about those needs; in the case of the "young in soul," regardless of the age of their bodies, the preparation and the theology awaken and begin to answer their doubts about the truth of the authoritative political opinions. For some, this beginning will be enough. For others it will not. At the end of Book Ten a new institution, the "nocturnal council," is introduced. This semi-secret body, whose power and complexity grows as the *Laws* draws to an end, will meet every night with those who have been convicted of impiety without beastiality, and will continually study and reconsider (cf. 899c6–7) the arguments in Book Ten and others no less wonderful. The place where the nocturnal council meets in private, and where the impious are sent, is named the *sophronisterion* ("the moderation-tank"—908a4, 909a1). This name is a comic word coined by Plato in answer to a comic word coined by Aristophanes. In the *Clouds,* Socrates and his followers meet in the *phrontisterion* ("the think-tank").[35] Book Ten shows how philosophy can find a home in a city ruled by nonphilosophers. Combining moderation (*sophrosunē*) with thought (*phronēsis*), philosophy uses theological rhetoric to make a home for itself by first exposing the nakedness of the city and then inducing the rulers to request that the philosopher come to cover that nakedness. Through theology, philosophy makes atheism — the denial of natural right, the denial of the city — a living challenge within the city. Philosophy comes to sight as being for the sake of theology which is in turn for the sake of the city; we are eventually led to wonder whether it is not equally the case that the city is for the sake of the theology which is for the sake of philosophy.

---

[33] For the replacement of the term "first things" (*prōta*) by the terms "older things" or "oldest things" (*presbutera* or *presbutata*) see 892b1, c6, 895b5, 896b3, c6–7, and above all *Epinomis* 980d.

[34] To put it another way, the question "What is soul?" is never really asked, and is replaced by the question "How does soul come into being?" The Athenian cannot, however, completely avoid the word *eidos*: 894a8, 895c5. Victor Brochard decisively refuted Lutoslawski's claim that the *ideas* are omitted in Book Ten because they are missing from the *Laws* as a whole (hence indicating a radical change in Plato's thought). But Brochard failed to explain sufficiently why the *ideas*, mentioned or discussed elsewhere (especially 965b, 967d), are never referred to in Book Ten. See Brochard, "Les *Lois* de Platon et la théorie des idées," in *Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne* (Paris; J. Vrin, [1912] 1954), pp. 151–68, and especially pp. 163–4.

But these various functions of the theology do not completely harmonize with one another. The unphilosophic needs of most citizens which the theology must satisfy are, as we have seen, obstacles to philosophy—unmovable obstacles to any fully theoretical discussion of the gods. The public theology can therefore be no more than an attenuated account which satisfies the needs of the city while at the same time it invites and stimulates a train of thought that goes beyond the surface doctrine. In the Athenian's preliminary sketch of the argument about soul we have already begun to see how he creates a doctrine whose lacunae and paradoxes point the attentive listener in the direction of a different account. For the present we can only draw attention to a few of the outstanding features which help show the path from the paradoxical surface of the theology to its unambiguous core.

Refutation of the Atheists

893b1–894a9: A Sketch of Platonic Physics. Plato seems now to have set the stage for a unique and most remarkable conversation. We anticipate hearing a philosopher's dialogue with himself, his self-questioning as he conjures up in thought an intellectual equal who would disagree on *the* fundamental issues. Our hopes are only slightly dampened when we hear the Athenian begin by invoking the aid of "god" as well as of "those whose existence is to be proved"; by now we have come to expect that the proof of the existence of the gods is predestined by the political exigencies of the situation. We are predestined, however, to a more severe disappointment. Whether we can overcome our frustration, whether the aborted dialogue irritates us or whets our desire, is part of the test the Athenian, and Plato, create for us.

In answer to the atheist's first question, do all things stand still, or is the opposite true (all move),[36] or do some move and some remain at rest, the Athenian gives the common-sense answer that some move and some remain at rest.[37] In accordance with the previously noted abstraction from the unchanging *ideas,* the Athenian has the atheist refrain from any attempt at refuting or even inquiring into the thesis that some things do not move or change. The atheist instead turns to a discussion of motion and asks two more questions which seem designed to begin a classification of motion in terms of its spatial character, i.e., as locomotion, change in or of place. At the third question, which distinguishes rotational from linear locomotion, the Athenian, rather than answering, reveals dissatisfaction with the imprecision of the atheist and asks the first of his own questions. Following this point the Athenian creates a certain ambiguity about who is supposed to be speaking which lines, but I am strongly inclined to believe that we should assign all the longer utterances to the Athenian, who has taken over the initiative. Reading thus, we find the atheist answering the Athenian's first question with a simple "yes," and the Athenian then proceeding to dwell on the qualitatively different character of rotational locomotion. There was no hint of such a qualitative difference in the atheist's question. As for the reason why the Athenian finds circular rotation a "source of wonders," it seems to depend on the geometrical relationships which he knows would obtain in the spinning of a perfect circle or sphere and which allow it to move at different speeds in the same place at the same time (893d1–5). At the end of the Athenian's further classification of locomotion, including combination (increase of mass) and dissolution, the atheist expresses full agreement.

This is the last we will ever hear from the atheist, for when the Athenian proceeds to talk about the motion which is "growth" and insists that this cannot be understood as mere increase and decrease resulting from complex locomotion of matter, the atheist is never allowed to reply. We are left even more curious when we are kept from hearing what the atheist would say to the Athenian's question and answer regarding coming-into-being. The Athenian's own account (894a3–5) is based on a striking but obscure geometric analogy that characterizes coming-into-being as the emergence of perceptible or three-dimensional objects from the successive dimensional "growths" of a non-dimensional point or source (*archē*).[38] What the Athenian gives us, it turns out, is not a real refutation of the atheists but rather an unusually abstract, compressed statement which only hints at key points of criticism.

---

[35] *Clouds* 94. See also the quotations from comic poetry in the explicit discussion of philosophy in Book Twelve: 967c5–d1.

[36] The Greek word for motion, *kinēsis,* also means change, and this should be borne in mind throughout.

[37] In this he joins the Platonic and Xenophontic Socrates against the pre-Socratics: see Xenophon *Memorabilia* I i 14 and Plato *Theaetetus* 180d (where Socrates says his is the view of the cobblers).

Considering this exchange in the light of the fuller presentation of the atheists' views a few pages earlier, we draw the following conclusions. Not only does the Athenian differ from the atheists in that he takes account of things which do not change, but furthermore he denies that change can all be understood as the result of locomotion, however complex. One cannot understand the "growth" of a thing (say, a puppy) without seeing the increase and decrease of matter as regulated by the "lasting character" (*hexis diamenousa*: e.g., the "dogness") of the thing; when the character disappears or is replaced, then (as in cancer) increase as well as decrease simply destroys the thing. Growth is the interaction of the changing and the unchanging (893e6–894al; cf. 894a7).[39] Moreover, even in the case of simple locomotion in dead matter, the Athenian (unlike his "materialist" opponents) cannot study "physics" apart from the nonmaterial entities of geometry and number: to understand the rotation of a star, for example, one must consider the geometric properties of a circle never present in any matter (893c7–d5). Finally, the way we follow by our minds alone the timeless geometrical construction or "generation" of the spatial properties of visible objects from unseen first principles (the point, the moving point which is the line, the moving line which is the plane, etc.) is one key to the way the visible beings (dogs, men, stars) "come into being" in matter, from invisible but intelligible principles (894a1–8).

894a9–899b9: The "Ideas" and the Soul. At the end of his mysterious remarks about coming-into-being, the Athenian abruptly turns to Megillus and Klinias, addressing them, "Oh friends" (894b1).[40] In a remarkably brief time the Athenian first has slid into the questioner's role originally assigned to the atheist and then has maneuvered Klinias into his own former role as respondent. The Athenian can introduce into the legal prelude no more than a glimpse of truly philosophic debate — a glimpse that points to "another and longer road" beginning from something other than the primacy of soul understood as self-moved motion. Until the atheist receded from view, the Athenian could not bring himself even to mention soul; although he discussed the cause of coming-into-being, he never referred to the temporal priority or to the self-moving capacity of that cause. To come to grips with the proof of the existence of gods that now unfolds, we need first to lay out the stages of the argument; after that we can try to assess the relative validity of the parts in order to understand what the Athenian's real views are and what are the reasons for his deviations from those views.

At the outset he gets Klinias to agree that all motion, however else it may be classified, can be divided into two kinds: motion which not only moves other motions but also moves itself; and motion which can move other motions but not itself and hence is always moved by another, preceding, motion. Nothing is ever said about the possibility of a thing which could cause other things to move but would itself remain unmoved. That the self-moved motion exists, that it is the most active, the first both in power and time, and the cause of all other motion, is proved on the basis of a premise stemming not from the Athenian but from what "most" of the atheists "dare to say," namely, that "all the things that come into being once somehow stood still together" (895a6–b1). At this point we still wonder what precisely all this has to do with "soul."

In the second stage (cf. 895c1) it is established, with more participation from Klinias, that our only direct experience of self-moved motion is the motion we call "living." Furthermore, whenever we apply the term "soul" to anything, we mean something is "alive."[41] After digressing to give, in the name of Zeus, a lesson about the nature of names and definitions, the Athenian claims that soul must be defined as the motion that moves itself. Hence soul is the oldest cause of all motion, if not the oldest thing simply, and rules by nature over all body. Is soul then god? Is soul "Zeus"?

---

[38] Some light is thrown on this very dark sentence by the commentaries gathered together and summarized in England, ad loc. See also Aristotle's partial elucidation in *On the Soul* 404b18ff. as well as Joseph Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris: Société d'edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1939), p. 61; J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1942), p. 104; Paul Kucharski, *Étude sur la doctrine Pythagoricienne de la tetrade* (Paris: Société d'edition "Les belles lettres," 1952), pp. 71–4.

[39] Cf. *Theaetetus* 181cff., *Parmenides* 138c, and Aristotle *Physics* VII ii.

[40] Could the accounts before and after the Athenian's invocation of his "friends" bear the same relation to one another as the accounts before and after his identical interruption of his presentation of the atheists' views (cf. p. 1068 above)?

The third stage shows that since soul, as the cause of all moving things, must be the cause of the evil, base, and unjust as well as of the good, noble, and just, there must be two souls or two sorts of soul. Somewhat to our surprise we learn now that priority in age, in power, and in rank over body does not necessarily imply goodness. Soul becomes good only when it "takes as its helper mind (*nous*), god in the true sense of the word for the gods."[42] But then which sort of soul predominates in the cosmos — the good, divine sort or the opposite? (Two things are certain; soul by itself is not divine, and the divine is not omnipotent.)

The last stage (or two stages: 897b7, 898c9) establishes the predominance of the divine kind of soul. The heavenly bodies, which manifestly dominate the whole universe, have a motion (orderly, circular revolution) which indicates that they are moved by soul possessing *nous* — for circular motion is an "image" of the motion of *nous* — and can therefore be worshipped as gods. This culmination of the argument is explicitly unscientific: the original theology of the "amazing" Klinias (897c4) is here vindicated through the Athenian's poetic use of "imagination" and "fine craftsmanship in speech" (898b2–3).

What strikes us as most plausible in all this is the assertion that the motion of living beings possesses, to greater and lesser degrees, an indeterminacy and independence that is missing from the motion of dead matter, and that living motion is capable of setting dead matter into motion. This phenomenon of living motion is surely a key part of what we intend by "soul." In addition, it makes sense to say that this independent motion can lead to good or evil, and that in many cases at least the motion is good when it is orderly and reasonable, "helped by mind." But beyond this there are enormous difficulties, some of them revealed by the Athenian's own words, some by the reactions of Klinias.

To begin with, the Athenian himself indicates that the proof that self-moved motion is the oldest and first cause of all motion is based on a "daring" premise of "most" atheists. If they did not hold this premise it is hard to see (*pace* Kant's "First Antinomy of Reason") what difficulties the atheists would encounter in believing that there has been an infinite regress of motion preceded by motion. It is true, an infinite regress of *causes* might seem to beg the question of cause (consider 894e), and this is part of the reason why the atheists lend themselves to being presented as the Athenian presents them here. As we have been (pp. 1065–1066, 1071 above), it transpires that the materialists' lack of concern for the unmovable and their emphasis on the priority in rank of things prior in time can be seen as common ground shared by the city in its reverence for the old — and the Athenian here makes full use of this possibility. But he does not himself endorse the "daring" premise of a beginning point for all motion. After all, it leaves quite unexplained the cause of the coming-into-being of the self-moved motion. Taken together with his abortive dialogue with the atheist, this lack of endorsement silently points to the possibility of another account in which the fundamental cause of the coming-into-being of all or some motion (self-moved or not) would be a thing or things not in motion and to that extent timeless, exerting force not through an original "push" but instead, perhaps, eliciting the motion of things in the form of a purpose. This might imply that some of the most recent motions are closest to the "first" cause. As we shall see presently, something more than the need to support the sanctity of the ancestral, forces the Athenian to ignore such a possibility in building his theology.

But granting the necessity for an original self-moved motion, we see, immediately that even this is not enough to establish any relation between the "oldest" cause and the old humanity or soul revered by the city. For why must the self-moved be nonmaterial? Why, for example, may not some matter be "explosive"? (Perhaps we have no experience of self-moved explosiveness because it exhausted itself in an original eruption.) Or why may not self-movement be a property of the elements when they are pure and unmixed — as they may have been in the beginning? The Athenian himself points to this latter possibility, but Klinias fails to take him up and ask how or when we could ever see self-moved motion in "unmixed" earth or fire or water (895c5). Instead Klinias suggests that the Athenian must mean that whenever we speak of self-moved motion we mean "life," and the Athenian, with a certain lack of enthusiasm, agrees (895c7–9).[43]

---

[41] The Greek word *psychē*, lacking of course all specifically Christian connotations, can more easily be applied to nonhuman life than can our modern word "soul." The Athenian fully exploits the breadth or ambiguity of the Greek word.

[42] Cf. 631d5. The Greek may have been written ". . . *divine* in the true sense of the word . . . ," but on the major textual difficulty I follow the manuscripts and Burnet against all the emendations. For this use of *orthōs*, see *Phaedo* 67b4, 82c2–3, *Apology of Socrates* 40a3; Euripides *Alcestis* 637, *Hippolytus* 1169–70, *Andromache* 377–8, and see John Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), commenting on 67b4. Stallbaum's discussion and proposed emendation are, however, cogent and attractive.

This leads straight into the most overt problem in the Athenian's proof of the gods' existence. After agreeing to identify self-moved motion with life, the two agree further that where there is life there is soul, and from this the Athenian commits the fallacy of arguing that soul must be defined as life. In so doing he ignores the different kinds of life and hence ignores the different kinds of soul, the defining species of soul. The rhetorical device he employs is a misleading analogy to mathematics: the division of all numbers into even and odd, as a proper division of the kinds of number, seems a model for the division of being into living and dead, or self-moved and moved by another. But numbers, unlike the natural species of things, are homogeneous: and evenness, unlike life, is an undifferentiated category.[44] Even Klinias finds it rather difficult to accept this "definition" of soul, but his eagerness to help win the argument prevents him from pressing his doubts.[45]

By abstracting from the *ideas* the Athenian is enabled to abstract from the *ideas* or forms of soul. He "mathematizes" the soul, or in other words he defines soul in terms of what is common to all soul. He adopts a version of the fundamental error of his opponents in order to draw a series of conclusions very different from theirs. Instead of reducing all complex and high manifestations of life to derivatives of lower, simpler life, he reads into all life, all soul, the capacities of the most complex, the human soul. He is therefore allowed to argue that the self-motion which is the source of all the motion in the cosmos must have been endowed with all the higher faculties of soul (896c9–d1).[46] More than that. Since he gives to every manifestation of soul the power possessed by the first cause of all motion, he can imply that all soul is simply dominant over body; he is able to forget the diversity of greater and lesser independence from body that different types of soul display. In particular, he can ignore the range of motions, from nutrition to pure reason, that exists within the human soul. He obscures the fact that much of the time soul is moved by body or in response to body, even in the most rational man. By obscuring this fact, the theology tends to assign to every man complete responsibility for his actions. It is true, soul becomes "good" only when it "takes *nous* as its helper," and the process by which this occurs is never spelled out. But we are left with the impresion that it is up to soul to choose whether or not it does so. Evil is ascribed entirely to soul, not to body, and as we have seen, the Athenian is stubbornly silent about chance. And all this applies to living things in general, not just to man. For all we know, any soul may "take *nous* as its helper" and begin to act divine: the theology "personifies" all life. As the Athenian says in conclusion, according to this theology "all things are full of gods" (899b9).

While the theology thus far does not promise personal immortality, and while it endows this particular city and its traditions with no special significance for the gods, it satisfies most of the major demands of *thumos*. Every man is called upon to assume his responsibilities and play his role in the struggle to overcome the evil sort of soul. There is even a sense in which the definition of soul as self-moved motion is a definition of the soul *as thumos*. If we recur to our earlier discussion of the basic dichotomy in the passions (*erōs* and *thumos*) and consider that dichotomy in the light of the twofold division of all motion, we see that *erōs* falls into the category of a motion moved by something outside itself, while *thumos* has among its properties not only a strong sense of self and of independence but a curious lack of any real object outside or beyond itself. The denigration of the moved motion that is *erōs* goes together with the forgetting of the eternal, unmoved things which are the ultimate objects and causes of erotic motion and generation (cf. 721bff. and *Symposium* 210e–212a).

---

[43] Contrast the other responses of the Athenian to Klinias's contributions, especially 894d5, 898c9.

[44] This is why there are for the Platonic Socrates no *ideas* of individual numbers (or of geometric entities), although there are *ideas* of odd and even. See *Republic* 510c–511a; Aristotle *Metaphysics* 987b14ff.; Jacob Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), pp. 56-7, 69ff. It appears that mathematics can be misleading as well as illuminating for the study of nature; the false mathematical physics goes with the neglect of the *ideas*.

[45] When the Athenian asks the crucial question, "Can we say the definition of soul is anything other than the motion with the power to move itself?" Klinias responds by repeating the question, as if he couldn't quite believe his ears ("Are you saying that . . . ?") — to which the Athenian replies hastily, "I say so, at least (*phēmi ge*), and if this is so, then . . . " (895e10–896a5).

[46] See the very just criticism by Paul Elmer More in *The Religion of Plato* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), p. 115.

In the principal and seemingly most coherent part of his theology the Athenian honors motion at the expense of rest and thumotic motion at the expense of erotic motion. He makes everything akin to political man; he creates a cosmos filled with, moved by, responsible beings engaged in the mighty moral drama of a universal contest between active good and active evil. The "problem of evil" is not solved, here at any rate, by ascribing evil to chance, or to "ignorance," to a "lack" or a "falling-off" (contrast 857ff.); evil is presented as a daemonic force pervading the universe. This is a civil religion rich with themes for epic myth — a vast canvas waiting to be filled with the songs and dances and poetry of a people who love the moral without being moralists. In creating such a vision the Athenian imposes on the phenomena a splendidly simple and homogeneous order: all life, all motion, is divided into that which is rooted in the acts of the good kind of soul and that which is rooted in the acts of the bad kind of soul. However much the different species of beings seem unlike or unrelated to one another, in the most important respect every individual of every species can be understood as intimately allied with others, cooperating on one side or the other of the divine struggle.

Yet at the same time, in the very act of erecting this awesome mythic structure, the Athenian begins, through eloquent silences and fruitful errors, to describe another articulation of the whole. This articulation begins not from the homogeneity of beings and the consequent kinship of all things to the human soul, but rather from the essential heterogeneity of things and hence from the problematic, if not disorderly, character of the relation between the human and the nonhuman (and, within the human, between the soul and its parts and between the soul and the body). Such an interpretation places man much more at the mercy of indifferent or alien forces — forces he may call "chance" and which, in part at least, reflect the tension between the fundamental parts or "tribes" which compose the whole. Moreover, in severing the link between man's moral action and a cosmic struggle the Athenian's implicit cosmology necessarily diminishes the significance of political life: the city ceases to be so clearly the microcosm. On the other hand, the citizen who begins to face this situation as the true human situation may find himself filled with a new sense of incompleteness; a new longing may set his soul in motion, a longing that does not manifest itself in political action but in private action and thought. Such experiences, if and when they are introduced into a soul by the Athenian's paradoxes, are the first rungs on a ladder that leads beyond the "horizon" that makes even this city a kind of cave. The Athenian does not leave us in a position to say a great deal about the goal of the ascent. But this much seems suggested: what the climber seeks is to know clearly the unique and distinct cause or source of each of the various kinds of being (e.g., man, dog, star, etc.). And the Athenian hints that it is an error to expect these roots or fundamental causes to be reducible to one another or to some "first cause": they will rather be seen as a plurality, coexisting always, timelessly, although each is the cause of many things that "happen," that come into being in time.

To perceive this underlying teaching of the Athenian's theology we need not rely solely on implicit hints. Even on its surface, the theology is not simply a monument to *thumos*. In the last and seemingly least philosophic section the Athenian redresses the balance and in fact transforms dramatically the tone and content of the theology. Up until the discussion of the motion of *nous* we had been led to believe in the similarity of human and divine soul, and in their mutual concern for one another. Now we hear that *nous*, "god in the true sense of the word," has a motion of its own, different from all ten of the motions previously under discussion but more comparable to circular motion than to any of the other nine, including soul or self-moved motion (897e4ff.). Nothing is said as to the coming-into-being of the motion of *nous*. Like the circular motion which is its "image," *nous* remains in unchanging but ceaseless activity, "according to the same things, in the same way, around the same things, towards the same things, according to one reason and one order" (898a8–b1). This would seem to imply that as soul approaches the divine motion it becomes more preoccupied with the unchanging truth and pays less attention to temporal affairs.[47]

Having given *thumos* almost its due, the Athenian concludes by making the city revere as its greatest god a being which seems to look down on the petty comings and goings of men.[48]

---

[47] Compare Aristotle's comment in *On the Soul* 407a22–24: "If the circular movement is unending, there must be something which mind is always thinking — what can this be? For all practical thought has an end; it all goes on for the sake of something outside the process of thought."

[48] The Athenian shifts from saying that the gods "care for" the cosmos to saying that they merely "order" it: 897e7, 898c3–4, 898b8. See also Friedrich Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942), pp. 149–50, 162–3.

Even the second-ranked sidereal gods — the relation of whose bodies to the soul or souls which move them is left surprisingly ambiguous — act as if they were unaffected by what men do on earth. Men may feel gratitude for the regular cycle of days and seasons brought by the heavens; but there is not a hint that the gods ever interrupt their beautiful motions to bring fearful punishment to the wicked or special reward to the just.[49] The starry gods dwell in a visible but faraway place. And if circular motion is a reliable sign of the presence of gods, how much of the earth manifests any divine presence? Are there gods of a third rank who dwell on earth — or could it be that earth is that part of the cosmos where the wicked kind of soul without *nous* holds dominion? Little wonder that by the end of this refutation the Athenian feels compelled to go on and devote one and a half times as many pages to a proof of divine providence and justice. Never in that proof does he mention the astral gods; his argument is based on a deduction from the "virtues" of the gods, not their motions. But we must leave to another time any comment on the rich elaboration of the psychology of indignation and belief contained in those pages.

The Athenian's philosophic-poetic conclusion has rendered the theology as a whole profoundly ambiguous. We realize now that his purpose is not only to serve the thumotic needs of the city and the philosophic needs of the philosophers and potential philosophers. By making the city as a whole look up to the visible heavens not out of fear or hope but rather for the sake of the heavens' imagery of divine reason, the philosopher fills all the citizens with uncomprehending gratitude and awe for what is truly highest. He edifies his city; he adorns it by giving it the gift of the capacity to "sing the most beautiful song" (cf. 666d11, 668b4).

We are thus given an intimation of the Athenian's answer to the question always present but never explicitly addressed in the theology, the question of the good for soul — the common good which is the goal of the restless motion that is soul. The Athenian implies that the good at which souls aim insofar as they "take *nous*" is none other than the motion of *nous* (mind) itself, for its own sake. Mind, thought, is something of which any soul can partake without diminishing the share available for all other souls. Yet if this is the true common good, the conclusion is inescapable that the city as a whole does not partake of it except in a very diluted form. To this extent the pre-Socratics are right. The city can, however, honor or look up to the common good. Some kind of looking up, some sense of rank and sense of shame, is of the essence of the city. Piety is at home in the city, and the Athenian has proved that piety, when understood, can be led without violence to dedicate itself to a kind of reason. This is what the pre-Socratics failed to comprehend, and this is part of the reason why the issue is, as the Athenian later insists (966dff.), not the status of reason (*nous*) but the status of soul—soul which is understood not primarily as reason but as what it manifests itself to be, as piety. And this is why the science regarding soul is the same as the science regarding gods.

Longing to find a home for the mind liberated from the myths of the city and its gods, the pre-Socratics turned to the "whole nature." In abandoning themselves to that vast and silent cosmos they missed the fact that the whole is a "cosmos" only because it produces the city, for the city and its gods are in a sense the human soul, and the human soul is or can become the only natural home of the mind. But in order for this to happen the soul must be acted upon, and before that it must be understood. To understand the soul is to understand its gods; psychology and theology are in the end the same. The city and its gods can become the home of the mind to the degree that they can become the home of philosophy. How and to what extent this is possible, how and to what extent the city can "take *nous* as its helper," is shown by the Athenian more in deed than in word (cf. especially 897b1–2 with d5–6, the only reference to "justice" in the proof). The drama more than the argument of the **Laws** is Plato's theology.

---

[49] In order to see what the Athenian's presentation of the heavens omits, compare Critias, fragment 25, in Hermann Diels, ed., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1922): " . . . and then when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence but they did them in secret, at that time it seems to me some clever and wise man invented fear of the gods for mortals in order that there would be terror for the wicked, even if they act or speak or think in secret . . . and he said that the gods dwelt in the place where, in speaking of it, he could most frighten man: the place from whence he knew that fears exist for mortals and rewards for a hard life, in the upper region, where men saw lightning and heard the dreaded thunder . . . and so with terror he surrounded mankind . . . " (my translation). Compare Solmsen, p. 35. The Athenian himself has not long before spoken of the fact that the gods kill men with lightning as a punishment: 873e. Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* IV iii 14 and Victor Goldschmidt, *La Religion de Platon* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949), pp. 123ff.

Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in The Third World*

ROBERT W. JACKMAN
Michigan State University

A mild controversy has emerged in recent years concerning the possible effects of military rule on social change in Third-World countries. Some observers argue that, in the absence of other established social and political organizations, the military is likely to act as a progressive force, inducing economic growth and social change. Other analysts make a contrary argument, that political intervention by the military should essentially be seen as a conservative or even a reactionary activity by the defenders of the status of entrenched elite groups, designed to inhibit economic and social change. Still others have suggested that the social and economic policy consequences of military rule vary according to the type of society being considered.

The purpose of this paper is to assess empirically the validity of these contending hypotheses about the effects of military rule on social change for a sample of Third-World countries. Throughout the paper, the term "social change" is used broadly to include economic growth and social reform. In particular, social change refers to transformations of the type implied in such terms as "modernization," and "social mobilization,"[1] as well as to the transformations that may accompany the expansion of health, welfare, education, and related facilities. Finally, by "Third-World" I refer to non-Western, non-Communist-bloc countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Theoretical Background

Perhaps the dominant theme of scholarly analyses of the 1950s and the early 1960s was that the military constitutes a modernizing force. Such an interpretation is of course consistent with the justifications for political intervention offered by the military themselves. Almost without exception, the leaders of *coups d'état* and new juntas declare that their action is necessary for national reconstruction and economic growth. Typically, they argue that political parties and civilian politicians have become corrupt and have monopolized social and economic resources, while the economy has stagnated and the "nation as a whole has suffered, allowing social antagonisms to emerge. Only a period of reformist military rule (at least "transitional") can correct these developments and thereby facilitate economic growth and modernization.[2]

Many social scientists have agreed with this prognosis. Thus, Marion Levy argues that in modernizing societies, the military is typically the organization that is most efficient at ". . . combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control."[3] His case is predicated on the assumptions (a) that in the early stages of modernization competing organizations and institutions are weak or nonexistent; (b) that the military provides some of the few available channels for social mobility to attract the talent of emerging societies; (c) that the military is a rationally based organization with relatively sophisticated technological requirements; and (d) that "military

---

* I would like to thank Mary R. Jackman, William M. Mason, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Brian D. Silver for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Arlene Sanderson for her assistance. This research was supported in part by an All-University Research Grant at Michigan State University, and in part by the National Science Foundation (SOC75-22661). Some of the data were originally collected by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr. defines modernization as a positive function of ". . . the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power" *(Modernization and the Structure of Societies* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966], p. 35). Karl W. Deutsch defines social mobilization as "something that happens to large numbers of people in areas which undergo modernization, i.e., where advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale" ("Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* 55 [September 1961], 493–514, at p. 493).

[2] On this point, see among others J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 117; and Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention," pp. 1–59 in *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change,* ed. Claude E. Welch (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), at p. 35. This theme is clearly dominant in news reports of military *coups* during the 1960s, as summarized in the sources cited in footnote 36 below.

[3] Levy, *Modernization and Structure,* p. 603.

technology is not radically different from the technology that is in general characteristic of modernization."[4] Levy hypothesizes that when these conditions converge (as is likely in Third-World countries), military governments will constitute a modernizing force.

The same argument has been advanced by others. For example, Lucian Pye suggests that the modernization of military organizations should produce spill-over effects:

> Above all else . . . the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically backward. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial change in their own societies.[5]

Both Manfred Halpern and Guy Pauker reach similar conclusions concerning the Middle East/ North Africa and Southeast Asia respectively, arguing that in these societies the officer corps usually have few ties with traditional "feudal" elites and that in fact many officers joined the military to escape the effects of the economic and social stagnation perpetuated by those traditional elites.[6] For these reasons, these analysts infer that military intervention in politics is likely to be a progressive force inducing modernization.

More recent studies have tended to question this general conclusion. While a similar emphasis is placed on the organizational characteristics of the military, the revisionists focus on different apects of the military's organizational structure. In particular, they make two arguments. First, it is argued that because military governments usually represent a relatively effective and disciplined organization, once they assume power they are primarily concerned with preserving and maintaining order in the wider society. Such goals are likely to become all-encompassing as it becomes clear how difficult they are to achieve. While the military may have enough organizational resources to overthrow an existing government, these resources are generally insufficient when it comes to the day-to-day business of governing and maintaining political stability. Thus, even if social change was proclaimed as the justification for the original intervention in politics, military governments are unlikely to have sufficient political and organizational skills to pursue modernizing policies; besides, they typically find that the organizational skills that they do possess are taxed to their limits by the problems of maintaining both general social order and control over competing political contenders (often from rival factions within the military iteslf).[7]

The second revisionist argument focuses on the corporate self-interest of the military. Here it is suggested that military governments are most likely to display a concern with maintaining or increasing the prerogatives and status of both the military and the middle class (from which the officer corps is drawn), even when such efforts conflict with the interests and aspirations of the wider society. Thus, military governments are likely to increase expenditures in the defense sector of the economy and at the same time to reduce the proportion of government expenditures allocated to civilian, non-defense programs. Similarly, these governments are unlikely to engage in programs that would help mobilize the lower classes, for to do so would be to create additional contenders for power and additional demands on resources, which would constitute a threat to both the middle class and their representatives, the officer corps.[8]

---

[4] Levy, p. 603.

[5] Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," pp. 69–89 in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), at p. 78. The term "politicians in uniform," which I have used in the title of the present paper, comes from this analysis by Pye (p. 69).

[6] Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics,* 11 (April 1959), 325–345, at pp. 339–340; Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," pp. 277–315 in Johnson (ed.), *Role of the Military,* at pp. 291–299; and Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 258. See also Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," pp. 7–67 in Johnson (ed.), *Role of the Military.*

[7] See among others Lyle N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review,* 2 (Fall 1966), 5–36; the essays in Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa;* and Henry Bienen, "The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization," pp. 1–33 in *The Military and Modernization,* ed. Henry Bienen (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), at pp. 17–19.

[8] Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review,* 60 (September 1966), 616-626, at p. 619; Jae Souk Sohn, "Political Dominance and Political Failure: The Role of the Military in the Republic of Korea," pp. 103–121 in *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development,* ed. Henry Bienen (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968); and Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social

In short, the revisionists do not disagree with the argument that the military is often the most effective organization in Third-World countries. The first revisionist perspective, however, suggests that this in itself does not imply that military regimes have the political and organizational skills appropriate to the pursuit of modernizing policies even when such goals are proclaimed by these regimes. The second revisionist perspective goes further to question whether military regimes are even initially concerned with social reform, arguing instead that they are more typically concerned with protecting their own middle-class and corporate interests and with preserving social order than they are with social change. These scholars therefore conclude that military regimes are likely to act as reactionary forces, or at most as conservative forces inhibiting social change.

In an effort to reconcile these revisionist arguments with those of their predecessors, Samuel Huntington has argued that both cases are essentially correct, but that the specific outcome of military rule depends on the type of society being considered:

> As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus, paradoxically but understandably, the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military.[9]

In other words, Huntington suggests that the effects of military rule vary by degree of "backwardness." While he does not specify the meaning of backwardness in detail, his discussion implies that the term refers to the level of social and economic development. Where the initial level of development is low, military rule will have positive effects on rates of social change, since there will be few middle-class interests for the officer corps to protect. On the other hand, at higher levels of development military rule will tend to inhibit further social change, since in such countries middle-class interests are sufficiently well-developed so that the officer corps will protect those interests from encroachments by lower-class and peasant elements.

Huntington's hypothesis is of particular interest because support for the argument that military governments are conservative or reactionary comes disproportionately from students of Latin American politics, while support for the alternative view comes primarily from students of other Third-World countries. Note that when compared to other Third-World countries, Latin American societies are relatively "nonbackward." For one thing, they are much older than the other Third-World countries, in the sense that they generally achieved national independence in the nineteenth century as opposed to the post-Second-World-War period.[10] Similarly, the middle classes are much larger and politically more important in Latin American countries than in other Third-World countries.[11] Thus, Huntington's hypothesis is not as inconsistent with the earlier arguments as it may initially appear because it implies that military governments in Latin America tend to act as conservative forces protecting both their own corporate interests and those of the middle class. In other regions of the Third World, however, where the middle classes are less numerous and significant, his hypothesis implies that military governments are likely to constitute a more progressive social force, since they have few corporate and social interests to protect.

These various arguments have received relatively little systematic empirical comparative analysis. Some recent research on Latin American countries by Philippe Schmitter and Jerry Weaver[12] indicates that military rule has no

---

Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December 1970), 1131–1148, at pp. 1134-1138.

[9] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 221.

[10] For data on this point, see Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 26–28.

[11] On this point, see the data on the "importance of the indigenous middle class" in Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 30–33. Excluding Greece, Japan, Rhodesia, and South Africa from the calculations (which leaves us with 70 countries), the mean value for middle-class size is 70.7 for the 21 Latin American countries while the mean value for the remaining 49 countries is 46.5 (the scale ranges from 5 to 95).

[12] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950–1967," pp. 425–506 in *On Military Intervention*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn (Rotterdam, Netherlands: Rotterdam University Press, 1971); and Jerry L. Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military Rule: Alternative Approaches," pp. 58–116 in *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives*, ed. Philippe C. Schmitter (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973).

discernible social and economic policy consequences. As Schmitter puts it:

> How much Latin American countries invest, industrialize, increase their GNP, raise their cost of living, increase their school enrollment and/or engage in foreign trade seems more the product of environmental or ecological factors than the willful acts of politicians grouped according to their competitiveness or civilian/military status. . . . In summary, no regime type seems to be exclusively responsible for "developmental success" in Latin America.[13]

Studies restricted to Latin America, however, cannot fully address either the Huntington hypothesis or indeed any hypothesis concerning the effects of military rule in nonindustrialized settings, since, as I have already noted, Latin American countries are not sufficiently heterogeneous in their levels of social and economic development. Eric Nordlinger's study, "Soldiers in Mufti," appears to be the only systematic analysis that goes beyond one region to consider a sample of all Third-World countries. His correlational analysis, based on data collected by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris,[14] essentially considers Huntington's hypothesis outlined above, and concludes that, subject to some small revision, Huntington is essentially correct.

> The data . . . thus tend to bear out the hypothesis that the officers act in accordance with their class interests, either failing to act as modernizing agents or opposing economic and social change where the middle class is relatively wealthy and established — where change is presumably seen to involve the redistribution of economic privileges. . . . There is only one revision that ought to be made of Huntington's interpretation. Analysis of the Adelman and Morris data indicates that it is only at the very lowest levels of political participation and only in the context of a minuscule middle class that the officers sponsor modernizing policies.[15]

In the following section of the paper a fresh analysis of the impact of military rule on social change is presented. First, I specify a general model that allows an evaluation of the merits of the competing theoretical arguments reviewed above. Second, this model is applied to the Adelman and Morris data in order to reconsider the conclusions reached by Nordlinger with those data. Finally, the model is tested with a new set of data covering the decade from 1960 to 1970 for 77 independent countries of the Third World.

Analysis

The Model. To determine which (if any) of the competing hypotheses concerning the effects of military rule on social change is valid, we need a model that allows for three different sets of effects. First, the model should specify the direct additive effects of military rule on social change. Second, it should include parameters for the direct additive effects of the level of economic development (or degree of "backwardness") on social change. Third, in view of Huntington's proposition, the model should also permit the effects of military rule on social change to vary according to the level of economic development. As I shall show below, this final consideration involves the specification of a statistical interaction between military rule and level of economic development.

Given these considerations, the most appropriate analytic strategy involves a covariance analysis model, of the following form:

$$(1) \qquad Y = \alpha + \beta X + \sum_{i=2}^{n} \gamma_i Z_i + \sum_{i=2}^{n} \delta_i (XZ_i) + \epsilon,$$

where Y represents the amount of social change, X denotes the degree of political involvement by the military, Z_i represents the effect of the i^{th} level of economic development (there being a total of n such levels), XZ_i designates the effects of military rule within the i^{th} level of economic development, and ϵ is a stochastic disturbance term. In this model, X (the degree of military involvement in politics) is treated as a continuous variable, while the level of economic development is specified as a set of dummy variables (the Z_i) representing n discrete categories.

This specification is perhaps best understood with reference to a concrete example. Figure 1 presents one hypothetical set of estimates for the simple case where two levels of economic development are specified (i.e., where n assumes a maximum value of 2). Here, Z_2 is equal to 1 if the country is in the high level of economic development category, and zero otherwise. Given the inclusion of α and β in equation (1), and to avoid a linear dependency, γ_1 and δ_1 are constrained to a value of zero.[16] Thus, the

---

[13] Schmitter, "Military Intervention and Public Policy," pp. 492–493.

[14] Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development.*

[15] Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti," pp. 1143–1144.

[16] On this point, see Daniel B. Suits, "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 52 (December 1957), 548–551. For general discussions of covariance analysis within the regression framework, see among others



Figure 1. Hypothetical Effects of Military Rule on Social Change, by Level of Socioeconomic Development

hypothetical estimates in Figure 1 would, if true, be consistent with Huntington's hypothesis. At the low level of development, Z_2 equals zero, and so the third and fourth terms in equation (1) are also zero. Thus, for this category, the intercept is α and the slope (β) is positive, in line with Huntington's argument that in "backward" countries, military rule is a progressive force bringing "modernization." At the high level of development (when $Z_2=1$), there is not only an adjustment to the intercept, which for this category becomes ($\alpha+\gamma_2$), but also an adjustment to the slope, which at the high development category is therefore ($\beta+\delta_2$). In Figure 1 this adjusted slope is negative (δ_2 is therefore negative and approximately twice as large in absolute magnitude as β), which represents Huntington's argument that in this case, military rule is a reactionary force inhibiting modernization.

It should be emphasized that Figure 1 is wholly hypothetical and represents only one of many possible sets of estimates for equation (1). Thus, if the data were to be consistent with the proposition that military governments are a modernizing force regardless of societal type, we would expect a positive parameter estimate for β combined with estimates for the δ_i not significantly different from zero. The hypothesis of reactionary military-government effects implies the same pattern except that β is negative. Neither argument provides us with any expectations concerning the γ_i, which represent the additive effects of the level of economic development. The behavior of the estimates for the δ_i, however, is critical to the argument that the effects of military rule on social change vary with the level of economic development. Specifically, if Huntington's argument is correct, we would expect a pattern resembling that outlined in Figure 1, with positive military-government effects at lower levels of development and at least slightly negative military-government effects at higher levels of development. Finally, the null hypothesis (i.e., that there are no military-govern-

---

Jacob Cohen, "Multiple Regression as a General Data-Analytic System," *Psychological Bulletin,* 70 (December 1968), 218–231; Jan Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics* (New York: MacMillan, 1971), 419–423; and J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods,* second ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 176–207.

ment effects) implies zero values for both β and the δ_i. Again, this hypothesis provides us with no expectations concerning the additive effects of the level of economic development, denoted by α and the γ_i.

Soldiers in Mufti: a Reexamination. In this section, the analysis of the covariance model just introduced is applied to data that were collected by Adelman and Morris;[17] these data were analyzed earlier by Nordlinger, who concluded that they are consistent with the proposition put forward by Huntington. The analysis that follows is based on the same variables and set of countries that were examined by Nordlinger.

To gauge the degree of military involvement in politics, Nordlinger used the Adelman and Morris classification of countries by what they call the "political strength of the military." This classification has the following three broad categories: (1) "Countries in which the military was in direct control during some part of the period 1957–62;" (2) "Countries in which the military was an important political influence but was not in direct political control during most of the period 1957–62;" and (3) "Countries in which the military had little or no political influence during the period 1957–62." Within these general categories, Adelman and Morris further subdivided countries according to the political strength of the military. For example, within the first category they distinguish beween countries where the military was in direct political control (a) for the *entire* period, (b) for *most* of the period, (c) for only one or two years in the period from 1957 to 1962.[18]

As indicators of modernization, Nordlinger took the following seven variables (the numbers in parentheses refer to the pages in Adelman and Morris on which these variables are described):[19]

1. *Leadership commitment to economic development, 1957 to 1962* (pp. 78–81). This variable has

> three broad categories on the basis of the following judgments: (1) whether the heads of government and semiofficial national agencies . . . involved in direct or indirect central guidance of the economy typically make concerted efforts to promote the economic growth of the country; (2) whether or not this planning effort includes purposive attempts to alter institutional arrangements that clearly block the achievement of development goals; and (3) whether or not there is a national plan and a planning group functioning within the government which is charged full time with executing the plan.

2. *Rate of growth of gross national product per capita in constant prices for the period 1950/51 to 1963/64* (pp. 87-90).
3. *Gross investment rate, 1957 to 1962* (pp. 93–96), calculated as the average ratio of gross investment to gross national product during this period.
4. *Change in degree of industrialization, 1950 to 1963* (pp. 99–100), defined as a composite of three statistical elements: "(1) the average annual rate of change in constant prices in industrial output (mining, manufacturing, electricity, and water) for the period 1950–63; (2) the change since 1950 in the proportion of gross domestic product originating in industry; and (3) the change since 1950 in the proportion of the total male labor force employed in industry."
5. *Improvement in agricultural productivity, 1950 to 1963* (pp. 107–108), "a composite variable based upon (1) judgments regarding the extent of use of mechanical power, fertilizer, and other modern techniques in agriculture cross-checked by quantitative data (where available and appropriate) on the use of tractors and fertilizer and (2) qualitative and quantitative information regarding the relative weights of traditional and modern agriculture."
6. *Change in the effectiveness of the tax systems, 1950 to 1963* (pp. 116–118), a composite variable consisting of three basic elements: (1) "The change in the ratio of government domestic revenue to GNP;" (2) "the average annual rate of increase in real government domestic revenue;" and (3) "the change in ratio of direct tax to total government domestic revenue."
7. *Rate of improvement in human resources, Circa 1957 to 1961* (pp. 123–126), defined in terms of two sets of school enrollment data: "enrollment at the second level of education as a percentage of the age group fifteen to nineteen and enrollment at the third level of education as a percentage of the appropriate age group."

Taking these seven measures of social and economic change as his dependent variables, Nordlinger examined the extent to which they are affected by the degree of political strength of the military, within categories of economic development. Economic development was defined in two ways. First, Nordlinger took the Adelman-Morris measure of the importance of the indigenous middle class, defined as the percentage of the male labor force " . . . in commerce, banking, insurance, or in technical, professional, managerial, administrative, or clerical employments," circa 1960.[20] This variable is grouped into three levels of development: low (less than 10 per cent middle class), medium (between 10 and 19 per cent middle class), and high (more than 19 per cent middle class). Nordlinger's second index of the level of economic development is the Adelman-Morris measure of the "degree of modernization of outlook," circa 1960, which also has three categories. First, and in the highest level of development, are "countries in which the outlook of the urban educated population was significantly modernized, judging by the standards of less-developed countries, and in which programs of political, social, and economic modernization had gained significant support among both the urban and rural populations." Second are "countries in which the outlook of the urban educated population was significantly modernized but in which programs of political, social, and economic modernization had gained significant support only among the urban population." Third, and at the lowest level of development, are "countries in which the outlook of the educated urban sector was partially but not significantly modernized and in which programs of modernization, if they existed, had gained relatively little support among either the urban or rural population."[21]

---

[17] The Adelman-Morris data were originally collected for and are described in their book, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*. The sample of countries consists of 74 non-Western, non-Communist countries, "which, as of 1950, were underdeveloped with respect to social and economic structure" and which, if not independent by 1962, were at least "recognized national units" (p. 9).

[18] For full details on this variable, see Adelman and Morris, pp. 74–76. The numerical scores for the variable are described on pp. 14–15.

[19] Numerical scores for the following variables are all described in Adelman and Morris, pp. 14–15.

Table 1. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on Seven Indicators of Social Change Within Categories of Middle-Class Size, circa 1957 to 1963 ($N=74$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Medium Middle Class (Z_2)	Large Middle Class (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Leadership commitment to growth	34.456* (8.324)	−.082 (.181)	15.301 (11.445)	32.936* (14.045)	−.121 (.224)	−.253 (.352)	.154
2. GNP per capita growth rate	26.982* (7.446)	.214 (.162)	27.172* (10.238)	46.177* (12.564)	−.126 (.200)	−.431 (.315)	.268
3. Gross investment rate	24.358* (5.797)	−.090 (.126)	29.123* (7.971)	36.797* (9.781)	−.286 (.156)	.065 (.245)	.383
4. Industrial growth rate	10.934 (7.864)	.240 (.171)	34.400* (10.813)	55.381* (13.269)	.069 (.211)	−.227 (.332)	.462
5. Agricultural productivity growth rate	35.866* (6.108)	.000 (.133)	17.652* (8.398)	33.570* (10.305)	.078 (.164)	−.155 (.258)	.292
6. Tax effectiveness growth rate	36.176* (7.322)	−.083 (.160)	14.227 (10.068)	24.310 (12.354)	.161 (.197)	.087 (.309)	.209
7. Change in human resources	18.031* (6.769)	.109 (.147)	32.734* (9.307)	61.365* (11.420)	−.040 (.182)	−.042 (.286)	.517

Data are from Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967) and are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

---

[20] Adelman and Morris, p. 31.

[21] *Ibid*, pp. 50–51.

Table 2. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on Seven Indicators of Social Change Within Categories of Degree of Modernization of Outlook, circa 1957 to 1963 ($N=74$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Medium Moderniz'n (Z_2)	High Moderniz'n (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Leadership commitment to growth	37.269*	−.117	8.191	24.622*	−.107	.018	.202
	(7.660)	(.151)	(12.126)	(11.590)	(.218)	(.249)	
2. GNP per capita growth rate	22.616*	.343*	24.701*	52.562*	−.237	−.493*	.352
	(6.637)	(.131)	(10.506)	(10.042)	(.189)	(.216)	
3. Gross investment rate	22.582*	.105	32.253*	39.491*	−.330*	−.174	.415
	(5.343)	(.105)	(8.459)	(8.085)	(.152)	(.174)	
4. Industrial growth rate	5.784	.630*	34.041*	55.109*	−.515*	−.442	.360
	(8.124)	(.160)	(12.862)	(12.293)	(.232)	(.264)	
5. Agricultural productivity growth rate	31.697*	.277*	16.188	36.336*	−.299	−.382	.236
	(6.008)	(.118)	(9.511)	(9.091)	(.171)	(.196)	
6. Tax effectiveness growth rate	29.784*	.275	23.821*	25.244*	−.461*	−.179	.153
	(7.177)	(.142)	(11.362)	(10.860)	(.205)	(.234)	
7. Change in human resources	11.121	.415*	30.524*	70.758*	−.393*	−.573*	.541
	(6.250)	(.123)	(9.894)	(9.456)	(.178)	(.203)	

Data are from Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development,* and are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

Nordlinger's analytic strategy was then to calculate zero-order correlation coefficients between the political strength of the military and each of the seven indicators of modernization, within the three categories of middle-class size and degree of modernization of outlook, respectively. This strategy generates a total of 42 correlation coefficients. In contrast, I shall fit the model specified in the last section to the same data, which gives fourteen sets of parameters to estimate. That is, there are seven different dependent variables (or seven alternative indicators for Y), and two three-category measures of the level of economic development (or two alternative versions of Z, each with $n=3$ categories). Finally, X is measured by the Adelman-Morris indicator of the political strength of the military.

The least-squares estimates for equation (1) with the Adelman-Morris data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports the estimates for the regressions of the seven social-change indicators on the political strength of the military within the three categories of the importance (size) of the indigenous middle class, while Table 2 reports the same regressions within the three categories of degree of modernization of outlook.

From Table 1 it is clear that these estimates provide no support for *any* of the three main arguments outlined earlier in this paper, and they completely contradict the inferences that Nordlinger drew from the same data. First, none of the seven estimates for the political strength of the military (X) is significantly different from zero,[22] which means that we can reject the arguments that military governments are *either* reactionary *or* progressive forces, regardless of the society's level of economic development (as measured by middle-class size). Recall that were either of these straightforward hypotheses correct, we would have expected statistically significant parameter estimates (either all positive or all negative) for the political strength of the military (β in equation [1]), combined with nonsignificant estimates for the two interaction terms (the δ_i in equation [1]). The pattern of the estimates in Table 1 clearly does not conform to these expectations. In addition, none of the estimates for the interaction terms is statistically significant, which indicates that the effects of military rule are not contingent on middle-class size.[23] Instead, the data show that social change generally varies according to the level of economic development, regardless of the political strength of the military. For example, rates of change in human resources (the seventh dependent variable) increase with size of middle class, from an average of 18.031 in the lowest category, through 50.765 in the middle category, to 79.396 in the highest middle-class size category.[24]

---

[22] A parameter estimate is considered statistically "significant" in this analysis if it is at least twice the size of its standard error of estimate: this criterion is the same as examining the t-ratios associated with each coefficient and rejecting those not statistically significant at approximately the .05 level. Strictly speaking, this test is not fully appropriate given that the sample of nations under consideration was not chosen randomly: however, it does provide a useful *a priori* criterion in view of the fact that I am not treating equation (1) as a fixed-effects model.

Essentially the same conclusions are implied by the estimates in Table 2. In five of the seven regressions, no consistent support is found for *any* of the three arguments discussed earlier. Rates of social change appear simply to depend on the level of development, as defined by degree of modernization of outlook, in these five regressions. In two instances, however (involving the second and seventh dependent variables: GNP per capita growth rate and changes in human resources, respectively), the data are partly consistent with Huntington's hypothesis and Nordlinger's conclusion. In these two cases, the parameter estimates for military rule are positive and statistically significant for countries in the low-development category, and the adjustments to those estimates (i.e., the δ_i) are negative and statistically significant for the countries in the highest development categories. Thus, for GNP per capita growth rates, the slope at the low level of degree of modernization is .343, while at the high level it is —.150 (i.e., .343 — .493). Similarly, for rates of change in human resources, the slope at the low level is .415, while at the high level it is —.158 (i.e., .415 — .573).

This, however, provides only partial support for Huntington's proposition, since the fact that the adjustments to the slopes are statistically significant does not imply that the adjusted slopes themselves are significantly different from zero. In fact, the above two adjusted slopes in the high-development category (i.e., —.150 and —.158) are *not* significantly different from zero.[25] Consequently, these estimates indicate that the effects of military rule on these two measures of social change do vary systematically across categories of level of modernization, but only in the sense that the effects are positive at the lowest level, while they are zero in the other two categories. This is indeed modest support for Huntington's argument, which implies negative, nonzero effects at higher levels of development. It also contradicts Nordlinger's analysis, which actually reports such negative effects for these two dependent variables.

Before discussing these results further, we should pursue a variation of this model suggested by Nordlinger that deals with possible regional (instead of level-of-development) effects. As noted earlier, there is substantial variation between geographic regions in mean levels of economic development: African countries are generally the least developed and Latin American countries are generally the most developed, while Asian and Middle East coun-

---

[23] Note that no parameters are estimated for Z_1 or XZ_1 (i.e., γ_1 and δ_1). This is consistent with the specification in equation (1) where γ_1 and δ_1 were constrained to a value of zero in order to avoid a linear dependency.

[24] These calculations are made by summing ($\alpha + \gamma_2$) and ($\alpha + \gamma_3$), respectively, since the γ_i are adjustments to the constant. Thus, the mean change in human resources for the lowest category of middle-class size is estimated by the constant (18.031); that for the intermediate category is (18.031 + 32.734); while the mean for the highest category is (18.031 + 61.365). For a discussion of dummy-variable regression analysis in terms of estimating conditional expectations, see Arthur S. Goldberger, *Topics in Regression Analysis* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 3–38.

[25] The statistical test for the adjusted slopes (rather than the adjustments themselves) is described in Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, at p. 179. Using the notation of equation (1) above, and focusing on the adjustment to β from δ_3, we first sum the estimates for the two coefficients ($\hat{\beta}+\hat{\delta}_3$), and divide this sum by the estimated standard error

$$\sqrt{\text{var } \hat{\beta} + \text{var } \hat{\delta}_3 + 2 \text{ cov}(\hat{\beta},\hat{\delta}_3)}$$

where the three terms in the standard error are obtained from the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients. The standard error of the adjusted slope for GNP per capita growth rates in the high modernization category is .172, which is larger than the adjusted coefficient (–.150). Similarly, the standard error of the adjusted slope for rates of change in human resources in the high modernization category is .162, which is again larger than the adjusted coefficient (–.158).

tries tend to fall in between. Thus, if we treat geographic region as a proxy measure of the level of economic development, a regional-effects model offers an alternative procedure for examining further the arguments discussed above. If, for example, Huntington's argument is correct, we would expect the effects of military rule on social change in Africa to be positive, while we would expect those for Latin America to be negative. Additionally, we would anticipate no pronounced effects of military rule on social change in either Asia or the Middle East.

In examining possible regional effects, I have grouped the 74 countries into the same four regions defined by Nordlinger: the Middle East (including North Africa), Latin America, Asia, and Africa. But instead of calculating correlations between the political strength of the military and the seven indicators of social change within geographic regions, I have simply modified the model in equation (1) by redefining the Z_i (the level-of-development effects) to refer to regional effects.[26]

The regression estimates for the effects of the political strength of the military on the seven Adelman-Morris indicators of social change within these regions are reported in Table 3. As might be expected, in light of the estimates in the first two tables, they provide no support for the arguments that the military is either a modernizing or a reactionary force, regardless of geographic region. That is, none of the estimates of the effects of military political strength (X) is significantly different from zero. Of more interest is the fact that (with one possible exception) these results provide no support for a regional-effects model. For six of the seven dependent variables, none of the parameter estimates for the interaction terms is significant, which, combined with similar results for

Table 3. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on Seven Indicators of Social Change, Within Regions, circa 1957 to 1963 ($N=74$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Leadership commitment to growth	46.653* (12.871)	−.155 (.225)	8.848 (16.286)	4.376 (19.758)	−5.900 (15.513)	.226 (.283)	−.019 (.338)	.232 (.348)	.087
2. GNP per capita growth rate	76.193* (11.645)	−.239 (.203)	−21.511 (14.734)	−26.293 (17.875)	−48.831* (14.035)	.236 (.256)	.237 (.305)	.693* (.315)	.191
3. Gross investment rate	56.819* (9.477)	−.196 (.165)	7.144 (11.991)	−7.698 (14.547)	−28.568* (11.422)	−.062 (.208)	−.031 (.249)	.237 (.257)	.255
4. Industrial growth rate	56.115* (13.415)	−.027 (.234)	−4.422 (16.973)	4.261 (20.592)	−47.964* (16.168)	.050 (.295)	−.084 (.352)	.510 (.363)	.293
5. Agricultural productivity growth rate	52.381* (10.041)	−.023 (.175)	1.027 (12.704)	18.720 (15.412)	−19.082 (12.101)	−.027 (.221)	−.281 (.263)	.524 (.272)	.136
6. Tax effectiveness growth rate	67.569* (11.150)	−.084 (.195)	−20.294 (14.108)	−11.265 (17.116)	−33.278* (13.439)	−.001 (.245)	.007 (.292)	.148 (.302)	.172
7. Change in human resources	63.228* (10.749)	−.094 (.187)	9.884 (13.600)	8.957 (16.499)	−51.121* (12.954)	−.166 (.236)	−.263 (.282)	.367 (.291)	.450

Data are from Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*, and are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

---

[26] Thus, for the regional-effects models, Z has four categories. The Middle East (Z_1) is taken as the "excluded" category.

X, means that military rule has no discernible impact on social change in any of the four geographic regions. Instead, the estimates for Z_4 simply indicate that, in general, African countries have slower rates of social change than other countries.

Only the estimates for GNP per capita growth rates suggest that the effects of military rule vary by region, and they thereby provide modest support for the Huntington argument. Here, the effects of military rule for African countries are positive,[27] while military rule has no impact on GNP per capita growth rates, one way or the other, in the other regions. Yet this is weak support for the regional-effects hypothesis, given that Huntington's argument implies negative military-government effects for the other regions and that Nordlinger actually reports such negative effects.

In short, Tables 1 through 3 provide little support for the Huntington hypothesis. Of a total of 21 sets of regression estimates, only three are even partly consistent with his argument, while the remaining 18 contradict it. To check on the robustness of the three sets of estimates that are partly congruent with the original argument, these estimates were recalculated using alternative measures of the dependent variables. The Adelman-Morris measure of GNP per capita growth rates was replaced with average annual rates of change in energy consumption per capita, 1960 to 1965, as reported in the recent *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.*[28] Similarly, the Adelman-Morris measure of rates of change in human resources (which, it will be recalled, is based on school enrollments) was replaced with average annual percentage rates of change in adjusted school enrollment ratios, 1960 to 1965, as reported in the same source.[29] All of

---

[27] Again, the slope here is given by summing β and δ_4, which, since the estimate for β is not significantly different from zero, gives $(0 + .693) = .693$.

[28] Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook,* pp. 326-328. Data on GNP growth rates have too many cases with missing data for our purposes.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 225-228, for the 1965 country values. The 1960 series is available from the *World Handbook* data released by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICPR) at the University of Michigan. Average annual rates of change were calculated as follows:

$$\text{change} = [\ln(X_1/X_2)]\ [100/K],$$

where X_1 is the 1965 score; X_2 is the 1960 score; and K is the number of years between the two scores (in this case, 5). For details on the calculation of average annual rates of change, see George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Research* (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 28-33.

Table 4. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on (a) Two Indicators of Social Change Within Categories of Degree of Modernization, and (b) One Indicator of Social Change Within Regions, circa 1957 to 1965 ($N=72$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Medium Modernization (Z_2)	High Modernization (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Energy consumption per capita growth 1960–65	6.282* (1.573)	.001 (.031)	−1.029 (2.520)	1.000 (2.338)	−.023 (.044)	−.059 (.050)	.067
2. School enrollment growth 1960–65	8.073* (1.316)	−.057* (.026)	−4.432* (2.151)	−6.415* (1.993)	.043 (.038)	.034 (.043)	.239

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Energy consumption per capita growth 1960–65	5.888* (2.406)	−.015 (.420)	.277 (3.104)	−.050 (3.694)	1.360 (2.927)	−.019 (.534)	.026 (.063)	−.465 (.655)	.057

Independent variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. The dependent variables are described in Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* second edition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), and in the text of this paper. Missing data on the dependent variables reduces the N from 74 to 72.

the independent variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3 above.

Table 4 presents the results of these recalculations. The revised parameter estimates are again inconsistent with the Huntington hypothesis. First, none of the parameter estimates for the interaction terms is significantly different from zero. Second, only one of the three parameter estimates for the political strength of the military (i.e., that for school enrollment growth) is more than twice the size of its standard error. This, of course, is inconsistent with Nordlinger's conclusion; besides, the simple bivariate regression of school enrollment growth on the political strength of the military produces a parameter estimate that is less than twice the size of its standard error (along with an R^2 of .033). Thus, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the 18 sets of parameter estimates in Tables 1 through 3, which show that military governments have little systematic impact on social change, regardless of societal type. In short, Table 4 indicates that the three apparent exceptions in the earlier tables to this general statement are not particularly robust, in the sense that they cannot withstand even a modest attempt at replication.

That this reanalysis of the Adelman-Morris data contradicts the earlier analysis by Nordlinger deserves comment. Essentially, the difference is due to Nordlinger's reliance on correlation coefficients calculated separately within level-of-development and regional categories, as opposed to my reliance on the metric (or unstandardized) regression coefficients, using an analysis of covariance model that explicitly specifies and allows for level-of-development and regional effects. The covariance model in equation (1) is superior to Nordlinger's procedure because it allows for statistical tests of difference (the t-ratios) across categories of the within-category slopes (i.e., the regression coefficients). This means we have been able to subject the proposition that the effects of military rule on social change vary by either region or level of development to tests of statistical significance.[30]

In addition, correlation coefficients are not particularly useful in this context, since, as standardized statistics, they are sensitive not only to changes in the "true" underlying relationship, but also to the ratio of the variances of each pair of variables being considered. This sensitivity becomes potentially troublesome for analyses like Nordlinger's, which compares the size of bivariate correlation coefficients between the same pairs of variables across discrete groups of countries. That is, Nordlinger stratified the 74 countries into three separate categories (on the basis of level of development) and then compared within-stratum correlation coefficients across strata. The problem here is that the ratio of the within-stratum standard deviations of the variables involved also varies across these strata, which directly affects the within-stratum correlation coefficients. Thus, Nordlinger's correlations are themselves subject to artificial fluctuations, in the sense that, in addition to possible cross-strata variations in the true underlying relationships, they also reflect cross-strata variations in the ratios of the within-stratum variances (or standard deviations).[31] In contrast, comparisons across strata

---

[30] In addition, by retaining all of the observations in the analytic design, the number of degrees of freedom retained for these tests is maximized, as it would not have been had separate regressions been estimated within each level-of-development or regional category. On this point, see Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics,* at p. 421.

[31] For general discussion on this point, see among others John W. Tukey, "Causation, Regression, and Path Analysis," chapter 3 in *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology,* ed. Oscar Kempthorne et al. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1954); and H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (March 1967), 130–136.

To illustrate the differences involved here, consider the following table, which reports the within-region relationships between the Adelman-Morris measure of "changes in human resources" (i.e., school enrollment ratios, designated here as y) and their measure of the political strength of the military (designated here as x):

Region	r_{xy}	=	s_x/s_y	×	b_{yx}
Latin America	–.435		1.676		–.260
Asia	–.342		.961		–.356
Africa	.336		1.229		.274
Middle East	–.115		1.229		–.094

Note that the ratio of the within-stratum standard deviations does in fact vary substantially across strata (from .961 to 1.676), and that this in turn substantially affects the relative magnitudes of the coefficients. Where the correlation coefficients suggest that the strongest (negative) effect of military rule on changes in enrollment ratios occurs in Latin America, the regression coefficients show the strongest effect occurring in Asia.

Incidentally, while I have been able to reproduce the Adelman-Morris zero-order correlations (reported in *Society, Politics, and Economic Development* at pp. 281–283), I have had more difficulty reproducing the within-stratum correlations reported by Nordlinger in his Tables 2, 3, and 4. My estimates are close to his in the cases of the third and fourth tables, and the mean differences between the (absolute) magnitudes of his correlations and mine are .010 and .011 for his tables 3 and 4 respectively. However, the mean difference between the absolute size of the correlations in his Table 2 and mine for this table is .079.

of the metric regression coefficients generated with a covariance analysis model are not subject to distortion from variation in within-stratum variances, and they therefore offer a more meaningful basis for the comparison of the nature of the true effects.

These considerations, along with the empirical results of this section, indicate that the Adelman-Morris data provide little support for the conclusions that Nordlinger has drawn from them. Unfortunately, these data themselves have serious limitations, which means that they cannot be used to generate an overwhelming challenge to Huntington's original hypothesis. First, while the independent variables (and in particular the political strength of the military) cover the period from 1957 to 1962, many of the dependent variables cover the period from about 1950 to 1963. The temporal problem with these data clearly impedes our ability to consider the effects of military involvement in politics on social change.[32]

Second, the 74 observations in the Adelman-Morris data file include three countries not normally considered part of the Third World (Greece, Japan, and South Africa), as well as 22 others that had not achieved political independence by January 1, 1960 (in spite of the fact that most of the variables cover the period 1957 to 1962, and some of them span the 1950 to 1962 period). While national sovereignty may not have been important to the analytic purposes for which Adelman and Morris originally collected these data, it clearly is critical to the hypotheses at hand. In particular, it is difficult to visualize indigenous military governments within the colonial setting.[33] To be sure, a reanalysis of these data with non-Third-World and nonindependent countries excluded (which reduces the *N* to 49) does not alter the conclusions of this section (the estimates are not reported here). On the other hand, these exclusions leave only five African countries in the sample, which makes regional comparisons impossible. The exclusions also remove a large proportion of the poorest Third-World countries from consideration, even though these countries are important to an evaluation of Huntington's hypothesis.

Finally, there is reason to believe that the Adelman-Morris measure of the political strength of the military is not particularly suited to our present purposes. In particular, intermediate values on this variable were assigned to countries " . . . in which the military was an important political influence *but was not in direct political control.*"[34] Most of the studies discussed in the first part of this paper, however, considered the effects of *direct* military intervention and political control on social change. Direct control is also critical to the claims typically made by the military themselves after *coups d'état*: such action is usually justified on the grounds that it is necessary to remove the existing ineffective or corrupt political leaders before social change can occur, and that only a period of military rule (at least temporary) can "clean up" politics in this manner and then initiate social change. Of course, the armed forces have to constitute "an important political influence" before they can mount successful *coups*, but such influence is not synonymous with direct political control. Given the hypotheses under consideration, a preferable measure would identify the duration of military governments that initially achieved direct political control through extra-constitutional means.

In short, these considerations imply that while Nordlinger's inferences are incorrect, the arguments put forward by Huntington have yet to be systematically evaluated. The next section of this paper attempts such an evaluation with more recent data that do not suffer from the limitations just discussed.

Military Governments and Social Change, 1960 to 1970. We now apply the model in equation (1) to data covering the ten-year period from 1960 to 1970 for the 77 independent Third-World countries listed in the Appendix.[35]

The measure of political intervention by the military emphasizes the duration of their direct control of the machinery of government. To be included in the index, such control had initially to take the form of an irregular, extra-constitutional power transfer — that is, a military *coup d'état*. This criterion is obviously important if we are to distinguish regimes such as the one headed by General Ne Win of Burma from that headed by General Dwight Eisenhower of the United States. Duration of military rule was then coded (in months) for the period from December 31, 1960 to December 31, 1970, so that the maximum possible score is 120. In addition, military regimes were counted as starting on December 31, 1960 if a *coup* occurred before that date but the chief executive installed at the earlier time remained in power into 1961, as did General Ayub Kahn of Pakistan. Finally, if elections occurred ("rigged" or otherwise) but were won by the incumbent from the officer corps who had originally gained power through a *coup d'état,* such elections were not counted as interruptions to the period of military rule. This procedure is required because for one thing, it is in general quite difficult to judge the extent to which elections are "rigged," and for another, military regimes that initially seize power through extra-constitutional means may often enjoy considerable popular support. Cases in point where elections took place within military regimes include the regimes of General Barrientos in Bolivia and of General Pak Chung Hi in South Korea.[36].

---

[32] Nordlinger also notes this problem in his preliminary discussion ("Soldiers in Mulfti," p. 138).

[33] This is also a problem with a more recent analysis that has come to my attention as this paper is going to press. See R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study," *Comparative Politics*, 8 (October 1975), pp. 1–30.

[34] Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*, p. 75. Italics added.

[35] To be included in the analysis, countries had to be independent before December 31, 1962.

To gauge the extent of social change over the same period, I have relied on four distinct measures. The first of these is the average annual percentage change in energy consumption per capita, 1960 to 1970, expressed in kilograms per capita of coal-equivalent energy.[37] As an indicator of economic growth, this reflects the same kind of change that is captured by four of the measures of economic growth employed by Nordlinger.[38] In particular, it reflects changes in the degree of industrial growth and in the degree of productivity of the economy as a whole. Besides, it is consistent both with Levy's discussion of modernization mentioned at the outset of this paper and with Deutsch's concept of social mobilization.

As a second indicator of social change, I have taken average annual percentage changes in school enrollment ratios, 1960 to 1970. These data are available from UNESCO, which defines the "enrollment ratio" as " . . . the total enrollment of all ages divided by the population of the specific age groups which correspond to the age groups of primary and secondary schooling. The result is expressed as a percentage. These ratios have been calculated taking into account the differing national systems of education and the duration of schooling at the first and second levels."[39] This variable measures the same aspect of social change as is measured by the rate of improvement in human resources, which was the last of Nordlinger's seven indicators of social change.

The third measure registers changes in health care. Specifically, it consists of the average annual percentage change in the number of physicians per 1,000 population, from 1960 to 1970.[40] While this variable taps a dimension of social change that differs from the other two variables just introduced, it does reflect an im-

---

[36] The primary data source for this variable is *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London: Keesings, Ltd.), which is published weekly. This source was also cross-checked against others, including the country profiles in Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, John N. Paden, and Hugh M. Stevenson, *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1972), the data in Kenneth Ruddle and Philip Gillette, *Latin American Political Statistics* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, UCLA, 1972), the data on coups in William R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01-047, Sage Publications, 1973), at pp. 68–70, along with the papers in the following books: *The Politics of the Coup D'État: Five Case Studies,* ed. William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969); Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes;* and Janowitz and Van Doorn (eds.), *On Military Intervention.* The cross-checking indicates that the primary source is quite accurate: in no cases were the data in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* contradicted by the other sources.

[37] The 1970 data are from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1971* (New York: Statistical Office of the U.N., 1972), pp. 336–339 and United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1974* (New York: Statistical Office of the U.N., 1975), pp. 359–362. The 1960 data are described in Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook,* and reported in the series released by the ICPR at the University of Michigan. This second source was also cross-checked against the data in the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook* of 1961, pp. 278–280. Average annual rates of change were calculated as described in footnote 29, where X_1 is the 1970 score; X_2 is the 1960 score; and K is the number of years between the two scores (in this case, 10).

[38] Recall that these measures of social change were: GNP per capita growth rates; gross investment rates; industrial growth; and improvements in agricultural productivity.

[39] UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1971* (Paris: UNESCO, 1972), p. 99. Data for both 1960 and 1970 are from the 1971 *Statistical Yearbook,* pp. 101–119, and from the UNESCO *Statistical Yearbook* of 1972, pp. 93–114. Average annual rates of change were again calculated as described in footnote 29 above: in a few cases 1968 or 1969 data were substituted for (unavailable) 1970 scores, and in these cases K assumed a value of 8 or 9, instead of 10. Data for Taiwan are missing.

[40] Data for the total number of physicians (1960) are from the ICPR version of the *World Handbook* and from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* of 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965. Discrepancies between these two sources were resolved in favor of the second one. Population data for 1960 are also taken from the ICPR version of the *World Handbook.* The 1960 physicians per 1,000 population ratios were generated from these variables. The 1970 physicians per 1,000 population ratios are derived from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* of 1971, 1972, and 1973 at pp. 711–714; 747–750; and 719–722 respectively. Average annual rates of change were calculated as described in footnotes 29 and 39 above.

Table 5. Intercorrelations Among the Four Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970[a]

	1	2	3	4
1. Energy consumption growth	1.000	.415	.119	.116
2. School enrollment growth	76	1.000	.141	.267
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	77	76	1.000	.118
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth	75	75	75	1.000

[a] The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Entries in the upper diagonal are pair-wise product-moment correlation coefficients; entries in the lower diagonal indicate the number of cases on which these coefficients are based. Data for variable 2 are missing for Taiwan, and data for variable 4 are missing for Taiwan and Yemen.

portant aspect of physical well-being that has subsequent effects on other aspects of well-being, such as infant mortality and life expectancy rates (for which, unfortunately, data on a sufficiently wide scale are as yet unavailable). In addition, for reasons discussed elsewhere, this variable reflects changes in part of the *distribution* of health benefits (an important material good), in the sense that higher ratios imply greater health benefits for the less wealthy.[41] At the same time, changes in physician-to-population ratios do share with changes in both energy consumption rates and school enrollment ratios a characteristic that is important to the hypotheses of this analysis, because all three of these variables are potentially available for fairly rapid manipulation by policy makers. In contrast, for example, even successful programs designed to decrease infant mortality rates may take a much longer time before their effects are readily discernible.

The final measure reflects changes in access to the mass media, in this case, radios.[42] The growth of the mass media generally reflects growth in the proportion of the population that is mobilized, with obvious implications for social and political change.[43] My focus on changes in the ratio of radio receivers to population is relevant for two reasons. First, this is a variable that is potentially capable of considerable growth at a rapid rate, even in non-industrialized societies. Second, radios can be an effective form of mass communication in the absence of a literate population.

I should emphasize that these four variables are not intended to serve as a unidimensional index of "social change." Indeed, as Table 5 shows, the empirical interrelationships among these variables are quite modest. Changes in per capita energy consumption rates are modestly associated with changes in school enrollment ratios, while each of these variables in turn is very weakly related to changes in both physician- and radio-to-population ratios. There are, however, no compelling theoretical reasons for assuming that social change is unidimensional. In fact, rapid economic growth may be incompatible (in the short run, at least) with some of these other facets of social change, for the reasons outlined by Mancur Olson, and others.[44] Thus, the four variables I have just introduced allow us to examine the effects of military rule on four *distinct aspects* of social change.

In addition to these data on both social change and military intervention in politics, a measure of the *level* of economic development is required before we can estimate equation (1). Here I have relied on the level of energy consumption per capita (again expressed in kilograms of coal equivalents) for 1960. The 1960 data were chosen so that we may examine the effects of military rule on social change during the subsequent decade given the *initial* level of economic development. This measure is, of course, highly correlated with others, such as gross national product or gross domestic product per capita, but it has the practical advantage over them of presenting us with no cases of missing data. In the following analysis the raw scores for countries have been grouped into three categories: countries with a 1960 energy consumption rate of less than 75 kilograms per capita ($N = 30$) were assigned to a low category; those with energy consumption rates from 75 to 250 kilograms per capita ($N = 24$) were assigned to the intermediate category; and those with energy consumption rates greater than 250 kilograms per capita ($N = 23$) were placed in the high category.[45]

---

[41] See Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1975), especially chapter 2.

[42] Data for radio receivers per 1,000 population for 1960 and 1970 are from the UNESCO *Statistical Yearbooks* of 1972 and 1973 at pp. 840–849 and pp. 732–737 respectively. Some 1960 values are from the ICPR version of the *World Handbook.* Average annual rates of change were calculated as described in footnotes 29 and 39 above.

[43] Cf., Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development."

[44] Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, 23 (December 1963), 529–552.

The least-squares estimates of equation (1) based on these data are reported in Table 6. They provide little consistent support for any of the hypotheses reviewed in the first section of this paper. First, the models for the first and fourth dependent variables (growth rates of energy consumption per capita and the radio to population ratio) provides no non-zero estimates for either the direct effects of military rule (X_1) or the adjustments to the slopes (i.e., the XZ_i terms). Second, in the case of growth in the physicians-to-population ratio, the estimate for XZ_2 suggests that military rule may result in social change among countries at intermediate levels of development ($N = 24$). This result, however, is inconsistent with any of the three basic arguments discussed earlier. Besides, the estimates of a revised model that includes only those independent variables for which the estimates in the third row of Table 6 were more than twice their standard errors produce an insignificant parameter value for the term in XZ_2. This suggests that the estimate of that parameter in the third row of Table 6 is not robust.

Only the estimates for the second dependent variable appear consistent with one of the earlier arguments, insofar as they suggest that military governments inhibit growth in school enrollment ratios, regardless of the level of economic development. To pursue this possibility, I estimated a modified version of equation (1), with both of the interaction terms (i.e., the δ_i) set to zero. This revised model produced significant estimates for all coefficients *except* β. The modified estimates thus provide no support for even the simple argument that military juntas systematically affect growth in school enrollment ratios.[46]

Table 6. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Categories of 1960 Level of Economic Development ($N=77$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Medium Development (Z_2)	High Development (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	7.345* (1.123)	−.009 (.022)	−1.054 (1.634)	−2.115 (1.655)	−.036 (.036)	.0002 (.033)	.078
2. School enrollment growth[a]	6.955* (.664)	−.027* (.013)	−3.002* (.967)	−4.557* (.998)	.018 (.021)	.028 (.019)	.280
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	4.760* (.956)	−.014 (.019)	−2.576 (1.392)	−3.580* (1.410)	.066* (.031)	.045 (.028)	.135
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[b]	14.702* (2.057)	.054 (.042)	−8.116* (2.995)	−11.420* (3.090)	−.028 (.067)	.018 (.061)	.290

The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates in this row of the table are based on an N of 76.

[b] Radios per 1,000 population data are missing for Taiwan and Yemen, so the estimates in this row are based on an N of 75.

---

[45] See footnote 37 above for the 1960 energy consumption per capita data sources. This classification provides three categories of approximately equal size. In addition, the cutoff points coincide with "breaks" in the data, in the sense that no country falls within ±5 kilograms (of energy consumption per capita) of the cutoff points.

[46] The modified model produced the following estimates (with standard errors in parentheses): $\hat{\alpha} = 6.505$ (.582); $\hat{\beta} = -.013$ (.008); $\hat{\gamma}_2 = -2.462$ (.776); $\hat{\gamma}_3 = -3.672$ (.792); $R^2 = .257$; $\overline{R^2} = .226$. I also estimated a model with both β and the δ_i set to zero, for which the estimated $\overline{R^2}$ is .212, which is very close to the $\overline{R^2}$s for either of the more complete models (for a definition and discussion of $\overline{R^2}$, see, e.g., Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics,* at p. 365).

Table 7. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Regions ($N=77$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Inter-vention (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	6.711*	−.037	−2.700	−.274	2.125	.037	.052	−.053	.173
	(1.451)	(.028)	(1.906)	(2.096)	(1.875)	(.039)	(.036)	(.045)	
2. School enrollment growth[a]	3.975*	−.014	−2.297*	1.535	2.982*	.028	−.002	−.017	.331
	(.874)	(.017)	(1.149)	(1.303)	(1.130)	(.024)	(.022)	(.027)	
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	1.861	.022	.433	.388	2.277	.011	−.005	−.019	.064
	(1.359)	(.026)	(1.786)	(1.964)	(1.757)	(.037)	(.034)	(.042)	
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[b]	3.716	.091	1.646	10.276*	7.580*	−.107	−.045	.011	.279
	(2.836)	(.057)	(3.726)	(4.226)	(3.666)	(.079)	(.073)	(.089)	

The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates in this row of the table are based on an N of 76.

[b] Radios per 1,000 population data are missing for Taiwan and Yemen, so the estimates in this row are based on an N of 75.

In addition to these results concerning military rule, Table 6 shows that average annual rates of change in energy consumption per capita are not sensitive to the initial level of economic development. The remaining three measures of social change, in contrast, do vary (inversely) with level of economic development, so that countries at lower levels of development have higher rates of growth, while those in the highest development category have the lowest rates.

Table 7 reports the parameter estimates for a variant on equation (1) that specifies the possible effects of military governments on social change within geographic regions. Countries have been grouped into the same four regions that were identified in Table 3: the Middle East (and North Africa), Latin America, Asia and Africa.[47] Recall that the rationale for examining possible regional differences is that these groups of countries vary in their average levels of economic development, with African countries as a group being the poorest and Latin American countries being the least poor.[48] If the estimates in Table 7 were to support Huntington's hypothesis, we would anticipate that military rule promotes social change in African countries while it retards such change in the other regions (including Latin America in particular). The estimates in Table 7 provide no support for this argument. None of the estimates for the effects of military rule (i.e., β and the δ_i) is significantly different from zero, which is consistent with the inferences drawn from Table 6.

It might be objected that these results are distorted because the distribution of X (duration of military rule) is skewed, since only 36 (46.8%) of the 77 countries listed in the Appendix have non-zero (positive) values on this variable. This raises the possibility that the variance of the disturbance in each of the models I have estimated is heteroskedastic (i.e., not constant for all observations).[49] More specifically, it is likely that the variance of the disturbance for $X = 0$ is greater than the variance of the disturbance when X assumes other values. To pursue this possibility, I re-estimated the models in Tables 6 and 7, excluding the 41 countries that experienced no military juntas.[50] The results of this reanalysis, along with a visual inspection of the appropriate scatter-plots, indicate that the estimated standard errors reported in Tables 6 and 7 are not biased.

---

[47] The countries are classified by the four regions described in the Appendix.

[48] This expectation is borne out in the regional mean values for energy consumption per capita, 1960. The regional means are: Africa, 50; Asia, 126; Middle East, 336 (this figure excludes Kuwait: with Kuwait included, the Middle East mean is 714); Latin America, 582.

[49] A key assumption of the ordinary least squares estimates of equation (1) is homoskedasticity, which implies

$E(\epsilon_j^2) = \sigma^2$ for all j (where the subscript j refers to the j^{th} observation). When this assumption is not met, the disturbances are said to be heteroskedastic, which implies

$E(\epsilon_j^2) = \sigma_j^2$

Although the ordinary least-squares estimates are unbiased and consistent under heteroskedasticity, they are not efficient. This means that the estimated standard errors are biased (for a useful discussion of this problem, see Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics*, pp. 249–269).

One final possibility deserves consideration. The measure of political intervention by the military is based on the duration of direct military rule. It does not, however, distinguish between uninterrupted military rule and a series of intermittent military governments. For example, two countries could have the same score on this variable (say, 75), but in the first country this count is based on a continuous 75-month period of military government, while in the second the same score reflects the presence during the decade of three distinct military governments, each of which lasted for 25 months.[51] This distinction is of potential importance because stable governments, military *or* civilian, are more likely to have the capacity to institute policies effectively than are less stable governments.[52] In terms of the arguments considered in this paper, this implies that the duration of military rule may affect social change when the military regimes involved are fairly stable. If on the other hand, they are relatively unstable, it implies that military regimes would have no noticeable effects on social change.

To determine whether variations in the continuity of military regimes systematically affect the estimates reported in the last two tables, those analyses were repeated excluding countries that experienced more than one *coup d'état* during the period under investigation (the fifteen countries involved here are noted in the Appendix). Many of the remaining 62 countries have experienced sustained periods of military rule, but none experienced a series of discrete military juntas during the decade beginning in 1960. Thus, this sample of 62 countries allows us to examine the effects of the duration of *relatively continuous* military regimes on social change.

Tables 8 and 9 report the parameter estimates for this subset of observations for the period from 1960 to 1970. Again, these estimates are consistent with those reported earlier in Tables 6 and 7. The two apparent exceptions

Table 8. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Categories of 1960 Level of Economic Development: Countries With More Than One *Coup* Excluded ($N=62$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Medium Development (Z_2)	High Development (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	6.883* (1.212)	−.018 (.025)	−.495 (1.727)	−1.634 (1.754)	−.018 (.040)	.018 (.037)	.041
2. School enrollment growth[a]	7.114* (.709)	−.031* (.014)	−3.257* (1.011)	−4.827* (1.046)	.017 (.024)	.037 (.022)	.317
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	4.435* (1.028)	−.035 (.021)	−2.253 (1.465)	−3.182* (1.488)	.079* (.034)	.067* (.032)	.136
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[a]	15.678* (2.237)	.040 (.045)	−9.846* (3.186)	−12.296* (3.299)	−.026 (.074)	−.016 (.069)	.325

The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment and radios per 1,000 population data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates for these dependent variables are based on an N of 61.

---

[50] These estimates are not reported here for reasons of space. Note that the distribution of X (Duration of military rule) is approximately normal for the 36 countries with $X>0$.

[51] This second outcome could indicate either that military governments were continuous but that every 25 months a new junta replaced the existing one through a *coup*, or that each 25-month period of military rule was followed or interrupted by (at least) a brief period of civilian government.

[52] On this point, see among others the discussion of "durability" in Harry Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Prospects* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01–017, Sage Publications, 1971).

Table 9. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Regions: Countries With More Than One *Coup* Excluded ($N=62$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	6.635*	−.050	−2.579	−1.434	2.088	.054	.061	−.028	.160
	(1.490)	(.038)	(1.961)	(2.196)	(1.932)	(.048)	(.045)	(.056)	
2. School enrollment growth[a]	3.891*	−.005	−2.264	1.079	3.104*	.018	−.018	−.009	.391
	(.881)	(.022)	(1.159)	(1.346)	(1.142)	(.029)	(.027)	(.033)	
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	1.866	−.009	.757	−.702	2.366	.040	.028	−.018	.086
	(1.389)	(.035)	(1.828)	(2.047)	(1.801)	(.045)	(.042)	(.052)	
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[a]	3.793	.009	.732	11.266*	7.287	−.061	.016	.166	.372
	(2.835)	(.072)	(3.732)	(4.335)	(3.677)	(.092)	(.086)	(.106)	

The data and their resources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment and radios per 1,000 population data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates for these dependent variables are based on an N of 61.

are the estimates for β in the equation for school enrollment growth rates and for the δ_i in the equation for growth in the physician-to-population ratio in Table 8. Like the corresponding estimates in Table 6, however, these are not robust and present no substantial challenge to the basic conclusion.[53] The analyses presented in Tables 8 and 9 thus indicate that the presence in the analysis of countries that had experienced more than one *coup* during the decade does not systematically affect the results reported earlier. In short, military intervention in the politics of the Third World has no unique effects on social change, regardless of either the level of economic development or geographic region.

Discussion

In this paper I have attempted to assess the empirical validity of three contrasting views of the effects of military governments on social change in countries of the Third World. The first and more optimistic of these views suggests that such regimes are typically progressive forces promoting social change, while the second view more pessimistically sees military governments as conservative or even reactionary forces that actively inhibit social change. The third perspective comes from Huntington and seeks to integrate the first two by hypothesizing that the effects of military governments on social change vary by the level of economic development: in poor countries, these governments tend to be reformist and progressive, while in more wealthy countries they become conservative (if not reactionary) movements seeking to protect the privileges of entrenched social groups.

The empirical analysis just presented lends no support to any of these viewpoints. Instead, both the reexamination of the Adelman and Morris data and the analysis of more recent data indicate that military governments have no unique effects on social change, regardless of level of economic development. This conclusion clearly contradicts the earlier analysis by Nordlinger, but the difference is readily explained in methodological terms. More interestingly, the present analysis is consistent with the results reported by Schmitter and Weaver for Latin America.[54] They, however, were not able to address the Huntington hypothesis fully, given their focus solely on Latin American countries, which are relatively wealthy when compared to other countries of the Third World. The present analysis extends the conclusion reached by Schmitter and Weaver, and indicates that the pattern they find for Latin America holds more generally.

---

[53] A modified model for school enrollment growth rates of the form discussed above in the text and in footnote 46 (with the δ_i set to zero) produced an estimate of β that was considerably less than twice its standard error. Similarly, a modified model for physicians to population growth rates with β constrained to a value of zero produced insignificant estimates for both of the δ_i. Note also that an application of the checks for heteroskedasticity discussed above indicates again that none of these conclusions is due to biased standard errors of estimate.

[54] Schmitter, "Military Intervention and Public Policy," *passim;* and Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military Rule," *passim.*

We can conclude that blanket statements portraying military governments in the Third World as either progressive or reactionary are without empirical foundation. This implies that many observers may have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills to the military, whether directed toward progressive or conservative ends. We can also conclude that military regimes do not assume different mantles as countries of the Third World become wealthier. In short, the simple civilian-military government distinction appears to be of little use in the explanation of social change.

Appendix: Country Values for Duration of Military Rule (in Months), December 31, 1960 to December 31, 1970 ($N = 77$)

Africa	
Burundi	54
Cameroon	0
Central African Republic	60
Chad	0
Congo (Brazzaville)*	28
Dahomey*	43
Ethiopia	0
Gabon	0
Ghana	53
Guinea	0
Ivory Coast	0
Liberia	0
Mali	25
Mauritania	0
Niger	0
Nigeria*	59
Rwanda	0
Senegal	0
Sierra Leone*	13
Somalia	14
Sudan	65
Tanzania	0
Togo*	48
Uganda	0
Upper Volta	60
Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa)*	61
Asia	
Afghanistan	0
Burma	109
Cambodia	9
India	0
Indonesia	58
Laos*	0
Malaysia	0
Nepal	0
Pakistan	120
Philippines	0
South Korea	114
South Vietnam*	86
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	0
Taiwan	0
Thailand	120
Latin America	
Argentina*	54
Bolivia*	74
Brazil	81
Chile	0
Colombia	0
Costa Rica	0
Dominican Republic	0
Ecuador*	33
El Salvador	120
Guatemala	39
Haiti	0
Honduras	87
Jamaica	0
Mexico	0
Nicaragua	0
Panama	27
Paraguay	0
Peru*	39
Trinidad and Tobago	0
Uruguay	0
Venezuela	0
Middle East (and North Africa)	
Algeria	66
Egypt	117
Iran	0
Iraq*	120
Israel	0
Jordan	0
Kuwait	0
Lebanon	0
Libya	16
Morocco	0
Saudi Arabia	0
Syria*	39
Tunisia	0
Turkey	18
Yemen*	81

* These countries (of which there are fifteen) experienced more than one military *coup d'état* during the period. They are therefore excluded from the analyses reported in Tables 8 and 9 of this paper.

Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance*

NEIL R. RICHARDSON
The University of Texas at Austin

An axiom among students of international politics is that there are vast disparities in the relative abilities of nations to influence each other. It is usually assumed that the roots of superior influence include population size, economic productivity, and military might. What is not fully clear, however, is how or whether such factors operate systematically. Are there patterns to the asymmetrical influence exercised by dominant nations? How is such influence made manifest?

The present study addresses these questions by developing and testing an economic explanation of international political submissiveness in a hierarchical world. Data from the 1960s are used to examine the role of the United States as a dominant nation with influence over a subsystem of dependencies. Both the fact and the extent of influence are assessed using foreign trade-related variables suggested by international trade theory.

A central proposition is that U.S. dependencies should distinguish themselves by displaying greater voting agreement with the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly than do other countries. The extent to which voting agreement is in fact an objective of the U.S., and hence a meaningful index of its dominance on issues of importance to it is also explored. Finally, a tentative ordering of the potency of each of the economic variables in question is considered.

Theoretical Considerations

The hypotheses considered in later pages are derived from an explanation which assumes that nations exist in a global hierarchy. As suggested, the notion of a hierarchical international system is hardly novel. But systematic explanations of resultant influence relations between powerful and weak nations are relatively scarce.[1]

It is generally agreed, however, that somehow a nation's influence capabilities depend on the amount of resources it has available. One way to conceptualize this connection between a nation's influence potential and its resource base is to view resources as goods and services which can be offered to, or withheld from, a second nation as the first chooses.[2] In this way, the first nation can influence the second by affecting the latter's benefits, costs, and probability of success.

This perspective on influence capabilities can usefully be adapted to a hierarchical analysis based on international trade theory.[3] To do so requires, as a first step, an understanding that trade between nations is beneficial to each participant. The benefits, in turn, result from differences in endowments of land, labor, and capital which best suit countries to the manufacture of different products, to attendant economies of scale provided by larger markets, and the like.

---

* This article is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation, *Trade Dependence and Political Cooperation Among Nations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1974). Generous help with the original manuscript was offered by Stuart Bremer, Dorwin Cartwright, A. F. K. Organski, and especially Raymond Tanter who chaired the project. Bruce Buchanan, Helmut Norpoth, Ivan Orton, A. T. J. Vernooy, and two anonymous referees have also provided valuable assistance at different stages. Many of the data were collected and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. Early phases of the study were facilitated by a dissertation grant from the Department of Political Science, The University of Michigan. Preparation of the manuscript for this article was aided by support from the University Research Institute, The University of Texas at Austin. An earlier version was delivered at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2-5, 1975.

[1] Recent volumes exploring this general perspective include Steven L. Spiegel, *Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), and Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

[2] This explication of the assumed relationship between rank and influence paraphrases *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 220.

The application of this idea to asymmetrical politics is exemplified by Edgar Litt and Michael Parenti, *Democracy's Ordeal in America: A Guide to Political Theory and Action* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 30–33.

[3] The reader is referred elsewhere for a full exposition of the fundamental trade theory employed here. See, for example, Charles P. Kindleberger, *International Economics*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958), chapters 5 and 6, or Paul T. Ellsworth, *The International Economy*, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), chapters 4 through 7.

But in a hierarchical world, an international system composed of national economies of widely differing sizes, the rudiments of trade theory bear implications beyond a mere "division of labor" characterization.

Thus, consider international trade transactions between unequals, the first being the United States and the second a small economy. In a hypothetical case where each annually sells 200 million dollars worth of goods to the other, the consequences are different for the two; the market value of the commodities is symmetrical but the effects of the exchange are not. The benefits to the second nation are greater because a proportionately greater share of its domestic consumption now occurs at reduced, import prices. Meanwhile, and more important in the present context, a proportionately greater share of its total economic activity depends on a foreign market for its exports. In sum, as a result of this transaction, the second nation becomes more *export dependent* than is the United States because the latter has the capacity to manipulate more benefits and costs (for example, via interruption of trade) than does the former.

The political ramifications of such economic interactions are not difficult to apprehend. Because the larger economy dominates the smaller one through their mutual trade, the latter will be constrained to exhibit "cooperative" behavior born of economic dependence; it should behave deferentially. Borrowing a term used by social psychologists, I shall hereafter refer to such political behavior on the part of economic dependencies as "compliance."[4]

The following proposition summarizes this form of political behavior: Nations that engage in substantial trade with a dominant partner should display compliant political behavior toward it. In more abstract language, the preceding exposition describes a hierarchical international system in which nations are differentially constrained according to their rank.

It should be added that the argument presented to this point is consistent with prior empirical investigations. For example, Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein have demonstrated that large (industrial) national economies clearly tend to rely on foreign trade as a constituent part of their total economic activity to a lesser degree than do small (nonindustrial) countries.[5] And Bela Balassa confirms that the great majority of exports from small, underdeveloped economies are sold in industrialized markets.[6] In combination, these two observations lend additional credence to the present economic characterization. Nonindustrial, that is, economically small nations are relatively heavily dependent upon foreign trade, and the buyers of their exports are chiefly those economic giants whose own resources are so great as to put them in a dominant position in the partnership.[7] Finally, trade flows for the United States accord with this global configuration. Whereas, for 1965, U.S. foreign trade made up only 7.3 per cent of its gross national product (GNP), Costa Rican trade with the U.S. *alone* accounted for some 19 per cent of that small economy's GNP.[8]

To this juncture, the political compliance of dependencies has been described as only a manifestation of export dependence. Trade theory prompts the inclusion of three supplemental factors: commodity concentration, recipient concentration, and economic development.

A common conception regarding international trade has it that small, nonindustrial economies have few commodities to sell on the world market owing to their narrow bases of production. Whether or not this is an accurate description of those countries in particular, there is theoretical reason to believe that undiversified export activity is a source of vulnerability for any nation. The logic is simple. A downward shift in price or demand for any single export commodity is to some extent damaging to any economy. The smaller the number of different exports a country has, the greater is its loss should any one product suffer market misfortunes. Thus, commodity concentration in exports should be particularly worrisome to a country highly dependent on its overseas markets.[9]

---

[4] See Herbert C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2 (March 1958), 51–60. Kelman's compliance and conformity as overt behavior styles correspond to the expectations here. But they do not require "internalization," behavior motivated by the intrinsic rewards of the acts for the actor. Also see Cartwright and Zander, p. 230.

[5] Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959," *World Politics*, 13 (January 1961), 267–299.

[6] Bela A. Balassa, *Trade Prospects for Developing Countries* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1964), p. 12, where the U.S., Canada, non-Communist Europe and Yugoslavia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are classified "developed."

[7] This same configuration is explored by Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, 8, No. 2 (1971), 81–117; Francois Perroux, *L'économie du XX^e siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Frances, 1961), pp. 27–56.

[8] Data are from the United Nations, Statistical Office, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967).

Another economic factor is recipient concentration, where "recipients" are countries other than the principal partner that buy exports from the nation in question. The point here again is that a lack of diversity is a liability for the exporter, in this case because recipients other than the dominant partner represent alternative markets which may be available should the dominant outlet be closed off. A small number of alternative markets reduces the exporter's immediately available buyers of goods no longer sold to the dominant country. Thus, the greater the concentration of (alternative) recipients, the greater should be a dependency's political compliance as insurance against loss of its largest market.[10]

Finally, theoretical discussions suggest that lack of economic development itself heightens dependency.[11] As suggested earlier, underdeveloped economies gain proportionately more from a given amount of trade than do their industrialized partners. In addition, insofar as such trade is thought to be a means to generate needed capital for development, their perceived stake in foreign commerce is further augmented.[12] Accordingly, any decrease in trade would thereby entail particularly high costs. Lack of economic development, then, is a further liability itself, exacerbating export dependence, and it should be manifested in increased political compliance with the dominant trade partner.

Now how do these factors relate to each other? The preceding paragraphs offer some clues that permit the analysis to advance an additional step. That is, a brief reconsideration of the four economic concepts — export dependence, commodity concentration, recipient concentration, and economic development — provides some basis for speculation as to their respective potencies in producing political compliance.

Taking commodity concentration and recipient concentration first, the former is likely to be more worrisome for the dependency. The reason for this is not difficult to grasp. The dependency that heavily relies on a single export product may suffer a disastrous price or demand decrease for that good at the hands of its dominant buyer. On the other hand, even a dependency with just a few other major buyers will continue to have some available markets for its exports should it lose its largest outlet. Thus, recipient concentration would appear to be a less threatening circumstance than commodity concentration.

Recipient concentration should also be less consequential in producing compliance than is export dependence. The reason for this expectation is that dependent status is an immediate fact of the dependency's existence, whereas the perils of recipient concentration deal with the availability of future, prospective markets if the country's trade circumstances should suddenly worsen.

Moreover, economic development is likewise probably more relevant than is recipient concentration to a dependency's political behavior. This is a defensible ordering because little economic development represents a systemic weakness in the dependency's economy. By comparison, a concentration of alternative export markets represents, after all, a potential hazard only in the economy's foreign trade sector (at least initially).

Thus, with recipient concentration as the fourth most important factor, attention can now be turned to the other three. Consider next commodity concentration and export dependence. An economy that produces a very narrow range of export goods yet relies on overseas markets for a limited share of its total economic activity is ultimately vulnerable only to the extent that it relies on that trade. But another dependency in opposite circumstances — low concentration and high export dependence — while not jeopardized in any one line of goods, can be devastated by unfavorable sanctions visited upon it by its dominant trade partner. Therefore, commodity concentration can be ranked behind export dependence.

In addition, economic development should also be ranked in importance ahead of commodity concentration. Parallel to the argument regarding recipient concentration, commodity diversification only bears on the external share of a country's total economic activity, whereas economic development is crucial to the entirety of a country's resilience in times of duress. Commodity concentration, then, is probably third most important among the economic factors.

---

[9] Also note that nonindustrial economies often rely heavily upon agricultural exports, those very goods historically susceptible to dramatic price changes. See, for example, Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 80.

[10] See Peter J. Lloyd, *International Trade Problems of Small Nations* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 46; Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), pp. 30, 85–86; Singer, *Weak States*, pp. 239, 222–223.

[11] David Vital, for example, asserts that economic dependence stems from several factors, including level of economic development, as well as the impact of foreign trade on the economy: ". . . the actual dependence of a given small power on foreign economic factors . . . will depend on the volume of foreign trade relative to total economic activity, on the rate and *level of economic development*, on the chosen fields of specialization, on the variety of the nation's domestic resources and the skill with which they are utilized . . . ." In *The Inequality of States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 55 (emphasis added).

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 47; Lloyd, pp. 21-22.

Speculation regarding the potencies of export dependence and economic development is, happily, facilitated by the above discussion. Again, economic development represents vitality in the entire national system, and export dependence is a vulnerability particular to just some portion of it. That is, even an extremely export-dependent country may be able to recover from a damaging blow to its foreign market if the economy is sufficiently developed to engage in compensatory domestic expansion or to nurture new overseas buyers. On the other hand, an economy only marginally dependent on exports to a dominant partner would suffer greater costs if that principal market were lost. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suspect that low economic development would induce a dependency's compliance more forcefully than would the *extent* of the dependence itself.

The transitive ordering of these factors is, then, in order of decreasing importance to compliance, (1) economic development, (2) export dependence, (3) commodity concentration, and (4) recipient concentration. But more must be said of the compliance expected to result from these constructs.

Political Compliance

In returning to the expectation that U.S. export dependencies should be politically compliant, one must consider the outward signs of such submissiveness. Governments have a variety of means by which to bestow political favors, including amicable and frequent diplomatic discourse, public and private diplomatic support on matters regarding third states, intervention to facilitate relations between private parties, and so on. But the publicity and frequency of such occasions varies so greatly among countries in the contemporary world that they are difficult to specify in a systematic and comprehensive fashion.

On the other hand, votes in some international organizations are regular and public statements of the member governments through their delegates.[13] Additionally, the United Nations General Assembly has been singled out as appropriate to this study owing to its almost universal membership.

Moreover, it is also asserted that General Assembly roll calls reveal patterns of voting alignments of particular interest to the present investigation.[14] Inis Claude says that "the major states have at least as much influence within and upon [the Assembly] as they are entitled to. by virtue of their size, strength, and general importance."[15] Robert Keohane identifies economic dependence as an important motive for roll call agreement: "The more dependent a state is on a great power for trade, aid, or protection, the more responsive it is likely to be to pressure" in the General Assembly.[16]

The Assembly annually votes on a wide range of substantive issues. Among the many resolutions subject to roll call procedures, some of them are doubtless of greater interest to the U.S. government than others are. Accordingly, it would seem likely that the U.S. would attempt to elicit its dependencies' compliance on votes most salient to it. Thus, the essence of this discussion suggests that the dependencies should display greater compliance when the outcome is more important to the U.S.

There is abundant reason to believe that the United States has ascribed great importance to its cold war relationship with the Soviet Union.[17] Even after the onset of détente in the mid-1960s, the continuing superpower arms race bears witness to the salience of their antagonisms and mutual suspicions. In sum, U.S. dependencies should exhibit greater compliance on cold war votes than on others.

---

[13] This paraphrases David Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 13, as quoted in Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 23. Also see Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 113.

[14] Hovet, p. 14.

[15] *The Changing United Nations* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 53. The same thesis is documented in case studies by John G. Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers* (New York: Random House, 1965).

[16] Robert O. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 557 (March 1966), p. 19. Empirical support for this proposition includes Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 868–888; Marshall R. Singer and Barton Sensenig III, "Elections Within the United Nations: An Experimental Study Utilizing Statistical Analysis," *International Organization*, 17 (Autumn 1963), 901–925. Wittkopf found some positive connection between U.S. foreign aid allocation and its recipients' Assembly and committee agreement with the donor in 1963 and 1966. Singer and Sensenig, accounting for nations' economic, military, perceptual, and communications ties with the superpowers, discovered these bonds to be associated with voting agreement on cold war questions from 1946 to 1959, though more so for interdependencies than for dependencies.

[17] Alker and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, chap. 10, present interesting evidence on

Derived Hypotheses

The preceding theoretical exposition provides a basis for the hypotheses of this study. The first hypothesis is a broad one, reflecting the primary thrust of the investigation. It distinguishes between dependencies and other countries on the presumption that the economic circumstances of the former will motivate them to display compliant political behavior.

H.1 A nation that is export dependent upon the United States will exhibit greater General Assembly voting agreement with it than will others that are not dependent.

The next hypothesis accounts for the distinction between those political issues more or less salient to the United States.

H.2 A dependency will exhibit greater compliance toward the United States on cold war issues than on other matters.

The third hypothesis captures the transitive ordering of the four economic factors for dependencies.

H.3 A dependency of the United States will display voting agreement with it in accordance with the following factors, listed in order of decreasing importance: (1) declining economic development; (2) increasing export dependence; (3) increasing commodity concentration; (4) increasing recipient concentration.

Operationalizing the Concepts

The concepts now identifiable as essential to this study are (1) export dependence, (2) commodity concentration, (3) recipient concentration, (4) economic development, (5) political compliance, and (6) issue salience. The following paragraphs indicate how they are operationalized for the empirical results which follow thereafter.

Export dependence upon a dominant nation must actually tap two ingredients. First, a nation can only be export dependent if foreign sales are important to that nation's economic health.[18] Additionally, of course, dependency status also requires that the country sell a large share of its exports to the dominant one. Both ingredients thus require relative measures, and each is necessary for a nation to be export dependent.[19]

Accordingly, two simple ratios have been constructed for each considered country. The first ratio is

$$a_i / GNP_i,$$

where a_i is the value of total exports of any country i and GNP_i is that same country's gross national product.[20] The second ratio is

$$a_{ij} / a_i,$$

where a_i represents the value of country *i*'s

---

nations' issue "intensities" in the General Assembly. Tabulating the numbers of speeches made in that body by different nations, they conclude that by 1961 (the last session they examined), the United States and the Soviet Union had become increasingly intense regarding their "East-West" confrontations, of which cold war issues were a major component.

[18] A similar argument is expressed in Bruce M. Russett's theoretical discussion of economic interdependence; see his *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), chap. 8, especially p. 124.

[19] A well-known measure, "relative acceptance" *(RA)*, was developed by Richard I. Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 28 (July 1960), 551–572. Measures which divide trade by a nation's gross national product have been used by Russett, *International Regions*, and by Singer, *Weak States.* Cal Clark and Susan Welch have come to the conclusion that investigations such as the present one should more appropriately use a trade/*GNP* measure than one resembling *RA*. See their "Western European Trade as a Measure of Integration: Untangling the Interpretations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16 (September 1972), 353–382, especially p. 337. Marshall Singer, *Weak States*, combines these two indicators in the same multiplicative fashion used here to measure export dependence, although his ratios are based upon total trade and gross domestic product. The bases for the present choices appear in the following footnote. Singer's formula is presented in his pp. 237–240. Curiously, however, as Singer attempts to establish a threshold value to distinguish "dependent" nations from others, he first argues (p. 238) that an index value of 0.067 is a reasonable partition. But then he less explicitly makes a contrary case (p. 239): "... any state that derives even 10 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product from trade with one country is *tied* to that Power" (emphasis added). The ambiguity may revolve around whether he equates "dependent" and "tied."

[20] The decision to use export figures rather than "trade" (roughly exports plus imports) is based on four considerations: (1) Degree of commodity concentrations in export trade is much less than in import trade, thus maximizing variance in the "active" variable, as indicated by Lloyd, p. 14. (For a lucid discussion of systematic, extraneous, and error variance problems in research design, see Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 2nd ed. [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973] chap. 17.) (2) Exports appear to be more insulated than imports from economic aid, particularly for the values of underdeveloped nations, thereby minimizing systematic extraneous variance, as indicated by Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," p. 274, Singer,

exports to country j. The two ratios can then be multiplied to generate

$$ED_{ij} = a_{ij}/GNP_i,$$

where ED_{ij} is an export dependence score for country i on country j.

The concept of *commodity concentration* is relatively straightforward. The indicator must identify the extent to which shares of total exports are distributed across a range of commodity classes. In other words, the need again is for a measure of relative distributions of values.

A concentration index developed by James Ray and J. David Singer has been chosen from among several measures of concentration (or inequality) available.[21] It is represented by the following formula:

$$CON = \sqrt{\frac{(S_i)^2 - (1/N)}{1 - (1/N)}},$$

where S_i is the percentage share of goods for each unit i (commodity class) and N is the number of units considered. One advantage of this index, when compared to others, is that it does not tend to overvalue the preponderance of the larger shares of an uneven distribution among classes.

A second characteristic of CON makes it an appropriate index for *recipient concentration,* as well. Its full range of possible values, 0.00 to 1.00, does not change as the number of units varies. This is an especially important attribute in view of the wide variation in numbers of recipients (units) among the included countries.

Economic development is frequently measured by gross national product per capita (GNP/capita). This measure provides no information regarding the domestic distribution of wealth, but it does offer an approximation of the amount of capital available for investment and industrial growth. Now "real" income per capita is a more meaningful measure of individual and collective economic status. But, unfortunately, the reliability of the relevant data is "almost inversely proportional" to their validity.[22] Accordingly, GNP per capita is used in this study, logarithmically transformed to approximate a normal distribution.

Regardless of its causes, *political compliance* or cooperation, as the case may be, might be expected to vary substantially. The questions treated here again demand a measure which captures the extent of expected behavior relative to the unexpected. Using Arend Lijphart's Index of Agreement *(IA),* the accord among General Assembly roll call positions for a pair of nations over a series of votes can be summarized.[23] Lijphart's index is

$$IA = [f + (1/2g)]/t,$$

where

f = number of votes on which the pair agrees (Yes-Yes, Abstain-Abstain, No-No)

g = number of votes on which the pair partially agrees (Yes-Abstain, No-Abstain)

t = total number of votes on which the pair voted.

An important assumption of this index is that abstentions represent a position midway between Yes and No. Lijphart argues that this coding rule is particularly appropriate in the General Assembly setting where nations may wish to vote "against" resolutions without offending its supporters by casting a No vote.[24]

Finally, in the context of this study, *issue salience* refers to the greater weight attached by the U.S. to cold war voting support than it imputes to other roll calls. Thus, the roll calls must be partitioned into two categories, "Cold War" and "Others."

The rule that governs the coding of each roll call into one of these two groups is simple. On

---

Weak States, pp. 248 and 256, and Masakatsu Sato, "A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme," in *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey,* ed. John E. Mueller (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 198–215. (3) Import values usually include the costs of transport and insurance, export values avoid the introduction of this sort of systematic extraneous variance; (4) Nations with relatively small shares of *all* international trade by virtue of their low resource and industrial base are also, by and large, nations whose exports are most commodity concentrated, according to Michael Michaely, "Concentration of Exports and Imports: An International Comparison," *Economic Journal* 68 (December 1958), 727.

[21] See James Lee Ray and J. David Singer, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System," *Sociological Methods & Research,* 1 (May 1973), 403–437.

[22] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 63.

[23] Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (December 1963), 902–917. Absences, as opposed to abstentions, are not coded in these data. As John E. Mueller puts it, an absent delegate is usually not present "for reasons which are best attributed to apathy or disinterest." *Approaches to Measurement,* p. 139. Similarly, those delegates present but not voting are not included, since inferring their positions would be a dubious enterprise in terms of validity or reliability.

[24] Lijphart, p. 910.

those items where the United States and the Soviet Union take positions in complete disagreement, the roll calls are designated "Cold War" ($n = 15$).[25] "Others" is the residual category for votes in which the bloc leaders are in agreement, partial agreement, or else where the Soviet Union did not vote and the United States did ($n = 9$). (If the U.S. did not vote, the roll call is discarded as of no use in computing *IA*'s with the U.S. as half of each pair.)

Data Sources

These operations call for data drawn from several sources. To develop the Export Dependence index, the design requires the coding of (1) the value of total exports by country, (2) the value of total exports to the United States by country, and (3) *GNP* for each country. The source for coding total exports values is the 1965 United Nations *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.*[26] Exports to the United States are taken from the same source. *GNP* figures for the same year are from Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,*[27] as is *GNP* per capita, the latter to measure economic development.

To measure commodity concentrations by the *CON* index requires only two kinds of data: (1) the number of commodity classes considered; (2) each country's distribution of export percentage shares across those classes. The *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* provides a tenfold scheme standardized for goods in trade according to the revised Standard International Trade Classification, a taxonomy followed here.

The index values for recipient concentration are based on (1) the number of recipients for each country's exports and (2) the percentage shares of each country's exports to each of its recipients, the United States excluded. (Recall that the U.S. is excluded because the search is for other partners as alternatives to the dominant market.) These data are also based on 1965 values from the U.N. *Yearbook.*

Finally, data for the Index of Agreement, tapping political compliance and cooperation, are drawn from the U.N. General Assembly Plenary Session roll calls for 1965.[28] From these Assembly records three types of information are drawn to meaure agreement: (1) the total number of roll calls in which both countries voted, for each pair; (2) the number of votes with ballot agreement; (3) the number of votes with partial agreement. In addition, to increase the validity of this data set, unanimous and near-unanimous roll calls (90 per cent agreement or more) are excluded because they provide little or no discriminatory information. The same decision also applies to votes specific to each paragraph of a resolution that is so dismembered for separate roll calls, and for the reason that they are nearly always redundancies which would introduce unwanted inflations of agreement or disagreement.[29]

Table 1 summarizes the indicators, measures, and data sources employed. Deleting those countries for which data were unavailable on at least one variable, there remain 103 countries with complete files used in the empirical analyses that follow.

Results

Before any statistical analyses relevant to the hypotheses can be discussed, the identity of the U.S. dependencies, from among the 103 countries, must be established. Here the task is to distinguish a subsystem on the basis of a reasonable criterion. Since dependencies have earlier been described in terms of the extent of their trade ties to the dominant U.S., the export dependence measure is an obvious choice.[30] Not so obvious, however, is the threshold value separating them from other countries.

---

[25] Alternative means of operationalizing "Cold War" voting are possible, of course. Analogous to Alker's and Russett's technique *(World Politics)*, a factor analysis of roll calls could be used to identify those in which the United States and other "western" nations vote in opposition to the Soviet Union and other "eastern" delegations. A second alternative, however, is employed by Robert J. Mokken and Frans N. Stockman, "A Theory and Method of Roll Call Analysis," paper delivered to the Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, 1970 (second mimeo, December 1971). Mokken and Stockman (p. 2-2) operationalized "East-West confrontation" ". . . by taking those issues (key votes) in which the U.S.A. and at least nine other NATO countries oppose the U.S.S.R. and at least five other Warsawpact countries." (Cited and quoted with the authors' permission.)

[26] United Nations, Statistical Office, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,* 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967).

[27] Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,* 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 306–313.

[28] Acknowledgments to Robert Beattie for making these data available through the International Relations Archive, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[29] This is a frequent practice when dealing with such data. See Alker and Russett; Lijphart, "Analysis of Bloc Voting," p. 910.

[30] Social psychologist Kurt Lewin preferred interactional criteria to attributional ones for purposes of partitioning: "A group is best defined as *a dynamic whole based on interdependence rather than on similarity,*" in his *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 184 (emphasis in the original).

Table 1

Indicators, Measures, and Data Sources

Indicator	**Measure**	**Data Source**
export dependence	export dependence index (*ED*)	a) total exports: *Yearbook,* 1965 b) exports to U.S.: *Yearbook,* 1965 c) *GNP*: *World Handbook*
commodity concentration	concentration index (*CON*)	commodity shares; # commodity classes: *Yearbook,* 1965
recipient concentration	concentration index (*CON*)	recipient shares; # recipients: *Yearbook,* 1965
economic development	*GNP* per capita	*World Handbook*
political compliance	index of agreement (*IA*)	General Assembly roll calls, 1965

Marshall Singer has suggested a 10 per cent cutoff for his trade/*GNP* ratio which, in turn, suggests a 5 per cent value here where only exports appear in the numerator.[31] Admittedly, the threshold has no particular theoretical origin, but it does satisfy an empirical criterion reflecting the presence or absence of alternate dominant trade partners. Of the 21 countries with ratios of 5 per cent or more on the *ED* index, only three (Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, and Gabon) are more closely trade-tied to a nation other than the United States.[32] Compare this ratio (18:21) to the next eleven nations with 3 or 4 per cent scores, falling just below the partition. Of this second group, only four export more to the U.S. than to some other partner (4:11). A list of the 21 countries designated as dependencies follows, ordered by the extent of their dependence on exports to the U.S., where higher scores indicate greater dependence.

A glance at the list immediately reveals the "westernness" of the subsystem; the members are not randomly dispersed geographically. Instead, fifteen of the twenty-one are about equally distributed among Caribbean, Central and South American locations.[33] This characteristic of the group is consistent with Hans Linne-

Table 2

Dependencies of the United States, Ordered by Export Dependence (ED)

Country	*ED* Value
Colombia	.05
Guatemala	.05
Peru	.05
Ecuador	.06
El Salvador	.06
Ethiopia	.06
Haiti	.06
Nicaragua	.06
Uganda	.06
Panama	.07
Philippines	.07
Saudi Arabia	.07
Bolivia	.09
Canada	.09
Jamaica	.09
Costa Rica	.10
Dominican Republic	.10
Gabon	.14
Venezuela	.14
Trinidad and Tobago	.20
Liberia	.23

---

[31] Singer, *Weak States,* pp. 238–239. Also see note 19, above, regarding Singer's apparent indecision on this threshold level.

[32] Nicaragua and Saudi Arabia are, by this measure, much more dependent on Japan than on the United States. Gabon is much more dependent on exports to its former metropole, France.

[33] Russett, *International Regions,* pp. 133–143, finds that twelve of these fifteen Western Hemisphere dependencies were "interdependent" traders in his two clusters of American countries. His overlap with this study is reduced owing to his search for *reciprocal* trade ties.

mann's discovery that geographical proximity is a valuable predictor of relative trade flows.[34]

With the dependencies now identified, the study hypotheses can be tested empirically. The first hypothesis, predicting that the dependencies would be in closer agreement to U.S. positions than would other countries, statistically states that differences in agreement among members of each group will be smaller than differences between the groups, with dependencies scoring higher. Analysis of variance shows that the two groups of nations do not differ appreciably on "Other" votes ($p > .77$). The picture is markedly different, however, on "Cold War" issues. Here the dependencies clearly agree with the U.S. significantly more than do the nondependent countries ($p = .0001$). Group agreement averages appear in Table 3.

Table 3

Agreement Averages by Group and Issue

	Dependencies	Nondependencies
Cold War ($n = 15$)	.598	.410
Other ($n = 9$)	.883	.855

Of course, this same evidence also bears upon the second hypothesis, predicting that dependencies will be more compliant on Cold War roll calls. Comparing dependencies' averages on the two issue categories (Cold War vs. Others), the hypothesis fails the empirical test in that their agreement on Cold War votes is lower rather than higher. That finding, however, is considerably mitigated by the fact that the remaining 82 countries tend to depart from the U.S. on Cold War votes significantly more than do dependencies. That is, although its dependencies agree with the U.S. less on Cold War roll calls than on Others, there is evidence that they are compliant when the superpowers are in full disagreement.

To clarify the matter, consider the plausibility of the following rationale. First, it should be noted that if the U.S. attaches greater utilities to Cold War issues than to Others, that does not imply that governments will therefore necessarily tend to agree with it more on Cold War votes. Instead, the proposition only implies that the U.S. will more often employ whatever resources it commands, including economic incentives accompanying its foreign trade relations, in efforts to muster Assembly support on those roll calls most salient to it. Thus, the fact that levels of agreement with the U.S. are lower on Cold War votes may mean that nations, dependent and otherwise, are less inclined to vote against the Soviet position despite U.S. efforts to the contrary. And the observation that dependencies are measurably more agreeable than nondependencies on Cold War votes supports this interpretation. Notice, however, that U.S. dependencies by this account are subject along with other countries to some unspecified influence by the Soviet Union, as well as by the United States.[35]

The third hypothesis, predicting a transitive ordering of the respective impacts of the economic variables upon compliance, is scrutinized by means of linear multiple regressions.[36] These results appear in Table 4.

Table 4

Partial Associations for Dependencies[a]

	Issue Category	
	Cold War ($n = 15$)	Other ($n = 9$)
(log) Economic Development	.44 (.00)	.14 (.00)
Export Dependence	–.31 (.00)	–.23 (.00)
Commodity Concentration	.47 (.52)	.04 (.09)
Recipient Concentration	.02 (.56)	–.29 (.10)

[a] Values are beta weights; those in parentheses are standard errors.

Several facts emerge here. First, it should be noted that the independent, economic variables are plagued by random error while the roll call tabulations of the dependent variables are nearly error free. This distribution of random error leads to somewhat understated partial coefficients, particularly for the dependence and development factors where the errors are probably greatest. The same unreliability also exaggerates the standard errors of the associations.

Second, notice that the partial associations (beta weights) are almost always higher for

---

[34] *An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1966). In his study of foreign trade *inter*dependencies, Russett, *International Regions*, shows the U.S. to be a key member of his "North and Central America" group in 1963.

[35] See Keohane, "Political Influence," p. 23.

[36] Bivariate correlation coefficients among all pairs of the four economic factors are so small that it is safe to interpret the partial associations between each of them and political compliance in a straightforward fashion; there is no significant multicollinearity among them.

Cold War votes than for Other issues, consistent with the second hypothesis. Some of these relationships, however, are themselves unexpected. For example, even though economic development is most strongly related to voting agreement, the *direction* of the association is the inverse of that predicted by the third hypothesis. Thus, dependencies such as Canada and Venezuela, with proportionately high per person productivity, are more prone to agree with the U.S. than are less developed dependencies such as Ethiopia, especially on Cold War roll calls. In theoretical terms, this positive association indicates that relative lack of economic development among the dependencies implies no corresponding heightening of compliance. Instead, the opposite association exists, and for reasons unanticipated by the present dependence theory.

The association of export dependence with voting agreement also assumes an inverse direction from the hypothesized one. Illustrative is a comparison of Liberia and Gabon, with very high dependence scores and Cold War agreement values of only .38 and .35 respectively, as opposed to marginally dependent Peru, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with agreement levels of .79, .79, and .94.

Table 5

Dependence and Cold War Compliance Averages

	Mean ED	Mean Cold War IA
Western Dependencies ($n = 15$)	.08	.66
Nonwestern Dependencies ($n = 6$)	.10	.28

Moreover, if the 21 subsystem members are subdivided into two groups according to whether they are in the western hemisphere, as in Table 5, an instructive comparison can be made. The six nonwestern dependencies average a much lower compliance level on Cold War votes despite a slightly higher dependence score average. The inference to be drawn is that western hemisphere dependence produces markedly more Assembly compliance than does dependence elsewhere in the world. And, to the extent that this tentative conclusion is correct, it is consistent with notions of geographical regions as identifiable subsystemic clusters of nations set apart by their interaction patterns.[37]

For both commodity and recipient concentrations the standard errors are sufficiently great so that no real confidence can be placed in their partial associations with voting in either issue category. But it does appear that recipient concentration can fairly be judged to have no effect upon dependencies' compliance, and the effect of commodity concentration is, at best, indeterminate.

Finally, the combined capacity of the four economic variables to account for variance in dependencies' compliance, measured by the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R^2), is .21 for Cold War votes and .18 for Others. In other words, the economic factors have only a modest impact on the voting behavior of the dependencies by this measure even though, as a group, these nations were earlier observed to differ markedly from other Assembly members in agreeing with the U.S. on Cold War issues.

To summarize, then, the dependencies proved to be distinctly compliant on Cold War voting occasions, so that the first hypothesis was apparently borne out in the context of the second. Characterizing the results concerning the third hypothesis is a more difficult task. The two economic factors expected to be of greatest importance *were* of greatest importance, but the signs of their partial regression coefficients were opposite to those hypothesized; the more economically developed dependencies tended to be in greater agreement with the U.S., as did those with relatively low export dependence scores. So what does all of this mean in broader terms? A few points of discussion are in order.

Discussion

This analysis of the behavior of U.S. dependencies in the mid-1960s prompts several points of discussion and speculation about the adequacy of the dependency theory advanced at the outset.

First, it is demonstrably true that the dependencies agreed with the U.S. more on Cold War votes than did the other countries in the study, consistent with the first and second hypotheses. What is not clear, however, is why this happened.

It may be, for example, that the dependencies were compliant because they were frequently reminded by the U.S. that their voting behavior on Cold War matters could affect their trade partnership. On the other hand, David Vital suggests that latent economic pressures are understood by dependencies: " . . . [possible sanctions] need not be put into full effect or even spelled out explicitly in diplomatic contacts for the desired political result to be produced."[38] The aggregate data analyzed here cannot, of course, resolve the question.

---

[37] One example of the controlling assumption that geographically-defined subsystems are valuable and defensible is Michael Brecher's "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, 15 (January 1963), 213–255.

The apparent absence of compliance on Other roll calls also merits some speculation. In keeping with the notion of issue salience, the fact that accord with the U.S. was higher for all nations on Other votes is relevant. This result may reflect the United States' willingness to accede to the wishes of other nations on issues it considered less salient and that they perceived to be important to their interests. If so, then U.S. agreement levels with its dependencies would not be expected to have been especially high on those occasions (Other votes) because it was not vulnerable to economic pressures from them; the economic ties were asymmetrical.

A second empirical result is that the dependency subsystem identified in this investigation was regional in two senses. On the one hand, its membership largely consisted of countries geographically clustered in the western hemisphere. But dependence also emerged as a regional phenomenon since the *western* dependencies exhibited the greatest degree of political compliance, the expected *consequence* of dependence.

Why was this so? Clearly the dependence theory, grounded in elementary international trade principles, is unable to account for the dramatically different compliance levels exhibited by the two subsets of dependencies. Indeed, greater doubt is cast on the appropriateness of the dependency theory by the discovered weakness of the total relationship between the dependency factors and political compliance.

Now, it may be that both of these threats to the theory could be silenced by fortifying the dependence theory, that is, by expanding it to include dependence upon foreign aid, international investment, and monetary relations, as well as upon trade. For example, it may be that western dependencies are more closely tied to the United States than are the other dependencies when several dimensions of economic dominance are considered simultaneously. Moreover, the merging of these economic possibilities might result in a greater statistical value for their combined relationship with compliance in the Assembly.

But attempting to defend an economic approach by suggesting its potential for expansion may seem too facile. Worse, such a strategy could become a barricade to further scientific inquiry if it were carried to extremes. Finally, and without prejudging the roles of unexamined economic influences, it nevertheless seems likely that some noneconomic factors affected the dependencies' voting behavior during the 1960s.

For example, governments of dependencies in the western hemisphere may have been more compliant because they feared the interventionist propensities of the United States, both overt (i.e., militarily) and covert, in "its own backyard." U.S. military ventures in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic had culminated in the "Johnson Doctrine" of 1965, a statement of intent to intervene whenever the U.S. perceived a communist threat in its hemisphere.[39] More recent covert intervention in Chile, officially acknowledged later in Washington, suggests that the "policeman's" active role in the hemisphere has been more frequent than military interventions alone would indicate.

A second noneconomic factor eliciting compliance from western dependencies might have been their fears of Castro's intent to export Communism in the region. In this example, contrary to the Johnson Doctrine notion, the U.S. and its dependencies in the hemisphere would have had a shared motive, a common, external threat perceived by the governments both of the dominant nations and of the more compliant subset of the dominated countries.

This study has not attempted to test such political influences on Assembly voting behavior. But the results presented here do indicate that factors other than the four trade-related determinants were at work. In other words, dependence relations have almost certainly been accompanied by many other types of motives that prompted Assembly delegates to cast their votes with and against the U.S. As Bruce Russett points out, some Assembly votes are based on domestic political considerations. At other times, roll call positions may reflect international, systemic pressures, even vote trading among delegations.[40]

Moreover, the character of global hierarchy is often said to have changed in important ways in the past decade. Accordingly, at least some of the salient motives of voting choice in the 1960s may no longer prevail. The growing scarcities of finite resources have already altered the fortunes of oil exporting countries. Whether or not comparable cartels will similarly reverse the economic circumstances of other poor societies, it seems likely that governmental leaders in dependencies will continue to be decreasingly compliant in their international economic and political behavior. (Recent anti-U.S. "majority tyranny" in the General Assembly is particularly suggestive in this regard.) If this is the case, then the ambiguous correspondence between theory and evidence found here can only decline in the absence of more adequate explanations of such international relations.

---

[38] Vital, *Inequality of States*, p. 90.

[39] See, for example, Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), especially chapter 5.

[40] This distinction between domestic and international factors is pursued by Russett, *International Regions*, chaps. 4 and 5.

Nevertheless, a continuing focus on global hierarchies is encouraged by the findings of the research reported here and, more broadly, by the near certainty that international asymmetries will persist in the foreseeable future.

Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective*

FRED H. WILLHOITE, JR.
Coe College

My central argument: There seem to be good reasons to believe that man's biological nature incorporates strong propensities to establish and sustain dominance-deference hierarchies within his social groupings; that is, the stratification of political authority, power, and influence may be *by nature* intrinsic to human social existence. If this hypothesis is tenable, a presupposition common to both liberal and radical political thought must be critically reconsidered and perhaps drastically revised.

The validity and utility of evolutionary-biological (or biobehavioral) analysis of political behavior are almost certainly not widely assumed, accepted, or even thought about very much, so far, by the great majority of political scientists. Nevertheless, this is a mode of analysis of human behavior that, in a variety of forms, is increasingly utilized by zoologists (especially ethologists, who study animal behavior), psychologists, anthropologists, and even a few sociologists.[1] Furthermore, there has been some writing along these lines by political scientists.[2]

Because numerous explanations and justifications of the basic premises of an evolutionary-biological perspective on human behavior appear in the sources which have been cited so far, I shall not present here any elaborate statement and defense of this approach.[3] Put very briefly, it involves assuming as the fundamental paradigm for the study of all living things (including man) the modern "neo-Darwinian" theory of evolution: species diverge and evolve as a result of the interactions of genetic variability, mutation, genetic recombination, and natural selection for fitness in given environments.[4] Since not merely the physical structure of an animal but also its behavior determines its evolutionary fitness, natural selection shapes the behavioral capabilities and propensities of every species and every individual.[5] Although in the hominid (prehuman and human species) line, generalized learning ability and intelligent adaptability have been strongly selected for, it is legitimate

---

* I am greatly indebted to Duane M. Rumbaugh, Georgia State University, for inspiring me to plunge into the primate literature, and to R. R. Larsen, Dalhousie University, and Roger D. Masters, Dartmouth College, for reading an earlier draft of this paper. Their criticisms were invaluable, but, of course, I alone should be held responsible for this final version.

[1] E. g., zoologists: Konrad Lorenz, *Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour,* Vol. II, trans. by Robert Martin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); N. Tinbergen, "On War and Peace in Animals and Man," *Science,* 160 (June 28, 1968), 1411–1418; Robert Bigelow, "The Evolution of Cooperation, Aggression, and Self-Control," in *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1972,* ed. James K. Cole and Donald D. Jensen (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 1–57; psychologists: John Nash, *Developmental Psychology: A Psychobiological Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1970); Donald O. Hebb, *Textbook of Psychology* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 3rd ed., 1972), esp. chap. 11, "Emotion and Motivation: The Social Context"; anthropologists: J. N. Spuhler, "Sociocultural and Biological Inheritance in Man," in *Genetics,* ed. David C. Glass (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1968), pp. 102-110; V. Reynolds, "Open Groups in Hominid Evolution," *Man,* 1 (December, 1966), 441–452; Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, *The Imperial Animal* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971); sociologists: Bruce Eckland, "Genetics and Sociology: A Reconsideration," *American Sociological Review,* 32 (April, 1967), 173–194; Allan Mazur and Leon S. Robertson, *Biology and Social Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1972).

[2] E. g., Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science," *World Politics,* 23 (April, 1971), 321–370; Roger D. Masters, "Genes, Language, and Evolution," *Semiotica,* 2,4 (1970), 295–320; Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., "Ethology and the Tradition of Political Thought," *Journal of Politics,* 33 (August, 1971), 615–641. For a cataloguing of political science articles influenced in a variety of ways by biological considerations, see Albert Somit, "Review Article: Biopolitics," *British Journal of Political Science,* 2 (April, 1972), 209–238.

[3] I would especially recommend to the curious reader, however, two of the most clearly written introductions to biobehavioral thinking: Robin Fox, "The Cultural Animal," in *Man and Beast: Comparative Social Behavior,* ed. J. F. Eisenberg and Wilton S. Dillon (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), pp. 273–296; Bigelow, "The Evolution of Cooperation, Aggression, and Self‘Control." A work that may become a basic point of reference for all biobehavioral thinking is Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975).

[4] For lucid explanations of this theory, see Theodosius Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); George Gaylord Simpson, *The Meaning of Evolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, revised ed., 1967), esp. chap. 14, "Forces of Evolution and Their Integration."

[5] For a review and explanation of some of the experimental evidence and basic theory on this point, see Gerald E. McClearn, "Behavioral Genetics: An Overview," *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development,* 14 (January, 1968), 9–24.

to infer that we have inherited both cognitive and affective biases which significantly and differentially influence our learning processes.[6] That is, because we are the products of an evolutionary history, we are genetically "programmed" to learn and persist in certain kinds of behaviors much more readily than is the case with other possible behaviors (and probably also, to a limited degree, to respond in stereotyped ways to certain types of stimuli). This does not necessarily mean that a particular behavior is *inevitable,* rather that heredity significantly affects the *probability* of its development.[7]

Setting out from these premises, how might we discover what kinds of evolved behavioral propensities in man may be relevant to comprehending and theorizing about political behavior? This effort invariably requires speculation about the nature of man's evolution, given the paucity, so far, of knowledge of the human behavioral genotype. Speculation can be, of course, more or less well grounded in and consistent with available evidence. The principal types of data used thus far in efforts to reconstruct the course of hominid evolution are studies of the behavior of other animal species (especially subhuman primates), interpretations of prehominid and hominid fossils, and observations of the behavior of contemporary Stone Age peoples. There are major problems in the evolutionary interpretation of each of these categories of data, but new discoveries of considerable significance and suggestiveness are constantly being reported—especially in the areas of primate behavior and hominid fossil-hunting. Reconstructions based on scientifically conscientious speculation seem at least deserving of serious consideration by all students of human behavior.

Relevance of Primate Studies

So far as scientific evidence is concerned, I shall focus primarily upon studies and interpretations of subhuman primate behavior, a field which has developed rapidly only in the past fifteen years. Carefully drawn analogies (and, to some degree, perhaps, homologies)[8] between behavior patterns in monkeys and apes and human behaviors are both legitimate and enlightening. A leading primate behavior theorist and an anthropologist conclude: " . . . to understand human societies, one needs to discover the lineaments of them in subhuman primate societies. This now seems possible."[9]

Monkeys and apes are considered to be of great significance for the study of man primarily because they are our nearest evolutionary relatives. Among the major primate groups, divergences from common ancestors occurred, probably, from about ten to fifty million years ago. Most recently on this time scale predecessors of present-day great apes (chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans) and of hominids diverged; next most recently, precursors of Old World monkeys (e.g., macaques, baboons) diverged from the primate line that eventually led to man; and long before that time, the New World monkeys (e.g., spider monkeys, squirrel monkeys) had differentiated from the primate line which ultimately produced Old World monkeys, apes, and hominids. An eminent primatologist points out that man shares a considerable degree of genetic potential with apes and monkeys and that anthropoid primates have been very conservative species which have departed little from the ancestral pattern of primate structure. Thus, he concludes, it is quite reasonable to assume that studies of ape and monkey behavior can provide indirect evidence for the impact of evolution on man's behavior. Especially is this the case if the species studied lives in an environment similar to that which early man probably inhabited (presumably because in different ecological settings differing phenotypical behaviors will be manifested by separate populations of the same species — if the genotypical behavioral range of a species is relatively broad).[10]

---

[6] Nash, *Developmental Psychology,* pp. 59, 116, 158, 233; David A. Hamburg, "Emotions in the Perspective of Human Evolution," in *Expression of the Emotions in Man,* ed. Peter H. Knapp (New York: International Universities Press, 1963), 300–317; Sherwood L. Washburn and David A. Hamburg, "The Study of Primate Behavior," in *Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes,* ed. Irven DeVore (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 5–6.

[7] The computer "programming" analogy is developed in effective heuristic fashion in Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal,* chap. 1, "Beginning Biogrammar." For a wealth of clearly explicated experimental evidence for the biobehavioral perspective, see *Biological Boundaries of Learning,* ed. Martin E. P. Seligman and Joanne L. Hager (New York: Appleton-Century-crofts, 1972).

[8] For a helpful attempt to specify the levels of comparison between human behavior and that of other species, see Roger D. Masters, "Functional Approaches to Analogical Comparison Between Species," Paper presented at Conference on the Logic of Inference from Animal to Human Behavior, sponsored by the International Council on the Social Sciences, 1973. Masters distinguishes between a biological "analogy," which refers to common functions served by similar behaviors, and "homology," in which similarities between species stem from a common evolutionary ancestry. (Thus "those characteristics which are more or less common to all primates" might well constitute homologies. [Masters, personal communication.])

[9] Michael R. A. Chance and Clifford J. Jolly, *Social Groups of Monkeys, Apes and Men* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1970), p. 209. The following are examples of anthropologists' attempts to reconstruct the origins of man and of his species-typical behavioral propensities, largely on the basis of primate studies: Reynolds, "Open Groups in Hominid Evolution"; Robin Fox, "In the Beginning: Aspects of Hominid Behavioural Evolution," *Man,* 2, (September, 1967), 415–433; C. J. Jolly, "The Seed-Eaters: A New Model of Hominid Differentiation Based on a Baboon Analogy," *Man,* 5 (March, 1970), 5–26.

In regard to my central argument, then, what might we learn from primate behavior studies that may help us to comprehend a behavioral pattern ubiquitously noted in human societies — the differential distribution of authority, power, and influence (political stratification)? Essentially, I agree that "political institutions, and particularly high ranking political roles, seem functionally analogous to dominance hierarchies such as those found among many primates."[11] But further, this question must be considered: how likely does it seem that these functional similarities stem, in part, from evolved behavioral propensities common to man and other primate species?

Difficulties and complications immediately arise in attempting to discern the behavioral referents of "dominance" in various studies of primate behavior. (Other terms which are sometimes used, apparently as synonyms of "dominance," are "status hierarchy" and "rank order.") Frequently the direction and outcome of agonistic encounters (threats and attacks) are used as indicators of dominance; in other cases a primary measure is differential access to incentives (e.g., food, estrous females, favored resting places); and sometimes a study focuses on leadership (or "forefronting") of group movement. These — and other proposed measures of rank order — are not invariably intercorrelated in every group of every primate species that has been studied.[12] Despite formidable methodological difficulties and, sometimes, conceptual ambiguity, almost every study of primate social groupings among a wide variety of species has discerned definite rank differentiations among group members. Very frequently these relationships have been more clearly evidenced in deferential and submissive behaviors than in assertive and intrusive activities. This point is emphasized by Hans Kummer, a leading student — both in field and in laboratory settings — of baboon behavior; Kummer asserts that it is the general rule among primate species that younger and weaker individuals defer to older and stronger ones and that males rank higher than females of the same age. Each group member learns its own rank of dominance. Fighting to determine or clarify rank order is relatively infrequent (but can be decisive when it does occur). The dominance order within a group seems to result primarily from some individuals learning — through experience — automatic deference to certain others, with respect to agonistic encounters or access to incentives.[13]

Four Primate Species

Credence may more readily attach to these generalizations if the nature and structure of

---

[10] John Napier, *The Roots of Mankind* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970), p. 219. An important animal behavior approach that supplements significantly the primatologists' efforts to understand human behavior is the study of predators. Since man evolved as a hunter-gatherer, "human social systems are the product of the selective forces operating on man the primate and man the carnivore . . . " (George B. Schaller and Gordon R. Lowther, "The Relevance of Carnivore Behavior to the Study of Early Hominids," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,* 25 [Winter, 1969], 336). Study of hunting species may reveal types of selective forces and convergent patterns of adaptation intrinsic to this way of life — despite the enormous phylogenetic distance between predators and man. Evidence thus far is somewhat equivocal, but there appear to be intraspecies competition and some forms — widely varying — of dominance-submission behavior in lions, hyenas, wild dogs, and wolves. The analogies between wolf pack structure and behavior and human social groups are especially striking. On lions, see George B. Schaller, *The Serengeti Lion: A Study of Predator-Prey Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), esp. chap. 5; on hyenas, Hans Kruuk, *The Spotted Hyena: A Study of Predation and Social Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), esp. chap. 6; on wild dogs, Hugo and Jane van Lawick-Goodall, *Innocent Killers* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 49–101; on wolves, Jerome H. Woolpy, "The Social Organization of Wolves," *Natural History,* 77 (May, 1968), 46–55, and L. David Mech, *The Wolf: The Ecology and Behavior of an Endangered Species* (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1970), esp. chap. 3. For a preliminary attempt to compare the behavior of primates and carnivores to presumed behavior patterns of man's ancestors, see Schaller and Lowther, "The Relevance of Carnivore Behavior to the Study of Early Hominids."

[11] Roger D. Masters, "On Comparing Humans — and Human Politics — with Animal Behavior," Paper presented to 1973 International Political Science Association Congress, p. 10.
Congress, p. 10.

[12] Irwin S. Bernstein, "Primate Status Hierarchies," in *Primate Behavior: Developments in Field and Laboratory Research,* Vol. I, ed. Leonard A. Rosenblum (New York and London: Academic Press, 1970), pp. 71–109.

[13] Hans Kummer, *Primate Societies: Group Techniques of Ecological Adaptation* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 58–61. The tentativeness of all generalizations must be persistently kept in mind in considering observational data from such a recently developed and rapidly changing field as primate behavior study.

dominance hierarchies in some particular primate groups are succinctly reviewed. I have singled out for this treatment studies of rhesus macaques, savanna-dwelling baboons, gorillas, and chimpanzees — primarily because one or more of these species has been commonly treated as the primate from which we might draw the most nearly valid analogies concerning the behavior of our prehominid and early hominid ancestors.[14]

The rhesus macaque is a primarily terrestrial monkey native to India and some neighboring areas of southern Asia. The representatives of this species whose behavior has been most intensively studied, however, live on Cayo Santiago, a small island off the east coast of Puerto Rico; these are descendants of a breeding stock transplanted to this location by a primatologist in 1938.[15]

In his study, Kaufmann found in a troop of about 150 monkeys a clear-cut linear dominance hierarchy among the adult males, as determined by physical displacements of one animal by another and by the direction of aggressive and submissive signals. There appeared to be distinct rank orders both for different groups of males and for individuals within those groupings. Most dominant were mature adult males in a "central hierarchy." Next in line were young adult males who tended to act together as a group to defend against attacks on one of them by other males; some of these young males were beginning to infiltrate the central hierarchy. Lowest in the male rank order were animals that were mainly orphans or sons of females in other bands; because of their usual location in relation to the rest of the band, these are referred to as "peripheral males." (In the study of macaques in India, a similar band structure was found. There was, however, less clear-cut ranking of every individual male, because two males who ranked lower than another individual would frequently team up to become dominant over him.[16] This kind of "coalition behavior" will be noted as significant also for savanna-dwelling baboons and chimpanzees.)

What are the social functions of the dominance hierarchy in the rhesus band? The "alpha" (most dominant individual) male was usually followed by the females in the band who had young infants. Although he infrequently initiated group movement, an initiative was seldom successful unless he participated in it. When the band was on the move, the males in the central hierarchy tended to remain in the center of its ranks, along with most of the females and infants. These dominant males also intervened to stop nearly every fight that was observed to break out between any other members of the band; this was done usually by running toward the combatants and threatening them visually or vocally. Finally, a positive correlation was noted between males' ranks and the extent of their mating behavior; presumably the higher ranking males were most successful in fathering offspring.[17]

Savanna-dwelling baboons live in numerous areas of southern and eastern Africa, and their behavior has been studied fairly extensively in the field.[18] These monkeys are close evolutionary kin to the macaques, and are similar to them behaviorally in many ways. Thus a type of male dominance hierarchy found among some baboon troops appears to be a linear rank order with one adult male clearly and consistently in the alpha position.[19] But in other troops the dominance hierarchy involves a more complex form of the "teaming" or "coalition" behavior observed among macaques in India. (In these studies, dominance was determined by noting relatively stereotyped aggressive sequences among males and, to a lesser degree, by differential access to incentives such as estrous females and food provided by human observers.)[20]

Usually (though not invariably), if there are three or more adult males in the troop, the more complex kind of hierarchy develops. For example, in one troop there were six fully adult males. Three of these animals frequently teamed with one another to defend against challenges or attacks from other adult males. None of the other three males in the band was ever seen to co-operate with any other individual. Thus, although one of these latter was individually the most dominant male in the band, any two or all three of the "co-operators" together were dominant over him. The latter trio were therefore considered to be the "central hierarchy" of the band. In another band, the significance of "coalition behavior" for dominance structure became clearly evident when one member of a two-male central hierarchy disappeared. Almost at once a formerly subordinate male displaced the remaining member of the central hierarchy and was soon joined in a new coalition of that type by a male that had only recently joined the band.[21] Membership in the troop's central hierarchy seemed to facilitate a male's success in copulating with females at the peak of estrus (when they are most likely to conceive), even as compared to individually *more* dominant males outside the central hierarchy.[22]

---

[14] For such assertions about baboons and macaques, see Napier, p. 219; about chimpanzees, see Alison Jolly, *The Evolution of Primate Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 132.

[15] For a study of this species in one of its native habitats, see Charles H. Southwick, Mirza Azhar Beg, and M. Rafiq Siddiqi, "Rhesus Monkeys in North India," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 111–159. Most of the description and analysis of rhesus behavior in the text is drawn from one of the Cayo Santiago studies: John H. Kaufmann, "Social Relations of Adult Males in a Free-ranging Band of Rhesus Monkeys," in *Social Communication Among Primates*, ed. Stuart A. Altmann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 73–98.

[16] Southwick *et al*, pp. 144–151.

[17] Kaufmann, *passim*.

[18] This account is based on K.R.L. Hall and Irven DeVore, "Baboon Social Behavior," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 53–110; and on I. DeVore, "Male Dominance and Mating Behavior in Baboons," in *Sex and Behavior*, ed. Frank A. Beach (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 266–289.

[19] Such a structure was reported in five troops by Hall and DeVore, p. 54.

[20] DeVore, "Male Dominance and Mating Behavior in Baboons, p. 269.

The social functions of the dominance hierarchy appear to be quite similar to those discerned in bands of macaques. Troop members ordinarily orient their attention to and follow the cues of the most dominant males. Thus, in troop movements, even though less dominant males usually go ahead of the troop, these animals sometimes get temporarily separated from the body of the troop because the central hierarchy males have taken another direction. As with the macaques, the most dominant males ordinarily remain in the center of the troop on the move, along with females and their infants. As soon as any strange or predatory animal is sighted (usually signalled by a barking sound from one of the peripheral males ahead, behind, or at the side of the troop), the central hierarchy males rush to confront in concert whatever danger may be present. Also like macaques, dominant male baboons — and almost exclusively the most dominant — frequently intervene to break up fights among other members of the troop, usually by means of noisy and menacing agonistic threats which seldom result in actual fighting. In sum, "the main characteristics of baboon social organization . . . are derived from a complex dominance pattern among adult males that usually ensures stability and comparative peacefulness within the group, maximum protection for mothers with infants, and the highest probability that offspring will be fathered by the most dominant males."[23]

The primate species which are phylogenetically nearest to man are the African great apes — the gorilla and the chimpanzee.[24] The gorilla is an endangered species now confined to certain lowland and mountainous rainforest areas of central Africa. Only the mountain gorilla has thus far been studied in the wild, but considerable attention has been given to its dominance-oriented behavior.[25]

Gorillas live in relatively permanent groups of from two to thirty individuals. They wander daily over large home ranges, feeding on relatively abundant types of plants. A typical group consists of one or more fully mature ("silver-backed") males, several females, half a dozen juveniles and infants, and one or more less mature ("black-backed") males. Also some "lone males" were observed (though no lone females); these animals seemed to associate freely with certain groups but never remained with any group for an extended period of time.

Group organization is quite cohesive. It features a central core composed of a dominant silver-backed male and all of the females and young. All other males, both silver-backed and black-backed, tend to assume peripheral positions as the group spreads out over a relatively small area (rarely exceeding two hundred square feet) to feed. Rank order largely correlates with body size; silver-backed males are dominant over all black-backed males, females, and young. If there are two or more silver-backed males in a group, they are arranged in a linear dominance hierarchy.

Dominance is most often expressed with respect to positions along narrow trails or in favored sitting places. A subordinate animal ordinarily moves aside to be supplanted by a dominant individual; the latter's mere approach or brief stare at the subordinate is usually a sufficient stimulus to effect this change. Occasionally the dominant animal gives the lower-ranking one a light tap with the back of the hand, which always produces movement by the subordinate.

---

[21] DeVore, p. 280.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 274, 281.

[23] Hall and DeVore, p. 71.

[24] For a lucid explanation of the evidence for this evolutionary relationship, see S. L. Washburn and Ruth Moore, *Ape Into Man: A Study of Human Evolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 11–29.

[25] This description is based primarily on George B. Schaller, "The Behavior of the Mountain Gorilla," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 324–367. For a much more elaborate account of the same study, see George B. Schaller, *The Mountain Gorilla: Ecology and Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

The dominant male in a gorilla group functions as its leader. Every group member seems to be constantly aware of the activity of the "alpha" male, and cues reflecting a change in the activity of the group are taken from him. Every part of the daily routine — travel, location of rest stops and feeding places, time and place of nesting — appears to be largely determined by the leader. In one case of a perceived external threat (the human observer), the leader dropped behind the fleeing group to face the intruder. When the group is moving rapidly, the leader is at or near the front of it; when its movements are slow, he is often located in the center or near the end of the group. Maintenance of order does not appear to be a significant function of the dominant male-leader — primarily because intragroup aggressiveness is confined to staring, snapping at, or bluff-charging another group member. Even these kinds of interactions were extremely rare.[26]

The final species included in this brief survey is the chimpanzee, which lives in rainforest and woodland areas of central Africa.[27] Until very recently, it was believed that chimpanzees do not live in closed, permanent groups, as do savanna baboons and macaques. Jane Goodall reported that, within a large home range, chimpanzees move about in small temporary groups which may consist of any combination of age and sex classes: "The only group that may be stable over a period of several years is a mother with her infant and young juvenile offspring."[28]

But in 1971, dramatic changes began to occur in the life of the Gombe Reserve (Tanzania) chimpanzee population which Goodall and her colleagues have been observing for a decade and a half. The whole large group suddenly divided into two separate groups, which occupied distinct territories and became overtly aggressive toward each other. Young males now "patrol" the boundaries between their group's territory and their "enemy's." These terms may seem overly anthropomorphic, but when such "patrols" sight a lone chimp not belonging to their group, they are likely to chase that individual and attack viciously if the outsider is caught. Several all-out bloody fights between members of these two groups have been witnessed, and at least three infants and three adults have been fatally wounded since early 1974.[29]

The early field reports on chimpanzee behavior[30] also reported such a paucity of dominance-submission interactions that Goodall questioned the feasibility of applying the dominance concept to a local chimpanzee population as a whole. Further study has persuaded her, however, that hierarchy and dominance are central features of chimpanzee group life. Although the hierarchy is not a neat and rigid progression of linear dominance, both high- and low-ranking individuals usually have clear-cut statuses. An individual's rank may vary, depending upon the social-behavioral context (e.g., the presence or absence of other family members), an individual's current motivation level, or the animal's "mood."[31]

However, Goodall determined that, in general, "the social status of each individual was . . . fairly well defined."[32] In dyadic encounters — usually competition for bananas provided by the observers — which animals would prevail became highly predictable. Furthermore, some animals frequently vacated favored resting places when approached by certain others. In such interactions, all females were normally subordinate to all mature males.

The male dominance structure is somewhat similar to that of savanna baboons, although dominance-deference interactions appear to be less frequent among chimpanzees than among baboons. The basic common feature is the presence of co-operative, or "coalition"-type behavior within the dominance-competition context in both species. As with baboons, two chimpanzees may combine to express dominance over a single animal to which both "coalition" partners are individually subordinate. But at any time within a group, one male clearly occupies the "alpha" position; he most frequently threatens and sometimes attacks the other males but is almost never attacked and seldom threatened by any of them. Infrequently, certain young but mature males try to displace the current alpha male. Within the Gombe population, three successful attempts have been observed, and in two cases the challenger was supported closely in agonistic encounters by another mature male (known in one case to be the challenger's brother). Some males seem much more highly motivated to engage in dominance competition than do others, and intelligence seems to be more important than size and strength as a determinant of success in rising to the alpha position.[33]

---

[26] Much more aggressiveness and activity than Schaller noted has been observed by Dian Fossey, who is currently engaged in a much longer-term study of mountain gorillas than was Schaller's. E.g., she observed some skirmishes between gorilla groups and, in three cases, saw lone males enter a group and engage in fights in which infants were killed (Jane Goodall, "Intra-specific Aggression," Lecture delivered to Human Biology Core Course, Stanford University, October 17, 1975).

[27] Most of our information on chimpanzee behavior comes from studies done by or under the direction of Jane Goodall, whose observations in the field began in 1960 and are still continuing. To date (January, 1976) her most comprehensive scientific report is Jane van Lawick-Goodall, "The Behaviour of Free-Living Chimpanzees in the Gombe Stream Reserve," *Animal Behaviour Monographs,* 1, part 3 (1968), 165–311. See also Jane Goodall, "Chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream Reserve," in *Primate Behavior,* ed. DeVore, pp. 425–473 (Jane Goodall and Jane van Lawick-Goodall are the same person); also Vernon Reynolds and Frances Reynolds, "Chimpanzees of the Budongo Forest," in the same volume, pp. 368–424.

[28] Van Lawick-Goodall, p. 167. In their study, the Reynoldses concurred (pp. 393–396).

[29] Goodall, "Intra-specific Aggression"; see also Michael T. Malloy, "Man See, Man Do," *National Observer* (December 6, 1975), 1, 18.

[30] Those of Goodall and the Reynoldses in *Primate Behavior.*

[31] Jane Goodall, "Social Hierarchy and Dominance," Lecture delivered to Human Biology Core Course, Stanford University, October 13, 1975.

[32] Van Lawick-Goodall, p. 212.

Discerning the adaptive functions of dominance-deference behavior in chimpanzees is very difficult, and the leading observers of their behavior in the wild have largely refrained from speculating on this point. The recent events at Gombe suggest the possibility that the hierarchical order may serve, in most circumstances, to restrain overt expressions of the dangerous — even deadly — aggressiveness which these animals have now surprisingly manifested. But why they are that aggressive is another unsolved evolutionary puzzle; the aggressiveness might be, in part, a phylogenetic holdover from an earlier, savanna-dwelling phase of chimpanzee evolution.[34] But perhaps, ironically, comparisons with human behavior might prove to be the most promising route for arriving at some understanding of intraspecifically lethal, group-territorial aggressive behavior in chimpanzees.

Primate-based Stratification Concepts

A sociologist has recently argued that biologically based proclivities may well be a cause of dominance-deference behavior in various primate species, including man.[35] Mazur points out that status differentiation within established face-to-face groups exists in all known human cultures. Extracting from the sociological literature seven characteristics typical of such status orders, he seeks to compare the behavior of seven primate species — ranging from the most primitive in evolutionary terms, the tree shrew, to man's nearest relatives, chimpanzees and gorillas — with respect to these traits of human groups. On the basis of admittedly incomplete evidence, Mazur concludes that most of these status-relevant behaviors are manifested in subhuman primate species and that a trend seems to exist for more of these traits to appear in species which are closer to than those which are more distant from man on the evolutionary time-scale. He concludes that status differentiation *as such* (i.e., the underlying pattern of motivation for the great variety of particular forms this phenomenon assumes among different groups in diverse cultures) very probably has a "noncultural" (phylogenetic) basis. Indeed, he tentatively advances an even broader suggestion: "Perhaps sociologists whose interests are limited to humans should accept cross-species behaviors as 'given' and requiring no further explanation, as most of us accept hunger and the sex drive as given."[36]

The relevance of primate behavior studies to the understanding of political stratification in human societies may be clarified somewhat through consideration of two theoretical conceptions that have been advanced by primatologists. One of these is an essentially functional concept: Bernstein notes that in numerous species of Old and New World monkeys and apes (including the species reviewed above, except perhaps for the chimpanzee), a "control role," "defending group or troop members against internal and external sources of disturbance, has been recognized . . ." This social role has been noted in nearly all species which manifest strong intragroup dominance relationships and also in some species in which rank order is either difficult to discern or very poorly developed.[37]

---

[33] Van Lawick-Goodall, p. 212; Goodall, "Social Hierarchy and Dominance."

[34] According to Robin Fox, recent Japanese work indicates that the chimpanzee once had a wider distribution and lived in open territory. When faced with open country, chimpanzee groups became tightly organized in apparent expectation of predatory attacks; for example, such groups exclude young, subadult males. (Robin Fox, "Alliance and Constraint: Sexual Selection in the Evolution of Human Kinship Systems, in *Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man 1871–1971,* ed. Bernard Campbell [Chicago: Aldine, 1972], p. 295.)

[35] Allan Mazur, "A Cross-Species Comparison of Status in Small Established Groups," *American Sociological Review,* 38 (October, 1973), 513–530.

[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 513-514, 517-525, 526. Mazur's argument strikes me as consistent with the primate data and as logically persuasive. I believe that he is unnecessarily restrictive, however, in asserting that "there is no biological justification" for concluding that "large-scale social stratification must also be a noncultural characteristic" (p. 527). While it is certainly correct that macro-stratification has not been observed in nonhuman primates, that is fundamentally because of man's most important species distinction — an enormously developed symbolizing capacity, manifested primarily through language. In a book which Mazur cites because of his apparent disagreement with its authors on this point, Tiger and Fox argue cogently that the macrostructures of human societies exist only because of man's symbolic-cultural capacities but that symbolism mainly and fundamentally expresses variations on a finite number of behavioral themes which may be discerned by means of thorough and careful cross-species comparisons. (*The Imperial Animal,* pp. 10–20, 34–35, 217–18.)

Recently Bernstein has suggested that an established rank order within a primate group contributes to the regularity and predictability of individuals' responses and thus to the ordered distribution of roles — essentially to the maintenance of order — within the group. He even concludes that intragroup aggression seems "to be motivated *primarily* by efforts to preserve established social position and to enforce expected patterns of social behavior, rather than resulting from active competition leading to conflict."[38] In sum, social order itself — at least among a number of primate species — may be mainly a consequence of individuals' motivations to establish and maintain places for themselves in a dominance-deference rank order.

A somewhat more highly developed conception — a kind of "proto-theory" — has been formulated by Michael Chance and elaborated by him in collaboration with Clifford Jolly.[39] Chance is leery of functional generalizations, given the fragmentary state of current data on primate behavior. He considers a structural conception to be much more tenable and thus advances the idea of "attention structure" as the behavioral common denominator in most, if not all, rank-oriented primate groups. Instead of differential access to incentives,

> A more rewarding way of defining the dominance status of a supremely dominant individual is that he or she is the *focus of attention* of those holding subordinate status within the same group. . . .
> A redefinition of dominance is now proposed on the assumption that the attention-binding effect of an animal in a group is essentially the quality which puts it in a behaviourally focal position, and which also tends to place it near the group's spatial centre. The dominant animal therefore may be said to dominate the attention of others at most, if not all, times, and usually without specific actions to do so.[40]

In this perspective, the focus is on the behavior of subordinates as much as if not more than on that of dominant animals, and the differential distribution of group members' attention does appear to hold consistently across group structures in many more primate species than is the case with aggressive dominance or linear rank order. Among savanna baboons and macaques the central hierarchy males are very much the predominant focus of attention, both of females, who remain relatively near them, and of peripheral males, who most often remain a certain distance away from the spatial center of the troop. Members of a gorilla group seem to take nearly all their behavioral cues from the dominant silver-backed male, while other mature males remain in locations peripheral to the core of the group. Processes of group movement and of inter-male agonistic competition in chimpanzees indicate that some of these animals tend to exert an attention-binding effect on the others.[41] The "attention structure" concept also seems to account for rank order behavior among species not specifically discussed above, such as Japanese and bonnet macaques and hamadryas baboons.[42]

Of critical importance for Chance's proto-theory is the "concept of attention structure as a *cause* as well as an effect" of dominance.[43] For it is on this hypothesis that Chance and Jolly base their interpretation of charismatic leadership (in Weber's sense) in human societies. Rather than being attended to because of his position in the official dominance hierarchy, the charismatic individual attains some kind and degree of dominance by means of his capacity to attract the attention of individuals who then become his adherents. In times of severe social crisis, confused and frightened people are more likely to attend to individuals who promise them personal or political salvation solely on the authority of that individual's distinctive personhood or the doctrine which he seems to embody. Because such individuals tend to receive attention far out of proportion to their objective ability to remedy the perceived crisis, "in attempting to explain charismatic movements we should look for the operation of an ethologically based attention-binding mechanism." Further evidence for such a "mechanism" is that not infrequently political leaders "capture the primitive allegiance of groups of men without necessarily having displayed a policy at that stage."[44]

---

[37] Bernstein, "Primate Status Hierarchies," p. 74.

[38] Irwin S. Bernstein and Thomas P. Gordon, "The Function of Aggression in Primate Societies," *American Scientist*, 62 (May–June, 1974), 308.

[39] The initial formulation occurs in M. R. A. Chance, "Attention Structure as the Basis of Primate Rank Orders," *Man*, 2 (December, 1967), 503–518; see also Chance and Jolly, *Social Groups of Monkeys, Apes, and Men*, pp. 173–175.

[40] Chance, p. 509. Emphasis in the original.

[41] A particularly dramatic instance of rank-order change — one male's displacing another in the alpha position — can be readily interpreted as demonstrating the importance of attention structure among chimpanzees. This transformation was caused by an adult male's discovering some empty kerosene cans, seizing them, and using them to make an unusually horrendous noise during a ritualistic "charging run," one of the principal forms of dominance competition among adult males of this species. The attention that he thereby drew to himself persisted, and — after several nonviolent agonistic contests — he was deferred to by all other group members, including the previous alpha male. See Jane van Lawick-Goodall, "Some Aspects of Aggressive Behaviour in a Group of Free-living Chimpanzees," *International Social Science Journal*, 23, 1 (1971), 93–95; also van Lawick-Goodall, *In the Shadow of Man* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 112–117.

[42] Chance and Jolly, p. 174. Some criticisms of the "attention structure" conception are mentioned briefly in Alison Jolly, *The Evolution of Primate Behavior*, pp. 192–193.

[43] Chance, p. 511. My emphasis.

Several anthropologists have attempted thus far to apply Chance's "attention structure" concept to the analysis of human political and social status hierarchies.[45]

I shall single out for brief discussion Larsen's formulations, since he seeks to integrate Bernstein's "control role" into the "attention structure" framework. Specifically, Larsen speculates that the control role — "defending group or troop members against internal and external sources of disturbance" — is the primary *function* of the centripetal hierarchical attention *structure*.[46]

From this perspective, Larsen seeks to reinterpret Weber's typology of traditional, legal, and charismatic authority. It seems more parsimonious to propose that there may be only one basic *type* of authority — a centripetal attention structure — and that Weber's "types" represent various stages or manifestations of this pattern. "Charismatic leadership" would thus "be viewed as a raw expression of attention structuring and the process of recreating centripetal hierarchy." This "primitive adaptive process" meets the urgent needs of followers in crisis circumstances, for it "facilitates group cohesion, integration, and stress reduction." Traditional and legal authority can be seen, then, as resulting from the routinization and institutionalization of centripetal attention structures (Weber's "routinization of charisma"), and "successful routinization involves providing the same satisfactions as the primitive pattern does."[47]

Evolution and Dominance

The argument that propensities to learn and persist in some form of dominance-deference behavior may well inhere in the human genotype requires some support from the highly controversial sphere of speculations about man's evolutionary history. The hominid fossil record is extremely fragmentary, certainly does not speak for itself, and obviously includes no fossilized behavior (though much can be discerned about diet from teeth, posture and gait from leg bones, manual dexterity from hand bones, and culture from artifacts associated with bones). Nevertheless, holding that we have inherited behavioral proclivities requires some kind of attempt to reconstruct how and why certain behaviors may have evolved — that is, what their adaptive value could have been for our evolutionary ancestors.

Because this topic is very broad and complex, and to do it justice would require extended separate treatment, I shall focus on only one speculative reconstruction[48] — Robert Bigelow's "The Evolution of Cooperation, Aggression, and Self-Control."[49] This account very ably integrates paleontological, anatomical, genetic, ecological, psychological, historical, anthropological, and ethological data (including a significant emphasis on primate behavior) into an explanatory theory of human evolution in which dominance-deference behavior plays an essential part. (The reader should keep very much in mind, however, that Bigelow's version of man's evolution is presented here only as an *example* of such a reconstruction; it is in no sense "proved" or "definitive" and on numerous points is open to honest disagreement and criticism.) Bigelow's central concern is to explain the evolutionary growth in size of the human brain. The fossil record seems to indicate that the brain in the hominid line has at least doubled and perhaps tripled in average size during the past three million years, and that this trend was apparently an accelerating process, with the bulk of the increase occurring during the past million years or less. Within the perspective of evolutionary time, this is an extremely brief period for a structure as incredibly complex as the brain of *Homo sapiens* to develop. (An individual's brain size *per se* does not necessarily signify a particular level of intelligence, but in comparisons between species, size correlates very highly with complexity of organization, hence with species-typical intelligence.) Thus some distinctive selective pressures must have been working upon the hominid line; Bigelow's controversial hypothesis is that the most influential of these forces (in conjunction with generally accepted ones such as tool-making and tool-use) was intergroup competition among hominids — not limited to but definitely including aggressive violence.[50]

---

[44] Chance and Jolly, pp. 208-209.

[45] See, e.g., Lionel Tiger, "Dominance in Human Societies," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, 1 (1970), 298–301; Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, pp. 39–51; R. R. Larsen, "Leaders and Non-Leaders: Speculation on Charisma," Paper presented to 1973 Southern Political Science Association Meeting.

[46] Larsen, p. 3.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

[48] For some other representative viewpoints, see fn. 9.

[49] See fn. 1.

According to Bigelow, it seems possible, even likely, that this is how we evolved: Early hominids, as primates, lived in social groups; intragroup communication and co-ordination were necessary to protect these ground-dwellers against predators such as lions and leopards.[51] Hominids would have needed a capacity to respond aggressively against attacks, coupled with an ability to control potentially disruptive aggression during intragroup encounters. Groups competed occasionally with others for food and mates, though natural selection would have minimized such competition when hominids were seriously vulnerable to predators and thus needed to attend primarily to their defenses against other species. When such intergroup contests did occur, however, their outcome normally was determined by capacities for aggressive and intelligent group response (which necessitates intragroup cooperation).[52]

As brains and, consequently, social capacities, evolved, abilities to deal more effectively with predators increased so that hominid intergroup competition could, and presumably did, intensify (largely for the territories most capable of supporting a hunting-gathering way of life). On the average the most co-operative, intelligently self-controlled groups would have succeeded in driving competing groups into less desirable peripheral areas. Successful human groups were the selective force which pushed less intelligently co-operative groups into relatively inhospitable habitats, severely lessening their chances of contributing to the genetic future of the species. As intelligence increased, some individuals would have become capable of perceiving the advantages of co-operation with groups other than their own; this would have required not only intelligence but self-control in the form of inhibitions against attacking former enemies. A primary motive of intergroup co-operation, presumably, was to compete more effectively with still other human groups, and the selective premium on an optimal combination of intragroup (or intra-coalition) co-operation and intelligent self-control for the sake of effective intergroup competition would have increased. Success stemming from these traits, in a positive feedback process, would have selected for increased size and complexity of the brain.[53]

At some unknown point in hominid evolution, linguistic communication emerged (presumably as a result of selective pressures for more effective communication, building upon a foundation made up of relatively high intelligence in combination with a typical primate capacity for vocalization of signals).[54] This made possible even more highly co-ordinated intragroup activity and may well have intensified group integration. But language differences made communication even more difficult with members of other groups and would have acted as an additional impetus to intergroup misunderstanding and hostility. Thus, "conceptual and emotional differences between 'us' and 'them' would have been accentuated."[55]

Within this scenario for man's evolution, self-control is critical:

> Capacities for self-control are provided by the actual physical structure of the brain, particularly the cerebral cortex. The result of human evolution was not an array of bodiless "instincts," but a network of physical nerves and endocrine organs. As this physical organization became more complex and efficient it provided greater capacities for learning from experience, for the repression of emotional drives, and hence for more intelligent

---

[50] Bigelow, pp. 1–3. That there was an important degree of prehistoric intergroup violence is perhaps Bigelow's most controversial — and controverted — point. This is a fairly typical critique of it by an anthropologist: " . . . the evidence for intergroup violent competition is exceedingly weak when we look at modern hunter-gatherer groups, the pre-historic tool assemblages, and fossil remains. I do agree, however, that there probably was competition between groups and that it was most likely linked to relative efficiency of resource exploitation and rate of population growth rather than aggressive interaction." (R. R. Larsen, personal communication.) Goodall's recent observations, discussed above, of group-territorial aggression in chimpanzees may provide some support for Bigelow's speculations.

[51] Note the stress on the evolutionary importance of predation pressures on savanna baboons, in Irven DeVore and K. R. L. Hall, "Baboon Ecology," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, p. 49.

[52] Bigelow, pp. 3–4.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

[54] For relevant speculations, see Charles F. Hockett and Robert Ascher, "The Human Revolution," *Current Anthropology*, 5 (June, 1964), 135–147.

[55] Bigelow, pp. 42–43.

self-control. Human capacities for learning, communications, government, science, and art are products of biological evolution, just as running, or any other manifestation of animal behavior, is an expression of the biological potential of interacting muscles, bones, and nerves.[56]

"Self-control" (or apparent inhibition of basic drives) is evidenced in many primates—for example, in thirsty baboons waiting till their group as a unit moves to a water source, in an adult male hamadryas baboon's refraining from copulating with members of a neighbor's "harem," and in a central hierarchy savanna baboon's learning not to respond aggressively and competitively to the initiatives of his "coalition partners." In this context, the dominance hierarchy within a primate group can be seen as an evolved control system at a supra-individual level which tends to reinforce the self-control systems built into the nervous systems of individual group members.[57]

Man, Bigelow believes, is a typical primate in these respects. Without using the precise terms, he emphasizes the "control" function of dominance (and of the rules, laws, and customs enforced by dominant authorities) and, implicitly, the significance of a "centripetal attention structure" for coordinating vital intragroup co-operative efforts during the course of hominid evolution. We have inherited this readiness to learn dominance-deference behavior, and, Bigelow asserts, we still cannot do without effective dominance hierarchies. Like our ancestors, we combine capacities for violence and for self-control, but the latter is not automatically sufficient to control the former. We have learned to extend our co-operative self-control from the small scope of prehistoric clans and tribes to that of groups comprising hundreds of millions, but "We are still learning, and until we have learned to live in peace with one another on a global scale we will have to be restrained — by force, if necessary."[58]

Leaders and Followers

From a perspective which seeks to encompass studies and theories of primate behavior and scientific speculations, such as Bigelow's, about the course and behavioral effects of man's evolution, it may prove useful to attempt to reinterpret in a summary way some social-psychological materials on leader-follower behavior. Fiedler's attempts to describe the nature of leadership in face-to-face groups appear to fit readily within the dominance-deference conception analyzed above: "The leader is one who succeeds in getting others to follow him"[59] (focal point of an "attention structure"). "Leadership, essentially, means power over other people . . . we shall here define the leader as the individual in the group who has the task of directing and coördinating task-relevant group activities"[60] (the "control role").

Fiedler strongly emphasizes the interactional, contextual character of leadership: "there are no leaders where there are no followers. Above all, leadership is a relationship."[61] This accords well, I believe, with ethological-evolutionary perspectives. But before trying to clarify that point, it is necessary to discuss briefly the biological conception that (in its vulgar form) some individuals are "born leaders" (or possess "innate dominance").[62] This idea should not be dismissed out of hand, even though it is obviously very much subject to abuse. Fiedler cites a study which found significant correlations between leadership and certain personality traits — e.g., intelligence, alertness, verbal facility, dependability, aggressiveness, sociability, cooperation, adaptability.[63] It is reasonable to assume that genetic capacities for developing these characteristics (given, of course, a supportive environment) vary widely among individuals. More specifically, Bigelow speculates that individual differences in "social intelligence" — the ability to predict the likely responses of others and to control one's emotional reactions under pressure — may rest, in part, upon a phylogenetic basis.[64]

In addition to abilities conducive to effective leadership, motivation to acquire high rank may also involve an innate component:

> . . . There are chiefs because there are, in any human group, men who, unlike most of their companions, enjoy prestige for its own sake, feel a strong appeal to responsibility, and to whom the burden of public affairs brings its own reward. These individual differences are certainly emphasized and "played up" by the different cultures, and to unequal degrees. But their clear-cut existence in a society as little competitive as the Nam-

---

[56] Bigelow, p. 6.

[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 29, 31.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[59] W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 23 (July-September, 1928), 144, quoted in Fred E. Fiedler, "Leadership" (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 2.

[60] Fiedler, pp. 1, 2.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[62] A popularized but stimulating discussion of this idea is presented in Robert Ardrey, *The Social Contract* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 102–136.

[63] Fiedler, p. 4.

[64] Bigelow, pp. 48–51.

> bikuara [the Amazon Indian tribe described in the article] strongly suggests to my mind that their origin itself is not cultural. They are rather part of those psychological raw materials out of which any given culture is made. Men are not all alike; and, in primitive societies . . . these individual differences are as keenly perceived and worked out as in our so-called "individualistic" civilization.[65]

However, no case has yet been made that there are any specific genes for generalized dominance or group leadership. It seems more likely that innate individual differences do exist in the capacity for developing certain personality traits which may enable an individual to become a leader in some circumstances but not in others. This hypothesis is compatible with the conclusion that "a person does not become a leader by virtue of his possession of any one particular pattern of personality traits, but the pattern of personal characteristics of the leader must bear relevant relationship to the present characteristics, activities, and goals of the group of which he is leader."[66]

This returns our attention to the subordinate-follower aspect of dominance-leadership, specifically to the "notion of submissiveness as a basic need in those who follow."[67] Much to this point, I believe, are Stanley Milgram's famous (even notorious) social-psychological "obedience" experiments.[68] They involved placing naive subjects in what they were told was a setting designed to test the effects of punishment on auditory memory. The subject would be seated at a genuine-looking (though phony) "shock generator" and instructed to give word tests to the experimenter's confederate, whom the subject believed to be a volunteer participant like himself. Each time the confederate made an error, the experimenter would order the subject to administer an electric shock to the "learner" by closing a switch. The switches were labeled at 15-volt intervals, from 15 through 450 volts. The experiment was actually intended, of course, to determine how many subjects would obey the "scientific authority's" commands to inflict punishment (supposedly) on a person who had done them no harm.

The experiment was run in many versions, and the principal result was quite astounding. Although both students of psychology and psychiatrists had predicted prior to the experiments that fewer than one-half of one percent of the subject would go all the way to 450 volts on the "shock panel," the actual range in most of the experimental variations was from 30 to 65 percent "fully obedient." Even when the confederate, in an adjoining room, banged on the wall and screamed about his weak heart, begging the subject to stop, 60 percent of the subjects were completely obedient to the experimenter.[69]

In Milgram's interpretation, this extremely surprising outcome resulted from many of the subjects forsaking their own autonomous judgment or "conscience" within the experimental context and entering into an "agentic state." That is, the compliant subjects ceased to evaluate or feel responsible for their own actions and came to consider themselves solely as obedient tools of the scientifically authoritative experimenter (all subjects were told that the experimenter would assume full responsibility for any harm suffered by the "shock victim"). Milgram believes that the rate at which the subjects assumed the "agentic" role indicates that the experiments must have tapped motivational sources too profound to be accounted for wholly in terms of the idiosyncracies of individuals' social conditioning. He turns, therefore, to evolutionary, biobehavioral theorizing as a mode of explaining his experimental results.

Essentially, he stresses the existence and importance of dominance structures within many animal societies and the probable survival values of hierarchy — including efficient division of labor, firmness of social organization, and maintenance of internal group order. He believes that natural selection has also built into the human species a propensity to create and maintain hierarchical social relationships, which entails a propensity to learn readily deference to authority: " . . . we are born with a potential for obedience, which then interacts with the influence of society to produce the obedient man." When such a person finds himself in the presence of a perceived authority-figure, his propensity to enter the "agentic state" is "exceedingly strong, and the shift is not freely reversible."[70]

---

[65] Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Social and Psychological Aspects of Chieftainship in a Primitive Tribe: The Nambikuara of Northwestern Mato Grosso," in *Comparative Political Systems: Studies in the Politics of Pre-Industrial Societies*, ed. Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1967), pp. 61–62.

[66] Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. IV, ed. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 2nd ed., 1969), p. 226.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[68] First reported in Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67 (October, 1963), 371–378; reviewed, analyzed, and interpreted in Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

[69] Milgram, *Obedience to Authority*, pp. 30–35.

The evolutionary theorizing of the late C. H. Waddington may help clarify further both the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of Milgram's "potential for obedience." Waddington stressed the protracted character of infant and childhood dependence (a trend that becomes progressively marked in primate species the nearer their evolutionary relationship to man). This dependence is both made possible and required by the human species' very great reliance upon learning as the individual's primary means of developing adaptive behavior. One ability which must be learned is what Bigelow called "self-control." It seems that the mechanism which we have inherited for controlling our own behavior normally involves accepting completely the authority of those on whom we are dependent when very young. The enormous dependence of our species upon cultural life, including moral norms, has resulted in the evolution of a tendency to "overlearn" and overgeneralize submissiveness to authority-figures and the norms which they supposedly represent.[71]

The evidence and ideas herein discussed that bear upon the dynamics and possible evolved mechanisms of "followership" or submissive behavior appear to provide strong support for Chance's and Larsen's stress upon the importance of the active role of subordinates in the "centripetal attention structure" of a dominance hierarchy. It seems quite likely, then, that phylogenetically determined propensities are profoundly influential on both sides of the leader-follower relationship. That hypothesis is strongly supported by a leading theorist of behavioral evolution: "Social individuals must actually inherit a kind of switch mechanism, which allows them to assume either the dominant or the subordinate role according to circumstances."[72]

To this point in my argument I have attempted, by discussing behavior, analogies, and theories concerning primate behavior, scientific speculation about man's evolution, and some social phychological evidence and concepts, to indicate why it is at least probable that "it is in the nature of human beings as members of a species to create hierarchical orders, some members of which necessarily constitute an elite."[73]

Because that hypothesis is very likely to be misunderstood, I should like — before attempting to explore some of its implications for normative political theory — to state as clearly as possible what my argument does *not* include or imply. I am not asserting that political hierarchies are or ever have been founded exclusively on our genetic proclivities; these can only be expressed through particular, distinctive, and varying cultural patterns and circumstances. I do not argue that economic, educational, and family differences among people do not critically affect individuals' placement within political hierarchies. I am not arguing that any single *type* of dominance hierarchy is the only "natural" pattern; nor do I mean that dominance must necessarily be harsh and repressive and involve extremes of stratification. Finally, I am not asserting, nor do I believe, that deliberate attempts to construct or reconstruct orders of political stratification are necessarily futile, in any sense "unnatural," or doomed to failure; I very definitely do not mean to imply that whatever is, is inevitable. The last thing I desire is to revivify the justly discredited ideas of "Social Darwinism."

The circumstances within which human behavioral capabilities evolved make it quite unlikely that the normal dominance hierarchy within hominid groups constituted a harsh and repressive tyranny. Our ancestors lived by means of hunting and gathering their food until the development of settled agricultural patterns about 8-10,000 years ago. Our phylogenetically conditioned behavioral propensities were shaped largely by the exigencies of leading a successful predatory existence.[74] Among the requirements of such a life are co-operation and integration of all mature males in the hunting group. In those circumstances, it seems more than likely that "dominance must tend toward the mild 'leadership' type . . . "[75]

---

[70] Milgram, pp. 123–125, 134. The possibility that Milgram had instead tapped a hidden wellspring of sadistic aggression is belied by the outcome of one version of his experiment. Subjects were allowed to choose the shock level they would use to punish the "learner." Only one of forty moved all the way up the panel to the "450" switch (*ibid.*, pp. 70–72).

[71] C. H. Waddington, *The Ethical Animal* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), pp. 155–174. Submissive obedience can be, of course, horrendously destructive. E.g., note Hannah Arendt's observation that the vaunted aggressive toughness of Nazi SS men was actually, with few exceptions, "nothing but a myth of self-deception, concealing a ruthless desire for conformity at any price . . . " (Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* [New York: Viking Press, 1963], p. 157.)

[72] V. C. Wynne-Edwards, "Population Control and Social Selection in Animals," in *Genetics*, ed. David C. Glass, p. 162.

[73] Tiger, "Dominance in Human Societies," p. 295.

[74] One of the best brief discussions of the impact of hunting on the evolution of human behavior is Sherwood L. Washburn and C. S. Lancaster, "The Evolution of Hunting," in *Man the Hunter*, ed. Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 293–303. See also fn. 10, above.

Further, as Tiger and Fox point out, humans must have developed a profound need for significant participation in face-to-face groups. Thus, they aver, we are so often frustrated by the remoteness and impersonality of bureaucracy because it is premised on a denial of our craving for a "primate politics" which involves dealing with a few well-known persons face-to-face. Yet bureaucracy —made possible by the symbolizing abilities of the cerebral cortex, the most recently evolved part of the human brain — persists. It does so not only because of its functional indispensability in complex industrialized societies but because its structure builds upon other motivations which were essential for a successful hunting life — loyalty and orderliness, a sense of belonging to an in-group and hostility to outgroups, hierarchy and competition.[76]

Possible Normative Implications

But however mild or harsh particular dominance structures may be or need to be, some kind of dominance will exist in any human society, along with deferential and obedient patterns of behavior. The evolutionary, primate behavior-based argument for this conclusion is clearly summarized by Jerome H. Barkow:

> How do we know . . . that human prestige-striving and nonhuman primate social dominance really share a common origin, that is, are homologous? Since our ancestors were nonhuman primates and primates exhibit social ranking, our ancestors presumably were socially ranked. We evolved from these ancestors while organized in cooperative bands of hunters and gatherers . . . , and organization implies social ranking. It would seem that at no point during our phylogenesis did we lack social hierarchy. If human and nonhuman social dominance have apparently been continuous, they must necessarily be homologous. Cultural systems of social rank are based on, not opposed to, our primate heritage.[77]

It thus seems probable that Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelian view is correct: " . . . it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal, to live in a group. . . . If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, it is necessary that there exist among men some means by which the group may be governed."[78]

I would suggest that this conclusion provides us with a reasonably secure hypothetical basis for theorizing about political obligation and about the problems of shaping political institutions to be optimally responsive to human needs and demands. In the remainder of this discussion, I shall focus primarily on political obligation.

The great progenitors of modern political thought — Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau — share a critical premise: the radically artificial, contrived, contingent character of any and all political authority. Despite the very important differences among them, all three theorists deny that structures of dominance and deference inhere in human nature and concur on the fundamental significance of the question, what can possibly justify the existence of any kind of political authority and obligation? The answer common to all three: only the consent of individuals.

Hobbes and Locke severely qualified this principle for the sake of political order and stability (Hobbes in fact almost, but not quite, qualified it out of existence.) Rousseau, however, attempted in an absolutely serious and literal way to make of it the sole foundation of the polity. Man was originally free — independent, individually isolated except for brief encounters; by virtue of haphazard circumstances developed small-scale societies of mutual accord; but then fell into the chains of extreme dependence and servitude because of the effects of covetousness as manifested in private property.[79] We now know, of course, as Rousseau could not, that every primate species lives within some kind of ordered social group, and that man was never absolutely "free" in the sense of complete isolation and independence.[80] Further, we have seen that dominance hierarchies exist because they have been adaptive in primate evolution — and in species in which, even by analogy, we cannot say that there is "private property."

---

[75] William Etkin, *Social Behavior from Fish to Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1967), p. 140.

[76] Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, pp. 48–51. Therefore it seems likely that, in evolutionary terms, "consent" is as old as, in fact coterminous with, "command" in human authority structures. This may be viewed as some degree of validation of Hannah Arendt's insight into the "elementary dynamics" of political life — namely, her recurrent emphasis upon the spontaneity of small-scale participatory political groups during most modern revolutionary upheavals and her insistence upon popular consent as the basis of effective political power. See Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), esp. pp. 259–285; Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," *Journal of International Affairs*, 23, 1 (1969), 14–15.

[77] Jerome H. Barkow, "Prestige and Culture: A Biosocial Interpretation," *Current Anthropology*, 16 (December, 1975), 554.

[78] St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, in *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Dino Bigongiari (New York: Hafner, 1953), pp. 175, 176.

[79] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind* (1755).

Nevertheless, Rousseau was led to set impossible conditions for the legitimacy of authority (though he considered it wise ordinarily to obey all *de facto* authority[81]). From premises like Rousseau's it was logical to conclude, as nineteenth-century anarchists and many socialists did, that putting an end to economic inequality and proletarian servitude would eventually bring the "withering away" of political authority. The government of men will be replaced by the administration of things, as "The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze ax."[82]

In no way do I underestimate or denigrate the great contributions of political theorists from Hobbes to Marx toward discrediting and undermining the authority of anachronistic, oppressive, and dysfunctional hierarchies. But a generalized and possibly justified suspicion of all political authorities is not really an adequate reason for remaining attached to beliefs which seem to bear little or no relationship to empirical reality.

For a specific recent example of such a viewpoint, consider Robert Paul Wolff's ideas on political obligation.[83] He assumes that all men have free will and reason, are thereby responsible for their choices, and hence have a *right* to wholly autonomous individual self-governance. Even more relentlessly consistent than Rousseau, Wolff concludes that "all authority is equally illegitimate, although of course not therefore equally worthy or unworthy of support. . . . There would appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands."[84]

Presumably Wolff does not mean his theory of political obligation to be counterempirical and thus, I believe, an irrelevant fantasy, for elsewhere he reveals a peculiar conception of man's relationship to nature: " . . . while the natural world really does exist independently of man's beliefs or desires, and therefore exercises a constraint on his will which can at best be mitigated or combatted, the social world is nothing in itself, and consists merely of the totality of the habits, expectations, beliefs, and behavior patterns of all the individuals who live in it."[85] But it is the fundamental premise of evolutionary biology that man's social behavior is totally a part of the "natural world." If one does not assume the "social world" to be supernatural, it can *only* be "natural." And, given man's primate social nature, there seems to be no more reason to base a normative theory on the assumption that political stratification and authority are contingent and ultimately dispensable than to spend one's life pondering the consequences for society of a dramatic mutation which would suddenly permit every human being to fly without mechanical assistance. Neither project is likely to get off the ground.

The realistic starting point for thinking about political obligation would appear to be not the question, what can justify authority *per se*, but a question something like this: What *kind(s)* of authority structure can be justified under what types of political and social circumstances? In itself, political authority is neither legitimate nor illegitimate; it simply *is*.[86]

In a sense, I am implying the need for an Aristotelian approach to political theory. I do not at all mean that one could or should accept Aristotle's metaphysical premises, ethical system, or political conclusions — but rather that one might set out from the now well-grounded premise that man is *by nature* a political animal and concentrate one's efforts upon trying to discern the empirical and normative relationships between particular kinds of societies and differing *types* of political authority structures.

---

[80] Sherwood L. Washburn and David A. Hamburg, "The Implications of Primate Research," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, p. 612.

[81] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or Education*, trans. Barbara Foxley (New York: E. P. Dutton, Everyman's Library, 1911, reprinted 1963), p. 274.

[82] Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), p. 394. It should be noted that Engels did not believe that all hierarchical authority would disappear under communism. In an essay on authority, he asserted that authority in the factory was a functional requirement of industrial production and thus unavoidable. In the same essay, however, Engels reiterated: "All socialists are agreed that the political state, and with it political authority will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society." ("On Authority," in *Basic Writings*, ed. Feuer, p. 485.)

[83] Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970).

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[86] Cf. Mazur, p. 526.

Finally, this quasi-Aristotelian biobehavioral perspective on authority and political stratification seems likely to inspire concern about discovering and preserving effective restraints upon the wielders of political authority. If one believes that hierarchical authority is a historically bounded phenomenon that will disappear in the socially transformed future, one will oppose overweening and arbitrary authority *only* until one's own movement or party gains absolute power (Leninism is the overwhelmingly relevant example). But if one believes to the contrary that political authority structures are very likely to exist, no matter what movement or party rules or what kinds of socioeconomic transformations occur, then one will consider the structure and operations of the authority system to be a problem of both pressing and permanent significance — especially for the great majority of people who are not members of a "central hierarchy."

Referring again to subhuman primate behavior, one should note in this context the intricately adaptive nature of dominance in species such as the savanna baboons. The central hierarchy males keep order within the troop, protect females and their offspring from predators, lead troop movement, and apparently do most of the breeding — passing on the genetic components of their greater than average capacities for co-operation, intelligent leadership, and aggressive defense. Thus males who achieve dominance invariably behave so as to protect the best interests of the troop as a whole.

It is more than evident that in groups and societies of our species this kind of automatic fit between success in dominance competition and effective substantive leadership no longer exists. Presumably a baboon-like congruence between them was present during the hundreds of thousands of millennia when our ancestors lived in small groups which could not survive without effective leadership and co-ordination of efforts in hunting, food-sharing, and group protection. But in populous, complex societies, political authorities are usually removed from the immediate contexts in which their decisions are implemented. They do not therefore get immediate or necessarily reliable feedback on their wisdom or effectiveness — something which no prehistoric hunter chief could avoid when he and his group either fed well or went hungry.

The transferring of authority structures from the context of face-to-face interaction to that of an ultra-symbolic remoteness also makes it much more difficult for the governed to determine how their own condition is actually affected by the decisions of political authorities.[87] And, of course, historical experience indicates that individuals who achieve high political rank may be too ignorant, arrogant, insensitive, or incompetent to cope satisfactorily with important social problems.

Yet dominance structures there will be in social groupings of the human species, and therefore discovering methods to make and keep them responsive to the substantive needs and desires of the society as a whole is a perennial dilemma. Although our complex societies have lost the automatic fit between dominance and adaptiveness typical of primate groups in their normal habitats, there has been in man an enormous development of a relevant generalized trait characteristic of nearly all primate species — the ability to learn how to adapt to varied circumstances.[88] Using that ability and building, no doubt, on our evolved capacity for self-control, men long ago learned and taught the desirability of subjecting the dominant as well as the subordinate to the restraint of custom and then to the more rationalized "rule of law": "Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all."[89] And, from an evolutionary perspective:

> Laws and social customs are not unnatural impositions from a source somewhere outside biology. They arise from interactions between the cerebral cortex and other parts of a single body, and from interactions between the brains and eyes

---

[87] See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[88] E.g., female savanna baboons were placed within a group of hamadryas baboons; within an hour each female had learned to remain near and follow the male which had threatened or attacked her. This is normal behavior for a hamadryas female but precisely opposite the usual behavior of a female savanna baboon among males of her own species. Conversely, hamadryas females placed among savanna baboons soon learned not to follow individual males as these females had always done among their own kind. (Kummer, *Primate Societies*, pp. 99–100.) The example cited above (fn. 41) of a rank order change in a chimpanzee group can be viewed as an individual's learning to use a newly available resource — noise-making tin cans — as a device to inhibit the dominance behavior of the alpha male, making it possible for the innovator to rise quickly to the top of the group hierarchy.

[89] Aristotle *Politics* 1253a, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 7.

and ears and vocal cords of different bodies. They are biological results of biological behavior.[90]

To be precise, the problem is how to prevent political dominance from becoming political domination. A continuing concern with what Madison called the "auxiliary precautions" of constitutionalism[91] will not appear to be the trivial and irrelevant diversion of a decadent bourgeois liberalism if one assumes that we can, within indeterminate limits, choose the *kind* of authority structure by which we will be governed but that if we do not concern ourselves with that choice, it will inexorably be made for us.

---

[90] Bigelow, p. 24.

[91] *The Federalist*, No. 51.

Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government

R. KENNETH GODWIN
and
W. BRUCE SHEPARD
Oregon State University

Beginning with Dawson and Robinson, several investigators have attempted to predict local government expenditures from political process variables such as party in power, level of citizen participation, party structure (reformed/unreformed), governor's power, and level of interparty competition.[1] In a large majority of these studies, these variables have not consistently predicted expenditure levels after socioeconomic attributes have been controlled.[2] Our purposes in this article are

(1) To argue that too little attention has been given to theoretical formulations in which political process variables act as linkage mechanisms. The inattention has resulted in the application of inappropriate tests for the effect of political variables on public policies;

(2) To present a method of analysis that, unlike those commonly employed, tests the linkage role of political process variables in policy determination; and

(3) To point out that the research findings based on such methods are compatible with traditional theories of representative government concerning the role which political process variables play in the determination of public policies.

A reconceptualization of the role of political structures and processes in the provision of goods and services may be initiated with several assumptions. First, assume that any given citizen has a demand curve for a service provided by his government such that for every level of price per unit of service provided, the citizen desires a given number of units (see Figure 1). If this assumption is accurate, then so long as the amount of the good provided is at the tax rate equal to the marginal utility of the private good foregone, the citizen's preferences have been accurately represented.

If we can further assume that the production costs curve of the government intersects with the demand curve of the citizens, then accurate representation is possible. In Figure 1, accurate representation would be at point B. If, however, the government supplies a level of the service which does not lie on the demand curve there is an error in the linkage between the expressed preference for a service and the supply. Notice that whether the government provides too little (point A) or too much (point C), the citizen will not be satisfied, and there is an error in the representation of the preference of the citizen by his government.

In making the leap from individual demand to collective demand for public service, previous studies of public expenditures have generally employed socioeconomic variables as surrogate measures of collective demand. Although these socioeconomic variables may not be entirely satisfactory operationalizations of collective demand, their use does appear reasonable. For example, as an individual's income increases, he may wish to purchase more goods from the public sector as well as the private sector. He may desire better educational facilities, police protection, or recreational facilities because he is now capable of paying for these. Or in the case of inferior

---

[1] See for example: Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *The Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963), 265–289; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," *The American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82; Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 867–879; Ira Sharkansky, "Problems of Theory and Method: Environment, Policy, Output, and Impact," paper delivered at Conference on Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28 – August 3, 1968; and Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[2] For one of the more recent articles and comments on the impact of political variables after controls are made for socioeconomic variables, see Brian R. Fry and Richard R. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 508–22; and John L. Sullivan, "A Note on Redistributive Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1301–05.



goods[4] — perhaps public health care — less of the inferior good may be desired as increases in income allow for the purchase of substitute goods — e.g., private health care. Similarly, the urban or rural character of an individual's environment may be expected to determine, at least in part, whether he prefers a higher percentage of the government's budget to be spent on the purchase of open space for recreation or for highways which enable him to travel to nearby markets.

Political process variables have generally been treated as causing expenditure levels in the same sense that increases in income, education, or urbanization cause various expenditure levels. Previous studies have placed both socioeconomic variables and political process variables in a single regression equation which is used to predict the level (or distribution) of expenditures in a given state or municipality. While the use of socioeconomic indices as surrogate measures for collective demand is justified, such a treatment is inappropriate for *political process* variables. Using political variables in this manner is inconsistent with those models of representative government which view representation as a process through which the demands of citizens are linked to policy

---

[3] Albert Breton in *The Economic Theory of Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine, 1974) has argued that the effect of price on the supply curve should be insignificant — i.e., the tax (price) of public services is constant per unit and has no effect on the shape of the supply curve. If this is the case, Figure 1 would be similar to the figure below.

Demand and Supply of a Public Service



Notice that this assumption by Breton would not change any of the following arguments.

[4] On income prompted demand shifts for inferior goods, see Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics*, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) p. 408.

outputs. Political process attributes should be viewed not as *determinants* of the shape or location of the demand curves of citizens, but as *modifying variables* which either facilitate or inhibit the accurate translation of demands into outputs, i.e., as mediational.

Perhaps we can illustrate the difficulties with previous research concerning public expenditures by returning to the original article by Dawson and Robinson.[5] In their article they hypothesize that environmental conditions are *mediated* by political variables,[6] not that the role of the political variables is *independent.* Dawson and Robinson, however, expected that the political variables (in their study the level of interparty competition) would increase the particular public service (welfare expenditures) because they believed there were excellent reasons for postulating that this particular service was being undersupplied. Using quotes from V. O. Key, Jr. cited by Dawson and Robinson, we can easily see the rationale behind this expectation:

> In the two-party states the anxiety over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the have-less elements of society, thereby putting the party into the countervailing power operation.[7]
>
> . . . in the one-party states it is easier for a few powerful interests to manage the government of the state without party interference since the parties are not representative of the particular elements that might pose opposition to the dominant interest groups. [8]
>
> . . . over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics. They have no mechanism through which to act and their wishes find expression in fitful rebellions led by transient demogogues who gain their confidence but often have neither the technical competence nor the necessary stable base of political power to effectuate a program.[9]

In other words, Key believed that unless there were active competition for support for lower-class demands, these demands would go unrepresented. Key was not hypothesizing that political variables, in and of themselves, should exercise an independent effect on expenditure demands. Rather, he was postulating that political mechanisms for aggregating preferences and guiding them through the political system, *when they were effective,* forced the political process to come closer to approximating the demands for services of a larger proportion of the citizenry. With this conceptualization one could plausibly hypothesize that interparty competition would decrease welfare expenditures when the majority of the active citizenry feels that such expenditures have exceeded their demands.[10] As Breton has pointed out:

> One of the most basic problems of welfare economics and one that has plagued that field of inquiry since its very beginning is that of finding out whether non-market organization leads to over- or to underinvestment in certain activities. . . . One should not be surprised . . . to discover that in practice there is overinvestment in some activities and underinvestment in others.[11]

As Breton's comments suggest, increased interparty competition need not consistently affect welfare expenditures in a single direction. Rather, interparty competition and other political variables must be related to the degree of error by a political system in approximating citizen demands (and to the extent that increased party competition increases the accuracy of the approximation, welfare expenditures may be either increased or decreased). For this reason, the inclusion of political variables along with socioeconomic variables in a partial correlation analysis or in a regression equation with welfare expenditures as the dependent variable implies a model which is conceptually inappropriate both to the original expectations of Key and Dawson and Robinson, and to conventional theories of representative government as well.

The Role of Political Variables In Accurate Representation

Although the point may seem trivial, there must be some set of mechanisms—institutions, organizations, decision rules—which link the demands of citizens for the services of government to the policies. This, of course, has been postulated by Herring, Key, Truman, Downs, and other writers on the roles of political parties, interest groups, and elections as the major function of the political system. The difficulty for the researcher is in testing which processes and institutions are performing their linkage function without direct knowledge of whether public services are being over- or undersupplied in relation to citizens' demands. The remaining section of this paper is devoted primarily to the solution of this difficulty.

---

[5] Dawson and Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition."

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

[7] V. O. Key, Jr. *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p. 337.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 337.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 307. Beginning with Dawson and Robinson, the hypothesis that the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics has been repeatedly examined through the study of welfare expenditures and interparty competition. One of the more recent studies finding support for the hypothesis (after allowing for interaction betwen interparty competition and "legislative professionalism") is provided by Edward G. Carmines, "The Mediating Influence of State Legislatures on the Linkage Between Interparty Competition and Welfare Policies," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (Sept. 1974), 1118–1124.

[10] Possible examples of interparty competition forcing a reduction in welfare expenditures are provided by those Scandinavian countries which have been dominated for a long period by Socialist parties; these parties' recent losses in strength have been popularly explained by a "taxpayers' revolt" against welfare expenditures.

[11] Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government*, pp. 192–193.

A theory of democratic representation must postulate some mechanism for linkage between masses and elites or the governed and the governors. Luttbeg has suggested that four traditional models of linkage can be found in political theory.[12] These are the rational-activist, the political-parties, the pressure-groups, and the socialization models. In these models, it is expected that either because of some mechanisms of coercion which the governed can apply to the governors or because of the socialization process which produces political leaders, neither the characteristics of political institutions nor those of political leaders will affect the level or composition of expenditures. Instead, the expected functions of political institutions and leaders are to aggregate the preferences of citizens for services and to translate these directly into the demanded services. That is to say, the governors attempt to implement the wishes of their constituents. Thus as representational mechanisms, political process variables would not be expected to cause particular shapes or locations of demand curves for expenditures. Rather, they would be expected to cause or explain the degree of variation between preference inputs to the representational system and policy outputs.

If political variables are to create a "demand" for expenditures, this "demand" would be caused by specific interests or ideological orientations of the political leadership. That is to say, the political leadership would not be translating (or representing) citizen preferences, but would be using their own preferences to determine expenditure levels or other policy outputs. We will label these conceptions of policy determinants "nonlinkage models." Only in these models would process variables determine the level and distribution of services independently of environmental characteristics.

A brief review of each model of linkage may clarify these distinctions. The rational-activist model of linkage is expected to work as follows:

> The individual is expected to be politically informed, involved, rational, and, above all, active. On the basis of an informed and carefully reasoned set of personal preferences and an accurate perception of the various candidates' positions, the voter is expected to vote for those candidates who best reflect his personal preferences. Thus, if an office holder or candidate neglects the public's wants and demands, the public will sense it and may deny him support in the next election.[13]

A second model of linkage between the governed and their governors is the political parties model. Briefly stated, this model relaxes the requirements which are placed upon the citizen by the rational-activist model. While the citizen must still be aware of the issues, he must only know the positions of the different political parties and choose the party which most closely approximates his own position. The citizen does not need to keep up with all candidates' positions on all issues or their actions while in office. The citizen must, however, know where the parties stand and vote for the party of his or her choice.

The third model described by Luttbeg is the linkage provided by pressure groups. This conception of linkage, like the two above, depends on the votes of the citizens for its coercive aspects. Proponents of this model view individuals as members of social groups and see their preferences for services as being both partially derived from and represented by the interests of the group. Thus, to the extent that the members of a group have leaders who present their interests to elected officials, these officials know what their constituents desire. For linkage to occur, a group's leaders must keep watch over the programs and actions of elected officials and the members of a group need only know and heed the electoral choices advocated by the leaders of the group.

In the fourth model, the socialization description of linkage, much of the coercive power attributed to the electorate in the first three models is replaced by the socialization of leaders. This socialization may be of two types. In its simplest formulation, belief-sharing, Luttbeg postulates that when society is sufficiently homogeneous, it does not matter who are the governors and who are the governed. "Leaders give expression to public wants and demands merely because they share preferences with the public."[14] Although such homogeneity between the rulers and the ruled is difficult to imagine when the governmental unit is the nation, state, or metropolitan area, it is not difficult to see how such a process might work in a water, light, or fire district.

---

[12] Norman R. Luttbeg, *Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 1–10.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Role-playing is the second and more complex formulation of linkage through socialization. The role-playing model postulates that leaders are socialized to believe in a conception of representation which causes them to attempt to represent their constituency's interests whether or not the electorate can coerce them to do so. Thus, a representative will attempt to develop a set of expenditures which closely approximates the preferences of the governed.

The determination of policy outputs may not depend upon linkage. This could occur in at least two situations. First, the political decision makers might produce policies which are not desired by the citizens but are believed by the decision makers to be in the citizens' "best interests." In the second situation, the incentive structures internal to legislatures and bureaus might require that the decision makers respond to these pressures rather than to citizen preferences. If the policy choices made by decision makers are a function of institutional incentive structures, then those political structure variables thought to covary with the relevant incentive structures may be treated as independent or intervening variables in a model of policy determinants.[15] Political structure variables may also be treated as intervening or independent variables if—due to selection or recruitment biases—decision makers' conceptions of best interests are a function of particular political structures. However, if political structures affect only the opportunity for decision makers to base policy on concepts of best interests, then political structure variables remain mediational, affecting the degree of congruence between preference inputs and policy choices.

The vast majority of studies concerning the impact of political variables upon public expenditures have treated political process variables as determinants of policy levels and types. They are, therefore, designed to test the assumption that policy outputs in the United States are of the form postulated in the nonlinkage models. Findings of no significant independent correlation between political process variables and most expenditure patterns and levels provide evidence that the assumption is often incorrect.

Unfortunately, if one is wedded to single-equation regression models containing socioeconomic and political process variables as the independent variables or causal modeling techniques with political process variables as the intervening variables, then one can do no more than test for the presence or absence of the nonlinkage models. A failure to find evidence for these models may be reassuring to those who hope that representation takes one of the "more democratic" forms; but this mode of analysis does not and cannot reveal which of the alternate types of linkage is operative. Therefore, questions of major theoretical importance remain unanswered.

It is difficult to see how major theoretical and practical questions can be addressed by the commonly employed logic for studying policy determinants. From the perspective of linkage theory, process variables need not cause particular levels or types of policy. They may, however, play an important role as policy determinants to the extent that they influence *conformance or disparity between citizen preferences* and policy outputs. To analyze the rational-activist, political-parties, interest-groups, or socialization linkage processes requires that one focus on something other than policies as dependent variables. One must study "translation errors" or discrepancies between citizen demands and political system output.

Assuming the availability of a measure of translation error, one may use each of the four models of linkage to deduce hypotheses relating political structure variables to translation error. Within the logic of a given linkage model, certain political structures and conditions should yield specifiable increases or decreases in the amount of translation error. For purposes of illustration, sample hypotheses are given in Table 1.

Empirical analyses which reveal relationships similar or dissimilar to those in Table 1 will permit conclusions about which of the types of linkage is operative.[16] For example, if

---

[14] Luttbeg, p. 7.

[15] An excellent discussion concerning how the presence or absence of an intervening variable model may be detected can be found in Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 858–866.

[16] Using the aggregate data normally available for the study of state and local expenditures, one cannot distinguish the belief-sharing and role playing conceptions of the socialization model. If individual data on citizen preferences, elite preferences, and elite perceptions of citizen preferences are available, then one may be able to determine which of these submodels is more appropriate. The two socialization submodels are not competing models: both could be operative.

Table 1. Illustrative Hypotheses on the Relationships Between Political Process Variables and Translation Error for Political Linkage Models

Linkage Model	Variable	Hypothesized Relationship with Translation Error
	Relationships Hypothesized Between Specified Variables and Translation Error Under the Assumptions of a Given Linkage Model	
Rational-Activist	Educational level of population	—
	Newspaper readership index	—
	Level of political participation	—
Political Parties	Degree of party competition	—
	Measures of party strength	—
	Prevalence of nonpartisan elections	+
Interest Group	Indices of interest group strength	—
	Size and activity of interest group memberships	—
	Percentage of labor force which is unionized	—
Socialization	Gini coefficient of income inequality	+
	Religious heterogeneity	+
	Racial heterogeneity	+

translation error is: (a) strongly and inversely related to party competition and party strength; (b) strongly and directly correlated with prevalence of nonpartisan elections; and (c) weakly associated with other variables, then one may conclude that, for the units analyzed, the political-parties model best describes the predominant type of political linkage.[17]

By reformulating the role of political variables, one may do more than test hypotheses such as those in Table 1. Some have recently pointed to the need to study political processes as dependent upon policy.[18] In the mode of analysis we are advocating, it is possible to explore whether a single form of linkage is operative across a wide set of policies or whether different types of policies elicit different types of linkage. This may be done by studying translation errors for a variety of policies. For example, linkages of the interest-group type may be suggested by patterns of translation error arising from distributive expenditures. In the case of more redistributive expenditures, the political-parties model may best conform to the observed pattern of translation errors.[19]

The mode of analysis proposed here may

(None of Luttbeg's models are competing in the sense that they make opposing assumptions. See John L. Sullivan, "Linkage Models in the Political System," in *Public Opinion and Public Attitudes,* ed. Allen R. Wilcox (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 637–659.

[17] The analyses may also reveal evidence on nonlinkage models. A finding of consistently high translation errors would support a hypothesis that expenditures are determined according to one of the nonlinkage models. Stated differently, one might suspect that a nonlinkage model is operative only when surrogate measures for citizen preferences (e.g., socioeconomic variables) poorly account for variation in expenditure levels. The "explanatory power" of socioeconomic variables could then be further studied for relationships to political process variables thought to facilitate operation of a nonlinkage model. This is the approach of Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler in "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review,* 61 (September, 1967), 701–716. Evidence of such relationships may permit one to speak of policy biases created by particular political process variables. In nonlinkage models, decision makers' values directly affect expenditure levels. Where most decision makers' values deviate from citizen preferences in a similar direction, then those political process variables which facilitate operation of a nonlinkage model (e.g., low party competition, reformed municipal structures) may appear to affect expenditure levels independently.

[18] See for example: Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in *Political Science and Public Policy,* ed. Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 41–52; and Michael D. Reagan, "Policy Issues: The Interaction of Substance and Process," *Polity,* 1 (Fall, 1968), 36–51.

[19] For a definition and discussion of distributive and redistributive policies, see Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics,* 16 (July, 1964), 677–715; and Robert Salisbury and John Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications," a paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1968. Printed in *Policy Analysis in Political Science,* ed. Ira Sharkansky (San Francisco: Markham, 1970), pp. 39–60.

also allow one to detect whether type of linkage covaries with such variables as region of the country (when studying state policies) or city size (when analyzing municipal expenditures). This may be done by testing relationships such as those hypothesized in Table 1 within subsets of the units of analysis, those subsets defined by the variables of interest (e.g., region, city size). To illustrate, relationships consistent with the hypotheses advanced under the rational-activist model may typify smaller towns. For large cities, evidence may favor the political-parties model.

The suggested analyses may offer more than the study of political linkage in a manner consistent with existing theory. The models of linkage as presented by Luttbeg lacked integration in an encompassing theoretical framework indicating the type of representation that will occur under particular conditions. Analyses of linkage by policy and political jurisdiction categories provide the opportunity for discoveries that could develop and integrate linkage theory.

To use the suggested mode of analysis in empirical work requires that one operationalize the concept of translation error. Conceptually, translation error may be defined as the absolute value of the difference between actual expenditure level and the expenditure level desired by the collectivity of citizens in a political jurisdiction.[20]

Unfortunately, what may be conceptually simple is not operationally simple. Initially, one may observe that collectivities exist only as abstractions and so do not have directly measurable desires. Therefore, the desires of a collectivity must be defined as a function of individual preferences: that function being some aggregation rule. But as Mueller has indicated, members of the mass public have a difficult time in specifying their preferred mix of public services.[21] Similarly, aggregation rules are not easily known. If the rule were strictly majoritarian and if each citizen had full information and an equal probability of participating in an expenditure decision (or if participation probabilities were unassociated with expenditure preferences, then the amount spent on each expenditure category would reflect exactly the citizen with median preferences.[22] These informational, probability, and majoritarian assumptions are not, however, empirically accurate.[23]

There are not entirely satisfactory solutions to these problems. But given certain assumptions, one can propose a readily estimated measure of translation error. One may assume, as previous studies did, that an individual's social class and the characteristics of his environment will determine his preferences for public services.[24] Or more weakly, one may assume that characteristics such as social class, race, and place of residence are so highly correlated with individual preferences as to be acceptable surrogate measures for preferences in many policy arenas. Then assuming an aggregation rule closer to logrolling than to majority rule,[25] one can express the level of expenditure desired by a community as a function of socioeconomic characteristics and price factors. The equation below illustrates such a function.[26]

---

[20] Note the necessity of using absolute values of the differences. If these were not used, then one is back to the largely atheoretical position that particular political variables affect the *direction* of translation errors. With absolute values, one is specifying that political variables, as linkage mechanisms, affect or cause the *degree* of translation error.

[21] Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 77 (May, 1963), 210–234.

[22] For a mathematical proof that such a preference pattern would be exhibited in public expenditure patterns, see Thomas Borcherding and Robert Deacon, "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," *American Economic Review,* 62 (December, 1972), 891–901.

[23] Discussions and demonstrations of the empirical inappropriateness of these assumptions abound in the political science literature. For discussions of the absence or presence of information, see Bernard Berelson et al., *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964); V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); and Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs." For discussions of probability of participation, see Lowi, "American Business," Robert Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). For discussions of majoritarian decision making, see Dahl, *Who Governs,* and the many discussions of community power and decision making. A more extensive review of much of the literature relating to these assumptions can be found in Sullivan, "Linkage Models."

[24] This assumption is, of course, simply stating that an individual's attitudes and values are primarily the products of the conditions in which he lives. Whether one accepts a behaviorist (stimulus-response) or cognitive orientation to psychology, this is a reasonable assumption.

[25] There are a large number of both theoretical and empirical reasons for assuming such an aggregation rule. Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government,* has shown that most governments supply more than a single service, that this feature allows representatives certain discretion in the development of the mix of services provided, and that logrolling types of decision rules will be used by the representatives. Similarly, the studies of political decision making in cities and states show that decision rules close to those posited in descriptions of pluralism do, in fact, dominate the decision making process. For a more complete discussion of decision rules and their implications for politics, see James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1962).

$$Y_{ij} = a + b_1 X_{1j} + b_2 X_{2j} \ldots b_n X_{nj} + b_{n+1} P_{ij} + b_{n+2} D_{ij} + e_{ij},$$

where

Y_{ij} = desired per capita expenditures for expenditure category i in political jurisdiction j

a = constant

X's = socioeconomic characteristics of political jurisdiction j

P_{ij} = per capita intergovernmental transfers to political jurisdiction j for expenditure category i

D_{ij} = per capita debt of political jurisdiction j for expenditure category i

e_{ij} = error term

b's = beta weights

If it is assumed, as almost all the evidence previously mentioned would indicate, that process variables do not independently affect observed expenditure levels, then observed expenditures may be used as the dependent variable in order to estimate the coefficients and the constant in the above equation. Once the constant and coefficients are estimated, then Y_{ij} can be estimated for each political jurisdiction. Translation error for expenditure category i and jurisdiction j is then operationalized as the absolute value of the difference between Y_{ij} and the observed level of expenditure in category i for jurisdiction j. As operationalized, the measure may then be used for the analyses previously discussed.[27]

The measure of translation error presented above has the advantage of not requiring any data in addition to those data which are usually gathered in quantitative, public-policy determinant studies. While the measure requires assumptions that one might wish to avoid, it should serve to redirect such studies toward a more theoretically germane mode of analysis. It is hoped that measures of translation error will be refined through attention to individual preferences and aggregation rules. But additional resources expended on improved measurement will be productive only after inappropriate modes of analysis have been dropped and more appropriate modes explored.

Empirical Support for Linkage Theories

As we have noted above, perhaps the most obvious support for the credibility of our proposed approach is the failure of previous studies of political process variables to show an impact either on expenditure levels or on distribution (with the possible exception of welfare expenditures) or on other policy outputs. In addition to this indirect support, several empirical studies of public policies tested process variables for their moderating impact. Lineberry and Fowler in their article, "Reformism and Public Policies," found that in "unreformed" cities, socioeconomic variables explained a significantly higher proportion of city taxes and expenditures than did these same variables in "reformed" cities.[28] This indicates that parties in cities do structure conflict and bring order and focus to public demands and thereby act in accordance with the political parties linkage model described above.

Support for the impact of process variables on policy outputs other than taxes and expenditures has also been empirically demonstrated. Crain, in *The Politics of School Segregation,* found that elected school boards did not inject their own liberalism into board policy as much as appointed board members who were less likely to reflect the demands of the mass public and interest groups.[29]

Empirical support for the socialization models has also been recently demonstrated. Morgan has shown that the belief sharing mechanism for linkage is applicable in smaller suburban communities in which electoral procedures are not of sufficient strength to require leaders to be responsive to community interests.[30] In addition, Verba and Nie have reported that more homogeneous communities, where higher levels of consensus on policy preferences exist among citizens, show a higher concurrence between the citizens and public officials on policy outputs.[31]

---

[26] A more precise estimation of public expenditures and their determination would require a multiple equation model in which the endogenous variables would include per capita expenditures, transfer payments, and debt. The exogenous variables could be the socioeconomic characteristics of the political jurisdiction. For examples of these models see Borcherding and Deacon, "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," and Theodore C. Bergstrom and Robert P. Goodman, "Private Demand for Public Good," *American Economic Review* 63 (June, 1973), 280–296.

[27] One may no longer distinguish the relative "importance" of environmental and political variables by the variance explained in a common dependent variable when Y_{ij} is treated as a function of environmental variables and $|Y_{ij} - \widehat{Y}_{ij}|$ is treated as a function of political variables. Restrictions on the ability to focus on statistically "explained" variance may be a blessing in disguise. As in most empirical work guided by theory, one's interest is in testing the structure and direction of relationships between operationalized theoretical concepts in the linkage models. The empirical congruence of alternative structural relationships may be of major theoretical relevance even when little statistically "explained" variance is at issue. In fact, the linkage models predict that little variance will remain in $|Y_{ij} - \widehat{Y}_{ij}|$: most of the variance in Y_{ij} will be explained by environmental variables. The theoretical issue is not, "how important are political variables?" Rather, the issue is: "how are political variables important?"

[28] Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies."

[29] Robert Crain, *The Politics of School Desegregation* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968).

The above studies only begin to test the relationships between process variables and policy outputs which are suggested by the various linkage models. They do indicate, however, the value of returning to the literature on the role of elections, parties, and pressure groups in aggregating and translating preferences.[32]

Summary

The generally weak relationships obtained when political process variables are treated as independent variables predicting public policies have been widely reported. We have argued that such findings do not contradict the significance of political process variables as posited in theories of political linkage. Rather, the methods used fail to permit testing of the range of propositions which can be devised from the theories.

As has been shown, it is possible to make such tests using an alternate mode of analysis that focuses on the study of translation errors —discrepancies between observed policies and the policies desired by citizens of a political jurisdiction. This method of analysis not only permits the examination of existing propositions, but also affords opportunities to explore those relationships which should contribute to the further development of linkage theory.

When faced with the findings of conventional studies of process variables as policy determinants, political scientists usually respond by searching for more and "better" measures of process and policy variables. If existing theories of political linkage are accurate, then the search is vain (leading only to the danger—if the search is long enough—of imputing meaning to those statistically significant associations which regularly occur by chance). There is no denying the importance of measurement problems; but in order to advance research on policy determinants significantly, we argue that researchers need first adopt modes of analysis capable of detecting those policy effects of process variables posited in the existing theory concerning the functions of elections, parties, pressure groups, and socialization of leaders.

---

[30] David R. Morgan, "Political Linkage and Public Policy: Attitudinal Congruence Between Citizens and Officials," *Western Political Quarterly,* 26 (June, 1973), 209–223.

[31] Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[32] This literature concerning the aggregation and transmission of preferences forms the heart of parties and pressure group theories and dates back to such influential works as Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940); Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study of Representation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); V. O. Key Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1942); and David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

Crude Communism and Revolution

DAVID RESNICK
Cornell University

The scholarly study of Marx has been deeply affected by the rediscovery and publication of his early writings, especially the so-called *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.* The recovery of these manuscripts was extraordinarily significant because they gave rise to a radical reinterpretation of the entire corpus of Marx's work. They did not simply represent the discovery of some hitherto unknown phase of Marx's intellectual development. It was well known that Marx was interested in Hegelian philosophy as a young man, but the assumption was that his early writings were primarily of biographical interest; they were important for understanding the genesis of Marx's mature thought, not a key to interpreting them. The revival of interest in the Hegelian roots of Marxism, and the study of Marx's early writings have led to an attempt to provide a general overview of Marx's work which sees the later mature published writings as merely representing a shift in style and emphasis.[1]

Shlomo Avineri is perhaps the most influential and subtle defender of this view. In the introduction to his important study of the social and political thought of Marx he states: "Marx's later writings merely articulate the conclusions at which he arrived at this early stage of his intellectual odyssey. The various economic, social and historical studies undertaken by Marx are but a corollary of the conclusions he drew from his immanent critique of Hegel's political philosophy."[2] Thus, if the early works were once seen as immature, youthful, pre-Marxist writings, the later works are now to be read as mere corollaries of these very works. Though the focus of Marx's work shifted from philosophy to economics, the focus of scholarly work on Marx has shifted from economics to philosophy. This can lead to distortions and misinterpretations of both Marx's early work and his later work. Too great a stress on the Hegelian heritage and the problem of continuity can prevent us from actually reading Marx. The attempt to understand the later writings in the light of the early writings not only gives a misleading reading of the later writings, but tends to project Marx's more developed insights and arguments upon his earlier theorizing.

In a recent article entitled "Marx's Vision of Future Society"[3] Shlomo Avineri makes many of the same points about Marx's account of the stages of socialism as he does in his book *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.*[4] I should like to re-examine the problem since I find myself in rather serious disagreement with Avineri. I shall try to demonstrate that Marx's discussion of the stages of socialism in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* should not be taken as a key to understanding the *Paris Manuscripts of 1844* or vice versa. According to Avineri, when Marx risks a discussion of future society he usually views it in terms of two temporal stages which Avineri dubs Stage I and Stage II. He bases his account of Stage I on two texts, the *Paris Manuscripts* and the *Critique of the Gotha Program,* and claims that Marx's remarks about Stage I in the latter text can be spelled out in more detail by considering his discussion of "crude communism" in the *Paris Manuscripts.* He notes that when Marx mentions "crude communism" he is obviously referring to communist theories other than his own, yet "the language of the manuscript as well as the parallels with the *Critique of the Gotha Program* make it clear that he is talking about what he considers also a historical stage in future development."[5] I find this claim very implausible. I see no warrant in the language of the text for believing that Marx thought of "crude communism" as the next historical stage; nor do I find the parallels with the *Critique of the Gotha Program* persuasive.

In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx explains why he goes into some detail about "equal right" and "fair distribution." He does so in order to show what a crime it is to attempt "to force on our Party again, as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period had some meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish," and to pervert the realistic outlook of the party "by means of ideological nonsense about right and other trash so common among the democrats and French Socialists."[6] In addition, Marx points out that in general it is a mistake to put the principal stress on the problem of distribution, since the distribution of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the means of production. "Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of democracy) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?"[7] I believe that crude communism is the name Marx uses in 1844 to refer to the theories of some vulgar French Socialists; if there is any meaningful parallel between the two texts, it lies in Marx's rejection of such theoretical positions, and his belief in the importance of correct theory for the working-class movement.

---

[1] See Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx, The Story of His Life* (Ann Arbor, 1962). For an account of the revival of interest in the Hegelian roots of Marxism, and the history of the debate about the interpretation of the early writings see Irving Fetscher, "The Young and the Old Marx," in *Marx's Socialism,* ed. by Shlomo Avineri (New York, Liber-Atherton Press, 1973), pp. 36–59.

[2] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 5.

[3] Shlomo Avineri, "Marx's Vision of the Future," *Dissent,* Summer, 1973, pp. 323–331.

[4] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.*

[5] Avineri, "Marx's Vision of the Future," p. 327.

David McLellan in his study of Marx's early writing suggests that by "crude communism" in the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx may be referring to two groups, the *Travailleurs Egalitaires* and the *Humanitaires,* which were mentioned by Engels in his article, "The Progress of Social Reform on the Continent," published in 1843. According to Engels, the former "were just like the Babouvists of the great revolution, rather "rough hewn"; they proposed to turn the world into a community of workers and thus to abolish every refinement of culture, science and art as useless, dangerous and aristocratic luxury"; and the latter were "particularly known for their attacks on marriage, the family and similar institutions."[8] Whether or not McLellan is correct about this historical point—and there is absolutely no reason to doubt him—it is important to note that Marx was never an egalitarian. I believe that Marx thought of egalitarianism as an expression of what might be called "The French Ideology," that is to say, politics.

The importance of correct theory for Marx rests on the relationship between theory and practice. If perchance the working class were seized by incorrect theory, then the outcome of a seemingly successful proletarian revolution would not be socialism as Marx understands it. Why else struggle against utopian socialists, bourgeois socialists, reactionary feudal socialists, anarchists, bourgeois democrats, and all the rest? Avineri is worried about the problem of transition: "If the description of Stage I in the *Paris Manuscripts* can sometimes be likened to a society reminiscent of the Soviet Union, what are Marx's guarantees that one may not be stuck in Stage I?"[9] Marx was certainly worried about such a problem; but crude communism of the *Paris Manuscripts* is not Stage I, a healthy infant society destined to grow into a full fledged socialist society. If it ever came into existence it would be merely another manifestation of the evils of capitalism; it would be a bloody abortion.

A Comparison of Two Societies

Since I wish to argue that the *Paris Manuscripts* do not contain a description of the next stage of society which is parallel to the one in the *Critique of the Gotha Program,* I shall refer to what Avineri calls Stage I in the latter as the "cooperative society," and Stage I in the former as simply "crude communism." In order to convince us that the cooperative society is the same as crude communism Avineri points to certain fundamental features which they share; in both "there is no private property in the means of production; everyone is employed by society, and there is an equality of wages."[10] In his book he is a bit more careful, and points out that there is a difference between the two texts on the equality of wages. He notes that in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* "though wages are not egalitarian (and in this respect this description varies from the *Manuscripts*) but depend on production, the principle underlying wage differentials (to each according to his work) remains egalitarian and preserves the bourgeois element of property rights related to commodities as objects of consumption."[11]

Yet this is not a superficial difference, it is absolutely crucial; once we have grasped the implications of this difference, the parallels between the two texts will seem less significant, and Avineri's assertion that, in respect to the cooperative society, "understanding its tone depends on reading the earlier sketch" will take on a rather different meaning.[12] The important theoretical point is that crude communism is a totally egalitarian society; it is not the result of merely retaining one element of bourgeois right. It is founded on the belief that social ills are the result of the inequalities created by private property; thus, the solution it proposes is to generalize the bourgeois principle, "all men are created equal" (the French Revolutionary principle), and apply this ruthlessly to all forms of inequality. Marx demands a cooperative society which has abolished private property in the means of production, a conclusion which is deduced from an understanding of the dynamics of capitalism; he is rather clear that such a cooperative society is thoroughly inequalitarian and that it transcended the naive hostility to private property which characterized the earlier stages of the socialist movement.

---

[6] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program* in *The Marx-Engels Reader,* ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 388.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 389.

[8] David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 182.

[9] Avineri, "Marx's Vision of the Future," p. 329.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 327.

[11] Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,* p. 225.

In order to bring out the difference between an egalitarian standard for assigning claims to the objects of consumption, which characterizes the cooperative society and the thorough going egalitarianism as a principle for society itself, which is crude communism, I shall briefly discuss the supposed parallels. In the cooperative society the value of both work and the means of consumption is expressed in terms of socially necessary labor time rather than money. Each worker contributes to the social product, but instead of money wages he receives labor script. His salary is not the exact equivalent of his contribution because a certain amount is deducted for the social fund, yet it enables him to appropriate objects from the common stock for his own use by exchanging his labor script for them. This scheme of distribution employs the same principle as that which regulates the exchange of commodity equivalents in capitalism, so far as this is an exchange of equal values: "a given amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form." This creates an equal right, but it is still bourgeois right because "the right of the producers is *proportional* to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an *equal standard,* labor."[13] He goes on to point out that applying an equal standard, labor, as a principle of distribution guarantees an *unequal* distribution of commodities:

> time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to
>
> But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This *equal* right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges. *It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right.*[14]

Marx then points out another source of inequality: even if two laborers perform the same amount of work and have the same natural endowments, one may be married and the other single, one may have more children than another and the like; thus, with an equal performance of labor and hence "even with an equal share in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on."[15] Therefore the equal right of labor in the cooperative society which Marx envisages in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* justifies *inequalities* of wealth on the basis of natural privileges; it recognizes and rewards the unequal distribution of talents and abilities; but does not recognize claims based upon differences in need, such as the possession of a family.

Crude communism as Marx envisages it in the *Paris Manuscripts* is a society characterized by greed, envy and animality; it is driven by a hostility to private property as such: "the dominion of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property.* It wants to abstract *by force* from talent, etc. For it, the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical *possession*"[16] (emphasis in original). Yet as we just saw, rather than trying to eliminate talent by force or any other means, the cooperative society, if anything, encourages individuals to exercise their talents; it incorporates talents concretely as a basic assumption of the distribution of the means of consumption. The argument of the crude communist seems to be that talent is not something which everyone can possess like a loaf of bread: we can take the property of the rich and divide it up amongst ourselves, but we cannot divide up the talents of the talented, therefore let's eliminate talent as a natural fact.

---

[12] Avineri, *Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,* p. 225.

[13] Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program,* p. 387.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 388.

[16] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Selections), in Tucker, p. 68. Note: I have tried to cite readily available translations of Marx's works, but have made slight modifications whenever I thought it helpful. Throughout I have used "transcendence" as a translation of *aufheben* in its various forms, and "alienation" as a translation of *entfremdung* in its various forms. It is always useful to consult the original German, especially when it comes to Marx's more philosophical works. Since some of my analysis of the *Paris Manuscripts* departs from traditional scholary interpretations, all references to the manuscripts will be accompanied by citations to the Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1932) I, 3, pp. 111–12, hereafter referred to as *MEGA.*

Marx then goes on to note that the hostility to private property manifests itself in an animal form by "counterposing to *marriage* (certainly a *form of exclusive private property*) the *community of women,* in which a woman becomes a piece of *communal* and *common* property. It may be said that this idea of the *community of women* gives away the *secret* of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism."[17] Needless to say there is absolutely nothing about women becoming communal property in the cooperative society. If anything, Marx's remark about the inequalities of wealth caused by the fact that one worker has more children than another might imply that he envisages the existence of a rather traditional family. A cooperative society based on the common ownership of the means of production entails a distinction between *producers* and *means of production;* certainly women are producers, not means of production. The suggestion that the first stage of socialism entails viewing women as property is certainly bizarre.

After showing how crude communism universalizes "human lust" by setting up a community of women, Marx describes how it universalizes human avarice, or the lust for objects. Avarice reappears in a disguised form as envy, and the universalization of envy leads to levelling:

> The thoughts of every piece of private property—inherent in each piece as such—are *at least* turned against all *wealthier* private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. The crude commonism is only the consummation of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the *preconceived* minimum. It has a *definite, limited* standard. How little this transcendence of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor and undemanding* man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it.[18]

Once again there is nothing about levelling down in the cooperative society; the equal standard of labor does not level down the world of wealth to make everyone's wealth equal.

Only after making these observations does Marx say that "the community is only a community of *labor,* and an equality of *wages* paid but by the communal capital—the *community* as the universal capitalist."[19] This description is very similar to one which Marx employs to characterize Proudhon's theory in an earlier section of the *Manuscripts.* He says, "Indeed, even the *equality of wages* demanded by Proudhon only transforms the relationship of the present-day worker to his labor into the relationship of all men to labor. Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist."[20] But whether society is conceived of as an abstract capitalist or a universal capitalist, it is not pictured as a cooperative society based on the common ownership of the means of production in crude communism; indeed, there is no cooperation at all.

I take it that the equality of wages in crude communism means that everyone is to be paid the same irrespective of the social value of his work; universal envy would preclude paying a skilled and talented worker any more than an unskilled and bumbling one. The demand is not to increase the total pool of social wealth so that everyone may have more; rather, it entails keeping a watchful eye on your neighbor to make sure he doesn't get any more than you do. Marx exposes the true nature of the crude communist's understanding of a truly human community; equality of wages and the community of work may seem to establish such a community, but their view of the sexual relationship, and their view of work itself betrays them. Crude communism is an extreme egalitarianism which demands the elimination of talents, the redistribution of property out of envy, and the universal prostitution of women out of lust. Such a society would seem very far removed from Stage I of socialism.

But if crude communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* is Marx's way of referring to a grossly inadequate communist theory, and not the first stage of future socialist society, then what of his own theory of communism—communism as "the positive transcendence of private property"? Avineri assigns it to Stage II, parallel to what is referred to in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* as a higher phase of communist society. I believe that this is also a mistake, and arises from reading Marx's early writing in the light of his later work. While an understanding of the philosophical concepts of his early writing may help to explicate his later work, a knowledge of the arguments of his later work may also obscure the philosophical concepts of the early writings. I shall try to show that what is called *Kommunismus* in the *Paris Manuscripts* is very different from the *kommunistische Gesellschaft* in the *Critique of the Gotha Program;* I shall argue that it is not intended to correspond to a future *society* at all; it is best understood as a theory which corresponds to a revolutionary movement which will bring about the truly human society. If we want a name for the form of future society envisaged in the *Paris Manuscripts,* an appropriate name would be socialism, and this society is not discussed in terms of stages.

---

[17] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* in *The Marx-Engels Reader,* ed. Tucker, p. 68; *MEGA,* p. 112.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 69; *MEGA,* p. 112.

[19] *Ibid.; MEGA,* p. 112.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 66; *MEGA,* p. 92.

In order to understand what Marx meant by communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* we must see Marx himself historically. When he wrote the *Paris Manuscripts* he thought of himself as a follower of Feuerbach and conceived of the enterprise he was engaged in as positive criticism. Communism was the outcome of the German positive criticism of political economy, and only from this perspective can we understand how Marx thought that communism was related to the next phase of history.

I hope that my discussion of the parallels between crude communism and the cooperative society has at least raised some doubts as to whether Marx thought that crude communism is the next historical stage. But the persuasiveness of the claim that he did rests upon taking what Marx said in 1844 as an amplification of what he said in 1875; to clinch the argument we have to investigate the language of the *Paris Manuscripts.*

The Meaning of Crude Communism

Marx first mentions crude communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* after he has listed a number of social theories, all French. He then asserts that communism is the positive expression of the transcendence of private property, and that its first form is "crude, unthinking communism." Marx starts his discussion of the various theories by making the following cryptic remark: "The overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation."[21] In order to understand the meaning of this, we have to see it as a reference to the positive criticism of political economy: "the overcoming of self-alienation," whatever its other possible meanings, refers to the analytical movement that theory must perform in order to comprehend the phenomenon of private property as alienated labor. I shall discuss the possible historical meaning of this statement below.

In the manuscript given the title "Alienated Labor" which comes before this section, Marx has criticized political economy for proceeding from the fact of private property, but not explaining it. He then goes on to explain private property as alienated, externalized labor, and summarizes his partial results as follows:

> We have considered the act of alienation of practical human activity, labor, in two of its aspects. 1) The relation of the worker to the *product of labor* as an alien object exercising power over him . . . 2) The relation of labor to the *act of production* within the *labor* process. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him. . . . We have yet a third aspect of alienated labor to deduce from the two already considered.[22]

Marx then launches into a discussion of man as a species being and concludes: "in alienating from man 1) nature, and 2) himself, his own active functions, his life-activity, alienated labor alienates the species from man."[23] Thus Marx explains private property as alienated labor alienates the *species* from man."[23] Thus (2) the activity of production, and (3) species-being.

Marx also uses the same three aspects to comprehend the transcendence of private property understood as self-alienation. He says:

> *Private property* is first considered only in its objective aspect—but nevertheless with labor as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore *capital,* which is to be transcended "as such" (Proudhon). Or a particular form of labor — labor levelled down, parcelled, and therefore unfree — is conceived as the source of private property's *perniciousness* and of its humanly alienated existence: for instance, Fourier, who, like the physiocrats, also conceived agricultural labor to be at least the *exemplary* type, whilst *Saint-Simon* declares in contrast that *industrial labor* as such is the essence, and now also aspires to the *exclusive* rule of the industrialists and the improvement of workers' condition.[24]

Thus we have the first two aspects, the object and the activity of production. Marx then says, "finally, *communism* is the positive expression of transcendence of private property — at first as *universal* private property."[25] He then goes on to discuss how communism is related to man as a species-being, the type of community it posits, how it expresses man's essence and the like. The first form is the one which only generalizes and completes the relations of private property and is called crude communism. I have outlined its main features above, but I wish to point to Marx's concluding summary statement: "the first positive transcendence of private property—*crude* communism—is thus merely one *form* in which the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the *positive community, comes to the surface.*"[26]

---

[21] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,* Tucker, p. 68; *MEGA,* p. 111.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 60-61; *MEGA,* p. 86.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 61; *MEGA,* p. 87.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 68; *MEGA,* p. 111.

[25] *Ibid., MEGA,* p. 111.

He then briefly mentions the second type of communism.

> Communism a) of a political nature still — democratic or despotic; b) with the transcendence of the state, yet still incomplete and being still affected by private property (i.e., by the alienation of man). In both forms communism already knows itself to be reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-alienation; but since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the *human* nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence.[27]

Finally he goes on to discuss the third form of communism:

> *Communism* as the *positive* transcendence of *private property* or *human self-alienation,* and therefore as the real *appropriation of the human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e., human) being — a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully-developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed humanism equals naturalism.[28]

It is rather clear that Marx identifies himself with this third form of communism, which we might call true communism. He has just proved that it is superior to all other communist theories because it is the only theory of the transcendence of private property which truly transcends private property in theory. All communist theories stand on a higher theoretical level than theories like Proudhon's and Fourier's which negate only one aspect of private property. This explains his comment to Ruge in a letter written just before he composed the *Paris Manuscripts* in which he sets out what he is going to prove. He says, "Communism saw the origin of other socialistic doctrines like those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc., not accidentally but necessarily in opposition to itself."[29] Communist theories raise the problem of community, of man's alienation from his species-being; but hitherto existing communist theories have not as yet grasped fully the nature or essence of man. A true communist theory must not only grasp private property as alienation, it must grasp all its aspects. Marx has thus "dialectically" proven the superiority of his theory to the attempt of political economy to explain the movement of private property, and the attempt of various socialist and communist theories to transcend the movement of private property. Hitherto existing proletarian movements have not succeeded in overthrowing private property, and I believe it is a deep assumption of Marx's early writings that only a movement which is based on a theory that transcends private property in theory, will be able to transcend actual private property in practice. I also believe that, with suitable terminological changes, this statement holds true for Marx's later work as well.

We have just seen how Marx criticized the inadequate communist theories because they still remained infected by private property; since they have not yet grasped all the aspects of private property as alienation of the human essence, they are still entrapped. Crude communism is merely universal private property. It posits the abolition of private property in a negative way; it negates private property without grasping its positive essence; it posits the negation of private property, but is not itself truly positive; it is the negative expression of the abolition of private property. It is a theory mired in negativity, infected by private property, and thus it posits the abolition of private property by the negation of private property. True communism, on the other hand, grasps the positive nature of private property, and thus expresses the abolition of private property in a positive way; it expresses the abolition of private property as the negation of the negation. True communism is the positive overcoming of private property as the expression of human alienation; it overcomes alienation because it is the negation of the negation: it is no longer infected by the negativity of private property. True communism is the positive expression of the abolition of private property because it is not merely the negation, it is the negation of the negation.

---

[26] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,* Tucker, p. 70; *MEGA,* p. 113.

[27] *Ibid., MEGA,* pp. 113-14.

[28] *Ibid., MEGA,* p. 114.

[29] Marx, letter to Ruge, in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,* ed. and translated by L.D. Easton and K. H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), p. 213.

I have gone through this bit of dialetics in order to bring out the significance of the following quotation from the *Paris Manuscripts* in which Marx *explicitly* mentions communism as the next stage of history:

> Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, therefore the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery. *Communism* is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development — the form of human society.[30]

But if Marx thought that crude communism was necessary for the next stage, because it will correspond to crude socialist theories or some such, he would have referred to communism as the negation. Only true communism is the negation of the negation, and thus only true communism is the phase necessary for the next stage of historical development.

But if true communism is only the next phase of man's liberation, but not the form of human society, what is? Why is true communism only the negation of the negation and not, as it were, in Feuerbachian terms the true positive, positively grounded on itself? Just before he refers to communism as the negation of the negation Marx tells us why socialist man would no longer need atheism in order to overcome the alienation of man from nature:

> Socialism as socialism no longer stands in need of such a mediation: it proceeds from the *practically and theoretically sensuous consciousness* of man and of nature as the *essence*. It is man's *positive self-consciousness* no longer mediated through the transcendence of religion, just as *actual life* is positive, no longer mediated through the transcendence of private property, through *communism*. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation . . . etc.[31]

Marx is drawing a distinction between communism as a revolutionary movement as, say, the union of critical philosophy and the proletariat, and socialism which is the outcome of such a revolutionary process; communism is not a type of society but the means by which a society will be brought into existence.

In the section of the *Paris Manuscripts* given the title, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole," where Marx is performing the task of positive criticism of Hegel and attempting to reveal the positive or useful aspects of Hegel's dialectic, he discusses the concept of *Aufheben,* or transcendence, as a movement, the movement of externalization taking back itself (Das *Aufheben,* als gegenständliche, die Entäusserung in sich *zurücknehmende* Bewegung). *Aufheben* actually entails the reappropriation of man's objective being through the destruction of the alienated character of the objective world. He once again draws the analogy between atheism and communism:

> Just as atheism as the transcendence of God is the emergence of theoretical humanism, so communism, the transcendence of private property, is the vindication of actual human life as man's property, the emergence of practical humanism. Or, atheism is humanism mediated with itself through the transcendence of religion, and communism is humanism mediated with itself through the transcendence of private property. Only through the transcendence of this mediation, which is, however, a necessary premise, emerges *positive* humanism, humanism emerging positively from itself.[32]

Thus communism is a movement of civil society to transcend private property; it is a movement whose essence is the transcending of private property, but it in turn will be transcended. Yet understood as a movement, it has its history in both theory and practice. Marx certainly knew that communism did not begin with his writing the *Paris Manuscripts* in 1844. To the extent that the statement "the transcendence of self-alienation follows the same course as self alienation" (Die Aufhebung der Selbstentfremdung macht denselben Weg wie die Selbstentfremdung)[33] has a historical meaning, it refers to the past history of the communist movement; it is not about the future of socialist society. Avineri apparently interprets this as a statement about the stages of socialism, understood as the society which is to be established after the proletarian revolution. He says that Marx adds something to the discussion of stages which he presents in the *Critique of the Gotha Program:*

> In the *Mansucripts* Marx adds a further dimension, making the stages of development of communism parallel the stages of the development of communist ideas. The less sophisticated stage of communism seems also to correspond to a less sophis-

---

[30] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Selections) in Tucker, p. 79; *MEGA*, p. 126.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79; *MEGA*, pp. 125-26.

[32] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* in Easton and Guddat, p. 331; *MEGA*, pp. 166-67.

[33] *MEGA*, p. 111.

> ticated and more primitive socialist theory. This enables Marx to acknowledge the immense contribution of the first and more primitive theories of socialism while demonstrating their utter insufficiency. He can even point to their dialectical necessity for the full emergence of his own synthesis, but this implies that by themselves they are unsatisfactory.
>
> To Marx the main defect of these socialist theories, and the main defect of the first stage of socialist society, is that they see the abolition of private property only objectively.[34]

This is a rather neat argument, but aside from acknowledging a debt to other socialists, what is the "dialectical necessity" which makes the stages of the future society correspond to the stages of the development of socialist ideas?

Avineri's argument turns on taking "the transcendence of alienation" as referring to a process which will occur in future society. Existing society has a great deal of alienation, alienation is maximized if you will; but alienation will only be overcome in stages, since there is too much of it to eliminate at once. Primitive socialist theories have only understood part of what is necessary to overcome alienation; but a more adequate socialist theory comprehends more, i. e., it overcomes more alienation in theory. Thus a more adequate socialist theory corresponds to a higher stage of socialist society, and a less adequate one to a lower stage. Since Marx says that the overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation, he must mean that the actual overcoming of alienation in future society will follow the same course as the theoretical overcoming of alienation.

I believe that any such interpretation is deeply mistaken and comes from the attempt to project Marx's later formulations upon his earlier theorizing; however useful the theory of alienation is to a deeper understanding of Marx's later work, on this point it leads to a distorted account of how Marx perceived the relation of communist theory to communist practice. In order to see why there is no reason at all to believe that Marx saw any "dialectical necessity" for a socialist society to parallel inadequate and incomplete socialist theories, we must try to reconstruct what Marx thought the task of critical theory entailed; how he conceived of the relationship between a theory which has transcended alienation and a movement which is the positive expression of the transcendence of private property; and why the criticism of other socialist and communist theories was significant.

Critical Theory and Revolutionary Practice

In September of 1843 Marx wrote a letter to Ruge in which he announces his forthcoming trip to Paris, and reflects on the task of critical philosophy. It entails, among other things the criticism of communist theories:

> I am not for setting up a dogmatic standard. On the contrary, we must attempt to help the dogmatists make their dogmas clear to themselves. Especially *communism*, this is a dogmatic abstraction; I have in mind actually existing communism, as Cabet, Dezamy, Weitling, etc., teach it, not some other imagined or possible one. This communism is itself only a separate phenomenon of the humanistic principle, infected by its opposite, private advantage. Dissolution of private property, therefore, is in no way identical with communism, and communism saw the origin of other socialistic doctrines like those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc., not accidentally but necessarily in opposition to itself, because communism itself is only a special one-sided realization of the socialist principle. And the entire socialistic principle, in turn, is only one side of the *reality* of human nature.[35]

I believe that the *Paris Manuscripts* carry out this program of criticism. Marx goes on to say that he does not face the world in a dogmatic way by attempting to announce some new principle:

> We merely show the world why it actually struggles; and the awareness of this is something the world *must* acquire even if it does not want to. The reform of consciousness exists *merely* in the fact that one makes the world aware of its consciousness, that one awakens the world out of its own dream, that one *explains* to the world its own acts . . . It will be evident that there is not a big blank between the past and the future, but rather it is a matter of *realizing* the thoughts of the past. It will be evident, finally, that mankind does not begin any *new* work but performs its old work consciously. Therefore, we can express the aim of our periodical in *one* phrase: A self-understanding (critical philosophy) of the age concerning its struggles and wishes. This is a task for the world and for us.[36]

Thus the task of philosophy is to criticize consciousness, to bring out the inadequacies of the existing modes of understanding the world; to transcend, if you will, all forms of alienated consciousness; and thus to correct and instruct movements which attempt to abolish the conditions causing alienation, by means of a consciousness that has not yet itself transcended alienation.

---

[34] Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, p. 222.

[35] Marx, letter to Ruge, in Easton and Guddat, pp. 212-13.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 214–15.

In an article entitled "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction," which Marx wrote between autumn of 1843 and January of 1844 and published in the *Deutsch Französische Jahrbücher,* he proclaims that

> As philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, the proletariat finds its *intellectual* weapons in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has deeply struck this unsophisticated soil of the people, the *Germans* will emancipate themselves to become *men.* Let us summarize the result: the only emancipation of Germany possible *in practice* is emancipation based on *the* theory proclaiming that man is the highest essence of man. In Germany emancipation from the *Middle Ages* is possible only as emancipation at the same time from *partial* victories over the Middle Ages. In Germany *no* brand of bondage can be broken without *every* brand of bondage being broken. Always seeking *fundamentals,* Germany can only make a *fundamental* revolution. The *emancipation of the German* is the *emancipation of mankind.* The *head* of this emancipation is *philosophy,* its heart is the *proletariat.*[37]

The theory which proclaims that man is the highest essence of man is Feuerbach's, and even the metaphor of the unity of head and heart refers to a passage of the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future.*[38] In August of 1844 while Marx was working on the *Paris Manuscripts* he sent a copy of this article to Feuerbach expressing his admiration for Feuerbach's work and proclaiming:

> In these writings you have given — whether intentionally I do not know — a philosophical basis to socialism, and the communists, too, have immediately understood these works in this sense. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real difference between men, the concept of a human species drawn down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what can this be but the concept of society?[39]

In the Preface to the *Paris Manuscripts* he also acknowledges his great debt to Feuerbach, since positive criticism in general and thus German positive criticism of political economy are founded on the discoveries of Feuerbach.[40] It seems clear that Marx thought the theory that would penetrate the German proletariat was theory which based itself on Feuerbach.

In another article he wrote in August of 1844 Marx refers to his earlier "Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*" for an understanding of the special talents of the German proletariat. He says, "It must be granted that the German proletariat is the *theorist* of the European proletariat, just as the English proletariat is its *economist* and the French proletariat its *politician* . . . only in socialism can a philosophical people find its suitable practice, thus only in the *proletariat* can it find the active element of its emancipation.[41] Thus it is the task of critical philosophy, of German positive criticism, to construct a theory for the emancpation of the proletariat, and thus the emancipation of mankind. While German economic and political conditions lag behind England and France, its theory is more advanced; German theory cannot be content with criticizing merely some aspect of existing reality, it must be truly radical; it cannot rest with overcoming alienation in one sphere, it must transcend all forms of alienation.

A primitive socialist theory is primitive because of the fact that it arose in more advanced political and economic conditions; that is to say, it does not comprehend fully the essence of private property as human self-alienation. Thus it cannot become the theory of a movement which will transcend private property, because it has not as yet transcended private property in theory. In the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx observes that

> Equality in the *groundwork* of communism is its *political* justification (Bergründung), just as when the German justifies it by conceiving of man as *universal self-consciousness.* It goes without saying that the transcendence of alienation proceeds from the form of alienation which is the *dominant* power, in Germany *self-consciousness,* in France *equality,* because politics; in England the real, material *practical* need taking itself as its standard. It is from this point that Proudhon is to be criticised and appreciated.[42]

Thus other socialist theories are to be understood as theories which are still enmeshed within alienation; only German theory has managed to break through. Marx then refers to true communism, the negation of the negation, which is his own theory, a theory which has completely broken through alienation and thus overcomes it in consciousness, and says:

---

[37] Marx, "Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 263-64.

[38] Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,* in *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach,* translated by Zawar Hanfi (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972), p. 243.

[39] McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism,* p. 194.

[40] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Selections), in Tucker, p. 54; *MEGA,* p. 34.

[41] Marx, *Critical Notes on "The King of Prussia and Social Reform"* (1844), in Easton and Guddat, p. 353.

[42] *MEGA,* p. 134.

> In order to transcend the *idea* of private property, the *idea* of communism is completely adequate; it takes *actual* communist action in order to transcend actual private property. History will create it, and this movement, which we already recognize in *thought* as self-transcending will in reality involve a severe and protracted process.[43]

Thus Marx is claiming that there will be a communist movement based upon theory which will bring forth the new society. The actual communist action which he contemplates is action based upon correct communist theory—theory which fully comprehends the essence of private property as self-alienation, and thus itself transcends alienation in theory.

German positive criticism has created such a theory, and it will probably be the German proletariat which is just emerging that will be infused with this theory, and thus accomplish what no other movement to transcend private property has accomplished. There is no dialectical necessity for the German proletariart to repeat the stages of socialist theory, since it has only just come into existence; it does not possess the English proletariat's belief in economic solutions, nor the French proletariat's faith in political solutions. It has only theory, and since German positive criticism has broken through the alienation of German philosophy, and since the German proletariat has no illusions because it has no history, it will be the class to succeed in actually transcending private property and abolishing alienation in all its forms. It is the task of German critical theory to prevent the emerging proletariat from being infected by other socialist ideas; only thus will it avoid repeating the failures of other socialist and communist movements.

I do not think that Marx in 1844 had any clear idea of what a socialist society would look like. He was attempting to prove that radical revolution was necessary in Germany and the world; and a radical revolution requires both a material element (a radical class), and a theoretical element (a radical theory). Such a revolution would go further than the French revolution; it would not be simply a political revolution, but a total social revolution of world historical significance. It is the task of criticism to break through all the illusions of civil society, and thus to provide the true theory for the class born without illusions, created by civil society but not a class of civil society—a class destined to create a totally new society which will have abolished the alienation of practical life, just as critical theory has abolished the alienation of the theory of practical life.

Even if my account of Marx's theory in 1844 is correct, it is still the case that he came to believe that communist society will develop in stages. However much the *Paris Manuscripts* anticipate Marx's later work, there is no question that Marx learned a great deal more about existing society and the proletariat. The more one reads the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* the odder seems the suggestion that communist society must repeat the stages of outmoded socialist theories. I have tried to show that Marx did not even believe this in 1844. I have tried to demonstrate that Marx never thought that crude communism was the first stage of future society; and I have felt that a brief discussion of what Marx thought the task of critical philosophy was in 1844 would be more or less adequate. An explanation of the necessarily limited nature of the first stage of socialism as Marx outlines it in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* would entail a much lengthier discussion of Marx's later critique of political economy; just as Marx's conclusion that socialism will entail stages is a more sophisticated view than the one he held in 1844, so its explanation must rest on his more developed theory.

---

[43] *MEGA*, p. 134.

Comment on Resnick's "Crude Communism and Revolution"

SHLOMO AVINERI
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The main point of issue between David Resnick's interpretation of Marx's views about socialism and my own hinges upon what "crude communism," as described in the *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844, stands for. Resnick thinks "crude communism" is merely a critical characterization of a number of communist *theories* preceding Marx, most of them French; I claimed that "crude communism" is *both* a description of earlier communist *theories* criticized by Marx *and* a rough delineation of what the first stage of future communist *society* may turn out to be.[1] Athough there are a number of other issues in Resnick's thoughtful article with which I might like to disagree, we have here, in the meaning of "crude communism," a central element in the interpretation of Marx, and I will therefore limit myself in my response to what I hope might be a further clarification of the issues involved.

Let me start from a point of agreement: despite our disagreement about the 1844 *Manuscripts,* both Resnick and myself agree that at least in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx envisaged *two* stages of socialist society and believed that only in the second stage would socialism be fully realized. Resnick calls Stage I in the *Critique* the "co-operative society";[2] he goes into considerable detail about the nature of this stage in his article, and his discussion is mainly aimed at showing how utterly different this "co-operative society" is from the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts.* I agree with the substance of what Resnick says about this "co-operative society." Yet despite his being aware of the limited horizons of this society, which is still enmeshed within the constricting concepts of bourgeois right, Resnick seems to me to have overlooked the fact that Marx himself explicitly pointed out some immanent shortcomings of this society, and that these shortcomings are very similar to some of the attributes of the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts.* Thus, despite the quite wide-ranging discussion of the "co-operative society," Resnick fails to quote or even mention the following sentence from the *Critique of the Gotha Program* which sums up Marx's awareness of the ambivalent nature of Stage I of socialist society:

> What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it has *emerged* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.[3]

Why is it that this has been overlooked by Resnick? The answer is simple enough: if Marx had not written these words, one would be able to surmise that the "co-operative society," while still retaining a bourgeois conception of rights as an egalitarian distributive criterion, is already in every other respect a full-blooded socialist society and hence cannot in any way whatsoever be likened to the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts,* irrespective of the question whether this "crude communism" is a mere underdeveloped *theory* of communism or the first *historical* stage of future communist society. But in the paragraph just quoted above and omitted by Resnick, this "co-operative society" of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* is explicitly characterized by Marx as being "stamped [*behaftet*] with the birth marks" of old, bourgeois society. Are these empty words? A society thus stamped, "economically, morally and intellectually," with the stigmata of bourgeois society is a very imperfect society indeed, certainly not as near-ideal as Resnick makes this "co-operative society" appear in his article. In the same paragraph Marx goes on to say that in this society "the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values," i.e., this society is still characterized by forms of alienation, since it is still ruled by commodity exchange. Had Resnick referred to this characterization of the "co-operative society" by Marx in such ambivalent terms, it would have been much more difficult for him to claim that it is so totally different from the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts.*

---

[1] In this I followed the interpretation initially suggested by Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 154–6. This interpretation has recently been challenged also by Michael Evans, *Karl Marx* (London, 1975), p. 150, without, however, suggesting any evidence.

[2] Resnick seems to take the term "co-operative society" from the text of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* itself, see: Karl Marx/Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow, n.d.), I, 22. The German original, however, is "genossenschaftliche Gesellschaft," which is better translated as "associational society"; see, Marx-Engels, *Werke* (Berlin, 1962), XIX, 19. This is, incidentally, also the term suggested by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* for the society emerging from the proletarian takeover. But for simplicity's sake, I have decided to follow Resnick's terminology and refer to the first stage of socialist society as described in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* as "co-operative society."

[3] *Selected Works,* II, 23.

I find Marx's usage of the phrase "economic, moral and intellectual" extremely intriguing and significant, as Marx does not use those terms lightly. In my mind, at least, they seem to evoke a direct echo of the raw nature of "crude communism." Is it too much to suggest that the "economic" birth marks suggest the purely distributive nature of the economic measures of "crude communism," that "moral" stands for the problem involved in the relation to women and that "intellectual" refers to the "abstraction from talent" envisioned by Marx as characterizing "crude communism" in the *Paris Manuscripts?* Am I reading too much into the text? If I am, then I would greatly appreciate an alternative suggestion about what exactly did Marx mean by these "economic, moral and intellectual" birthmarks with which the first stage of socialism is stamped in the *Critique of the Gotha Program.* It seems to me to be too cavalier to overlook this statement when it is quite obvious that Marx registers here a strong reservation about the nature of the first stage of future society, a reservation clearly reminiscent of all that is so repulsive in "crude communism."

This reservation in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* and the context in which it appears have further consequences for the understanding of the underlying structure of Marx's argument about the nature of the transition from captalism to socialism. This transition has to be dialectical, i.e., it cannot be achieved by "leaps" but through an historical process in which every change has to be mediated through the process of *Aufhebung*—a transcendence (here I fully agree with Resnick's rendering of this difficult Hegelian term) which implies (a) abolition, (b) raising to a higher level as well as (c) preservation. Each element in a given historical situation has to be brought to full fruition before it can be transformed and transcended. Hence the bourgeois notion of "equal rights" is brought in Stage I of socialist society (let us continue to call it by the name Resnick gave it, the "co-operative society") to its utmost realization, and it is this ultimate realization which brings out the intrinsic contradictions of this society as well as the potentiality for novel forms inherent in the old structure. The immanent *injustice* in bourgeois concepts of equal rights can never be brought out in bourgeois society itself, for bourgeois society itself can never fully realize this concept. Only the first stage of socialism can *fully* realize and thus also bring out the utter insufficiency of the bourgeois quest for equal rights, as Marx suggests in the *Critique of the Gotha Program:*

> [But] one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time. . . . This *equal* right is an unequal right for unequal labor. *It is, therefore, a right of inequality in its content, like every right.*[4]

Stage I of socialism as described in the *Critique* is thus merely a negative transcendence of bourgeois society ("negation of the negation"); despite its incompleteness, it is through such a negative transcendence that the ultimate, *positive* transcendence of private property can be achieved; it is only in the second stage, which has the first stage as its dialectical precondition, that "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right [can] be crossed."[5]

Is this so very different from what Marx postulates in the *Paris Manuscripts?* We know, and Resnick acknowledges, that in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx deals with historical stages, not with different theories of socialism, and these stages are necessary given Marx's dialectical understanding of historical development. But let us suppose for a moment that the text of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* had been obscure and cryptic, as I readily grant that the text of the *Paris Manuscripts* is. Could we then not make a convincing argument that given the defects of Stage I (the "co-operative society" of the *Critique*), that Marx could not conceivably have had such a defective society in mind as a stage of future development, and hence one must view this as a mere critique of an undeveloped socialist *theory*—say of Lassalle, whose views are after all very heavily criticized in the same piece of writing? In other words, could not the same argument which Resnick makes about "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts* also be made about the "co-operative society" of the *Critique of Gotha Program?*

If Resnick is right and the *Paris Manuscripts* in their discussion of "crude communism" (as well as of "true communism") refer merely to *theories* of communism, not to historical stages, two further difficulties arise: first, it would then appear that Marx totally divorces a discussion of communist theory from historical reality; in such a reading, Marx in 1844 just juxtaposed an underdeveloped theory of communism to his "true" communism, and left it at that, without bothering at all about the historical context in which it could come about. It is precisely at the same period in his development that Marx emphasized the unity of theory and practice, and the *Paris Manuscripts* were written after the *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* in which the historicity of communist future society had been discussed by Marx in some detail. Furthermore, in the *Paris Manuscripts* themselves Marx correlates the theory of classical political economy with the capitalist mode of production. It would be most surprising and indeed inconceivable that given these theoretical premises Marx would then deal with theories of communism, including his own theory of what Resnick calls "true communism" without at all bothering about its realization, thus leaving it completely abstract. One would have expected him to discuss at least his own theory of communism in relation to an historical, albeit future, dimension as well, and hence view it as a model for a stage of historical development. In Resnick's reading, the discussion of communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* is completely divorced from the level of historical reality, a theoretical discussion wholly separate from historical praxis. This just does not fit into any interpretation of Marx's thought with which we are familiar.

---

[4] *Selected Works,* II 24 (italics in the original).

[5] *Ibid.*

Second, I have tried to show above why a model of *two* stages of socialism, as envisaged in the *Critique*, is immanent in Marx's dialectical understanding of historical change. It would therefore again create theoretical difficulty to suppose that in 1875 he was aware of the dialectical dimension of historical change which necessitates stages, whereas in 1844 (when he was so much more imbued with Hegelian concepts and terminology), such a dialectical dimension escaped his mind and he would be ready to espouse a full-fledged "theory of communism" realizing itself without mediation, "developed on its own foundation," jumping, like Minerva, fully armed straight from Jupiter's brow.

In my book I pointed out that one of the differences between the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts* and Stage I in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* relates to a different conception of the function of equality and egalitarian criteria in both society. While "crude communism" is postulated as a harshly egalitarian society, the "co-operative society" of the *Critique* uses equal measures for the distribution of wealth and is consequently an unequal society (Resnick is right that I should have emphasized this distinction more forcefully in the *Dissent* article). But the point is that despite the difference, in both models *equality* is the core of the distributive system, and what unites both models is that at this stage of future society socialism is purely *distributive* and is not yet premised on the productive abundance Marx envisages as the precondition for a full-fledged socialist society. This is evidently clear in "crude communism," which is stigmatized by Marx as a "regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and wantless individual who has not only not surpassed private property but has not yet even attained it."[6] The same point is implied when in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx says that only in "the higher stage of communist society" have the "productive forces also been increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly"[7] — a state of affairs obviously not yet achieved in Stage I, the "co-operative society." Again, if "crude communism" is merely a description of theories of communism discarded by Marx as underdeveloped, then these theories have something very basic in common with the "co-operative society" of the *Critique* — a merely distributive understanding of the nature of a communist society; thus the "co-operative society" is very similar to various underdeveloped theories of socialism, and the clearcut dichotomy Resnick postulates between the systematic meaning of the *Paris Manuscripts* (mere discussion of the theories of communism) and the *Critique of the Gotha Program* (a detailed discussion of future historical stages of socialist societies) is hopelessly blurred.

Finally I would like to turn to the textual evidence of the *Paris Manuscripts* and to indicate those elements in the texts which suggest to me that Marx is dealing here with varieties of communist theory *as well as* with stages of future communist society.

One should first be made aware of the fact that the text in which this discussion appears, entitled by the editors of the *Manuscripts* "Private Property and Communism" (there is no title in the original ms.) is a commentary, or a lengthy addition or footnote, to another text *which has been lost*. The text starts with the words "ad pag. XXXIX", and then, a paragraph later, there is another annotation reading "ad ibidem." The pages to which this citation refers have been lost, so what we have is a truncated manuscript, and this goes a long way to explain the slightly cryptic and esoteric nature of the references in the text.[8]

---

[6] Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, ed. T. B. Bottomore (London, 1963), pp. 153–4.

[7] *Selected Writings*, II, 24.

In this truncated text there are a number of references which suggest that the various types of communism described there are related to each other in a temporal sequence:

> But the antithesis between propertylessness and property is still (*noch*) . . .
> Private property is first (*erstens*) considered . . .
> Finally (*endlich*) communism . . .
> Communism in its first form (*in seiner ersten Gestalt*) . . .
> The first positive transcendence of private property . . .
> Communism, still (*noch*) political in nature . . .[9]

One could perhaps argue that such a temporal sequence could also refer to various theories of communism as they unfold over time. But at the end of this sequence of various forms of communism we have an unequivocal explicit statement:

> Thus the whole historical development, both the *real* genesis of communism (the birth of its empirical existence) and its thinking consciousness, is its comprehended and conscious process of becoming. [10]

The discussion, therefore, even when it relates to theories of communism has a much wider connotation: it is a discussion both of the "real genesis of communism" as well as of its "thinking consciousness," i.e., the different theories related to its development. There is in Marx's attitudes to previous theories of communism something reminiscent of Hegel's inclusion of previous schools of philosophy into his own system: they all represent merely a partial truth, but this partial truth was necessary towards the emergence of the ultimate synthesis which incorporates them in its totality. Just as Hegel's philosophy is a dialectical *Aufhebung* of all previous philosophies and contains their essential truth while discarding the inessential and arbitrary elements within them, so Marx's theory of communism is related to previous communist theories. But just as to Hegel every philosophy represented in the form of reflection *(Nach-denken)* the spirit of an age, there may be something similar in Marx's attitude to socialist theories: they represent not only an underdeveloped level of revolutionary consciousness within a not yet fully developed capitalist society, but also, as the "co-operative society" of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* shows unambiguously, partial stages of communist realization. If Marx's theory of communism reflects (or, one should probably say, projects) the ultimate form of socialism, so less articulated theories of communism may reflect (or project) earlier, less articulated, and less differentiated forms of future communist development.

This should not be construed to suggest that Marx envisaged socialist society as having to pass through *all* the various forms of socialist theories: yet whenever Marx described future society (and as we know, he was very reluctant to do so), in the initial stages of this future society one can always discern the footprints of the undeveloped theories of communism. By and large, all these theories had to Marx one common denominator — their inability to grasp the true nature of private property, and hence their inability to overcome it. In his *theory,* Marx claims to have overcome this limitation, but how could this transcendence be achieved on the level of historical, practical *action?* I see no indication in Marx suggesting that his mere discovery in *theory* of the principle of private property would ensure its realization in historical development; society itself, and not only its philosophers or theorists, will have to overcome in practice what has already been transcended in theory. Mere interpretation does not change the world, and though it is a necessary condition for such change, it is not a sufficient one. As Marx himself wrote in the *Paris Manuscripts,* it is the whole historical development, both the "real genesis of communism . . . and its thinking consciousness" which are involved. This is the unity of theory and praxis, and Resnick's interpretation would leave us facing precisely those dichotomies which Marx set out to overcome.

---

[8] See the pagination of the original mss. as reported in *Werke,* Ergänzungsband I (Supplementary volume I), 533.

[9] *Early Writings,* pp. 152, 153, 154, 155.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 155.

Rejoinder

David Resnick

I wish to thank Avineri for his response, and attempt to reply in ways which will bring out the differences which exist in our reading of Marx. Much of his criticism centers around the claim that my analysis of communism in the early manuscripts betrays an insufficient attention to the unity of theory and practice. From my reading "it would then appear that Marx totally divorces a discussion of communist theory from historical reality" (p. 1148). In addition my reading would commit Marx to the belief that "his mere discovery in *theory* of the principle of private property by himself would ensure its realization in historical development" (p. 1149). It was certainly not my intention to offer such a reading. Indeed I quoted Marx's statement that "in order to transcend the *idea* of private property, the *idea* of communism is completely adequate; it takes actual communist action in order to transcend *actual* private property."[1] My discussion of Marx's early theory of revolution was intended to make concrete his understanding of the relation of revolutionary theory to revolutionary action. As far as I can see our disagreement does not arise because Avineri's reading of Marx incorporates the unity of theory and practice while mine does not; it turns directly on the interpretation of the unity of theory and practice in the early writings.

Nor do I think that my reading implies that Marx separates his discussion of communist theory from historical reality, it is simply that Avineri and I disagree as to what Marx thought that historical reality was. Our most fundamental disagreement — indeed the source of a great many different concrete points of interpretation — concerns the subject of history in the early manuscripts. There is no question that in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx is discussing types of societies, and that he outlines future historical development as the movement from capitalist society, to the lower stage of communist society, to the higher stage of communist society. But I argue in my paper that the *Paris Manuscripts' Kommunismus* should not be equated with *kommunistische Gesellschaft* of the *Critique of the Gotha Program;* the subject matter in the *Paris Manuscripts* is a movement, not a type of society.

From the point of view of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* to ask whether we have achieved the higher stage of communism is to ask what type of a society we are living in; from the perspective of the *Paris Manuscripts* to ask a similar question is to ask what stage have we arrived at in the struggle between capital and labor — i.e., has the revolutionary movement of the proletariat reached its highest and most mature stage? In the *Paris Manuscripts* communism is discussed purely dialectically. Marx says in the *Paris Manuscripts,* "*Communism* is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but Communism as such is not the goal of human development — the form of human society."[2] Marx speaks of communism as itself being transcended since it only exists as the negation of the negation, as a movement which struggles against private property. In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx speaks of the higher stage of communism, but he does not say that this stage will in turn be transcended; if we are to accept Avineri's claim that the two texts outline essentially the same course of future history, then we are stuck with the problem of explaining why Marx thought that communism had to be transcended in the *Paris Manuscripts* but not in the *Critique of the Gotha Program.* We could interpret those passages as referring to crude communism not true communism, but we are presented with a pseudo-problem which can be solved only by text torturing, or some elaborate dialectical argument. I submit that my solution is simpler, more cogent, and adequately explains all the relevant passages.

If we accept my claim that communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* refers to a movement, then the objection that my treatment is unhistorical has little to recommend it. As I said in my paper, communism understood as a movement has a history both in theory and practice, and to the extent that Marx's discussion of inadequate communist theories has a historical meaning it refers to the past history of the communist movement. I also believe that Marx's account of this history, as well as the characterization of different communist movements in terms of their origin in different nations with different levels of political, economic and intellectual development is heavily indebted to Engels's article, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent."[3] In this article Engels gives what he calls a sketch of the history of communism in France. He speaks of Babeuf's communism arising from the first French revolution, and the second revolution of 1830 giving rise to another more powerful communism. This communism spread rapidly during the mid-1830s in the large manufacturing towns of France. Engels says:

---

[1] Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1932), I/3, p. 134, hereatfer referred to as *MEGA*.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

> Various secret associations followed each other, among which the "Travailleurs Egalitaires," or Equalitarian Working Men, and the Humanitarians, were the most considerable. The Equalitarians were rather a "rough set," like the Babouvists of the great revolution; they purposed making the world a working-man's community, putting down every refinement of civilisation, science, the fine arts, etc., as useless, dangerous, and aristocratic luxuries, a prejudice necessarily arising from their total ignorance of history and political economy. The Humanitarians were known particularly for their attacks on marriage, family, and other similar institutions. Both these, as well as two or three other parties, were very short-lived, and the great bulk of the French working classes adopted, very soon, the tenets propounded by M. Cabet, "Père Cabet" (Father C.), as he is called, and which are known on the continent under the name of Icarian Communism.[4]

He also says of these Icarian Communists that "they have embodied in their plans everything rational they found in Saint-Simon and Fourier; and, therefore, are very much superior to the old French Communists."[5] In his analysis of Fourier he makes the crucial observation, "There is one inconsistency, however, in Fourierism, and a very important one too, and that is, his nonabolition of private property."[6]

It is my belief that in the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx offers a critical analysis of communism based upon Engels historical sketch. Engels distinguishes two stages of the modern communist movement, the crude stage and the contemporary Icarian Communist stage. If we turn to the *Paris Manuscripts* we see that Marx analyzes communism in three stages; his discussion is numbered (1), (2), and (3).[7] Under (1) he discusses crude communism; under (3) he sets forth what I have called "true communism," Marx's own theory, the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future; but under (2) he gives only the briefest outline; he calls it "Communism (a) of a political nature still — democratic or despotic (b) with the transcendence of the state, yet still incomplete, [*aber zugleich noch unvollendetem*] and being still affected by private property (i.e. by the alienation of man)."[8] I believe that under (2) Marx had in mind the higher type of communism that Engels describes. Marx characterizes what we have been calling "crude communism" as "this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism [*dieses noch ganz rohen und gedankenlosen Kommunismus*],"[9] but when he refers to the Communism of Cabet in a later passage he characterizes it as "the still immature communism [*noch unvollendete Kommunismus*] which seeks proof of itself in various historical phenomena opposed to private property."[10] Thus Marx distinguished crude and thoughtless communism from the higher but still incomplete type represented by the Icarian communists.

This second higher form is dialectically related to other theories and movements because it unites the rational plans of the utopian socialists with the demand for the abolition of private property put forth by early crude working class movements arising from the French revolution. Marx held that his own theory raises this historical movement to a higher level because it incorporates all the positive moments embodied in the history of the struggle against private property, but adds to it an understanding of the positive nature of private property as well as the human nature of need.

On the First Stage of Communist Society

In my article I argued that what I called the co-operative society, the lower stage of communist society as depicted in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* was so different from what Marx calls "crude Communism" in the Paris Manuscripts as to hardly support the claim that Marx thought of crude communism as an outline of the first stage of future communist society. In his reply Avineri says that in my comparison of the two societies I depict the co-operative society as "near ideal," and that if I had attended to Marx's description of "the imanent shortcomings" of this society it would become apparent that the differences are far outweighed by the similarities. Specifically he says that I fail to mention or quote the following passage which sums up Marx's awareness of the ambivalent nature of the first phase of communist society:

---

[3] Frederick Engels, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent" in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels *Collected Works*, Vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 392–408.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 395.

[7] *MEGA*, pp. 111–114.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

> What we have to deal with here is a communist society not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emergers.[11]

Avineri then asks what I trust is merely a rhetorical question, "Why is it that this has been overlooked by Resnick?" He claims to see in the phrase "economic, moral, and intellectual" a direct echo of crude communism and offers the tentative suggestion that by "economic," Marx meant to suggest the purely distributive nature of "crude communism"; that "moral" stands for the problem of the relation to woman; and that "intellectual" refers to "abstraction" from talent. But he also says that he would be interested in an alternative suggestion.

First, I would like to note that I did not simply overlook this passage. The main focus of my article was on Marx's early writings, and as I observed in the last page of my article an explanation of the necessarily limited nature of the first stage of communist society as Marx outlines it in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* would entail a lengthy discussion of the later works, especially the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. But since Avineri claims that it is "too cavalier" of me to overlook this problem, I feel called upon to at least enter the lists. While I do not intend to offer the detailed analysis which this topic demands, I would like to present a different interpretation of the co-operative society from that offered by Avineri. I hope this will shed some light on what Marx meant by the limitations of the co-operative society, and in addition explain why he thought that such a society could serve as a foundation for a higher stage of communism while a society organized along the lines of "crude communism" could not.

In his response Avineri claims that crude communism and the co-operative society share one fundamental limitation whether one thinks of them as theories of socialism or as future socialist societies. He says as theories they both have "a merely distributive understanding of the nature of communist society," (p. 1148); and also that "what unites both models is that at this stage of future society socialism is purely *distributive* and is not yet premised on the productive abundance Marx envisages as the precondition for a full-fledged socialist society" (p. 1148). I think that this is an incorrect interpretation of the theory of the first stage of socialism which Marx presents in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. The tendency to think of socialism in terms of distribution is one of the theoretical weaknesses he detected in the *Gotha Program* itself. After discussing the problem of distribution in the first stage of socialism Marx says: "Quite apart from the analysis so far given, it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on it. Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the *distribution* of the conditions of production themselves."[12] For Marx the most fundamental feature of a socialist society, whether fully developed or not, is that it rests upon a qualitatively different mode of production from that of capitalist society. Marx very clearly points out that "vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of the democracy) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?"[13] Indeed it is very difficult to understand what Marx says about distribution without a thorough grounding in Marx's theory of production.

This leads me to another criticism of Avineri's account of the first stage of socialism. He cites the following passage from Marx's account of this stage in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*: "the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values"[14] and takes it to mean that "this society is still characterized by forms of alienation, since it is still ruled by commodity exchange." I take it Marx's belief that a society ruled by commodity exchange would be characterized by alienation, rests upon his analysis of commodities, especially the famous section of *Capital* in which Marx describes the fetishism of commodities. Although alienation as a central analytic concept is absent from Marx's later published writings — it still plays a very important role in the *Grundrisse* — his discussion of commodities shows that he is dealing with similar themes in a different language. If we accept this view, then the claim that the cooperative society as outlined in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* is ruled by commodity exchange is extremely important. If Marx believed this, then I would agree with Avineri that he would be very ambivalent about it; I simply do not think that he had any such belief.

---

[11] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program* in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 386.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 388.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 388.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

Rather than a society ruled by commodity exchange, the cooperative society, I would argue, is presented as a society which is characterized by the *absence* of commodity production; and this very absence of commodity production is a necessary condition for progress to a higher stage of comunmist society. I believe the analytical model for the first stage of communist society as discussed in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* is contained in the section of *Capital* entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof." Marx asks us to picture to ourselves

> . . . a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community. . . . The total product of our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But another portion is consumed by the members as means of subsistence. A distribution of this portion amongst them is consequently necessary. The mode of this distribution will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers. *We will assume, but merely for the sake of a parallel with the production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence is determined by his labour-time.* Labour-time would, in that case play a double part. Its apportionment in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the proper proportion between the different kinds of work to be done and the various wants of the community. On the other hand, it also serves as a measure of the portion of the common labour borne by each individual, and of his share in the part of the total product destined for individual consumption. The social relations of the individual producers, with regard both to their labour and to its products, are in this case perfectly simple and intelligible, and that with regard not only to production but also to distribution[15] (emhasis added).

Marx then goes on to say "The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan."[16] The mode of distribution which Marx suggests in this model of a co-operative society in *Capital* is exactly the same as the one he describes in the *Critique of the Gotha Program.*

In addition, to characterize this principle of distribution according to contribution to the social product as still bourgeois right because "the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values" (pp. 1146–47) is very different from claiming the principle of equal rights applies to the exchange of commodities as it does in capitalist society itself. In *Capital* Marx observes that the nature of the exchange of commodities itself imposes no limit on the working day, on the amount of surplus value which the capitalist can extract from the worker. In capitalist society labor itself becomes a commodity, and this creates an inherent contradiction in the concept of equal rights in exchange. In reference to the determination of the working day Marx notes: "There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working-day, presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working-class."[17] It is clear that in capitalist society the exchange of commodities is more than simply the exchange of equal values; the equality of rights in capitalist society obscures the conflict between capital and labor which is a necessary feature of a society built upon the extraction of surplus value.

Thus we can see that the equality of rights in distribution which characterized the first stage of communist society is not the full fledged bourgeois equality of rights under the law of exchange of capitalist society, since the exploitation of labor by capital has been abolished. Furthermore, the equality of rights in distribution is adopted by a communist society

---

[15] Karl Marx, *Capital,* Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 78–79.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

— a society which has eliminated commodity production, and thus does not suffer the form of alienation which is inherent in such a form of production; a society in which "the social relations of the individual producers, with regard both to their labour and to its products, are perfectly simple and intelligible, that with regard not only to production but to consumption."[18]

What I have just said by no means implies that the first stage of communist society, the cooperative society, is very close to an *ideal* society; I have said nothing about the development of individual talents and abilities, the level of material production, the relative proportion of free time and socially necessary labor time, and the division of labor. In short, I have not assumed that this society is a truly wealthy society in human terms, and it is only such a society which conforms to Marx's understanding of the higher stage of communism. Yet we must not forget that he did assume that the lower stage, the cooperative society, would provide the material preconditions for the further development of man himself and thus enable humanity to move on to a higher stage of society.

The principle "to each according to his work" which Marx advocates for the first stage of socialism is not an egalitarian principle of distribution. Yet it does have the advantage of requiring no radical alteration in human nature; it is not an idealistic or utopian principle, but one directly related to the experience of labor itself; the more you work, the more you make. Marx may very well have thought that what was needed at this stage was a nonexploitative incentive system which would appeal to workers; and that the adoption of a more egalitarian distributive principle would significantly restrict output and prevent the achievement of a sufficient social surplus product for investment in new means of production. The most important problem from the point of view of distribution is not the distribution of the portion of the total social product destined for individual consumption, but the allocation of the total social product itself to different sectors of the economy.

For Marx a crucial factor in economic development is the use of the social surplus product in order to transform the means of production. In the transition from feudalism to industrialism the private extraction, appropriation, and use of the social surplus product in the form of surplus value was absolutely necessary; but Marx argues that the private ownership of the means of production is no longer an efficient method of operating an advanced industrial society. He believed that the collective ownership and operation of the means of production would overcome the inefficiencies of capitalism such as the business cycle, unemployment, poverty, and the like. Despite whatever experience we have had with economic planning in the 20th century, there is no question that Marx thought it would be a more productive and less wasteful economic form than free market capitalism. But Marx also presents a qualitatively different, though related indictment of capitalism — i.e., that it prevents the formation of the social surplus product which could potentially be generated by the efficient operation of an advanced industrial economy.

The theoretical problem of socialist economic development is how to use the enormous increase in the total social product in the most efficient way to promote the goals of socialism. The theoretical weakness of egalitarianism is the inability to confront this basic problem, because distribution is regarded as if it were independent of the mode of production. Assuming that the collective ownership of the means of production and a planned economy creates a relatively affluent society, this society would still suffer from inequalities; egalitarian socialism would create pressure to distribute the social surplus product in the form of subsidies to the relatively inefficient producers. This approach characterizes the type of liberal welfare economics which attempts to combine economic efficiency understood in terms of a high level of material production with social justice by means of taxation and transfer payments. Such a scheme tries to realize the moral ideal of equality with a minimal negative impact on production. As I read him, Marx is claiming that we need to justify a relatively high rate of savings in an affluent socialist society in order to prevent the dispersal of the social surplus product to achieve egalitarianism.

By emphasizing distribution, egalitarian socialism reveals that it is still operating with a very narrow view of consumption, a view more appropriate to a capitalist society and a free market economy. In the *Grundrisse* Marx speaks of the need to acquire a new understanding of wealth and economic efficiency, and this requires a systematic rethinking of the process of production and consumption itself. In classical political economy, consumption was understood primarily in terms of a using up and destruction of resources; economic savings occurred by reducing consumption. Marx speaks of " . . . the development of power, of capabilities of production, and hence both of the capabilities as well as the means of consumption." He observes:

---

[18] Marx, *Capital,* vol. 1, p. 79.

> The capability to consume is a condition of consumption, hence its primary means, and this capability is the development of an individual potential, a force of production. The saving of labour time is equal to an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the greatest productive power. From the standpoint of the direct production process it can be regarded as the production of fixed capital, this fixed capital being man himself. . . . Free time — which is both idle time and time for higher activity — has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject. This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming; and at the same time, practice, experimental science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society.[19]

The thrust of Marx's argument is that human beings do not merely consume material goods, they consume life experience itself. The process of material production, labor, is at the same time a process of consumption from the point of view of the laborer, the consumption of the life experience of laboring. Marx thus provides a justification in terms of economic efficiency for the investment of resources in what is now known as human capital.

What Marx is suggesting is that such investment will yield nonmonetary gains, gains which could not be measured according to the criteria developed for evaluating the profitability of investment in a capitalistic society. What is needed is a new criterion for evaluating the economic efficiency of investment of the social surplus product which does not depend upon some form of increase in material production. In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx speaks of overcoming the effects of the division of labor and the development of a sector of the economy which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs. He says, "From the outset this part grows considerably in comparison with the present-day society and it grows in proportion as the new society develops." In effect, what Marx is pointing to is a very significant market failure of capitalist society, the radical underconsumption of life experience itself in the great mass of humanity.

The phrase "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" assumes that both ability and need have been fully developed. Capitalist society as Marx envisaged it restricts the exercise of human ability and perverts the nature of human needs; only with the appropriation of the total social product by the associated producers is it possible rationally to invest in the transformation of society such that each is fully able and willing to contribute according to his abilities, and to consume according to a human understanding of needs. Only from this perspective, I believe, can we begin to understand what Marx means by the limitations of the first stage of socialism, and why he thinks that we can pass into a higher stage only "after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want"; why the necessary condition for this stage is that "the productive forces have also increased with the allround development of the individual."[20] Marx's theory of the development of communist society is not based upon a millennial expectation of the second coming of the dialectic which will transform human consciousness and mysteriously liberate humanity from the curse of economics. Both the limitations and potentials of the first stage of communist society cannot be grasped until we concentrate on the primacy of the means of production, and come to see consumption and distribution as a consequence of the mode of production. This was Marx's method for understanding society, and I submit that it is also a good method for understanding Marx. We have become very sensitive to the philosophical problems embedded in Marx's economic concepts, but it might be time to reverse the trend and once again attempt to see economic problems behind Marx's philosophical speculations.

---

[19] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 711–712.

[20] *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Tucker, p. 388.

Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes*

HELMUT NORPOTH

University of Cologne, Germany

Contrary to the chronic laments of the "responsible parties" advocates and their contemporary apostles,[1] it is generally "party" which in one way or another emerges as a force without rival in legislative decision making in Congress.[2] Roll-call votes typically reveal splits along party lines, even though few if any floor votes pit just about all members of one party against all members of the other party.[3] "Party," nevertheless, has remained an elusive concept in the American legislative context, for there is little party organization, whether within Congress or without, which would seem capable of molding the voting decision of the individual congressman. The elected party leaders, for example, are not credited by most observers with much direct influence on decisions of their party colleagues.[4] Sanctions against deviance from the party line lack the force of deterrence. Yet the imprint of party on legislative decisions remains visible.

The apparent lack of party discipline has prompted some analysts to suggest that "party" is only a shorthand for "constituency." Members of the same party are said to vote together because they come from the same kinds of local districts and respond alike to the same

* This article is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation, "Sources of Party Cohesion in the U.S. House of Representatives" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1974). Acknowledgements are due Gudmund R. Iversen, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes and Herbert F. Weisberg for comments on the dissertation. I am also grateful to Russ Dalton and Lanny Dodd for encouraging advice. The data used in this analysis were originally collected by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, and were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

---

[1] See David S. Broder, *The Party's Over* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) as well as the classic report of the APSA, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, Report of the Committee on Political Parties (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

[2] See Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Julius Turner and Edward V. Schneier, Jr., *Party and Constituency*, revised edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959); Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and their World* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960); Gerald Marwell, "Party, Region and Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 390–399; Michael J. Sapira, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll Call Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (June, 1968), 494–517; and Cleo Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro, *Representatives and Roll Calls* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1969). The work by Cherryholmes and Shapiro comes closest to an assessment of party within the full context of legislative behavior. For an extensive review of the literature on party voting, see W. Wayne Shannon, *Constituency and Congressional Voting* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), pp. 3–63.

[3] In purely descriptive terms, the role of party in roll call voting has gradually declined. In 1921, nearly one of every three roll calls showed a split in which more than 90 per cent of the members of one party opposed more than 90 per cent of the members of the other party. In 1967, barely three of every hundred roll calls met that standard. See Turner and Schneier, *Party and Constituency*, p. 17. Even while this secular decline was under way, it was common for a congressional session up until the mid 1960s to witness a majority of Democrats oppose a majority of Republicans on most roll calls. During every session from 1966 until 1970, however, only a third of the roll-call votes fitted that description. See Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 351. However intriguing these symptoms may be, hinting at both a long-term as well as an accelerated recent decline of the party factor in roll-call voting, they lie outside the scope of this analysis.

[4] See Truman, *The Congressional Party*, pp. 203–226; Matthews, *U.S. Senators*, pp. 123–129; and John E. Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Roll-Call Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 451–470. Some of the conditions under which party leadership may affect the voting decisions of representatives are examined by Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of House Democrats," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63. For a more extended discussion of the activities, organization, and influence of party leadership, see Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967). For a look at the Senate, see Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (March, 1961), 331–344. Unlike the U.S. Congress, state legislatures have been found to be more heavily dominated by the party leadership. See, for example, Susan Welch and Eric H. Carlson, "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Non-partisan Legislature," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September, 1973), 854–867. Also see Sarah McCally Morehouse, "The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (March, 1973), 55–72. Morehouse argues that the governor, through the control of the party's nominating organization, brings about party cohesion.

kinds of pressures.[5] But in analyses based on this contention, "party" never dissolves quite so neatly into the constituency components. And even if it did, the question of what made congressmen vote along party lines would only be shifted to another level, for "constituency" can have a variety of meanings and exert influence through a variety of mechanisms.[6]

Conceptually, the alternative to cohesion based on discipline is cohesion based on shared policy goals.[7] That is to say, members of a given party vote alike because they tend to agree on policy and not because they fear sanctions or expect favors. Such policy agreements would largely result from the way in which candidates are selected, whether through careful screening by party officials, supporting coalitions and primary voters or through self-selection of candidates along ideological lines. Regardless of the specific selection mechanism, representatives of a given party would face legislative issues with a similar outlook on policy which would distinguish them from members of the other party (or parties).

It is the purpose of this study to examine the impact of shared policy attitudes on legislative decision making. The central hypothesis states that party cohesion, i.e., the extent to which parties vote in unison, is rooted in shared policy attitudes. The empirical analysis of this hypothesis which follows attempts to do the following:

1) assess the degree to which House representatives differ by party in their attitudes towards important political issues.
2) compare, within a given domain of policy, the attitude locations of the parties with their respective locations during roll call voting, and determine the closeness of fit between a party's attitude and its roll-call record.
3) develop a special statistical model designed to measure the relative impact of shared attitudes vs. individual attitudes on roll-call voting.
4) briefly explore the process through which shared attitudes become translated into votes along party lines. Special attention is paid in this part to key representatives whose advice is highly valued by their House colleagues.

Theoretical and Methodological Overview

Party cohesion in legislative voting is hypothesized to be rooted in policy attitudes shared by members belonging to the same party. Matthews has suggested this explanation of party cohesion in his study of Senate voting,[8] and others have attempted to explain in this way the cohesion of British and Canadian Parliamentary Parties.[9] The reformatory party government literature postulated a unified programmatic orientation as one way to achieve more cohesive legislative parties in the future.[10]

That representatives share policy orientations sounds plausible; so plausible, in fact, that few observers have bothered to measure the extent of such sharing.[11] Kingdon's study of congressional candidates' beliefs and strategies is a welcome exception. His findings demonstrate sharp contrasts in the issue appeals that Democrats and Republicans offer the electorate: hardly any Democratic candidate had conservative issue appeals, and hardly any Republicans had liberal ones.[12]

---

[5] This view is best expressed by Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1963), p. 89. Like his study, most of the other studies devoted to this relationship rely on the demography of the congressional district in their attempt to measure the presumed influence of the local constituency. Besides Froman, pp. 92–96, see Turner and Schneier, *Party and Constituency*, pp. 222–225; also Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (March, 1964), 60–72; Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relationship Between Roll Call Votes and the Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 46 (December, 1952), 1046–1055; and David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[6] For the development of complex linkages between the local constituency and legislative decision making, see, above all, the pioneering study by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56; also Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); and John W. Kingdon, *Candidates for Office* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[7] See the lucid theoretical delineation of the two rival models of party government in Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Representation in the American Congress*, Part I, chap. 2, mimeo.

[8] See Matthews, *U.S. Senators*, p. 133.

[9] See Leon D. Epstein, "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (June, 1956), 360–377; also Allan Kornberg, "Caucus and Cohesion in Canadian Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 89. For a recent probe of party differences in policy attitudes in the British House of Commons, see Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September, 1971), 694–703.

[10] See the APSA report, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.*

[11] The studies of McClosky *et al.* cover a somewhat wider spectrum of party activists. See Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (June, 1960), 406–427.

These issue appeals are more than fleeting campaign promises, for they are firmly rooted in the supporting coalitions of candidates: "Not a single Democrat in this study perceived his supporting coalition as including business and professional groups but not labor, and not a single Republican listed a coalition which included organized labor but not business and professional people."[13] Unless such perceptions are pure fantasies, the two parties — outside the South — rest on different socio-structural foundations.[14] A certain social support goes hand in hand with a certain issue orientation, and both of them square with a certain party affiliation. Representatives of a given party can reasonably be expected to face the legislative workload with a basically similar outlook on policy matters.

Maintaining that candidates of a given party share policy attitudes, however, is not the same as saying that representatives are affected in their voting decisions by such shared policy attitudes. How much influence are attitudes likely to exert on behavior in the institutional context of the legislative world?[15] Attitudes covering a range of political issues would seem to help a representative respond consistently to the variety of legislative bills that he must face, shortening considerably his decision time. Policy attitudes, in fact, have been found to correlate fairly strongly with roll-call voting in a number of policy areas.[16] Such zero-order correlations at the very least establish the fact that representatives vote largely in accordance with their policy attitudes. That much seems beyond dispute.

The hypothesis, however, that attitudes — even those with a fairly specific policy reference — exert a direct influence on legislative voting has met with strong criticism.[17] The legislative scene, it is argued, confronts the individual representative with a workload of immense volume and complexity. He is faced with sheer insurmountable problems of information gathering and processing. These problems are presumed to curtail severely the influence that a representative's attitude may exert on his voting decisions. The way he handles these problems, it is suggested, is by specialization, on the one hand, and reliance on the judgment of trusted colleagues, on the other. The division of labor embodied in the committee system encourages such specialization and generates voting cues in situations where a legislator is unfamiliar with the subject matter of a given bill. In selecting a source of information and advice on such bills, most congressmen are said to turn to members of committees which have dealt with those bills.[18] In and through committees legislative proposals receive the precise and detailed shape in which they reach the ordinary legislator on the House floor.

I have no quarrel with this view but, at the same time, would not necessarily deduce from it the irrelevance of attitudes to legislative decision making. To be sure, on bills pertaining to his domain of specialization a committee member enjoys a prominent position, but not every member of that committee is equally attractive to every House colleague outside the committee. Congressmen have been found to be much better acquainted with members of their own party than with those of the other party, and this preference extends to consultation on important policy matters as well.[19] This pattern of choice, I contend, greatly contributes to the effect of shared policy attitudes on legislative voting.

---

[12] See Kingdon, *Candidates for Office*, pp. 122–123.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 55–66; Kingdon strongly argues that these ties do not imply control. The representative is not "owned" by the coalition supporting him nor does he feel he owes it any favors. Instead, he shares from the outset the policy goals of those groups.

[15] The literature on the notion, definition, and impact of attitudes is vast. See, for example, Daniel Katz and Ezra Stotland, "A Preliminary Statement to a Theory of Attitude Structure and Change," in *Psychology: A Study of Science*, vol. 3, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 424–465. For a discussion of the role of attitudes in the realm of political behavior, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969).

[16] See Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence;" also John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, "Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1256–1268.

[17] That a representative's predisposition cannot have a strong effect on his voting decisions is strongly argued by Arthur H. Miller in his doctoral dissertation, "The Impact of Committees on the Structure of Issues and Voting Coalitions: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1955–1962" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1971), p. 6.

[18] See the vivid testimony cited by Arthur G. Stevens in his dissertation, "Informal Groups and Decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1970), pp. 54–59; also see Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work and as He Sees It* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 149, 292. A more rigorous assessment of this relationship is presented by Miller, "Impact of Committees," pp. 158–208.

[19] See Clapp, *The Congressman*, pp. 14–17. Also consult John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 78.

The hypothesized effect is largely indirect. Shared policy attitudes are regarded as the basis for choosing certain informants from the ranks of one's own party. These informants then act in their own sphere of specialization on the basis of shared policy attitudes. The average House member, in turn, following the cue of his informant, casts a partisan vote which bears the imprint of shared policy attitudes. This, in very condensed form, is the hypothesized linkage between shared policy attitudes and party voting to be examined in this analysis.

The data for this analysis came from the Representation Study conducted by Miller and Stokes in 1958–59.[20] This complex set of data includes interviews with about one third of the members of the 85th and 86th Congress (1957–60). The sample of congressmen was drawn from congressional districts located within the sampling frame of the mass election surveys conducted by the Michigan Survey Research Center in 1956. For every incumbent included in this sample, his nonincumbent challenger in the 1958 congressional election was also interviewed, provided the incumbent was challenged. The combined sample consists of 251 individuals.

This data set was chosen because of the invaluable information it contains on the policy attitudes of congressmen, the key concept of this enterprise. Such attitudes were ascertained for three classical dimensions of partisan conflict, namely the federal government's involvement in "social welfare," its involvement to protect "Negro civil rights," and the United States' role in "world affairs."[21] These dimensions were salient not only during the 1950s but even more so — with Johnson's Great Society Program, voting rights legislation and the escalation of the Vietnam War — during the 1960s. To be sure, the composition of Congress has greatly changed since 1960 and with it perhaps the importance of the concepts examined here. Short of a retest with data on a recent Congress, the findings reported below merely suggest rather than establish the pattern of party voting in the present-day House of Representatives.

In the analysis which follows, southern Democrats are treated as a separate partisan group.[22] This step, I believe, is strongly justified by the amply documented split between southern and nonsouthern Democrats in Congress not only over racial issues but issues of foreign policy and economic and social policy as well.[23]

Shared Policy Attitudes

The first step in the analysis involves a look at the extent of attitudinal cohesion among representatives of the three party groups. The shared policy attitudes have been estimated by the arithmetic mean of scale items endorsed by members of the same party group. In order to assess the extent to which these attitudes are shared within the three party groups, I rely on eta^2, the correlation ratio.[24]

The attitude positions of the three party groups emerge with clear and statistically significant distinction in all three domains, as revealed by Figure 1. In the domain of foreign policy, nonsouthern Democrats take the most internationalist position while their southern colleagues prove to be most isolationist. The

---

[20] Two files, made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (I.C.P.R.), contain the data used for this analysis: *The Representation Study: The Candidate File,* 1970, and *Candidates and Constituents,* 1971, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[21] Within the domain of "social welfare," the issues include public housing, full employment, aid to education, and the federal development of atomic energy. The "civil rights" items refer to Negro voting rights, the establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Commission, and school desegregation. The "foreign policy" issues include foreign economic aid, foreign military aid, aid to neutral countries, and the general theme of isolationism vs. involvement abroad. For a wording of the questions, see I.C.P.R., *The Candidate File,* pp. 28–43. The items within each of the three policy domains have been combined into Guttman scales, and these scales are used whenever policy attitudes are examined in this analysis. For details of the scale construction, see I.C.P.R., *The Candidate File,* pp. 219–222.

[22] The South is considered to include the eleven states of the former Confederacy plus the four border states of Maryland, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.

[23] For such evidence, see Turner and Schneier, *Party and Constituency,* pp. 171–179; also Truman, *The Congressional Party,* p. 149; H. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different? An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns," in *Politics and Social Life,* ed. Nelson W. Polsby, R. A. Dentler, and P. A. Smith (Boston: Houghton, Miflin Co., 1963), p. 755; and Shannon, *Constituency,* pp. 81–94. The early development of the Republican-Dixiecrat coalition is traced by V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949).

[24] Since the data are weighted, the significance of the differences was tested by relying on the unweighted N for finding the degrees of freedom in the F-table. For information on the assignment of weights, consult I.C.P.R., *The Representation Study: The Candidate File.* With a random sample of about 120 observations and three groups, any value of eta^2 exceeding .06 ($eta = .25$) is significant at the .05 level. For a detailed presentation of eta^2, see Linton C. Freeman, *Elementary Applied Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 120–130, 199–209.



Figure 1. Attitude Locations of House Representatives by Party in Three Policy Domains.

Republicans, located between the two Democratic groups, take a position which is closer to the isolationist than to the internationalist end of this scale. This pattern also holds consistently for each particular item composing the foreign policy scale except for the item involving military aid. On this issue, nonsouthern Democrats proved less internationalist, i.e., less generous with military aid, than did the other two party groups. On the whole, the differences in this domain, while significant, are small. None of the three party groups is, by its attitude, closely identified with a specific course in foreign policy. One would not expect a high level of voting cohesion against this backdrop of attitude differences.

In the civil rights domain, the distinctions between the three party groups are far more impressive. With the gulf separating the two Democratic groups turning out as vast as expected, one may pause to note the distinctive position with which Republicans emerge in this domain. Representatives of the party of Lincoln and the abolition of slavery approve integration far less wholeheartedly than do Democrats outside the South. The roots are planted for an occasional coalition between Republicans and southern Democrats even in this domain.

The social welfare domain most sharply reveals differences in party attitudes. Republicans and Democrats from outside the South confront each other from opposite ends of the social welfare continuum. While southern Democrats take a position in the middle of it they are slightly closer to the Republicans. On the whole, the attitudes of southern Democrats have proved more compatible with those of Republicans than with those of their own party colleagues outside the South. The so-called "conservative coalition" in House voting has a firm root in the policy attitudes of the partisan groups forming it.

The reliance on the arithmetic mean in portraying the attitudinal locations of the parties may invite some questions and criticism. One might ask whether or not these means indicate positions which are shared by a majority of party colleagues in the House. A party polarized over a given issue may be characterized by a mean position which has few if any occupants. Likewise, a few colleagues located at one extreme of a scale may unduly shift the mean of the whole group away from the point where most of the members are found.

As Table 1 demonstrates, the mean party position in most instances points closely to the scale portion where a majority of members of any party group — often an overwhelming majority — happens to be located. Only two exceptions need to be noted: Southern Democrats in the social welfare and Republicans in the civil rights domain. Their mean values of 1.98 and 1.33, respectively, identify thinly populated scale areas. Southern Democrats are divided on social welfare issues into two wings, the larger one finding a comfortable alliance with Republicans and the smaller making a congenial partner for nonsouthern Democrats. Republicans exhibit a similar split over civil rights issues, with one wing sharing the southern and the other one sharing the nonsouthern position of the two Democratic groups.

The discussion of shared attitudes thus far has focused on representatives who have served in Congress. Their policy attitudes have been ascertained at a certain moment of their political careers. It is conceivable that their atti-

Table 1. Percentage of House Representatives Sharing the Mean Attitude of their Party Group by Issue Domain[a]

Party Group	Foreign Policy	Civil Rights	Social Welfare	(Weighted N)[b]
Nonsouthern Democrats	54.5 (2,3)	78.6 (2,3)	83.4 (3,4)	(204)
Southern Democrats	60.2 (1,2)	88.9 (0,1)	36.5 (1,2)	(232)
Republicans	51.0 (1,2)	29.9 (1,2)	78.7 (0,1)	(280)

[a] The pair of adjacent scale positions surrounding the partisan mean is given in parentheses below the percentage figures.

[b] The unweighted N includes 42 nonsouthern Democrats, 34 southern Democrats, and 52 Republicans.

tudes have changed, in a systematic way, as the result of age or legislative experience since entering Congress. The data at hand are too limited for a full examination of this question. But what can be investigated is the fit between the party attitudes of incumbents and those of candidates aspiring to the office of congressman. Should their attitudinal locations match closely, the party attitudes of representatives would seem unaffected by congressional experience and could be regarded as widely shared partisan goals.

In Figure 2 the attitude locations of incumbents face those of nonincumbent candidates in the three policy domains. It may appear that the Republican as well as the southern Democratic nonincumbents are taking, in all three domains, far more "contemporary" positions than do their incumbent party colleagues — "contemporary" referring to internationalist, integrationist, and liberal, respectively. But these differences seldom reach statistical significance (only among Republicans in the social welfare and among southern Democrats in the foreign policy domain). And nonsouthern Democrats reveal differences which are neither striking nor significant. Thus the mean party attitudes of representatives, on the whole, seem very little influenced by the legislative setting. Instead these attitudes hint at a platform also shared by fellow partisans outside Congress, at least by those who pass the hurdle of party nomination. In one way or another, then, the differences in policy attitudes found among representatives can be traced to the selection of candidates for congressional office. Each of the three party groups manages to recruit candidates whose policy outlook fits the partisan mold.

Party Positions: Attitudes vs. Voting

Shared policy attitudes, so runs the hypothesis of this paper, are supposed to leave a major imprint on the voting decisions of representatives. One way to test this proposition is by comparing the roll-call positions of the parties with their attitudinal positions.[25] A test of this sort requires comparable scales of attitude and behavior; not only must the domain of policy be equivalent in both instances, but the measured scores must be comparable as well — a condition achieved here by the use of standardized scores, expressing both attitudinal and roll-call scores as standard deviations from their respective means.

The standardized mean positions are displayed in Figure 3 for incumbents of the three party groups. In all three domains, the rank order of attitudinal positions is the same as the rank order of roll-call positions. That is to say that a party group which professes more liberal attitudes than another one also votes more liberally than the other one. Of course, with only three objects to be ranked, such an agreement in rankings can easily occur by chance alone. But to encounter it in three domains is not so easily done by chance, the probability being less than .005.[26] As a result, the finding that the three parties considered here have the same rank in both attitude and voting in three domains is not at all trivial.

Figure 3, moreover, reveals the goodness of fit between a party's attitude and its roll-call position, with the match between the two being closest in the social welfare domain. The impression conveyed by the configuration in that domain suggests that representatives, on the whole, vote in strict accordance with their party's attitude. Such a result squares nicely with the finding of a sharp attitudinal cleavage between the parties in this domain.

In the foreign policy domain, however, the parties' vote positions do not match as closely their attitudinal locations. In fact, among Republicans, whose behavior suggests perfect harmony between attitude and voting, the match is worst. The party is sharply split over foreign policy roll calls, with one wing — Republicans from coastal states — acting very much like nonsouthern Democrats, while the opposite wing — Republicans from interior states — shares the isolationist position taken by south-

---

[25] For each of the three policy domains, the data set of the Representation Study contains Guttman scales of roll-call votes, one scale for the 85th Congress and another one for the 86th. The social welfare scale for the 85th Congress is made up of items referring to public housing, aid to education, area development, and appropriations for various agencies of the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare. The items of the foreign policy scale (85th Congress) include a variety of foreign aid votes. And the civil rights scale (85th Congress) consists of items dealing with the Civil Rights Act of 1957. For a more detailed reference to the titles of the bills and a description of the scale construction, see I.C.P.R., *The Candidate File*, pp. 226–229. For the roll-call scales pertaining to the 86th Congress, see I.C.P.R., *Candidates and Constituents*, pp. 619-624.

[26] Three objects can be ranked six different ways, and each ranking can form a pair with any other one of the six, including itself. This results in 36 pairs of such rankings, six of which are in agreement. Thus the probability of independently ranking three objects the same way twice is 6/36 or .167. The probability of obtaining such a result in three different domains independently, therefore, is $(.167)^3$ or .0046.

(a) Foreign Policy



(b) Civil Rights



(c) Social Welfare



Figure 2. Attitude Locations of House Incumbents (1) and Nonincumbent Candidates (N) by Party in Three Policy Domains



Figure 3. Roll-Call and Attitude Positions of Party Groups in the House of Representatives (Standardized Means)

ern Democrats. The less than perfect overlap between attitudes and voting positions accomplished by the party groups in the foreign policy domain is closely tied to the feeble distinction of foreign policy attitudes noted above.

The civil rights configuration also reveals some discrepancies between the voting positions of the parties and their attitude locations. Southern Democrats shift to an even more segregationist position than their shared attitude would suggest, and Republicans pay a heavier tribute to their historical legacy in racial policy than their shared attitude would have led one to expect. In this domain party attitudes differed noticeably — although not as much as in the social welfare domain; but their ability to generate corresponding voting positions is somewhat weaker by comparison.

The slippage between attitude and voting in this domain might be explained by constituency influence. On civil rights issues, representatives have been shown to be closely attuned to the opinion of their local constituencies.[27] It is very likely, therefore, that southern Democrats are acting on perceptions, which are widely shared within this group, that their constituencies demand a far more restrictive policy in this domain than they would offer themselves; likewise, Republicans are moved by shared perceptions of their constituencies to stronger action than their own attitudes would demand.

Despite some noted slippage between attitude and voting, a certain pattern emerges quite visibly. In all three domains the two party groups which stand closest to one another on the attitude continuum also turn out closest in roll-call voting. Thus voting coalitions observed in floor decision making mirror the attitudinal configurations of the party groups. Even though the focus on mean positions has obscured sizeable individual shifts as well as wholesale moves by some intraparty wings, these mean values hint at the approximate locations of most members of the respective party groups.

Measuring the Effect of Party Attitude on Individual Behavior: The Statistical Model

The analysis so far has established that the three party groups differ substantially in their attitudes toward controversial matters of policy, although not equally so in all policy domains, and that the shared attitude of a party group points to its position taken during roll-call voting, although again in one domain more closely than in another one. But since none of the party groups, save nonsouthern Democrats in one instance,[28] achieve unanimity in either attitudes or voting, individual variation from respective party positions waits to be taken into account. Such individual variation may severely curtail the role of party in the event that attitudes and voting positions prove highly correlated among individuals within party groups, or it may simply introduce some random "noise" surrounding the well separated party positions. In order to shed some light on this question, I propose a statistical model aimed at simultaneously estimating the effects of individual attitude and partisan attitude on individual roll-call behavior.[29] That is to say, the effect of shared policy attitudes is to be assessed in the presence of individual deviations from those shared attitudes.

The hypothetical situation of a pure group (party) effect is displayed in Figure 4. The roll-call positions of members of three groups have been plotted against their attitudinal positions. The groups are ranked the same way on both the attitude and the roll-call axis. Within each of the groups, however, an individual's attitude fails to be linearly related to his vote, a condition which is indicated by the zero slope found within each group. In other words, the group molds the behavior of the individual who belongs to it. However much an individual's attitude deviates from the group voting standard, such deviations are randomly distributed instead of being systematically related to an individual's policy attitude. This model has been labeled "model of group effect only." By drawing a single line with a positive slope through the three clusters of points, one could still visualize an overall

---

[27] The importance of a congressman's perception of constituency opinion in the civil rights domain is emphasized by Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence."

[28] The zero variance displayed by nonsouthern Democrats in roll-call voting on civil rights bills is rather exceptional and is not duplicated in the subsequent Congress (86th). But the lack of any variance shown by the data for the 85th Congress is not the result of sampling oddities. The sample mean of 6.0 lies well within the neighborhood of the population mean of all nonsouthern Democrats, amounting to 5.9 with a standard deviation of 0.62.

[29] The basic ideas for this model have emerged from a great deal of communication betwen the author, Gudmund Iversen, and Lawrence Boyd. See Gudmund R. Iversen, "Recovering Individual Data in the Presence of Group and Individual Effects," *American Journal of Sociology*, 79 (September, 1973), 420–434, as well as Lawrence Boyd's doctoral dissertation, "Multiple Level Analysis With Complete and Incomplete Data" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1971). Both authors also provide an extensive bibliography of the literature on group, structural, and contextual effects.



Figure 4. A Model of Group Effect Only

relationship between an individual's attitude and his voting, but that slope would vanish once the group positions are held constant.

As an alternative consider a model which, in addition to the group effect, also recognizes an individual effect (e.g., the representative's own attitude). Such a model would obtain when the slopes of the within-group relationship were allowed to become non-zero, while the group means remain different and in the same rank-order on both axes. An example of such a model is depicted in Figure 5. It should be noted that all the within-group slopes are listed as equal, a condition which indicates that the same relationship between attitude and voting holds for each group.

But such a pattern is just a special case within the class of "models combining a group effect with an individual effect." Another special case of that class worth noting arises when the within-group slopes vary systematically with the group positions. One might suppose that the higher the group position on X is, the steeper the slope is going to be for that group. The possibility of such "interaction" between the individual position on X and the group position on X, which need not be positive, has been included here along with individual and group effects taken separately.

In order to develop the equation representing this complex model, let us designate the voting position of individual j in group i as Y_{ij}, his attitudinal position as X_{ij}, the intercept and the slope of the linear relationship between X and Y within his group as a_i and b_i respectively, and the random disturbance associated with his voting position as e_{ij}. The basic relationship between an individual's attitude and his vote can then be represented by

$$(1)\quad Y_{ij} = a_i + b_i(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i) + e_{ij}$$
$$(i = 1,2, \cdots, k)$$
$$(j = 1,2, \cdots, n_i)$$

Expression (1) defines the parameters of the within-group relationship, one set of a and b coefficients for each group of individuals. By measuring the individual predictor X_{ij}, as de-



Figure 5. A Model Combining Group and Individual Effects

viation from the group mean $\overline{X}_i$, the model guarantees the independence between the individual and the group variable. Unless eliminated, the substantial overlap between the two variables would jeopardize the estimation of their coefficients.

In order to introduce the "group effect," let us postulate a linear relationship between group means on X and Y (with the disturbance term omitted for sake of simplicity):

$$(2)\quad \overline{Y}_i = A_0 + A\overline{X}_i \quad (i = 1,2,\cdots,k)$$

Such a linear relationship between group attitude ($\overline{X}_i$) and group voting position ($\overline{Y}_i$) was suggested by the display of locations in Figure 3. Note that the coefficients in (2) have been capitalized in order to distinguish them for the individual level coefficients in (1). By taking group averages on both sides of equation (1) one obtains another expression for $\overline{Y}_i$, namely:

$$(3)\quad \overline{Y}_i = a_i$$

By combining (2) with (3) one finds that

$$(4)\quad a_i = A_0 + A\overline{X}_i$$

A link has now been established between the individual model and the group model of the relationship between X and Y. The intercepts of the individual (within-group) relationship a_i have been expressed as a function of the group means on X. Going one step further and entering (4) into (1) leads to:

$$(5)\quad Y_{ij} = A_0 + A\overline{X}_i + b_i(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i)$$

Thus, both the group and the individual effects are now included in one model, the two effects being independent of each other. Expression (5) still provides for a separate individual effect b_i for each group. In the event that this effect can be considered equal for all groups, it can be replaced by a constant b. If, on the other hand, this effect is supposed to vary systematically with the group means on X, b_i ought to be replaced by a linear function. This kind of variation, which is denoted as "interaction," is captured by (6), the disturbance term having been omitted:

$$(6)\quad b_i = B_0 + B(\overline{X}_i - \overline{X}) \quad (i=1,2,\cdots,k)$$

B_0 denotes that part of the individual relationship which is constant throughout the groups, and B refers to the other part whose size depends on the value of $\overline{X}_i$, this being taken as a deviation from the overall mean $\overline{X}$. B indicates the interaction between individual and group effects. By substituting (6) into (5) one gets:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} &= A_0 + A\overline{X}_i \\ &\quad + [B_0 + B(\overline{X}_i - \overline{X})](X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i) \\ &= A_0 + A\overline{X}_i + B_0(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i) \\ &\quad + B(\overline{X}_i - \overline{X})(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i) \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

The model presented in (7) allows for the simultaneous estimation of the effects of group position $\overline{X}_i$; of individual position $(X_{ij}-\overline{X}_i)$; and of the multiplicative combination (interaction) of both. Defining this term as the product of deviations from means—$(\overline{X}_i-\overline{X})(X_{ij}-\overline{X}_i)$—keeps its correlation with each of the other two predictors at a low level. Had the interaction term instead been measured by the product of X_{ij} and $\overline{X}_i$, it would have been so highly correlated with each of them that the least-squares estimation would not have yielded best unbiased estimates. The way the interaction is defined in (7) eliminates such unwanted collinearity and provides for best unbiased estimates.

Estimates of the Model and Discussion

The model developed in the previous section and summarized in equation (7) accounts well for the roll-call voting of House representatives. The multiple R^2 varies from .38 (foreign policy, 86th Congress) to .72 (civil rights, 85th Congress). Table 2 presents these summary measures along with the standardized regression coefficients of the various effects.

The standard coefficients reveal that, in all policy domains, party, i.e., the shared attitude of a party group, proves far more influential than does the individual attitude. The latter effect is not reduced to insignificance, but is modest by comparison. Judging these results according to the typology of models introduced earlier, one would not want to identify this pattern with the "group effect only" model, but rather, in elaborating the earlier distinction, with a model combining a strong group effect with a weak individual effect.

It may come as a surprise that the civil rights domain, according to the coefficients presented in Table 2, does as well as or even better than the social welfare domain, as far as the strength of the party effect is concerned; recall that, in the aggregate, voting positions diverged somewhat from attitudes in the civil rights domain. One reason for the unusually high party effect in this domain lies in the surprisingly cohesive behavior of nonsouthern Democrats. Their voting record on civil rights, in fact, was unanimous during the 85th Congress. Such a complete lack of individual variance exhibited by one of the three groups strongly tilts the balance toward the "group effect only" side. What the balance might have been in the presence of some individual variation can be gleaned from the figures pertaining to the 86th Congress, where nonsouthern Democrats failed to duplicate their unanimous record of the previous Congress.

In the social welfare domain the strong showing of the party effect coincides with close proximity of shared party attitudes and party voting positions. The reason for this "coincidence" lies, I submit, in the marked partisan distinction of policy attitudes which was noted for this domain. Where party positions are sharply defined in the minds of representatives there is little room for deviation of individuals from the partisan standard.

Finally, the foreign policy domain also dis-

Table 2. Individual, Party, and Interaction Effects on Legislative Voting (Standardized Regression Estimates)

	85th Congress			86th Congress		
Predictor	Foreign Policy	Social Welfare	Civil Rights	Foreign Policy	Social Welfare	Civil Rights
Individual	.36	.26	.28	.36	.25	.31
Party	.53	.65	.79	.48	.76	.74
Interaction	−.12	−.01	−.22	−.12	−.08	−.18
Multiple R^2	.42	.48	.72	.38	.64	.64
(Weighted N)[a]	(652)	(655)	(678)	(721)	(710)	(720)

[a] The unweighted N varies from roughly 120 in the 85th Congress to roughly 130 in the 86th Congress.

plays the expected pattern. With a low degree of party distinction in the realm of attitudes as well as a modest match, in the aggregate, between attitudes and votes, this domain was not made for a pronounced party effect on roll-call voting. Compared with the other two domains, the party effect ranks lowest, whereas the individual effect ranks highest, as could reasonably be expected.

Thus far the assessment of the party effect has only occasionally paid attention to variations of this effect among the three party groups. Not all of them contribute equally to the showing of the party effect in a given domain. Already noted was the extraordinary voting cohesion displayed by nonsouthern Democrats in the civil rights domain during the 85th Congress. Representatives of the other two party groups fall dramatically short of such a level of cohesion. Moreover, individual attitudes and voting records are significantly correlated among the other two party groups.

Such a pattern is neatly summarized by the interaction term. As built into the model, it is sensitive to systematic covariation between the mean party attitude and the slope — or correlaion — of the within-group individual relationship. The estimate for such interaction in the civil rights domain is -.22, indicating that the higher (integrationist) the party attitude is, the weaker the correlation between individual attitude and voting will be. Nearly all the interaction estimates listed in Table 2 are negative, being zero at best. This finding demonstrates that nonsouthern Democrats, whose attitude means are the highest in all domains (i.e., most liberal, internationalist, integrationist), show the lowest correlations between individual attitude and voting.[30] Compared with members of the other two parties, they rank last in reliance on individual attitudes in casting roll-call votes but rank first in the degree to which they are affected by their shared policy attitude.

As for policy domains, the concept of shared party attitudes performs best in the social welfare domain.[31] Here policy attitudes were found most sharply polarized along partisan lines as well as most closely matched, in the partisan aggregate, by voting positions on the House floor. And the reliance of representatives on their own particular attitudes was found to be at a "local minimum" in this domain. Saying, however, that covariation between individual attitudes and voting is slight does not imply that representatives sacrifice their own attitudes for the sake of party. Their own attitudes are located so closely around their party attitude, and the party groups are separated by such wide distances on the attitude continuum that conflict between individual attitude and party attitude and, thus, the need for sacrific rarely arise.

Shared Policy Attitudes and the Legislative Arena

Now that the importance of shared policy attitudes has been demonstrated, it remains to be shown how such attitudes are translated into party votes within the legislative arena. Perhaps this translation occurs instantly in the minds of most congressmen, especially when the party position is perceived with great clarity by all members. Even then, however, a representative may find it difficult, within a given policy domain, to relate each of the many bills with which he is not greatly familiar to the party attitude. The congressman who is not an expert on a given bill indeed requires some form of communication which spells out for him the party vote on that bill. Two questions can thus be posed: (1) who communicates voting cues to the congressman, and (2) do these cues benefit party cohesion?

---

[30] This finding can also be demonstrated by comparing the correlations between attitudes and roll-call voting within parties. When averaged across policy domains, these correlations stand at a value of .28 for nonsouthern Democrats, at .43 for Republicans, and at .49 for southern Democrats. Herb Weisberg suggested to me that the more "individualistic" behavior of southern Democrats was a function of the broad definition of the South, which included four border states along with the former Confederate states. One could argue that if the Democratic representatives from the border states were counted among the nonsouthern Democrats, it would be the latter group which would exhibit the more marked covariation between attitude and vote. While this might prove to be the case, it is worth noting, that southern Democrats, even including Border representatives, were found to be more united in their policy attitudes than were nonsouthern Democrats.

[31] A vast literature has documented and discussed the strength of the party factor in structuring roll-call voting in this domain of policy. Among the more recent publications, see Marwell, "Party, Region and Dimension of Conflict;" Shapiro, "Computer Simulation;" also consult Aage R. Clausen and Richard B. Cheney, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953-1964," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (March, 1970), 138-152. Clausen and Cheney ((pp. 144-145) distinguish between an "economic policy" dimension and a "social welfare" dimension within the larger domain — not separated in this paper — of government intervention; they found that party was twice as strong a predictor of voting in the economic policy area as in the social welfare area.

Nearly every congressman interviewed in the sample at hand responded positively to the question of whether "there were other members of the House whose views you found especially valuable when it came to making your own decisions." This kind of consultation with trusted colleagues would seem likely to encourage party voting, for it occurs almost exclusively within the ranks of a party group. By the same token, not every representative takes his cue from the same trusted colleagues within his party group. The larger the number of such colleagues whose advice is sought and the wider the differences of their views, the less positive their contribution to party cohesion will be.

In order to examine the nature and strength of that contribution, the analysis turns, again, to the model (see expression [7]) which expressed a representative's roll-call position as a joint function of his own attitude, the party attitude, and the interaction between the two. This model can be applied separately to those representatives who, in a given domain, indicated strong reliance on consultation and to those who indicated otherwise. Such a test is feasible since not every representative sought advice with equal readiness in all three domains. Within a given domain, about one half of the representatives indicated that consultation in that domain was highly important for their own decisions, and the other half did not.[32]

The hypothesis that intensive consultation with trusted colleagues helps a representative vote in accordance with the shared attitude of his party group can be examined by comparing the estimates of the various effects obtained for the two sets of representatives. The figures presented in Table 3 reveal that in almost every instance the party effect relative to the individual effect as well as to the interaction effect is far greater among representatives who consult than among those who do not. To be sure, the party effect is not always enhanced by consultation, but the individual effect is diminished by it close to insignificance, particularly in the social welfare domain. The greater relative weight of the party effect among advice seeking representatives points to the intervening influence of trusted party colleagues on legislative voting.

These findings imply that shared attitudes form the basis for the information and advice provided by those key representatives referred

Table 3. Individual, Party, and Interaction Effects on Legislative Voting, with Control for Consultation with Colleagues

a. 85th Congress

Predictor (Standardized)	Foreign Policy Consultation Yes	Foreign Policy Consultation No	Social Welfare Consultation Yes	Social Welfare Consultation No	Civil Rights Consultation Yes	Civil Rights Consultation No
Individual	.23	.43	.06	.32	.19	.32
Party	.54	.49	.62	.65	.79	.78
Interaction	.02	−.27	.08	.01	−.18	−.19
R^2	.31	.52	.37	.51	.74	.73
(Weighted *N*)	(280)	(287)	(246)	(324)	(182)	(419)

b. 86th Congress

Predictor (Standardized)	Foreign Policy Consultation Yes	Foreign Policy Consultation No	Social Welfare Consultation Yes	Social Welfare Consultation No	Civil Rights Consultation Yes	Civil Rights Consultation No
Individual	.28	.34	−.08	.34	.30	.31
Party	.54	.45	.75	.75	.69	.76
Interaction	.11	−.37	.22	−.09	−.23	−.16
R^2	.31	.57	.54	.68	.70	.70
(Weighted *N*)	(294)	(232)	(231)	288)	(163)	(366)

---

[32] For a construction of the consultation index and the frequencies, see the codebook for the *Candidate File,* variable numbers 82, 83, 86, 87, 88.

to as "trusted colleagues." By relying on such information and advice, the ordinary House member casts a heavily partisan vote reflecting the shared attitudes of his party group. Partisan cohesion in House voting thus rests on the following four pillars: (1) representatives choose informants from the ranks of their own party group, (2) representatives as well as informants share policy attitudes, (3 informants reach their own voting decisions on the basis of shared attitudes, and (4) representatives adopt the decisions of their informants as guide for their own behavior.

Conclusions

Post-Burkean models of representation have reserved for political parties a crucial role as vehicles of representation of the popular will in modern democracies. One of the ways by which a party can play that role is for its representatives to act, during legislative decisions, with cohesion based on widely shared policy goals. This study has examined the influence of "shared policy attitudes" on the voting behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The findings make a strong case for such influence in the policy domain of social welfare issues. For one, the shared policy attitudes as measured by locations on an attitude scale indicate, with a good amount of precision, the locations of the party groups on the roll-call scale referring to the same domain of policy. Second, even though individuals deviate from their respective party attitude, and despite the fact that such deviations are to some extent matched by deviations from the party's roll-call position, the significance of this individual relationship pales by comparison with the match between party attitude and party voting.

These findings suggest a way to reconcile two approaches to legislative decision making, namely the approach based on the notion of "predisposition" and the approach based on the notion of "personal interaction."[33] The first views the indivdiual act of legislative voting as a response to one's ideological position—what I have called attitude; whereas the second views that act as the result of communication between the representative and other actors in the legislative arena, such as colleagues, legislative leaders, the administration or interest group representatives. The findings presented above have indicated that trusted colleagues leave a marked partisan impact on the voting records of congressmen. This tends to buttress the "personal interaction" hypothesis. On the other hand, these findings have also revealed the impact of predispositional factors, i.e., the shared policy attitudes of members of the same party group. This set of findings hints at a linkage between predisposition and personal interaction. By selecting informants from the ranks of their own party, congressmen pick colleagues whose attitudes they are most likely to share. In fact, it can be argued that his desire to find like-minded informants leads a congressman to a party colleague.[34] This choice sets the stage for shared policy attitudes to leave a partisan imprint on the ultimate voting decision of a congressman.

Even though some of the elusive traces of party in legislative behavior have been tracked, some elusiveness remains. One of the questions raised by this analysis is, Who are those informal partisan leaders known as "trusted colleagues?" Are they identical with the members of the committee dealing with a bill on which advice is sought? One might wish to examine both the degree to which these committee members rely on the shared party attitude for their *own* behavior and the degree to which they help their fellow party members in the House reach their decisions. Furthermore, the impact of these "informal" partisan leaders should be compared with the impact of the elected floor leaders in the House. A fuller understanding of the role of party in legislative decision making awaits consideration of these questions.

---

[33] For a review of these different approaches, see Arthur H. Miller, 'The Impact of Committees," chap. I; also Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, chap. 3.

[34] For evidence on this point, see Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, pp. 72–74.

Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria*

RICHARD D. MCKELVEY AND PETER C. ORDESHOOK

Carnegie-Mellon University

Spatial models of election competition now constitute a major part of the application to political science of the rational choice paradigm. Critics, of course, may disagree over the empirical adequacy of a particular model's assumptions. Nevertheless, the path of spatial theory's development—commencing with Downs's seminal analysis[1]—exhibits a concerted effort to accommodate numerous theoretical and empirical considerations (with varying degrees of success), including multidimensional issue spaces, variations in the functional form of citizens' utility functions, alternative hypotheses about abstention and candidate objectives, risky strategies, sequential elections, the electoral college, sophisticated voting, and the proper conceptualization of spatial analysis as a substantively interpreted application of game theory and social choice theory. Undoubtedly, we should anticipate further developments, including models that address elections other than two party majority rule contests.

Despite the achievements of spatial theory, however, *all* models that seek an explicit prediction about candidate strategies focus on a single solution concept—pure strategy equilibria—and thereby suffer from a common and seemingly devastating shortcoming: they assume either that the election concerns a single issue or that citizens' preferences are distributed with perfect mathematical symmetry.[2] Even if every other restrictive assumption heretofore considered is satisfied, abandoning these two restrictions on preference renders spatial theory incapable of revealing propositions about the strategies candidates should adopt. We attribute this state of affairs to the fact that unless the assumption of unidimensional or symmetrically distributed preference is satisfied, the solution to the election game posited by spatial theory does not generally exist. In this essay we consider the game-theoretic extension of pure strategy equilibria—mixed minimax solutions—and we examine the possibility of using this extension to admit more general and more empirically reasonable analyses of election competition.

In the first section we introduce some elementary notation, and we review the general perspective of spatial theory and the reasons that sufficient conditions for majority rule equilibria are restrictive. Additionally, we discuss why spatial theorists are reluctant to extend their notion of a solution to mixed minimax strategies. The second section contains the main theoretical results of this essay. Specifically, after admitting the possibility that candidates adopt mixed strategies, we hypothesize that such strategies provide a reasonable solution to election games without pure strategy equilibria. Our hypothesis is based, first, on showing that for a general class of two-person zero-sum games, the support set of a mixed minimax solution (i.e., the set of pure strategies to which a solution assigns a nonzero probability) is restricted to a particular subset of the pure strategies. Second, we show that for the class of spatial games in which citizens' preferences are characterized by simple Euclidean distance functions, the support set of minimax solutions is limited to a well-defined subset of the issue space, and that for continuous densities of electoral preference, this support set typically is small. We conclude this section with the argument that this support set may be of special interest for even a sequential conceptualization of campaigns. In the third section we examine the frequently blurred distinction between spatial conceptualizations of two candidate elections and of committees. We conclude that while this distinction is unimportant if pure strategy equilibria exist, it is critically important otherwise. Specifically, the policies implied by solutions to the committee problem (i.e., solution concepts from *n*-person game theory) if pure strategy equilibria do not exist, differ generally from the policies adopted by candidates who abide by the minimax principle.

The Theoretical Context

Spatial models use a variety of assumptions about candidates and citizens. All models of two candidate competition, however, can be viewed simply as substantively interpreted two-person zero-sum games—games in which the players are the candidates, a strategy is a position on each of *n* dimensions (issues), and a candidate's payoff

---

* We wish to thank the National Science Foundation for their support of this research and Richard Mickelsen for his technical assistance.

[1] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1957)..

[2] One exception to the use of this condition is Melvin J. Hinich, John O. Ledyard and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games," *Journal of Politics,* 35 (February, 1973), 154–193. There, however, the restrictive assumption of continuous concave-convex payoff functions is used.

(e.g., probability of winning, expected plurality, and so on) is determined by each citizen's evaluation of respective strategies and a decision rule for revealing his preference. A model's prediction about the issue positions of candidates, then, follows from the game-theoretic notion of a solution—an equilibrium strategy pair, i.e., a pair of spatial positions such that once there, neither candidate possesses any incentive to deviate unilaterally.

In this essay, we focus on a limited class of models. Our procedure is to introduce that class by rigorously developing its game-theoretic structure and by conducting the analysis within that structure. Since spatial models share a common theoretical foundation, if not particular substantive assumptions, this provides a general perspective for resolving spatial theory's dependence on a single solution concept.

We begin formally by letting X denote the set of feasible alternatives or strategies, by letting C be the set of all voters, and by letting μ be a finite measure on C such that $\mu(A)$ represents the "number" of voters in the set $A \subseteq C$. (Note that the technical terminology of measure is used here to admit the possibility of a continuum of voters, as when the distribution of voter preferred points is approximated by a continuous density. If C is finite and if each voter possesses one vote, then μ is simply the counting measure.) Assuming now that each citizen $c \epsilon C$ possesses a utility function $U_c: X \rightarrow R$, such that he prefers x over $y \epsilon X$ if and only if $U_c(x) > U_c(y)$, individual preferences determine a majority preference relation over X thus:

> $x \epsilon X$ is *majority preferred* to $y \epsilon X$ (written $x \succ y$) if and only if $\mu(S_{xy}) > \mu(S_{yx})$,

and

> $y \epsilon X$ is *not majority preferred* to $x \epsilon X$ (written $x \succsim y$) if and only if $\mu(S_{xy}) \geq \mu(S_{yx})$,

where S_{xy} is the set of all citizens who strictly prefer x to y, i.e., $S_{xy} = \{c \epsilon C \mid U_c(x) > U_c(y)\}$, and S_{yx} consists of all citizens who strictly prefer y to x, i.e., $S_{yx} = \{c \epsilon C \mid U_c(y) > U_c(x)\}$. Thus, if $x \succ y$, x defeats y in a majority vote, while if $x \succsim y$, y does not defeat x. Using this preference relation we construct a two-person constant-sum symmetric game.[3] Specifically, we form the game (φ, X) by assuming that each player's strategy consists of the set X, that player 1's payoff function is

$$\varphi_1(x,y) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } x \succ y \\ 1/2 \text{ if } x \sim y \\ 0 \text{ if } x \prec y, \end{cases}$$

and that player 2's payoff function is $\varphi_2(x,y) = 1 - \varphi_1(x,y)$.

To interpret (φ, X) as a spatial model of election competition under majority rule, then, we assume that (1) the players are candidates, where each candidate seeks to maximize his probability of winning; (2) all citizens vote unless they are indifferent; (3) a strategy $x \epsilon X$ is a position on each of n issues such that alternative positions on an issue are represented by a segment of the real line (thus $X \subseteq R^n$), and; (4) all citizens possess identical perceptions of each candidate's strategy.

One definition of a solution to (φ, X), now, is the notion of a pure strategy equilibrium:

Definition 1: (θ_1^*, θ_2^*) is a *pure strategy equilibrium pair* if and only if

$$\varphi_1(\theta_1^*, \theta_2) \geq \varphi_1(\theta_1^*, \theta_2^*) \geq \varphi_1(\theta_1, \theta_2^*)$$

for all $\theta_1, \theta_2 \epsilon X$.

Furthermore, if

$$\theta_1^* = \theta_2^* = \theta^*,$$

then θ^* is said to be an *equilibrium strategy.*

The problem with this solution concept, however, is that pure strategy equilibria need not exist. The simple illustration of the paradox of voting, in which $X = \{A, B, C\}$, and $A \succ B$, $B \succ C$, and $C \succ A$, is an admissible counter example to universal existence. For the spatial game, Plott's necessary and sufficient conditions and Sloss's generalization of them reveal, in fact, that spatial strategies satisfying Definition 1 exist only under extremely limited conditions—conditions such as unidimensional or symmetrically distributed preference.[4] In particular, if we represent citizens' utility functions by Euclidean distance, a pure strategy equilibrium exists only if *all* median lines of the electorate's preference distribution intersect at a common point.[5]

---

[3] Briefly, a two-person zero-sum game is symmetric if the strategy sets of both players are identical, if the value of the game to both players is zero and if $\varphi_1(x,y) = \varphi_2(y,x)$ for all x and y—i.e., if they interchange strategies, they interchange payoffs. A constant sum game, moreover, is equivalent to a zero-sum game since for any constant sum, there exists a positive monotonic transformation of the payoffs that renders the game zero-sum (e.g., substitute the payoffs, 1, 0, −1 for 1, 1/2, 0).

[4] Charles R. Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review*, 57 (September, 1967), 787–806; and Judith Sloss, "Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games," *Public Choice*, 15 (Summer, 1973), 19–48.

[5] See Otto A. Davis, M. DeGroot, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," *Econometrica*, 40 (January, 1972); and R. W. Hoyer and Lawrence S. Mayer, "Comparing Strategies in a Spatial Model of Electoral Competition," *American Journal of Political Science* (1974).

By relying wholly on this solution concept, then, spatial theory implicitly assumes that unless pure strategy equilibria exist, parsimonious propositions about the policy positions candidates adopt cannot be formulated. Consequently, a substantial amount of theorizing can be viewed not simply as the attempt to weaken assumptions or to ascertain the implications of alternative structures, but to establish sufficient conditions for a majority rule equilibrium. In fact, while assumptions are justified frequently because they are tractable, the definition of tractability usually is that they yield identifiable equilibria such as the electorate's median preference. Thus, since the existence of equilibria is unusual in even the simplest model, it is not surprising to find spatial theorists imposing restrictive or empirically untenable assumptions.

That pure strategy equilibrium solutions need not exist to two-person zero-sum games such as (φ,X) is, of course, well known. It is precisely this fact that led Von Neumann and Morgenstern to introduce the concept of a *mixed strategy* and to resolve partially the issue of an appropriate solution by proving that every such game with finite strategies possesses an equilibrium minimax solution in either pure or mixed strategies.[6]

Game theory, then, suggests a logical extension for spatial analysis in the event that pure strategy equilibria do not exist—namely, mixed minimax strategies. In conjunction with our assumptions about payoffs, for example, the cycle in which $X=\{A,B,C\}$ and $A \succ B \succ C \succ A$ yields the following two-candidate constant-sum game (payoffs are to Candidate 1):

		Candidate 2		
		A	B	C
Candidate 1	A	1/2	1	0
	B	0	1/2	1
	C	1	0	1/2

Figure 1

Although this game does not possess a pure strategy equilibrium, it has a mixed strategy equilibrium—$P_1=(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$ and $P_2=(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$. That is, by choosing a strategy randomly, each candidate guarantees himself an *expected* payoff of at least 1/2, and no other strategy provides such a guarantee.

Despite the mathematical closure of the problem provided by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, spatial theorists resist this extension.[7] Their argument is twofold. The first objection concerns the inherent lack of specificity of mixed strategies as to the spatial positions candidates eventually adopt. Pure strategy equilibria are appealing (especially if they are unique) because they identify unambiguously the policies candidates should advocate. Mixed strategies, on the other hand, by design seek to disguise a candidate's ultimate choice of policy. For the game in Figure 1, for example, every pure strategy is a possible outcome. For those, then, who desire explicit predictions about the policies engendered by majority rule procedures, the mixed strategy notion seems less than satisfactory.

The main thrust of our argument in the next section, however, is that while mixed minimax strategies necessarily entail some ambiguity, they can nevertheless limit considerably our expectations about the spatial positions candidates adopt.

The second argument against the use of mixed strategies in a simple spatial context concerns the dynamics of campaigns. Specifically, the most reasonable model of the extensive form of the election game is one in which candidates are permitted to sequentially adjust their spatial positions. A pure strategy for this extensive form game is not simply an element of X, but a "game plan"—a specification of a spatial response to an opponent's position for each and every adjustment period. Thus, if we retain our present conceptualization of pure strategies, we necessarily violate the conditions for regarding minimax strategies as solutions—the conditions being that both candidates announce their pure strategies simultaneously and neither player is permitted to alter his choice thereafter (e.g., payoffs are realized immediately). This violation seems unimportant, though, if the minimax strategy corresponds to a pure strategy equilibrium since neither candidate possesses any incentive to move unilaterally from the equilibrium. But, if the minimax strategy is mixed, the abstraction of spatial theory from the true extensive form of the election game seems to preclude its applicability. The essential problem is that the spatial positions candidates adopt in accordance with a mixed minimax strategy are not in equilibrium. Thus, if no prohibitions to sequential adjustment exist, at least one candidate should change his strategy on the next move. For example, if the candidates abide by the mixed strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for the game we illustrate in Figure 1, Candidate 1 can find himself choosing A and losing the election because his opponent chose B. Clearly, he should shift to another alternative if permitted to do so, and not take solace from the fact that he chose A in accordance with a mixed minimax solution to a myopic model.

---

[6] John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

[7] See, for example, William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 340, and Richard D. McKelvey, "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, 43 (September, 1975), 815–843.

In this essay, however, we pursue the logical consequences of the hypothesis that candidates abide by mixed minimax solutions to the simple spatial game for several reasons. First, such an analysis seems an essential first step toward the construction of sequential models. Second, if we assume that the campaign consists of a sequence of simultaneous moves but that candidates possess sufficient spatial mobility at each move, then we should anticipate the choice of spatial positions in the support set for solutions to a myopic model. Finally, if the candidates adjust their strategies one after the other, but if their adjustments are designed to be secure against the opponent's history, then again we anticipate spatial positions within the support set. We elaborate these arguments later in the next section. First, however, we turn to the simple mixed strategy extension of the myopic model.

The Support of Mixed Minimax Strategies

To extend the analysis of (φ,X) to mixed strategies, let $\tilde{X}$ denote the set of probability measures over X (i.e., the set of all pure and mixed strategies).[8] Then, for any P_1, $P_2 \epsilon \tilde{X}$, we define φ_1 thus:

$$\varphi_1(P_1,P_2) = \sum_x \sum_y \varphi_1(x,y)P_1(x)P_2(y)$$

if P_1 and P_2 are discrete, or

$$= \int \Big[\int \varphi_1(x,y)dP_1(x)dP_2(y) \Big]$$

if P_1 and P_2 are continuous.

These definitions generate, then, a new symmetric, two-person constant-sum game, denoted $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$. Thus, if P^* is a minimax solution to this game, our objective is to establish the bounds on P^*, i.e., the subset of X to which P^* assigns positive measure. To do this we let

$$D_y = \{x \epsilon X \mid x \succ y\}$$

$$D_y^* = \{x \epsilon X \mid x \succsim y\}$$

That is, D_y consists of all strategies in X that strictly defeat y while $D_y{}^*$ consists of all strategies in X that y does not defeat. Clearly, $D_y \subseteq D_y{}^*$.

The usual game-theoretic definition of domination states that a strategy x weakly dominates a strategy y if x is at least as good as y in every possible contingency and better in some. In the context of the above game, where the possible payoffs consist only of a win, a loss, or a tie, we express weak domination thus: For any x, $y \epsilon X$, x *weakly* dominates y iff $D_x{}^* \subseteq D_y$. After eliminating any or all weakly dominated strategies, we obtain the following definition:

> *Definition 2:* A set $\Omega \subseteq X$ is said to be *admissible* if, for each $y \epsilon X$, with $y \notin \Omega$, there is an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that
>
> $$D_x^* \subseteq D_y.$$

We also define a weaker type of admissible set, which we call weakly admissible:

> *Definition 3:* A set $\Omega \subseteq X$ is said to be *weakly admissible* if, for each $y \epsilon X$ with $y \notin \Omega$, there exists an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that
>
> $$D_x^* \cap \Omega \subseteq D_y \cap \Omega.$$

A set Ω is admissible, then, if for each $y \notin \Omega$, there exists an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that $z \succsim x \Rightarrow z \succ y$ for all $z \epsilon X$. (Note that an admissible set can contain dominated strategies.) Further, since x is not majority preferred to itself $(x \sim x)$, and since $x \epsilon X$, then $x \succ y$. A weakly admissible set, Ω, on the other hand, allows for the elimination of strategies that are dominated only in Ω. That is, Ω is weakly admissible if for every $y \notin \Omega$, there exists an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that $z \succsim x \Rightarrow z \succ y$ for all $z \epsilon \Omega$. And as before $x \epsilon \Omega$ so $x \succ y$. Note that if the set Ω is admissible it is also weakly admissible, but a weakly admissible set need not be admissible. For example, successive elimination of dominated strategies results in weakly admissible sets that may not be admissible. Not all admissible sets can be obtained, however, by a successive application of domination.

To illustrate these ideas, consider Figure 2 and note first that no strategy is at least as good as another under all contingencies. Hence the set of all strategies $\{a,b,c,d,e,f\}$ is admissible, and no subset of this set is admissible. Nevertheless, the set $\{a,b,c\}$ is weakly admissible. For example, $d \notin \{a,b,c\}$ is defeated by a while everything in $\{a,b,c\}$ that defeats a, namely b, also defeats d. That is, with respect to the set $\{a,b,c\}$, a is at least as good as d and sometimes better.

---

[8] Formally, if B is a σ-algebra of sets in X, a probability measure $P{:}B \rightarrow R$ is a set function satisfying the usual probability axioms. I. e., for each A, $B \epsilon B$, $O \leq P(A) \leq 1$ and $A \cap B = \Phi \Rightarrow P(A) + P(B) = P(AUB)$. We use the notation $P(x) = P(\{x\})$.

	a	b	c	d	e	f
a	0	−1	1	1	−1	1
b	1	0	−1	1	1	−1
c	−1	1	0	−1	1	1
d	−1	−1	1	0	0	0
e	1	−1	−1	0	0	0
f	−1	1	−1	0	0	0

Figure 2

The value of isolating admissible sets derives now from the following well known result of game theory:

Theorem 1: If P^* is a minimax solution for the reduced game (φ,Ω) where $\Omega\subseteq X$ is an admissible set, then P^* is a minimax solution for the game $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$.

Actually, the same result holds for weakly admissible sets:

Theorem 2: If P^* is a minimax solution for the reduced game (φ,Ω), where $\Omega\subseteq X$ is a weakly admissible set, then P^* is a minimax solution for the game $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$.

Proof: Since P^* is minimax over Ω, it must be the case that

$$P^*(D_x\cap\Omega) \geq 1/2$$

for all $x\epsilon\Omega$—otherwise x defeats P^*. But, since Ω is weakly admissible, then for any $y\not\epsilon\Omega$, $\exists x\epsilon\Omega$ such that $D_x\cap\Omega\subseteq D_y\cap\Omega\subseteq D_y$, in which case $P^*(D_y)\geq P^*(D_x\cap\Omega)\geq 1/2$. Thus, P^* is minimax over X. Q.E.D.

It follows that mixed minimax strategies can be limited not only to admissible but to weakly admissible sets as well. From Theorem 2, then, the mixed strategy solution to the game we illustrate in Figure 2, excluding strategies *d*, *e*, and *f*, is a solution to the full game. In fact, the mixed strategy solution to this game is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, 0, 0)—i.e., zero probability is given to the three strategies not in the weakly admissible set $\{a, b, c\}$.

For these results to be of interest, we must show, within the context of our problem—spatial theory—that such sets necessarily exist. To this end, we offer the following theorem.

Theorem 3: The set of Pareto optimals in X is an admissible set.

Proof: Let $Q\subseteq X$ be the set of Pareto optimal pure strategies and let $y\not\epsilon Q$. Then, by the definition of Pareto optimality, there exists an $x\epsilon Q$ such that $U_c(x)\geq U_c(y)$ for all $c\epsilon C$ with "$>$" holding for at least one $c\epsilon C$. Suppose $z\epsilon D_x^*$. Then, $z\succsim x$. But, since x is strictly preferred to y by at least one voter, it follows that $z\succ y$. Hence, $z\epsilon D_y$, which implies that

$$D_x^*\subseteq D_y$$

Thus Q is admissible. Q.E.D.

Taken together, Theorems 1 through 3 state that if a minimax strategy exists to the game over X—pure or mixed—there exists at least one such strategy that gives positive weight only to Pareto optimal positions.[9] This conclusion can be viewed as uninteresting, though, since the set of Pareto optimals typically is large—in the spatial problem, with utilities as introduced below, it must encompass all ideal points and can include all of X (as when the distribution of preferences is given by a normal density). Note, however, that Theorems 1 and 2 make no use of spatial concepts, and in this sense they are completely general propositions about symmetric two-person zero-sum games given the appropriate assumptions about payoff. Our intent, then, is to add a particular spatial assumption about citizens' preferences and prove first that a well defined subset of the Pareto optimals is admissible in the resultant model. By way of example, we then suggest that the notion of weak admissibility can further restrict our expectations about candidate strategies.

The particular spatial model we consider is limited, but it is the basis for much theorizing. Specifically, assume that for all citizens $c\epsilon C$, there is an ideal point $x_c\epsilon R^n$ such that

$$U_c(x) = -(x-x_c)'(x-x_c) = -\|x-x_c\|^2 \tag{2}$$

---

[9] Note that Theorems 1 and 2 do not imply that there cannot exist mixed minimax strategies that give positive weight to positions not in admissible or weakly admissible sets (recall that minimax strategies need not be unique). With respect to Theorem 3, however, it is straightforward to show that such strategies cannot exist outside of the Pareto optimals, Q. Briefly, from the definition of Pareto optimality we see that the weak inequality in expression (1) holds for all $z\epsilon X$, while strict inequality holds for at least one $z\epsilon X$, namely x. Thus, any strategy, P, that gives positive weight to some position not in Q, can be strictly dominated by a strategy P′. In the case of a finite strategy space, for example, if $P(y) \neq 0$ for some $y\epsilon Q$, we can define P′ thus,

$P'(z) = P(z),\ z\epsilon Q,\ z \neq x$
$P'(y) = 0$
$P'(x) = P(y) + P(x),\ x\epsilon Q,\ x \succ y$

By successively applying this transformation for all y Q to which P gives positive weight, we arrive at a strategy that dominates P but which gives weight only to Q. This result is established elsewhere by Peter C. Ordeshook, "Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 6 (December, 1971), 1141–1145.

(actually, we can assume that $U_c(x)$ is any monotonically increasing function of $-\|x-x_c\|$).

Relegating proofs to an appendix, let H be a hyperplane in R^n (e.g., a line in two dimensions). Thus, H is a median hyperplane (e.g., line) if and only if it bisects the density of preferences in a particular direction—if and only if it divides R^n into two half spaces H^+ and H^- such that $\mu(H^+) \leq 1/2$ and $\mu(H^-) \leq 1/2$. A point $x \epsilon R_n$ is called a partial median if and only if it is the intersection of n distinct median hyperplanes. Letting I be the set of all such points and I^* its convex closure, we prove the following theorem in the appendix to this essay:

Theorem 4: Given expression (2), I^* is an admissible set.

The central corollary that follows from Theorems 1 and 4, then is,[10]

Corollary 1: Given expression (2), a minimax solution to the reduced game $(\varphi, \tilde{I}^*)$ is a minimax solution to the game $(\varphi, \tilde{X})$.

Note, moreover, that given our assumptions, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is that all median hyperplanes intersect at a common point. Under this condition I^* reduces to a point so that Corollary 1 can be viewed simply as a generalization of existing theory.[11]

The question, nevertheless, that we must now address if pure strategy equilibria do not exist concerns the size of the admissible set I^*. If this set is large relative to X or to the set of Pareto optimals, then our analysis fails to limit our expectations about the positions candidates ultimately adopt in campaigns. Stated differently, if I^* is large, we possess a theory that is nearly vacuous empirically since any observed strategy choice may be consistent with the hypothesis suggested by Corollary 1. But, if I^* is small and our expectations more limited, the theory is more



Figure 3: Admissible Set for Three Voters

---

[10] An important issue that Theorem 4 and its corollary fail to address is whether minimax strategy solutions exist in simple multidimensional elections. We know from the minimax theorem that if X is finite such strategies necessarily exist. From a practical perspective, moreover, this is perhaps the most reasonable context of election competition in the sense that the real constraints on candidate strategies and their perceptions of alternatives may render the game finite. For an infinite strategy space, however, establishing existence is more problematical. This is especially true in our analysis since φ is not continuous (for a proof that continuous zero-sum games over closed convex strategy spaces possess minimax solutions see Guillermo Owen, *Game Theory* [Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1968], pp. 76–78). We conjecture, nevertheless, that the class of spatial games being considered here always possess minimax solutions.

[11] If the number of voters is finite and even, this assertion is not strictly true, given our definition of a median in terms of hyperplanes. Thus, if C is odd or infinite, there exists a unique median in every direction, whereas for C even, median hyperplanes are not necessarily unique. That is, for C even, a median in a particular direction can be a bounded region (e.g., for two voters on a line, the median is the set of all positions between the two ideal points). If we extend our notion of a median to bounded regions, the assertion follows. The definition of medians in terms of hyperplanes is simply a convenience for reducing notational complexity.



Figure 4: Admissible Set for Five Voters



Figure 5: Weakly Admissible Set for Three Voters

readily disproved and, therefore, potentially more powerful.

By way of several examples, we conclude that the admissible set I^* can be either large or small—depending on the electorate's preference distribution. In Figures 3 and 4 we offer two examples in which I^* encompasses the entire set of Pareto optimals. In Figure 3, three voter's ideal points are arrayed in a triangle so that the Pareto optimal set consists of the triangle and all points within it. It is readily verified, moreover, that at least two median lines intersect everywhere in the triangle and, thus, that I^* is "limited" to the Pareto optimals. In Figure 4, five voters are arrayed in a pentagon, so that the set of Pareto optimals consists of the pentagon and all interior points. The shaded star, on the other hand, corresponds to the set of all median line intersections, and we see that I^* again corresponds to the Pareto optimals.

We have, then, these two examples to demonstrate that our expectations about spatial strategies are not necessarily limited by Corollary 1. Nevertheless, we can reduce further our expectations about candidate positions by noting for the three-voter example that the shaded region in Figure 5 is a weakly admissible set.[12]

Weak admissibility, then, can be used to analyze games further if I^* is too large. Unlike the correspondence between I^* and admissible sets, however, there is no simple general geometric characterization for weakly admissible sets. Hence, in practical applications, an admissible set seems the more useful notion; but, to show that Theorem 4 can in fact limit our expectations about candidate strategies, recall that the usual context for spatial theory is large electorates. Suppose, then, that the electorate consists of a continuum of voters whose ideal points are distributed uniformly over the triangle and the pentagon. For these two examples, we denote I^* by the shaded set (see Figures 6 and 7). Clearly, I^* is substantially smaller than the set of Pareto optimals, which again is bounded by the triangle and pentagon.

Thus, in these two examples, the domain of mixed minimax strategies seems limited to a reasonably small region. In fact, if we assume that preferences are more concentrated near the center of the triangle and pentagon, I^* becomes even smaller. The implication of Figures 3 through 7, then, is that for finite, dispersed preferences, I^* can be large; but if we characterize preferences by continuous densities, I^* is smaller and substantively more interesting.

As a final check on this inference, we examine

---

[12] The identification of I^* in theory is simple in two-dimensions: identify all median lines and hence their intersections, and take the convex hull of these intersections. To generate Figure 8, however, a computer is essential to calculate and plot these median lines for the several values of λ. Identification of the weakly admissible set in Figure 5, on the other hand, is accomplished by trial and error. We note simply that a point at the center of the triangle dominates all of the excluded points within the triangle.



Figure 6: Uniform Distribution of Preferences over Triangle



Figure 7: Uniform Distribution of Preferences over Pentagon



Figure 8: I* for Bimodal Density

the class of nonsymmetric densities that result when two bivariate normals are weighted and summed (in which case all of R^2 is Pareto optimal). Weighting two standardized ($\sigma = 1$) densities with means 0 and 5 by λ and $1-\lambda$ respectively, we know, of course, that for $\lambda = 0$, 1/2, or 1, the resultant density is symmetric, and, hence, yields a pure strategy equilibrium. In Figure 8, we illustrate the form of I^* for several alternative values of λ that do not yield such equilibria.

The results here are gratifying, in terms of both the size and position of I^*. With respect to size, we see that the width of I^* is not unreasonably large in comparison to the distance between the modes of the preference density.[13] The position of I^*, moreover, confirms the intuitive supposition that if the electorate's preferences are bimodally distributed, the candidates' strategies will be drawn towards, but not wholly to, the largest mode. Interestingly, except for unidimensional contests, this supposition has not previously been established by spatial theory owing to its dependence on the more restrictive solution concept of pure strategy equilibria.

---

[13] We note also that if we decrease the distance between the means of the two bivariate normals used to construct Figure 8 (or, equivalently, increase their variances), the size of I^* decreases. A distance of 5σ, moreover, seems the extreme of opinion polarization.

Despite Corollary 1 and the apparent constraint it places on mixed strategy solutions—at least for games with a continuum of voters—the question again arises: What should a candidate do if permitted to move after revealing his choice of pure strategy? Clearly, if the candidates must again reveal their next move simultaneously and if their current spatial positions do not prohibit mixed strategies over I^*, then Theorem 4 again pertains. That is, each move is simply a repetition of the game (φ, I^*), with the result that candidates choose strategies in I^*.

More interestingly, suppose that after their initial choice of positions, the candidates are permitted to make adjustments one after the other. Our question then is: Might sequential adjustments lead candidates to strategies outside of I^* or some smaller weakly admissible set? The reasons, even with sequential moves, for avoiding strategies outside of the admissible set I^* are obvious. Regardless of whether he is responding to his opponent's current position or to positions his opponent might take in the future, a candidate does at least as well with positions in I^*, and sometimes better than he does with positions outside of it. That is, if he is contemplating the strategy $y \notin I^*$, then there exists an $x \in I^*$ that is at least as good as y under *all* contingencies.

With respect to weakly admissible sets, which admittedly are more difficult to compute, there is a similar but somewhat weaker rationalization. Specifically, suppose Candidate 1 chooses a strategy, w, in the weakly admissible set Ω, and 2 chooses $z \in \Omega$, but that $z \succ w$. Thus, if afforded the opportunity, Candidate 1 prefers to alter his position and find a spatial strategy that renders him a winning rather than a losing candidate. Let $y \notin \Omega$ be such a strategy. Should the candidate move out of Ω to y? The definition of weak admissibility suggests that there is a "better" alternative in Ω, say x, which not only dominates z, but dominates y as well.

For another reason for supposing that candidates adopt strategies in I^* or in potentially smaller weakly admissible sets, consider the following sequential model: Each candidate records the frequency distribution, F, of all previous positions adopted by his opponent and candidates adjust their positions with perfect spatial mobility one after the other. Suppose also, that the candidates' adjustments proceed as in the "method of fictitious play." That is, the candidate with the next move chooses a strategy that is good against his opponent's history, F (i.e., guarantees him an expected payoff of at least a tie, given that his opponent chooses in accordance with the mixed strategy F). Clearly, F changes as the game proceeds. From the theory of finite zero-sum games, however, we know that the overall observed frequency of each candidate's choices approaches, in the limit, the mixed strategy to the myopic game.[14] It follows, then, that while the candidates cycle in a continual process of adjustment and readjustment, they remain in I^*.

This, of course, does not resolve all issues surrounding sequential elections contests—issues such as the effects of imperfect spatial mobility and information. Our analysis does show, nevertheless, that the support of mixed minimax strategies can provide a substantively satisfying constraint on strategic choice in both the static and sequential context.

Committees vs. Elections

The hypothesis that the notions of admissible and weakly admissible sets constrain the policy outcomes of an election assumes that candidates or political entrepreneurs compete for the votes of a passive electorate. Thus, the candidates motivate the social choice by their goal of electoral victory, while citizens simply endorse the candidates they most prefer. This may be a reasonable model for large electorates. In smaller voting bodies without candidates (e.g., committees), however, the voters themselves are the active participants in policy formation, in which case it is more appropriate to model the "election" as an n-person cooperative game and to use n-person solution theory to predict policy outcomes. Since the context of social choice determines the appropriate model, it is reasonable to expect that we can ascertain the effects of political entrepreneurship on policy by comparing the two-person and n-person solution concepts.

Owing, perhaps, to the correspondence between pure strategy equilibria and the core, the distinction between the two-person and n-person models is frequently blurred. That is, since pure strategy electoral equilibria are equivalent to the core of the corresponding n-person game, it is tempting to conclude that the context of social choice does not affect policy. This, however, does not follow since the equivalence between the n-person and 2-person formulations has been shown only when a core or a pure strategy equilibrium exists. And, as we show here, by an example, if these solutions do not exist, this equivalence disappears. Thus, the context of choice affects public policy substantially.

---

[14] The theorem is outlined in Owen, *Game Theory*, p. 31, 36–37, and proved in Samuel Karlin, *Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming and Economics*, Vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1959), pp. 179–189. As proved, the theorem applies, of course, only to finite games. Thus, we can only conjecture that it applies to infinite solvable games as well.

As an example of a case in which the two-person and n-person formulations yield different outcomes, consider an electorate of three citizens with the following transitive preferences over $X=\{a, b, c, d, e, f\}$:

Citizen	*Preference*
1	$a \succ d \sim f \succ c \succ b \succ e$
2	$b \succ e \sim d \succ a \succ c \succ f$
3	$c \succ f \sim e \succ b \succ a \succ d$

Note that these preferences yield the majority dominance relations described in Figure 2. Thus, $\Omega=\{a,b,c\}$ is a weakly admissible set and

$$P(x) = \begin{cases} 1/3 \text{ if } x \in \Omega \\ \ \ 0 \text{ if } x \notin \Omega \end{cases}$$

is the minimax solution to the resultant two-person game.

Consider now the $n(=3)$ person game that results from these preferences. Two solution concepts are considered usually to analyze such games—the V-solution and the Bargaining set.[15] Briefly, the V-solution consists of any set, V, that is both internally and externally stable, i.e., $V \subseteq X$ is a V-solution if and only if

(internal stability): $\forall x, y \in V, x \sim y$

(external stability): $\forall y \notin V, \exists x \in V$ such that $x \succ y$.

Similarly, a policy $x \in X$ is a member of the Bargaining set if there is a coalition $B \subseteq N$ that can secure x and if every member of B can protect his interest in x against objections by other members of B.[16]

It is easy to verify now that $V=\{d, e, f\}$ is a unique V-solution to our game. Furthermore, V is also the bargaining set associated with the minimal winning coalitions in this game. But $V \cap \Omega = \Phi$. Stated differently, the V-solution and the Bargaining set possess no equilibrium properties for candidates.

In this example, then, the policies considered and ultimately proposed by candidates or political entrepreneurs differ completely from the policies that result from a cooperative play of the game. Which solution is "better" depends, of course, on which citizen's opinion you seek. Both solutions yield Pareto optimal outcomes. In this example, however, there is a tendency for the cooperative solution to extract as much as possible from the losers by giving them their least preferred outcomes, and to require compromise between the members of the winning coalition. The two-person solution allows some citizens to realize their most preferred outcome. We do not know, of course, whether these observations are generalizable, but we must conclude that the context of choice can affect outcomes.

Conclusions

One issue that we fail to address in this essay concerns a candidate's ability to compute an appropriate minimax strategy for a particular configuration of preferences. Doubtless, such a computation is exceedingly difficult—so difficult in fact that it seems to push the *as if* principle beyond credulity to argue that candidates act as if they calculate and use mixed minimax strategies. Our prediction about candidates, however, is not that they adopt a particular mixed strategy but, given our assumptions, that they eventually adopt a position in the admissible set I^* and, perhaps, a position in a potentially smaller weakly admissible set. Consider, then, the candidate who is unable to compute the appropriate solution strategy but who knows the general outlines of I^*. Should he choose a position in I^* or not? Our assumption, of course, is that he knows that for every $y \notin I^*$, there exists an $x \in I^*$ that is at least as good and sometimes better against the opponent. Thus, even if he does not know the details of his opponents' strategy or how to calculate the mixed mimimax solution, there is a positive incentive to avoid positions not in I^*. Alternatively, if the candidates move sequentially in accordance with the method of fictitious play, we know that they choose strategies in I^* and in the limit can be said to act as if they calculated mixed minimax strategies.

---

[15] For a discussion of n-person majority games without side payments (the context of a spatial conceptualization of preferences) see Robert Wilson, "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social Choice," in B. Lieberman, ed., *Social Choice* (N.Y.: Gordon and Breach, 1971), pp. 393-408; and Wilson, "Stable Coalition Proposals in Majority Rule Voting," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 3 (September, 1971), 254–271.

[16] Usually, a bargaining set is defined in terms of a payoff configuration and a particular coalition structure. Here, however, exposition is eased if we consider only the payoff configuration x. Note also that payoffs are defined in game theory in terms of utility, whereas here x is a policy position. This transformation of terminology is of no consequence to our analysis owing to the 1 to 1 correspondence (given our assumptions about utility) between payoff configurations and spatial position.

Relative to mixed minimax strategies, I^* is easy to compute—assuming, of course, that the candidate knows the electorate's preference density. Usually, however, even the best polls afford candidates knowledge only about the distribution of preferences along individual issues (i.e., the marginal densities of μ). But, except perhaps for exaggerated bimodal densities, I^* should generally be small in mass electorates. In fact, a good approximation to I^* is a small region about the intersections of the median lines of the known marginal densities.

In summary, then, our analysis extends one of the most pervasive conclusions of spatial theory—the power and importance of the electorate's "median" preference. Given our assumptions, *on the average we anticipate finding successful candidates at or near the electorate's median preference on each salient issue of the election even if the distribution of ideal points is not symmetric.*

Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4

Before proceeding to a formal proof of Theorem 4 we offer an informal description of the method of proof for the two-dimensional case. In Figure 9, I^* represents the convex closure of the set of partial medians. To show that I^* is an admissible set, for any point $y_0 \notin I$, we pick $x_0 \in I^*$ such that x_0 is the closest point to y_0 in I^*. Since I^* is convex, there is a hyperplane (line), H, that is perpendicular to and bisects the line connecting y_0 and x_0, such that y_0 is on one side and I^* is on the other side. Since there exists a median hyperplane, M_1, parallel to H (lemma 1) and since this median hyperplane passes through I^* (lemma 3) it follows that x_0 is closer to M_1 than is y_0. Thus, x_0 defeats y_0 (lemma 2). Now let z be any other point in X such that $z \succsim x$. Thus, there must exist a median M_2 in the direction of $z - x_0$ (i.e., perpendicular to the line connecting z and x_0) that is closer to z than to x_0 (lemma 2). Suppose now that, contrary to Theorem 4, $y_0 \succsim z$. By the same argument, there must exist a median M_3 in the direction $y_0 - z$ that is closer to y_0 than to z. But



Figure 9

this yields a partial median in the region S, which is impossible since S is on the wrong side of the separating hyperplane H. Thus, $z \succ y_0$, in which case I^* is an admissible set since for any $y_0 \notin I^*$, $\exists x_0 \in I^*$ such that $x_0 \succ y_0$ and $\forall z$, $z \succsim x_0 \Rightarrow z \succ y_0$.

More formally, let a *hyperplane* $H \subseteq R^n$ be any set of the following form:

$$H = \{x \in R^n \mid x.a = b\}$$

for some $a \in R^n$ and $b \in R$, and let $\overline{H}$ be the set of all hyperplanes. Thus, any $H \in \overline{H}$ partitions the space into three exhaustive disjoint sets, H, H^- and H^+, where

$$H^- = \{x \in R^n \mid x.\ a < b\}$$

$$H^+ = \{x \in R^n \mid x.\ a > b\}$$

A hyperplane, H, is defined as a *median hyperplane* if and only if $\mu(H^+) \leq 1/2$ and $\mu(H^-) \leq 1/2$. We define $\overline{M}$ as the set of all median hyperplanes, i.e.,

$$\overline{M} = \{H \in \overline{H} \mid \mu(H^+) \leq 1/2 \text{ and } \mu(H^-) \leq 1/2\}$$

We now state several elementary lemmas without proof that are used in the proof of Theorem 4.

Lemma 1: For any $a \in R^n$, there exists a $b \in R$ such that if $H = \{x \mid x.a = b\}$, $H \in \overline{M}$.

Stated simply, Lemma 1 asserts that there exists a median hyperplane in every direction. Notationally, we use b_a to denote some value of b associated with a particular $a \in R^n$ and

$$M_a = \{x \mid x.\ a = b_a\}$$

to denote a median associated with the vector a.

Our next lemma states that if $y, x \in R^n$, x is preferred to y by a majority of citizens if and only if a median in the direction $x-y$ is closer to x than to y.

Lemma 2: If $U_c(x) = \|x_c - x\|^2$ for all $c \in C$, then for any x, $y \in R^n$, $x \succsim y$ if and only if there is some b_{x-y} such that

$$b_{x-y} \geq \frac{(x+y)\cdot(x-y)}{2} = \frac{\|x\|^2 - \|y\|^2}{2}$$

where $x \succ y$ if "$>$" holds.

We now offer several additional definitions and a third lemma.

Definition A1: If $M_{a1}, \ldots, M_{a_m} \in \overline{M}$ is a set of median hyperplanes generated by the vectors $a_1, \ldots, a_m \in R^n$, then the median hyperplanes are *independent* if and only if $\{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$ are linearly independent.

Note that if $M_1, \ldots, M_n \in \overline{M}$ are independent,

$$\bigcap_{i=1}^{n} H_i$$

consists of a unique point. This follows because $\{x.a_i = b_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ is a set of n linearly independent equations in n unknowns and, hence, possesses a unique non-trivial solution.

Definition A2: A vector $x \in R^n$ is called a partial median if there is a basis $\{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$ for R^n such that

$$x \in \bigcap_{i=1}^{n} M_{a_i}$$

We use the notation I to denote the set of all partial medians in R^n and I^* to denote its convex closure. It is easy to show, now, that every median hyperplane passes through I^*.

Lemma 3: For every $M \in \overline{M}$, $M \cap I \neq \Phi$, and if $M_1, \ldots, M_k \in \overline{M}$ are independent, for $1 \leq k \leq n$, then

$$\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^{k} M_i\right) \cap I^* \neq \phi.$$

We proceed now to the proof of Theorem 4.

Theorem 4: Given expression (2), I^* is an admissible set.

Proof: Let $y_0 \notin I^*$. Since I^* is closed and convex, there exists an $x_o \in I^*$ that minimizes the distance of y_o to I^* as illustrated in Figure 8. We pick such an $x_o \in I^*$ and claim that $x_o \succ y_o$. This follows because

$$H = \left\{x \mid x\cdot(x_o - y_o) = \frac{(x_o + y_o)}{2}\cdot(x_o - y_o)\right\}$$

in a separating hyperplane, i.e., $y_o \in H^-$ and $I^* \subseteq H^+$. But then, since $M_{x_o - y_o} \cap I^* \neq \Phi$ by Lemma 3, it must be the case that $M_{x_o - y_o} \subseteq H^+$, or equivalently,

$$b_{x_o - y_o} > \frac{\|x_o\|^2 - \|y_o\|^2}{2}$$

By Lemma 2, it follows that $x_o \succ y_o$.

Now consider any other z with $z \succsim x_o$. Suppose $y_o \succsim z$. From Lemma 3, this implies we can find b_{z-x_o} and b_{y_o-z} satisfying

$$b_{z-x_o} \geq \frac{\|z\|^2 - \|x_o\|^2}{2}$$

$$b_{y_o-z} \geq \frac{\|y_o\|^2 - \|z\|^2}{2}$$

Let $x^* \epsilon M_{z-x_o} \cap M_{y_o-z}$. Then,

$$x^* \cdot (z - x_o) = b_{z-x_o}$$

$$x^* \cdot (y_o - z) = b_{y_o-z}$$

or, adding these two expressions and combining with the sum of the previous inequalities,

$$x^* \cdot (y_o - x_o) = b_{z-x_o} + c_{y_o-z} \geq \frac{\|y_o\|^2 - \|x_o\|^2}{2}$$

which is equivalent to

$$x^* \cdot (x_o - y_o) \leq \frac{\|x_o\|^2 - \|y_o\|^2}{2}$$

Thus, it must be the case that $x^* \notin H^+$. But, since $x^* \epsilon M_{z-x_o} \cap M_{y_o-z}$ and since x^* is arbitrary, we must conclude that

$$(M_{z-x_o} \cap M_{y_o-z}) \subseteq H^- \cup H$$

This yields a contradiction of Lemma 3, i.e., since H is a separating hyperplane and $I^* \subseteq H^+$, the assumption that $z \succsim x_o$ and $y_o \succsim z$ where $x_o \succ y_o$, implies that

$$(M_{z-x_o} \cap M_{y_o-z}) \cap I^* = \phi.$$

Thus, for all $z \epsilon I^*$, $z \succsim x_o \Rightarrow z \succ y_o$, in which case I^* is an admissible set. Q.E.D.

An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining

JAMES L. PERRY and CHARLES H. LEVINE
University of California, Irvine *Syracuse University*

The dramatic growth of unionism and collective bargaining in the public sector signifies a drastic departure from previous conceptions of the public employment relationship and previous patterns of public employee activity.[1] Concomitant with the rise of public sector unionism has been the increased interest social scientists have exhibited in the determinants of power, conflict, and outcomes in public sector collective bargaining. Despite increased scholarly interest, however, attempts at theory construction have fallen short because there has been a tendency to use conventional language consistent with the common discourse that occurs in the actual collective bargaining process; many scholars in the field have viewed idiographic orientations as the only means of validly approaching the subject; and the field has been dominated by scholars seeking melioristic solutions to employee relations problems in their research rather than focusing on theory building.[2]

In order to better understand public sector collective bargaining and to build theory about the phenomena, we need to develop a theoretical framework that allows for the systematic testing of propositions. Interorganizational theory, one approach that appears fruitful for constructing such a theory, is used in this study to capture major properties of the structure of public sector collective bargaining and to present and test some derived hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested with data gathered from a sample of 60 case studies of public sector collective bargaining in New York City from 1968 to 1972.

Theoretical Considerations

A public organization may be viewed as a coalition of individuals, "some of them organized into subcoalitions," whose "members include administrators, workers, appointive officials, elective officials, legislators, judges, clientele, interest group leaders, etc."[3] Drawing boundaries around the organizational coalition is difficult because organization members play a variety of roles. Nevertheless, the concept of organizational coalition can be simplified by identifying coalition members for certain classes of decisions and for specified periods of time.[4] An organizational coalition may be distinguished from its various subcoalitions by the degree of autonomy it exercises in decision making and goal setting. A subcoalition's decisions are influenced by legitimated authority within a hierarchical structure of which the subcoalition is an integral part. In interorganizational relationships, on the other hand, "the individual decisions of two or more units are made on a more inclusive systemic level which includes these units."[5]

---

[1] One observer notes that in 1955 "the subject of labor relations in public employment could not have meant less to more people, both in and out of government." See Ida Klaus, "The Emerging Relationship," *Collective Bargaining in the Public Service,* ed. D. H. Kruger and Charles F. Schmidt, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 11. Within 15 years, 2.3 million government employees held union membership and an additional 1.7 million government employees were members of associations, often functioning indistinguishably from unions. Municipal employees are represented for bargaining purposes by unions or associations in more than 1,300 communities. For statistics on the extent of public employee unionization and strike activities, see Tax Foundation, New York, *Union and Government Employment* (New York: Tax Foundation, May 1972), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 8–9, and Table 10, p. 29, and Richard H. Nelson and James L. Doster, "City Employee Representation and Bargaining Policies," *Monthly Labor Review,* 95 (November, 1972), 43–50. For a comparison of union and association behavior in the field of public education, consult J. Douglas Muir, "The Strike as a Professional Sanction: The Changing Attitude of the National Education Association," *Labor Law Journal,* 19 (October, 1968), 615–627.

[2] Scholars have adopted a number of approaches in their efforts to describe and explain conflict and outcomes in public sector collective bargaining. Liston, for example, attempts to explain the causes of public employee strikes merely by asserting that government workers in the lower classifications want higher salaries. See Robert A. Liston, *The Limits of Defiance: Strikes, Rights and Government* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1971). Wellington and Winter, in *The Unions and the Cities* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), Chapter 1, employ a conceptual framework which assumes "a municipality with an elected city council and an elected mayor who bargains with unions representing the employees of the city." The conceptual framework is for the most part undefined and unaccompanied by indicators or constructs for its operationalization. Drotning, Lipsky, and Foster take a broad positivist approach to public sector collective bargaining. The outcome of interest to Drotning et al. is the mode of conflict resolution — mediation, fact-finding or conciliation. Although the authors fail to operationalize their approach, a more fundamental problem is the absence of any formal explication of the theoretical relationships underlying the variables. See John Drotning, David Lipsky, and Howard Foster, "The Analysis of Impasse Procedures in Public Sector Negotiations," *Management of Personnel Quarterly,* 9 (Summer, 1971), 21–30. For one of the more promising recent attempts to explain conflict see Thomas A. Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* 27 (July, 1974), 525–542.

[3] Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 27.

The establishment and perpetuation of an organizational coalition rests on an equilibrium between member contributions and organizational inducements.[6] For individual workers the inducements/contributions contract has both short-term and long-term implications. Thompson writes:

> Clearly there is a *quid pro quo* theme to the inducements/contributions contract, for it defines what is expected of individuals in terms of jobs needing to be done, and it defines the rewards which the organization pledges for the appropriate performance of such jobs. . . . As a unit in his career, the job provides the individual with an arena or *sphere of action* in which to seek solutions to his career problems, and thus to meet the demands placed on him by the social system.[7]

March and Simon note that each participant will continue his participation in an organization only so long as the inducements offered him are as great or greater than the contributions he is asked to make. They assert: "Where the contract is viewed as unchangeable, the only options are 'accept' or 'reject'."[8] In cases where the contract is viewed as changeable, however, the motivation of individuals to protect or enhance their "sphere of action" is reflected in the negotiation of inducements/contributions contracts.[9]

Since the action spheres presented by jobs differ, they require different strategies for the negotiation of the inducements/contributions contract.[10] Collective bargaining may be viewed as a special (though not uncommon) strategy for the negotiation of the inducements/contributions contract. Thompson emphasizes that "the content of the inducements/contributions contract is determined through power (political) processes."[11] Conceived as the dependence of the parties relative to one another,[12] the power of the individual in "routinized technologies" and "early-ceiling occupations" is severely limited in negotiation of the inducements/contributions contract.[13] Nonetheless, when there exist large numbers of individuals in similar occupational roles, opportunities develop for collective action as a strategy of negotiation. Under these conditions, the problems of defining and enforcing the employment contract become a matter of concern for all organizational participants:[14] "The higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions that unions demand are collective goods to the workers."[15]

Collective bargaining involves a transformation of the basic structure of the public organizational coalition. Rather than the individual negotiating for the protection and enhancement of his job, negotiation is pursued through the formation of a new and distinct organization.[16] For purposes of analyzing collective bargaining the employee union can be considered an autonomous organization, free from the decision-making constraints of an overarching organization, and sharing in the formation of policies that determine the public employment relationship. The operation of neither organization, however, can be understood merely as an aggregation of the goals of its members. Coleman writes: "The actions of a trade union and other mass-based collectives are not always toward goals collectively held, but the very existence of the collectivity is based upon action toward collective goals."[17]

To account for collective goals, Thompson suggests conceptualizing goals as the "future domains intended by those in the dominant coalition."[18] An organization's domain may be viewed as the claims which an organization stakes out for itself in terms of (1) range of products, (2) population served, and (3) services rendered.[19] The dominant coalition is conceived by Thompson as a subgroup of "interdependent individuals who collectively have sufficient control of the organization's resources to commit them in certain directions and withhold them from others."[20] In collective bargaining, two dominant coalitions each act to preserve or expand their domains through negotiation over the content of the inducements/contributions contract.

---

[4] Cyert and March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm,* p. 27.

[5] Roland L. Warren, "The Concerting of Decisions as a Variable in Organizational Interaction," *Interorganizational Decision Making,* ed. Matthew Tuite, Roger Chisolm, and Michael Radnor (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), p. 21.

[6] Equilibrium theory is presented and discussed in Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), and James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

[7] James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 106.

[8] March and Simon, *Organizations,* p. 83.

[9] Thompson, *Organizations in Action,* p. 106.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 109.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 106.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 107.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 110.

[14] See March and Simon, *Organizations,* p. 91.

[15] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 79.

[16] Although March and Simon indicate the trade union occupies an ambiguous position, they do classify it as an extraorganizational group. March and Simon, *Organizations,* p. 72.

[17] James S. Coleman, "Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions," *American Journal of Sociology,* 71 (May, 1966), 615–627, at 616.

From this interorganizational relationship comes *conflict* and *contractual change*, and these are related to the nature of *goal divergencies, dependencies,* and the degree of *stability* in the relationship between the two organizations.

Following Cyert and March, the amount of *goal divergence* in the collective bargaining relationship can be understood in terms of the dimensions of each organization's goals (the future domains they view as important) and the strength of their preference for a particular outcome on a goal dimension.[21] The strength of an organization's preferences represents its "aspiration level" on any particular goal dimension. The organization's past goals, its past performance, and the past performance of other "comparable" organizations contribute to the organization's goal dimensions and aspiration levels.

In interorganizational relationships, power resides implicitly in the dependencies of organizations on one another. Pugh et al. focus on *organizational dependence* in the following manner: "The dependence of an organization reflects its relationships with other organizations in its social environment, such as suppliers, customers, competitors, labor unions, management organizations, and political and social organizations."[22] Within the environment of the union and the public organization exist a set of power-dependence relations—what Dill terms "task environment"—those actors in the environment which are relevant to goal attainment.[23]

Net power then results from a set of relationships between the organization and the elements of its pluralistic task environment. This admits the possibility that in collective bargaining the public organization may be powerful in relation to the union but dependent on other actors in its task environment to enforce its claims to domain. Thus, it becomes important for the organization to judge the amount and sources of support that can be mobilized for its goals, and to arrive at a strategy for their mobilization.

Although the public organization and the union organization negotiate a contract periodically, they must deal with each other continuously in handling disputes arising during the administration and interpretation of the contract. Walton and McKersie contend that the pattern of interaction between the organizations during contract administration directly influences the attitudes between the units that later affect contract negotiations.[24] Confined to the dyadic relationship between the union and public organization, *stability* refers to the degree to which prior structural features of the relationship expand or contract the capacity for joint decision making during collective bargaining.

In light of this distinction, the degree of stability in the relationship between the union and the public organization may be viewed as a product of the interactions between the two organizations *prior to the initiation of contract negotiations.* The interactions between the organizations during contract administration affect the development of the capacity for collaboration during contract negotiation by influencing the pattern and quality of information exchanged between the parties.[25] Also, the interactions prior to collective bargaining, directly influence attitudes between the parties which in turn determine how the organizations view the continuity of the contract administration and contract negotiation phases of the relationship.[26]

---

[18] Thompson, *Organizations in Action,* p. 128.

[19] Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 5 (March, 1961), 583–601; and Thompson, *Organizations in Action,* p. 26.

[20] Thompson, *Organizations in Action,* p. 128.

[21] Cyert and March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm,* p. 115.

[22] D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, and C. Turner, "The Context of Organization Structures," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 14 (March, 1969), 91–114.

[23] William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 2 (March, 1958), 409–443, at 410. "Organization set" is a term analogous to "task environment" employed by William M. Evan in "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," *Approaches to Organizational Design,* ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh, Pa.: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 173–191.

[24] Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), chapter 6.

[25] Richard E. Walton, "Theory of Conflict in Lateral Organizational Relations," ed. J. R. Lawrence, *Operational Research in the Social Sciences* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), pp. 409–426.

These situational phenomena—goal divergence, stability, and organizational dependence—are conceptually distinct from the behaviors of the individual members of the union and public organization and affect the degree to which interorganizational behavior is oppositional, that is, the extent to which conflict takes passive or aggressive forms. This conceptualization of *conflictual behavior* is intended to encompass the whole range of oppositional behavior from manifest forms of "strategic maneuvering" to covert forms of passive resistance.[27] Within the interorganizational decision-making process, oppositional behavior may be triggered by either acts of the other organization or changes in situational contexts.

The collective agreement that terminates negotiations between the public and union organizations comprises the inducements/contributions contract agreed to during the collective bargaining process. The inducements/contributions contract represents a set of decisions of two individual organizations at a more inclusive systemic level because the organizations jointly establish their domains with regard to the public employment relationship until the negotiation of a new agreement. *Contractual change* refers only to the changes in the content of the inducements/contributions contract negotiated from the conclusion of one agreement to the conclusion of the subsequent agreement through the collective bargaining process. Inducements include such items as salary levels, monetary fringe benefits, union security provisions, and the control of the physical and health-related environment of the workplace. Although often implicit in the employment relationship itself and only suggested in the management rights clause, contributions items frequently specified in the contract include the length of the workweek, the residual rights of management, the grounds for disciplinary actions, and descriptions of job duties.

Table 1. Theoretical Definitions

Goal Divergence:
  The degree of incompatibility between the goals of the union and public organization.
Stability:
  The degree to which prior structural features of the relationship expand or contract the capacity for joint decision making during collective bargaining.
Organizational Dependence:
  The degree of support from the task environments of the negotiating organizations.
Conflictual Behavior:
  The degree of behavioral opposition between the union and public organizations during collective bargaining.
Contractual Change:
  The degree of change in the content of the inducements/contributions contract.

Propositions and Operational Linkages

With the groundwork laid through the introduction of the interorganizational analytic framework, some of the concepts may be interrelated via formal theoretical statements. Preceding each proposition is a statement of the theoretical linkages and premises, and following each proposition is an exposition of supportive empirical evidence and the hypothesized operational linkages.

I. The choice of tactics for pursuing incompatible goals is likely to be influenced by the nature and radicalism of each organization's goals.[28] While goal divergence identifies the state of incompatibility or opposition between forces, the degree of conflictual behavior characterizes the behavioral outcome of the interactions between the organizations. The relationship between these concepts is not merely unidirectional since the escalation of conflict can be expected to influence the nature of the goal divergencies. As conflictual behavior escalates, there is a greater tendency for participants to associate only with those similarly oriented to the issues. This form of social support strengthens individual organizational members, highlights the incompatibility of goals, and solidifies the divergence of positions.

These relationships between goal divergence and conflictual behavior are particularly relevant for understanding strike behavior.[29] The union views the strike costs as costs to be recouped and revises its aspirations upward in an attempt to offset the costs of the strike. In response to the union action, management's resolve to avoid concessions on certain goal dimensions is likely to increase, and management may even be inclined to withdraw earlier concessions.

---

[26] Walton, "Theory of Conflict in Lateral Organizational Relations"; see also Walton and McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.*

[27] Louis R. Pondy, "Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 12 (September, 1967), 296–320, at 312.

[28] See Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), and Louis Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflicts* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

[29] See Walton and McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,* pp. 56–57 for an extended discussion of this point.

Proposition I. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the goal divergence, the greater the conflictual behavior; as conflictual behavior increases, goal divergence also increases.

Empirical and experimental evidence from Axelrod, Bell, and Deutsch and Kraus is supportive of the plausibility of the two-directional theoretical relationship between goal divergence and conflictual behavior.[30] The operational linkage for *Proposition I* is hypothesized to be a positive, S-curve relationship. When the degree of goal divergence is minimal, some conflictual behavior may exist, but not a sufficient amount to produce feedback consequences. At intermediate levels of goal divergence, a nearly linear relationship between goal divergence and conflictual behavior is anticipated. Goal divergence may further increase while the degree of conflictual behavior has approached or reached an upper limit, thus accounting for a leveling off in the operational linkage.

II. Schelling writes that bargaining necessitates some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster.[31] The time and effort required by the public and union organizations to form mutually consistent expectations, the nature of the expectations, and the capacity to communicate or to destroy communication in collective bargaining depends on the stability of the relationship developed during interaction in administering the collective agreement.

In analyzing interunit conflict in organizations, Walton proposes that more flexible and informal decision rules and less frequent recourse to the use of outside arbiters is likely to increase the capacity for collaboration in joint decision making between the units.[32] The development of mutual attitudes toward one another is a product of the degree of positive or negative affect between the organizations throughout their relationship. It is during interaction in contract administration that the organizations develop mutual expectations, attitudes, and decision rules relevant to their later behavior during collective bargaining. It is this structure of interorganizational interactions which expedites agreement or, conversely, hinders agreement and the control of conflictual behavior during collective bargaining.

Proposition II. In public sector collective bargaining, the lesser the stability during contract administration, the greater the conflictual behavior during negotiations.

Newcomb; Loomis; Bixenstine, Levitt, and Wilson; and Hammond et al. provide experimental results that support this proposition.[33] Lincoln's case analysis of the 1966 New York City Transit Authority negotiations identifies instability in the system as an explanatory variable, for the strike which subsequently occurred.[34] Pruitt, in a theoretical analysis of stability between pairs of national decision-making units,[35] suggests that the operational linkage between stability and conflictual behavior may be a step function; i.e., when the level of stability reaches a critical state, it causes the likely degree of conflictual behavior to change radically. The operational linkage at the interorganizational level of analysis, however, is more likely to be a power function.

III. Within the context of public sector collective bargaining, the choice of negotiation strategies and the employment and timing of particular commitment tactics for the attainment of new organizational domains will depend upon the support each organization obtains within its task environment. The amount of asymmetry between the dependence positions of the organizations influences the success of strategic choices and in turn the degree of behavioral opposition.

Small imbalances in relative dependence continually reinforce the need for cooperation by highlighting the interdependencies of the organizations. As the asymmetry of relative dependence increases, the likelihood increases that persuasion as a means for reaching agreement will fail, stimulating greater behavioral opposition in the modes of transaction between the organizations. Large differences in relative dependence invite the stronger of the organizations to use coercion against the weaker organization to expand its domain. On the other hand, refusal by the stronger organization to make changes requested by the weaker organization stimulates greater conflictual activity by the weaker organization.

---

[30] Robert Axelrod's investigation of a series of situations in politics confirmed his hypothesis that the greater the conflict of interest in a strategic interaction, the greater the conflictual behavior. See Robert Axelrod. *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970); see also Inge Powell Bell, *CORE and the Strategy of Non-Violence* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 59; and Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Kraus, "The Effects of Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 61 (September, 1960), 210–225.

[31] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[32] Walton, "Theory of Conflict in Lateral Organizational Relations."

[33] T. M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts," *Psychological Review*, 60 November, 1953), 393–404; J. L. Loomis, "Communication, the Development of Trust and Cooperative Behavior," *Human Relations*, 12 (November, 1959), 305–315; V. E. Bixenstine, C. A. Levitt, and K. V. Wilson, "Collaboration Among Six Persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (December, 1966), 488–496; K. R. Hammond, F. J. Todd, M. Wilkins, and T. O. Mitchell, "Cognitive Conflict Between Persons: Application of the Lens-Model Paradigm," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2 (October, 1966), 343–360.

[34] Albert A. Lincoln, "The New York City Transit Strike: An Explanatory Approach," *Public Policy*, 16 (1967), 271–292.

[35] Dean G. Pruitt, "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and and International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (March, 1969), 18–38.

Proposition III. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the asymmetry of relative dependence between the negotiating organizations, the greater the conflictual behavior.

Narrative and empirical support of the proposition is provided in studies by Terhune, Kerr and Siegel, and Zinnes.[36] A negatively skewed, positive curvilinear operational linkage is expected because beyond a certain level of asymmetry of relative dependence the likelihood of conflictual behavior is considerably reduced. Where an organization is so limited by its dependence position that it very nearly ceases to operate as an independent unit, the likelihood of conflictual behavior rapidly declines.

IV. The more substantial or encompassing a conflict, the greater the pressures from third parties for its solution.[37] In the public sector, as conflictual behavior persists or increases, efforts to arrive at agreement and achieve finality in the collective bargaining process generally lead to mediation or factfinding mechanisms. Concurrent with this phenomenon is the fact that as conflictual behavior between the union and public organization increases, agreement is less likely to be achieved by voluntary concession and reduction in demands. The anticipation of third party intervention may stimulate marginal concessions by the organizations and actual third party intervention may legitimate or require further concessions.[38] Thus, as conflictual behavior increases, the process is likely to produce greater change in the inducements/contributions contract.

Proposition IV. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the conflictual behavior, the greater the contractual change.

Little empirical research has been undertaken to assess the plausibility of this proposition. However, one study of the effect of impasse during collective bargaining on negotiated salaries of teachers found better mean salary gains in some impasse districts.[39] The proposed relationship is expected to be clearly evident if all dimensions of the collective agreement are analyzed. The operational linkage between conflictual behavior and contractual change should be positive and linear. The slope of the function is expected to be substantially less than unity.

V. When it comes to a test of strength, the organization that can mobilize the most resources and trade on relationships within its task environment should achieve a more advantageous outcome. Even the expectation of losing at some future time may encourage the weaker organization to search for an immediate solution or offer a favorable concession to the stronger organization. The degree of imbalance in their relative strength is likely to affect the amount of the concessions that the weaker organization will have to offer in order to extract lesser concessions from the stronger organization or to reach final agreement. Since demands are almost always initiated by the union, changes in the contract will usually take the form of concessions to the union.

Proposition V. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the asymmetry of relative dependence favoring the public organization, the lesser the contractual change; the greater the asymmetry of relative dependence favoring the union, the greater the contractual change.

This proposition is consistent with Gamson's theoretical analysis[40] and is supported in Rapoport's and Orwant's review of experimental games, particularly those of Flood and Caplow.[41] Lammers likewise found a strong

---

[36] Kenneth Terhune, "Motives, Situation, and Interpersonal Conflict Within Prisoner's Dilemma," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 8 (March, 1968), 1–24; Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Inter-industry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison," *Industrial Conflict,* ed. Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur M. Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 189–212; and Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research,* 4 (1967), 270–288.

[37] Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), pp. 619–620.

[38] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict,* and Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker, *Bargaining and Group Decision Making* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

[39] Robert Arnold Mickler, "A Study of the Effect of Impasse During Collective Bargaining on Negotiated Salaries of Teachers" (Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1972).

[40] William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968).

[41] Anatol Rapoport and Carol Orwant, "Experimental Games: A Review," *Behavioral Science,* 7 (January, 1962), 1–37.



Figure 1: An Overview of the Model

relationship between relative strength of the parties and outcome.[42] The trace line for the operational linkage between relative dependence and contractual change should resemble a negatively sloping S-curve; the relationship is also expected to exhibit both upper and lower limits.

A diagrammatic summary of the theoretical relationships is presented in Figure 1; Table 2 presents a summary of the operational linkages. The broken lines in Figure 1 depict feedback between the outcome of the collective bargaining process in one period and its effect upon the variables in the succeeding period.[43] Because conflictual behavior is caus-

Table 2. Summary of Operational Linkages

Relationship	Direction	Type	Limit
Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior	positive	S-curve	upper
Stability and Conflictual Behavior	negative	power	none
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior	positive	negative skew, curvilinear	none
Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change	positive	linear	none
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence favoring one of the organizations and Contractual Change	negative	S-curve	upper and lower limits

---

[42] Cornelius J. Lammers, "Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organizational Conflicts Between Rulers and Ruled," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 14 (December, 1969), 558–572. A laboratory simulation of interparty exchange during labor negotiations tested the effects of varying the level of social cues during negotiations on the outcome of bargaining. Increases in the level of social cues favorable to the union positively influenced the level of contractual change; social cues favorable to management led to a reverse outcome. See Ian R. Morley and Geoffrey M. Stephenson, "Interpersonal and Interparty Exchange: A Laboratory Simulation of an Industrial Negotiation at the Plant Level," *British Journal of Psychology,* 60 (November, 1969), 543–545.

[43] For an exploration of feedback processes in labor relations systems see A. Dale Allen, Jr., "A Systems View of Labor Negotiations," *Personnel Journal,* 50 (February, 1971), 103–114; and John T. Dunlop, *Industrial Relations Systems* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958).

ally dependent on goal divergence, stability, and asymmetry of relative dependence but causally prior to contractual change, it is depicted as an intervening variable in Figure 1.

Methodology

The practice of collective bargaining in the public sector has not triggered a bounty of empirical studies which have accumulated large bodies of comparative data. The dearth of research in this field partly stems from the realities of public sector collective bargaining and from the nature of measurement problems associated with the most relevant variables. These problems indicate that relatively inexpensive data collection procedures like the analysis of available aggregate data sets would be inadequate to test the propositions presented in this paper. To provide an appropriate setting to test the model, we had to select a field site with an adequate population of cases for the selection of a sample of cases, adequate archival records for the measurement of the variables, and a uniform legal and political framework within which collective bargaining takes place. For these reasons, the tests of the hypotheses focused on a cross-sectional analysis of public sector collective bargaining in one large municipality, New York City.

Collective Bargaining in New York City. In 1958, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 49, Mayor Robert Wagner initiated a program to implement collective bargaining practices prevailing in the private sector.[44] Horton writes: "The executive order quickly was dubbed the 'Little Wagner Act' and the city's civil service leaders called it their 'Magna Carta.' In retrospect, however, the City's new labor relations program hardly deserved these appellations."[45]

Collective bargaining procedures were altered in 1967 by Executive Order No. 52 which established independent, impartial tribunals to settle disputes arising in contract negotiations, contract administration, and representation elections.[46] Simultaneously, the New York State Legislature passed the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law) which exempted New York City from the jurisdiction of the State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) on the condition that its system for collective bargaining be "substantially equivalent."[47] Thus, City policies were modified in accordance with the provisions of the Taylor Law to parallel State guidelines more closely.[48]

Sayre and Kaufman's contention that "no single ruling elite dominates the political and governmental system of New York City"[49] is characteristic of its labor relations activities. A multiplicity of public officials and agencies are involved in New York City government labor relations: the mayor, agency personnel, the Office of Labor Relations, the Office of Collective Bargaining, the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Personnel, the City Council, and the Board of Estimate.[50] The governor and the State legislators are also occasional participants in City labor relations policy making.[51]

While the Office of Labor Relations provides the professional expertise in contract negotiations,[52] it is the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) that can be considered the governmental "core group."[53] The OCB is a tripartite board consisting of two members appointed by the mayor, two members appointed by a committee of municipal union leaders, and three members selected by unanimous vote of the mayoral and union appointees. The primary function of the OCB is the resolution of bargaining impasses. The Board of Certification, composed of three of the seven OCB members, is responsible for certifying employee bargaining representatives. In addition, arbitrability of grievances is determined by all OCB members in their role as the Board of Collective Bargaining.[54]

---

[44] New York City, Office of the Mayor, *Executive Order No. 49*, March 31, 1958.

[45] Raymond D. Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 30.

[46] New York City, Office of the Mayor, *Executive Order No. 52*, September 29, 1967. See Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City* for an extended discussion of the evolution of New York City's collective bargaining law.

[47] New York State *Sessions Laws* (1967), Chapter 392.

[48] These procedures are spelled out in the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, New York City, *Administrative Code*, chapter 54. For the establishment of the Office of Collective Bargaining, see: New York City *Charter*, chapter 54, section 1173.

[49] Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 710.

[50] Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City*, p. 12.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] The Office of Labor Relations was created by Mayor Lindsay in 1966. Its primary function is to represent the City government and units within its jurisdiction in collective bargaining. For an inside view of its operations see Anthony C. Russo, "Management View of the New York City Experience," *Unionization of Municipal Employees*, ed. Robert H. Connery and William V. Farr, (New York: The Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1971, pp. 80–93.

[53] Sayre and Kaufman, *Governing New York City*, p. 710.

When the Office of Collective Bargaining started operations in January, 1968, there were approximately 400 bargaining units in existence.[55] Through consolidation of units, the number of bargaining units was reduced to 325 by 1971.[56]

The choice of New York City as the locus of research creates some dilemmas because New York's city government often is considered *sui generis* by researchers. It is larger and possibly more complex than any other United States city government.[57] The weight of several other factors, however, outweighed these considerations in the selection of New York City as the research site. First, a limited geographic area provided the opportunity to gather information that, dispersed over a larger region, would have been too costly and time consuming to collect. Second, testing the model on a sample of New York City cases did provide an opportunity to disconfirm the propositions, a consideration that took precedence over concern with external validity. Finally, where a comprehensive legal framework for public employment collective bargaining has been adopted by state and local jurisdictions, there tends to be marked similarities in statutory provisions.[58] Therefore, no compelling reason exists for contending *a priori* that an explanatory model tested on cases of public sector collective bargaining in New York City would be less valid for other settings with a comprehensive statutory framework.

Sample Selection. Specification of the population was achieved through the collection of comprehensive lists of collective bargaining settlements in New York City. A set of master lists,[59] prepared by the New York City Office of Labor Relations (OLR), contained identifying and descriptive information on collective bargaining settlements between New York City governmental units and various unions representing public employees from 1968 through 1972. Three sources, containing lists of public employee work stoppages during this period, were also consulted to assure that these cases were included on the master lists.[60] As a result of this process, the population encompassed 535 collective bargaining settlements.

The next step toward selecting the 60-case research sample was to identify the level of conflict during negotiations so that the population could be stratified. To achieve this objective, several sets of documents were consulted. First, the lists of public employee work stoppages were again utilized.[61] Second, all cases in which impasse, fact-finding, or mediation occurred were identified.[62] Third, *The New York Times Index* was utilized to identify negotiations, strikes, settlements, and other activities that may have been reported in *The New York Times*. Fourth, several civil service and local union publications proved to be valuable sources. *The Chief* and the *Civil Service Leader*, publications covering topics of general interest to civil service employees, provided information on a wide range of cases within the population; and the local publication of the AFSCME, *Public Employee Press*, yielded valuable information pertaining to many additional cases in the population. Stratification was based on a four category scale. Different conflict acts served to define minimum inclusion levels for each group. Group 1 included all cases where no conflictual acts were observed. Group 2 included cases in which impasses occurred but in which no overt conflictual acts were observed. Group 3 included all cases in which overt acts short of a strike were observed. Group 4 included all cases in which a strike did occur. Once stratification of the population had been completed, the final step in specifying the sample was to select 15 cases randomly from each of the four groups.[63]

---

[54] Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City*, pp. 77–79.

[55] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Reports, 1970–1971*, pp. 6–7.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Sayre and Kaufman, *Governing New York City*, p. 709, characterize New York City as "imperial" among American cities.

[58] On this point, compare the 1971 and 1973 versions of the following publications: U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services Administration, Division of Public Employee Labor Relations, *Summary of State Policy Regulations for Public Sector Labor Relations: Statutes, Attorney General's Opinions, and Selected Court Decisions* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 1971 and February, 1973). For a general discussion of the diffusion of similar institutional innovations, see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 880–889. For an analysis of public employment bargaining laws see Thomas A. Kochan, "Correlates of State Public Employee Bargaining Laws," *Industrial Relations*, 12 (October, 1973), 322–337.

[59] New York City, Office of Labor Relations, *Collective Bargaining Settlements by the Office of Labor Relations, 1968–1972* (mimeographed).

[60] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Report — 1972*, pp. 23–24; New York State Public Employment Relations Board, *Detailed Listing of Public Employee Work Stoppages, New York State, 1968–1972.* (Mimeographed); Economic Development Council of New York City, *New York City's Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Looking Ahead in New York City*, No. 4 (New York: Economic Development Council of New York City, 1973), pp. 101–103.

[61] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Report — 1972;* New York State Public Employment Relations Board, *Detailed Listing of Public Employee Work Stoppages;* and Economic Development Council of New York City, *New York City's Public Sector Collective Bargaining.*

[62] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Report — 1968–1972.* The bulk of information was contained in these reports. Additional information on impasses was retrieved from other unpublished documents within the Office of Collective Bargaining.

Operational Measures

The indicators for each of the concepts defined in Table 1 are presented below. Because most of the indicators were developed specifically for this study, little attention can be given to the empirical validity of the indicators as they have been used in previous studies.

Goal Divergence. The number of demands submitted by the union at the initiation of negotiations was selected as the indicator of goal divergence. This indicator was chosen over others primarily for advantages of data availability, ease of accessibility, and completeness. Using an unobtrusive indicator to measure goal divergence also circumscribed many of the difficulties which could have been encountered in attempting to measure the variable with reactive instruments.

Ideally, the number of initial public organization demands should have been considered also. For the population utilized here, however, there were approximately thirty demands general to all collective bargaining negotiations in New York City.[64] Since the content of the demands was not published or available from a sufficient number of the involved organizations so that further analysis could be performed, the number of initial union demands was considered adequate for cross-sectional analysis.[65]

While this indicator was assessed on an *a priori* basis for its face validity, there was little evidence for assessing its empirical validity.[66] From an appendix of data from Hammermesh,[67] a median test was performed on the divergence of wage proposals. Dichotomizing the cases on the basis of whether a strike did or did not occur, and computing the probability for the marginal totals in a 2 × 2 contingency table produced a significant relationship at alpha $= .05$. Although this evidence is not substantial, it does point to the empirical validity of using initial bargaining demands to measure goal divergence.

Relative Dependence. In Pugh et al.[68] the size of the organizational unit relative to its parent organization was utilized to measure dependence. Relative size was found to intercorrelate substantially with other dimensions of dependence: status of organization unit (.68), organizational representation on policy-making body (.50), specializations contracted out (−.60), and vertical integration (−.40).[69] Pugh et al. concluded from these results, and from low intercorrelations with the dimensions of other concepts, that this indicator does tap "aspects of the dependence of the organization, particularly its dependence on external resources and power. . . ."[70]

A second consideration was how to operationalize the variable to measure the difference in the amount of dependence between the organizations. The operationalization selected rested on an additive assumption. The dependence score for the union organization was subtracted from the dependence score for the public organization. Under this approach, asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations theoretically ranges from a lower limit of -1 (most favorable to the union organization) to an upper limit of $+1$ (most favorable to the public organization). This indicator was used to test Proposition V. The absolute value of this indicator was used to test Proposition III since the amount of asymmetry alone, and not which organization was favored, was hypothesized to be the significant determinant of conflictual behavior.

Stability. In order to measure this concept, data on the number of grievance arbitrations filed and the number of employees in the unit were collected. Most of this information was available from the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining and Office of Labor Relations.[71] In cases where these data were not available from these sources, the data were obtained from union publications.

---

[63] An appendix containing the cases analyzed, the affiliations of the employee groups, and the year in which negotiations were conducted is available upon request from the authors.

[64] Communication from John T. Burnell, Director, Office of Labor Relations, March 23, 1974. The initial number of union demands was also supplied by the OLR.

[65] The content of the demands would have been extremely useful for further analysis, but the lack of uniformity in maintaining these as records within organizations and the often sensitive nature of their content militated against obtaining them.

[66] Daniel S. Hammermesh, "Who Wins in Wage Bargaining," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 26 (July, 1973), 1146–1149, at 1147.

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, and C. Turner, "The Context of Organizational Structures."

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

A time frame for isolation of the grievance arbitration data had to be selected so as to be compatible with the conceptualization of stability. The period beginning one year prior to the initiation of contract negotiations appeared to be an appropriate time span. Collecting grievance arbitration data for one year provided a sufficiently long, continuous span of time prior to negotiations to observe variance in the stability of relationship patterns.

The decision to utilize grievance arbitration data for the indicator of stability stemmed from several factors. First, grievance arbitration is generally recognized as an interorganizational mechanism for concerting the action of two or more organizations. Second, regarding the conduct of labor relations in New York City, Executive Order No. 52 required that "an employee organization certified for the unit of which the grievant is a member shall have the right to bring grievances unresolved at Step 2 of the general procedure . . . to impartial arbitration."[72] Third, previous research by Derber, Chalmers, and Stagner[73] suggested that the grievance process serves as a valid indicator of the stability of the labor-management relationship. Finally grievance arbitration data were easily accessible and inexpensive to collect.

Conflictual Behavior. Dubin points to the difficulty of developing adequate empirical indicators of conflictual behavior since "conflict behavior includes nonhomogenous acts . . ." and ". . . it is a major task to develop some measuring scale by which it is possible to equate a given number of units of personal abuse with the calling of a strike."[74] Dubin notes, however, that "some acts are more critical to the union-management relationship than others."[75]

Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend approach the measurement of conflictual behavior on the basis of observationally defined events representing different points on a scale.[76] Similarly, to analyze conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining, we chose to use a four-point scale, ranging from 1 (denoting absence of conflictual behavior) through 4 (denoting extreme conflictual behavior) to stratify the cases. Once the cases were selected, they were also ranked within the groups when distinctions could be made in the frequency or intensity of conflictual acts. The final scores for the cases ranged from 1 to 32.

Contractual Change. In scaling items within the contracts, weights were given to contract provisions on the basis of their increasing cost to the public organization or their favorableness to the union.[77] In the case of some contract provisions, the item was assigned a value of 0 or 1 depending on its presence or absence in the contract. For the remainder of the contract provisions, however, more specific ordinal scales were identifiable. By coding successive contracts on this basis, an index of contractual change was obtained by subtracting the values of the previous contract from those of the current contract. Despite an attempt to formulate an exhaustive set of provisions, it was unreasonable to assume that all provisions could be anticipated prior to analysis. Furthermore, some judgment was likewise exercised by the coder in assigning values to idiosyncratic provisions and deviations in particular contracts.

Findings

The operational relationships between the variables are examined graphically in Figures

---

[71] The number of employees in the bargaining unit was contained on the master lists used in sample selection. Most of the information on grievance arbitrations filed was obtained from internal records of the OCB.

[72] New York City, Office of the Mayor, *Executive Order No. 52,* p. 19.

[73] Milton Derber, W. Ellison Chalmers, and Ross Stagner, *The Local Union-Management Relationship* (Urbana, Ill.: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1960).

[74] Robert Dubin, "A Theory of Conflict and Power in Union-Management Relations," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* 13 (July, 1960), 501–508, at 501.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948–62: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* (September, 1966), 249–271.

[77] The coding scheme employed here was constructed from a contract analysis instrument originally developed by Thomas A. Kochan and Hoyt N. Wheeler. See *Contract Analysis of Fire Fighter Labor Agreements* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services Administration, Division of Public Employee Relations, Contract No. L-72-157, February, 1973). Some additions and modifications were made in their original instrument to reflect provisions across employee groups and categories peculiar to New York City contracts. An appendix containing the clauses which were coded and the values assigned to the clauses is available upon request from the authors.



Figure 2. Operational Linkage Between Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior



Figure 3. Operational Linkage Between Stability and Conflictual Behavior



Figure 4. Operational Linkage Between Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior



Figure 5. Operational Linkage Between Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change



Figure 6. Operational Linkage Between Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Contractual Change



Figure 7. Operational Linkage Between Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Conflictual Behavior

Table 3. Correlates of Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change[a]

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Goal Divergence		−.045 (.365)	.225 (.042)	−.283 (.014)	.492 (.001)	.613 (.001)
2. Stability			.076 (.282)	−.066 (.308)	.527 (.001)	.016 (.451)
3. Asymmetry of Relative Dependence				−.765 (.001)	.255 (.024)	.330 (.005)
4. Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations					−.373 (.002)	−.387 (.001)
5. Conflictual Behavior						.361 (.002)
6. Contractual Change						

[a] Pearsonian correlation coefficients rounded to the nearest one-thousandth. The figures in parentheses are levels of significance for n = 60. Variable values have been transformed to standard scores.

2 through 7. Only the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior deviates from the hypothesized relationships. On the basis of the graphic analysis, the relationships between conflictual behavior and stability and asymmetry of relative dependence were linearized, and a correlation matrix was computed for the entire set of variables. The correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 3.

Expectations about the relationship between the initial number of union demands and conflictual behavior are borne out by the substantial positive correlation with the indicator of conflictual behavior. The relationship between stability (decreasing) and conflictual behavior also exhibits a substantial positive correlation. When a transformation based upon the revision of the hypothesized operational linkage suggested by Figure 4 is employed, the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior is found to be significant. The hypothesized relationships between conflictual behavior, relative dependence and contractual change also accord with our predictions.

In addition to the lack of support for the hypothesized relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior indicated by the zero-order correlations, the

Table 4. Selected Bivariate Relationships Controlled for Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior

Relationship	Partial *r*	Control Variable
Stability and Conflictual Behavior	−.205 (.060)	Goal Divergence
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior	.122 (.179)	Goal Divergence
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Conflictual Behavior	−.280 (.010)	Goal Divergence
Goal Divergence and Contractual Change	.537 (.001)	Conflictual Behavior
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Contractual Change	−.291 (.013)	Conflictual Behavior
Stability and Contractual Change	.097 (.233)	Conflictual Behavior



a. *Determinants of Conflictual Behavior*

b. *Determinants of Contractual Change*

Figure 8. Determinants of Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change

first-order partial correlations (Table 4) indicate further difficulties in the original formulation of the relationships. The revised relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior and the relationship between stability and conflictual behavior are reduced below the .05 level of significance when controlled for goal divergence. Although stability remains significant at the .06 level, the reduction in the significance of the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior is substantial. On the other hand, controlling for goal divergence does not substantially reduce the significance of the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior when the direction of asymmetry is specified (i.e., the relationship between the actual rather than the absolute value of the asymmetry of the relative dependence variable and the conflictual behavior variable). In addition, when conflictual behavior is utilized as the control variable to test the independent effects of goal divergence and asymmetry favoring one of the organizations, both relationships remain significant well below the .05 level. We had expected the relationships between goal divergence and contractual change to be substantially reduced according to the original formulation.

Based upon these findings, Figure 8 (a and b) presents revised models of the determinants of conflictual behavior and contractual change. The major changes in the models are represented by the specification of the direction of the asymmetry in explaining conflictual behavior and the addition of the direct linkage between goal divergence and contractual change. The operational linkage of Figure 7 indicates that the level of conflictual behavior decreases as a linear function of management's dependence on the union. That goal divergence accounts for a substantial amount of the contractual change in the revised model can be explained in part by inadequacies of the indicator used to measure goal divergence. The initial number of union demands appears to represent not only the divergence, but also the convergence of goals. It is also not a good measure of what was termed the aspirational or strength of preference dimension of the concept. The relationship between goal divergence and contractual change may be inexplicably strong for these reasons.

Another interesting phenomenon surfaces when the contractual change index is broken down into the three dimensions of salary adjustment, nonsalary cost changes, and noncost changes.[78] Table 5 displays the correlations be-

---

[78] These categories correspond to the frequently used empirical distinctions among wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. Different terminology is used here to reflect more clearly the inclusion criteria for each category. Those provisions other than wages and salaries which either

Table 5. Zero-Order Correlations Between the Explanatory Variables and Three Contractual Change Dimensions

Explanatory Variables	Contractual Change Dimensions		
	Salary Adjustment	Nonsalary Cost Items	Noncost Items
Goal Divergence	.162 (.109)	.497 (.001)	.513 (.001)
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations	−.104 (.214)	−.407 (.001)	−.227 (.040)
Conflictual Behavior	−.065 (.309)	.385 (.001)	.368 (.002)

tween the explanatory variables and these three dimensions of the inducements/contributions contract. None of the explanatory variables correlates at a significant level with salary adjustment, although they all exhibit significant correlations for the other two dimensions of contractual change. At least two complementary interpretations may be posited to account for these relationships.

One of the interpretations involves the temporal aspect of the collective bargaining process in the public sector. Downing suggests that it makes "good common sense — when it comes to the question of wages and fringe benefits, you do not want to have seniority problems hanging fire."[79] The key to adducing the importance of timing in relation to the composition of the items in the inducements/contributions contract is suggested by Stevens:

> The agenda-related point of interest is that even though a number of items are on the "same" agenda, they may in a sense be accorded separate "forums." . . . The significance of the attempt to distribute items on the "same" agenda among separate forums by pressing for seriatim treatment is conditioned by a provision strongly implied by the package settlement rule: Any agreements or proposals relating to individual items made during the course of negotiations are understood to be provisional and may be withdrawn if final agreement upon all items in dispute is not reached. . . .[80]

The importance of these statements for the discussion at hand rests on several assumptions. First, collective bargaining in the public sector may be partitioned into at least three time periods, each associated with an appropriate forum: (1) pre-impasse, two-party bargaining; (2) impasse, mediated bargaining; (3) post-mediation, power bargaining. Second, the grouping of agenda items for seriatim treatment depends on the organizations involved and varies from situation to situation. Noncost items may, for example, normally be agreed upon first in negotiations, but the second assumption suggests that there is sufficient variation from case to case so that the items which represent subordinate differences will vary. Finally, any package settlement should be viewed as having an upper bound above which management will refuse to agree and a lower bound below which the union will refuse to agree.

Within this framework, the statistical relationships between the dimensions of the contractual change index and the explanatory variables can be more easily understood. For example, take the case in which the agenda orderings of the organizations are consonant and salary is agreed upon in the first time period. Assume that agreement on this item brings the organizations close to their settlement points. Even if bargaining proceeds beyond this forum, it seems unlikely that adjustments in the other time periods will substantially change the focus of settlement in the earlier period. Furthermore, early agreement on

---

entailed a direct fiscal outlay or for which cost calculations could be made were placed in the nonsalary cost category. Items such as tuition reimbursement, uniform allowances, and meal allowances were included in this category. Among the items included in the noncost category were provisions covering contracting out, transfers, physical working conditions, and posting of vacancies.

[79] Thomas G. Downing, "Strategy and Tactics at the Bargaining Table," *Personnel,* 37 (January/February, 1963), 44–45.

[80] Carl M. Stevens, *Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 44–45.

salary does not preclude the importance of the explanatory variables in determining nonsalary cost and noncost outcomes in succeeding forums and time periods.

A second explanation relates to the visibility of salary adjustments and the proportion of the settlement allocated to each of the items in the inducements/contributions contract. The magnitude of the salary adjustment may vary inversely with the explanatory variables because of the need for the organizations to maintain or enhance future task-environment support. A weak union, for example, may pursue a large wage increase in preference to other inducements because of the immediate and visible gains its leaders are able to provide its rank-and-file members. Conversely, once the salary demands of strong unions become publicly visible it may be necessary for them to accept other, less visible inducements so that their current gains are not translated into loss of support in the future.

Conclusions

A summary of findings on the original theoretical propositions and operational linkages is presented in Table 6. Although these results do not advance our understanding of public sector collective bargaining processes sufficiently to draw any firm conclusions beyond the scope of the research, three areas of practical implication are suggested to us by this research: the need to give greater emphasis to public interest considerations in the collective bargaining process; the consequences of collective bargaining for internal resource allocation in public organizations; and the utility of the model for evaluating alternative policies or policy changes.

The research indicates that perhaps the scope of the public interest is too narrowly defined in the collective bargaining process. In the bilateral structure of negotiations the broader needs of the community tend to be ignored. As Kochan notes: "The issue which now must be confronted is how to devise a bargaining system for municipal employees which insures them the rights of 'first class citizenship' and still provides a voice for the pluralistic interests of the community."[81]

A second area of practical implication, related to public interest considerations, is the consequences of collective bargaining for the allocation of resources among subunits of the public organization. When the outcome of public sector collective bargaining tends to allocate scarce governmental resources according to union power, severe wage and benefit imbalances can develop which may have serious programmatic and personnel consequences. For example, program outputs may be reduced in one agency to maintain wage and benefit levels in another. Also, the betterment of working conditions for employees in some units may be

Table 6. Summary of Findings of the Theoretical and Operational Relationships

Relationship	Confirmation Status	Expected Operational Linkage			Observed Operational Linkage		
		Direction	Type	Limits	Direction	Type	Limits
Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior	Confirmed	Positive	S-curve	Upper	Positive	S-curve	Upper
Stability and Conflictual Behavior	Confirmed	Negative	Power	None	Negative	Power	None
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior	Disconfirmed	Positive	Negative skew, curvilinear	None	Negative	Curvilinear	None
Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change	Confirmed	Positive	Linear	None	Positive	Linear	None
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Contractual Change	Confirmed	Negative	S-curve	Upper and lower limits	Negative	S-curve	Upper and lower limits

---

[81] Thomas A. Kochan, *City Employee Bargaining With a Divided Management* (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Institute, 1971), p. 68.

reflected in the resentment and lower morale of employees in other units.

The model could also be useful for evaluating alternative policy prescriptions. For example, a policy change designed to control the scope of bargaining could be evaluated on the basis of how it affects the values of the goal divergence variable over time. Similarly, the comparative effectiveness of state collective bargaining policies for state and local government employees could be evaluated on the basis both of how the policies affect the distributions of the explanatory variables and of how they limit the degree of conflictual behavior.

The greater part of the impact of collective bargaining on government operations and the public employment relationship most certainly lies in the future. It will probably be another decade before the rapid growth of public employee unionism slows appreciably. In the meantime, collective bargaining is bound to continue growing in use and evolving with experience. A disconcerting prospect is that collective bargaining in the public sector will continue to evolve toward the private sector model without adequate consideration being given to the differences in the two settings.[82]

---

[82] For a discussion of some of the contextual differences between collective bargaining in the public and private sectors, see George H. Hildebrand, "The Public Sector," *Frontiers of Collective Bargaining,* ed. John Dunlop and Neil Chamberlain (New York: Harper and Row, 1967, pp. 125–154; David T. Stanley, *Managing Local Government Under Union Pressure* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1972); Harry Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *The Unions and the Cities;* and Gerald M. Pops, "A Decisional Analysis of Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector" (Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1974).

Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition*

RUSSELL HARDIN

University of Maryland, College Park

Introduction

More than a century ago, in 1868, former Representative Ransom Gillet (Democrat of New York, 1833–37) recalled that

> the way to enact a tariff bill was to provide protection for the local interests of enough representatives to ensure the bill's passage. "Interest and not principle," he said, "determines what shall be done. If votes from Louisiana and Texas are needed, sugar will come in for favor. If support is needed from Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan, lead, copper and pine lumber are provided for. If the votes of Pennsylvania are wanted, coal and iron receive full attention. . . . The principle of protection under a tariff never expands beyond the objects necessary to carry a bill."[1]

In *The Theory of Political Coalitions,* William Riker proposed his "size principle," according to which: "In n-person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur."[2] Riker's proof of the principle uses a clever incentive argument which allows him to escape from the morass of game theoretic solution theory. Over the past decade, the size principle has entered theoretical analyses as a basic assumption,[3] and it has spawned numerous empirical studies.[4] It has also been subjected to serious criticism.[5]

---

* I am grateful to the students of my spring 1973 graduate seminar in formal analysis in the Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, for giving me cause to pursue the topic of this paper. I am also grateful to several colleagues for discussing the ideas in the paper at times when they hardly deserved inclusion in the class of ideas. William H. Panning especially deserves thanks for his criticisms and suggestions, and for calculating the probabilities of coalitions by size in a random legislature. William L. Ascher, Charles D. Elder, Edwin T. Haefele, Jack H. Nagel, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Dennis H. Paranzino, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Jeff Smith, Oran R. Young, and an anonymous reviewer — who together must constitute a winning coalition in some realm — all read earlier drafts of the paper and recommended extensions, revisions, and additional literature.

[1] *Guide to the Congress of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Research Service, 1971), p. 607.

[2] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 32. The original presentation of the proof of the principle, at pp. 247–278, is somewhat involved. I will therefore generally refer to the briefer, clearer presentation in William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 176–187. This later presentation is eminently accessible to anyone who has even limited patience for game-theoretic algebra. See also Riker, "A New Proof of the Size Principle," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* II, ed. Joseph L. Bernd (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 167–174.

[3] Lawrence C. Dodd, "Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *American Political Science Review,* 68 (September 1974), 1093–1117; Edwin T. Haefele, "Coalitions, Minority Representation, and Vote-Trading Probabilities," *Public Choice,* 8 (Spring 1970), 75–90, and "A Utility Theory of Representative Government," *American Economic Review,* 61 (June 1971), 350–367; Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "The Effects of Group Size on Collective Decision Making," in *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making,* ed. Niemi and Weisberg (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972), pp. 125–148; and Bruce M. Russett, "Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 12 (September 1968), 285–301. See further the book length manuscript of Steven J. Brams, "Coalition Dynamics: Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies" (New York University, 1971, mimeo.), esp. chapters 1 and 3.

[4] Most of the contributions to *The Study of Coalition Behavior,* ed. Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), either apply the size principle or discuss its relevance to various empirical problems. Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (September 1968), 770–787, finds that the size principle fits coalition formation in the conservative Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party. David H. Koehler, "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," in Niemi and Weisberg, pp. 149–164, argues that the size principle explains roll-call voting behavior in the United States House of Representatives. David W. Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court," in Niemi and Weisberg, pp. 165–178, applies the principle to Supreme Court decisions. Markku Laakso, "Riker's 'Size Principle' and Its Application to Finnish Roll-Call Data," *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 9 (1972), 107–118, applies the principle to a multiparty parliament.

Further references are given in Riker and Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory,* pp. 192–194. In addition, Riker presents anecdotal evidence in support of the size principle from the collapse after victory of the wartime grand coalitions of 1815, 1917, and 1945; from the American presidential elections of 1824 and 1964–1968; and from the collapse after victory of recent national independence movements in colonial states. See further, *Positive Political Theory,* pp. 188–191, 194–196, and 199–201; and Riker, *Political Coalitions,* chap. 3.

In what follows I will argue that, contrary to Gillet's common sense and Riker's game theory, the size principle should be expected to fail in application. The first part of the argument will be that the range of the theoretical validity of the principle is far more restricted than is apparent from Riker's proofs and discussions of it. In particular, it is valid only for a very narrow class of all zero-sum symmetric games (the class of supersymmetric games, which will be defined below) and for a similarly narrow class of all zero-sum asymmetric games (which are vaguely the asymmetric equivalent of supersymmetric games). The incentive argument for the size principle fails for the more general classes of all symmetric and asymmetric games.

The second part of the argument will be more general and hence more succinct. It appears that any model which predicts a tendency toward minimum winning coalitions would be theoretically insignificant and empirically untestable for games in which n is very large, as for instance in the House of Representatives. This follows because in such games almost all winning coalitions which are possible will fall within a few per cent of minimal size merely by chance.

After briefly discussing the game theoretic context of the size principle, I will first address theoretical issues and then empirical issues. Throughout, the concern is exclusively with zero-sum games, but the zero-sum condition will not be constantly reiterated.

An *N*-Person Zero-sum Game. In order to facilitate discussion of the derivation of the size principle, it will be useful to refer to an actual game. On the other hand, in order to maintain the reader's patience, I will restrain the urge to create ever more beautiful games to demonstrate ever more beautiful points. Hence, the reader will be burdened with only one tedious game matrix.

Consider the 5-person zero-sum game whose payoffs are allotted by majority decision from the set of outcomes presented in cursory form in Game 1:

Game 1

Player	A	B	C	D	E
Outcome I	0	0	0	0	0
Outcome II	20	20	20	−10	−50
Outcome III	20	20	20	−50	−10

If all possible permutations on Outcome II are included, the game is symmetric.[6] The only restrictions on the payoffs are that they sum to zero; that the majority coalition will allot to its members payoffs which sum to the value of the coalition; and that the payoffs be subject to the constraint of individual rationality, that is, no player will accept less than his security level. The *security level* of a player is the best payoff which he can unilaterally guarantee for himself even against a coalition of all the other players. The security level of players in Game 1 is −50. The *value,* or *characteristic function,* of a coalition is the total payoff which the coalition can guarantee its members no matter what players outside the coalition do. The possible majority coalitions in Game 1 include ten 3-player coalitions, five 4-player coalitions, and one 5-player coalition. The value of each 3-player coalition is 60. The value of each 4-player coalition is 50. And the value of the 5-player grand coalition, of course, is zero. The value of coalition ABC is represented as v(ABC).

Symmetry in Games. In general a game is said to be *symmetric* if the value of a coalition is a function only of the number of players in it. For instance, in Game 1 above, all 3-person coalitions have a value of 60. All 1-person coalitions have a value of −50. The condition for symmetry will be met if the payoff configuration faced by one player is identical to that faced by every other player, in which case the game will be called *identically symmetric.* The condition of symmetry can also be met under other payoff configurations, as for example if three players must choose by majority agreement among the three outcomes (1,1,−2), (2,−2,0), and (−2,1,1). In this game, the 3-person coalition has the value of 0; all 2-person coalitions have the value of 2; and all 1-person coalitions have the value of −2. In this game, the payoffs are not symmetric, but the values of coalitions are.[7] In order to determine whether a game is symmetric, it is necessary to know only the characteristic function form of the game, i.e., the values of coalitions. To determine whether a game is identically symmetric, it is necessary to know much more — the full matrix of payoffs.

---

[5] Barbara Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress: Size and Ideological Distance," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 16 (May 1972), 197–207, and "Coalitions in Congress: Size in a Series of Games," *American Politics Quarterly,* 1 (July 1973), 339–359. Robert Lyle Butterworth, "A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review,* 65 (September 1971), 741–745. Riker rejects Butterworth's arguments in "Comment on Butterworth," *American Political Science Review,* 65 (September 1971), 745–747; and in Riker and Ordeshook, p. 186n. Norman Frohlich, "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review,* 69 (September 1975), 943–946. Oran R. Young, "The Size of Winning Coalitions: A Note on Riker's Size Principle," unpublished manuscript (University of Texas, Austin, 1972, typescript).

[6] All possible permutations can be generated by switching the labels of the players through all orderings. With five players, these number 5!, or 120 outcomes.

Riker's Assumption of Symmetry. Riker tacitly introduces symmetry when he presents the graphs of Figure 1, which plot the values of coalitions against their sizes. On the horizontal axis are the sizes of coalitions ranging from *m*, the minimal winning size, to *n*, the total number of players in the game. On the vertical axis are the values, or characteristic functions, of the coalitions. One should not be confused by the multiplicity of curves actually plotted — each curve simply represents a typical game. For example, the flat curve labeled II represents a game in which every winning coalition has the value (or collective payoff) γ, except that the grand coalition of all *n* players has the value 0 (because the game is zero-sum). The payoff to the corresponding losing "coalition" is always the negative of the payoff to the winning coalition.

A conspicuous point of these graphs is that they can be plotted as single-valued curves only if all coalitions of a given size have the same value, i.e., if the game is symmetric. If in Game 1 the only outcome possible were that presented as Outcome II without allowing permutations, then possible 3-person coalitions would have the values 60, 30, −10, and −40; and 4-person coalitions would have the values 50, 10, and −40. Hence, this restricted game cannot be fitted into Riker's graphs.



Figure 1. Size and Value of Winning Coalitions

From Riker and Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory,* p. 181. Copyright 1973 by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Butterworth's and Shepsle's Assumptions of Symmetry. Butterworth likewise tacitly introduces the condition of symmetry when he presents symmetric counterexamples to Riker's size principle, and when he refers to "games with a nonpositively-sloped characteristic function" such as those represented by curves I and II in Figure 1. In his proof of his own "maximum number of positive gainers" principle, he does not invoke or need the symmetry condition. But he concludes by suggesting that "a most desirable line of development is to generalize the analysis of [his] principle beyond simple symmetric games."[8] A simple generalization is easily deduced and will be noted below. Indeed all that is required is to restate Butterworth's principle in words as general as his elegant proof.

In a recent defense of the size principle, Kenneth Shepsle explicitly assumes symmetry — "without seriously jeopardizing the argument," he says. He is right insofar as he means to say that an assumption which is necessary to an argument cannot sensibly be said to jeopardize it. But the assumption does jeopardize the applicability of any size principle which is based upon it, since it is an assumption which may not be met in contexts which interest us. Shepsle calls the assumption of symmetry "an anonymity condition," in that "the labels identifying the players in a coalition are not relevant to a determination of a coalition's worth . . . "[9] The notion has a persuasive ring, but it is not the commonplace "anonymity condition" of conventional game theory, which is meant to apply even to games which are not at all symmetric. In its conventional version, anonymity is a condition on *players' abilities,* not on the *structure of payoffs* in the game. Shepsle's condition is strictly a condition on the latter, whereas the conventional condition is a way of saying that we are not interested in the differential skill of the players but only in the logical structure of the game. For example, for a given 2-person game payoff matrix, our analysis of the rationality of various strategies is anonymous in that it does not take into consideration whether the row player is Buster Keaton, Anatol Rapoport, or a sophomore psychology student at a large state university.[10]

---

[7] A more striking example of a game whose *normal form,* or matrix of payoffs, is distinctly asymmetric but whose *characteristic function form* is symmetric was proposed by J. C. C. McKinsey, *Introduction to the Theory of Games* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), pp. 351–353. The example is discussed in R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 190–191.

[8] Butterworth, p. 745.

[9] Kenneth A. Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review,* 68 (June 1974), 505–518, at p. 506.

Theoretical Issues

In what follows I will first show that Riker's proof is insufficient. Then I will show that for the narrow class of supersymmetric games, Riker's incentive argument yields a valid proof of the size principle. Then I will generalize from the condition of supersymmetry to show that the principle is also valid for a highly restricted class of asymmetric games. Finally, I will comment on Butterworth's critique of the principle and his modification of it, on Shepsle's recent "favorable impression of the size principle's validity,"[11] and on von Neumann and Morgenstern's simple games.

Insufficiency of Riker's Proof. Riker's proof of the size principle is based on a consideration of the possible shapes of the graphs in Figure 1. He suggests that it is necessary to corroborate the principle for three cases, according as

I the slope is always negative,
II the slope is zero or negative,
III the slope is positive in part and negative in part.[12]

Riker concludes that the principle cannot be proved for case III, but that it is definitive for cases I and II. The actual proof for these two cases, however, is strictly algebraic rather than geometric. For case I, if S is a coalition which is winning, then by definition

$$v(S) > v(S+i).$$

Riker claims that "*it is always advantageous, regardless of the division* of [the payoffs to the members of a larger than minimum winning coalition], $(S+i)$, for the s members of S to eject person i."[13]

There are two points to be made about this claim before we turn to the proof of the size principle. First, the claim is not quite accurately worded, and as stated it may well be false.[14] The correct wording is:

> If $v(S_{r-1}) \geq v(S_r)$, then *some* (r-1)-member subcoalition of S_r has incentive to evict the other member. Lemma 1

In subsequent discussion, it will be assumed that Riker's proof is based on the statement in Lemma 1, which is proved in the following paragraph.

> PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Suppose S_r is a larger than minimum winning coalition. If the game is symmetric, then every coalition of r-1 players is also winning. Suppose $v(S_{r-1}) \geq v(S_r)$ by hypothesis. Let A, B, . . . be the players in S_r, and let their payoffs in S_r be p_A, p_B, . . . Suppose that the payoff to A is at least as great as the payoff to any other player in S_r. Since $v(S_r) > 0$, it follows that $p_A > 0$. Now consider the coalition S_{r-1} whose members are B. C, . . . , i.e., which is S_r – A. Let the payoffs to the players in S_{r-1} be $p_B{}^1$, $p_C{}^1$, . . .
>
> We have,
>
> $$p_B{}^1 + p_C{}^1 + \ldots = v(\text{BCD} \ldots) \geq v(\text{ABCD} \ldots) = p_A + p_B + p_C + \ldots$$
>
> or,
>
> $$p_B{}^1 + p_C{}^1 + \ldots \geq p_A + p_B + p_C + \ldots$$
>
> Hence, $(p_B{}^1 + p_C{}^1 + \ldots) - (p_B + p_C + \ldots) \geq p_A > 0$. That is, the sum of the payoffs to the players B, C, D, . . . in S_{r-1} is greater than the sum of their payoffs in S_r. Hence, it is in their collective interest to evict A in order to form S_{r-1}.

It follows that, in any symmetric game in which S_r is a larger than minimum winning coalition and $v(S_{r-1}) \geq v(S_r)$, some winning subcoalition, S_{r-1}, of S_r has incentive to reduce the size of S_r by evicting the extra player. Note that *not every* winning subcoalition has such an incentive, because a single player, A, whose payoff in S_r is p_A, can profitably be evicted only if

$$p_A > v(S_r) - v(S_{r-1}).$$

---

[10] In this respect, the interest of mathematical game theory is contrary to the interest of what are normally called games, such as basketball or chess. In chess, Boris Spassky will find it profoundly important to know whether it is Bobby Fisher or I who sits across from him. If the game theorists ever solve the game of chess (as tic-tac-toe has been solved), chess will lose its interest except among the ignorant (as tic-tac-toe can be played with interest only by the very young and the daft). Of course, game theorists have long been trying, and they may yet succeed. (Also of course, the class of the ignorant and daft may be much larger in the case of chess than in the case of tic-tac-toe.)

[11] Shepsle, p. 515.

[12] Riker and Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory*, p. 182.

[13] *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

[14] Assume by hypothesis that $v(S)-v(S+\text{i}) = \Delta$, where $\Delta>0$. It is possible that the security level, q_i, of player i is less than $-\Delta$. Hence, it is possible that i was making side payments in excess of Δ to the members of S. If S now evicts i, its members collectively lose this excess over Δ. In Game 1 for example, if coalition ABCD has formed with payoffs (26, 26, 26, –28), then ABC cannot afford to evict D, although ABC would be of winning size and $v(\text{ABC}) > v(\text{ABCD})$.

This condition can be put into words which make the point clearer: If, in a larger-than-minimum-winning coalition, *S, the sum of the payoffs to the members of some winning subcoalition is less than the value of the subcoalition, then that subcoalition has incentive to form in the place of S.* The conditional of this statement will always be fulfilled for symmetric games in Riker's Cases I and II, and it can be met even in games which fall into Riker's Case III (the slope of the characteristic function is positive in part).

The second point to be made about Riker's claim (Lemma 1) is that, although he does not say so, Riker evidently assumes that demonstration of the validity of this claim is prima facie *sufficient* to prove the size principle (for Case I games). It should be clear, however, that the validity of Lemma 1 is at best only necessary for proving the size principle. According to Lemma 1, some winning subcoalition of any larger-than-winning coalition has incentive to reduce the size of the coalition. But then it might still happen that any coalition of minimum winning size has incentive to expand its size. In order finally to prove the size principle with his line of argument, Riker would have to show that this latter is not the case. But it may well be the case, as can easily be shown for Game 1.

Because Game 1 is a majority rule game, coalition ABC can by itself determine which of the three represented outcomes will occur. If ABC selects Outcome III, D loses 50 units. Hence, ABC might make D an offer: we will select Outcome II if you will make us a side payment of roughly half the difference in your payoffs at these two outcomes. That difference is 40 units. Suppose ABC lets D have 22 units of that difference and asks for 6 units to each of its three members. The full set of payoffs (with side payments calculated in) would then be (26,26,26,–28,–50). Note that this set of payoffs requires the cooperation in coalition of four players, one more than minimum winning, and all four members of the coalition are better off than they might have been outside the coalition.

Since Game 1 is identically symmetric, it follows that *every minimum winning coalition in the game has incentive to expand* from three players to four. That is to say that the incentive argument which Riker uses to demonstrate that *only minimum winning coalitions* occur can likewise be used in this game to demonstrate that *only larger than minimum winning coalitions* occur. Hence, this proof is insufficient reason to accept the size principle.[15]

The Size Principle in Supersymmetric Games. Riker turned to his incentive argument in order to escape the endless circularities of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution theory, and still there is circularity. But I have only demonstrated that for at least one game which meets the definition of Riker's Case I, the incentive argument fails because it produces an infinite circular chain of expansions and contractions of coalitions. The question remains whether the demonstration generalizes to all games. The answer is that for one narrowly defined class of games, which can be called supersymmetric, Riker's incentive argument does not lead to circularity, but for apparently all other symmetric games it does. Hence, the size principle can be applied only to supersymmetric games, as will be argued below.

If for some game the incentive argument is not to lead to endless circularity, it must happen that in that game minimum winning coalitions do not have incentive to expand. In general there will always be incentive for a winning coalition to expand *except when the value of that coalition is equal to the negative sum of the security levels of the individual losers.* That is, always except when there is nothing more to be squeezed out of the losers.

If the number of players in a game is n, the number of players in a winning coalition S is $r(<n)$, the payoff to player j is p_j, and the security level of player i is $-q_i$, then the sum of the winnings of the winners is

$$v(S) = \sum_{j\in S} p_j \leq \sum_{i\notin S} q_i. \qquad 1)$$

In symmetric games, all players have the same security level, $-q$, so that eqn. 1 reduces to

$$v(S) = \sum_{j\in S} p_j \leq (n-r)q.$$

Hence, if

$$\sum_{j\in S} p_j < (n-r)q,$$

the players in S have incentive to expand their coalition.

Note that there may be an incentive for winning coalitions of some sizes to expand and not for others. For example, there is obviously no incentive for a coalition of $n-1$ players to expand, because its value is q, and the single loser has nothing more to give. For symmetric games, the condition under which *no* winning coalition has an incentive to expand is

---

[15] Norman Frohlich has presented a related but substantially more elegant and more general demonstration of this conclusion in "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions."

$$v(S_r) = (n - r)q, \qquad 2)$$

for all r for which S_r is winning. It is easily shown that this reduces simply to $v(S_m) = (n-m)q$, where m is the minimal winning number.[16]

We can call a game which meets the condition in equation 2 *supersymmetric*. For such games, Riker's incentive argument for the size principle has great appeal: in a supersymmetric game no winning coalition has incentive to expand, but every larger than minimum winning coalition has incentive to contract down to minimal winning size. The condition of supersymmetry is *sufficient* for the size principle to hold. It is also *necessary* to prevent the incentive argument from leading us into endless circles.[17]

A game can be supersymmetric without being identically symmetric, and vice versa. An easily represented class of supersymmetric games, however, is the class of identically symmetric majority rule games whose matrices of outcomes include all permutations on the outcomes $(n-m, n-m, \cdots, -m, -m, \cdots)$, where the payoff $n-m$ accrues to m players, the payoff $-m$ accrues to $n-m$ players, and

$$\frac{n}{2} < m \leq \frac{n}{2} + 1$$

(In order to let the world move on to other concerns in the event of extended lack of agreement, it is sensible also to include in the matrices an outcome in which each player's payoff is 0).

A Supersymmetric Example. To show the appeal of Riker's argument for a case in which the condition of eqn. 2 is met, consider a game which is a modification of Game 1. Let the game be identically symmetric and majority rule, but let the payoffs which are negative in any outcome be equal at –30 (instead of the –10 and –50 as shown). Every non-zero outcome is therefore a permutation on the payoffs (20, 20, 20, –30, –30). Suppose the coalition ABCD has formed with payoffs to its members (20, 20, 20, –30). The value of the coalition is 30. Rather than create a new term, let us follow Butterworth and refer to a member of a winning coalition whose payoff is negative as a *negative gainer.*

Now, according to Riker's argument, three members of ABCD have incentive to expel the fourth member. At first glance, it might seem that ABC should expel D, the negative gainer, but this first glance is deceiving. Since the distribution of payoffs to the coalition is (20, 20, 20, –30), the expulsion of D will gain ABC nothing. ABC has no incentive to expel D. Oddly, however, any subcoalition of D with two positive gainers has incentive to expel the third positive gainer. For example, if B, C, and D collude to expel A, they will gain 50 units to divide among themselves, so that all three can easily be made substantially better off.[18] As the new winning coalition, however, BCD has no incentive to expand by adding A or E.

It is easy to see that, beginning from any initial winning coalition in this game, and given any division of the spoils within that coalition, Riker's incentive argument will lead to a point at which there is no longer any incentive to expand or contract, and that point will always be when a three-person or minimum winning coalition has formed. Of course, it would still and would always be the case that each (or at least n-1) of the individual players has incentive to strive for a larger payoff through coalitional realignment or threat of realignment.

Asymmetric Games. Eqn. 1 suggests another possibility, which is that

$$v(S_r) = \sum_{i \notin S_r} q_i \qquad 3)$$

in a game which is *not* symmetric. As an example of an asymmetric game, consider again Game 1 under majority rule with the *only* outcomes being those actually given and not including permutations on these. In this game, players A, B, and C have security levels of 0; D and E have security levels of –50. The value of ABC is 60; the negative sum of the security levels of D and E is 100. Clearly, ABC has incentive to expand.

But any three-player coalition which includes D and E has no incentive to expand. Consider CDE, which has the value of 0. The losers, A and B, have security levels summing to 0. In this game Riker's incentive argument leads any initial winning coalition through an inexorable series of expansions and expulsions which ends at a three-player coalition including D and E which has no incentive to do anything further. Hence, the size principle applies to this game. And there is Schellingesque irony in the end result: the two apparently weakest players are sure to be in the winning coalition.

---

[16] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 3rd edition), p. 423. Equation 2 implies that S_{n-r}, the losing complement of S_r, is *flat,* that is, every member of S_{n-r} receives his security level. Every subset of a flat set is also flat. For a symmetric game it follows that, if the losing coalition S_{n-m} is flat, then S_p is also flat for every $p \leq n - m$.

[17] In the terminology of the previous footnote, the necessary and sufficient condition for Riker's argument to guarantee that only minimum winning coalitions form in a symmetric game is that all losing coalitions in the game be flat (where losing coalitions do not include blocking coalitions).

As a rule, it is more difficult to give general analyses of asymmetric than of symmetric games. For symmetric games it was moderately simple to characterize the class of all games to which the size principle evidently applies. For asymmetric games, the task is more tedious. Clearly, a *necessary* condition for the size principle to hold in an asymmetric game is that eqn. 3 be fulfilled for *some coalition of minimal winning size*. A *sufficient* condition is that it be fulfilled for *every coalition of winning size*. The example in the foregoing paragraph, however, shows that this latter sufficient condition is not a necessary condition.

The class of games which meets the condition of eqn. 3, either for all winning coalitions or merely for some minimum winning coalition, is conspicuously narrow compared to the class of all games (it is trivially easy to construct asymmetric games which do not meet the condition, and a random zero-sum matrix generator might work for days before it cranked out a matrix that met it). Perhaps this class is as peculiarly narrow in the space of all majority rule games as the class of supersymmetric games is in the space of all symmetric majority rule games. In any case, it is at least clear that Riker's incentive argument produces endless circularity in an enormous array of asymmetric games, but that it leads to the size principle in a narrowly defined class of asymmetric games.

Butterworth's Modification of the Size Principle. Robert Butterworth has perceived from counterexamples that the size principle is not well founded, and he has suggested a modification which would salvage much of its import. He recommends and proves a principle of the "maximum number of positive gainers," according to which: "In n-person, zero-sum games with a nonpositively-sloped characteristic function, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, the largest possible number of *positive gainers* that can occur is the number of players necessary to comprise a minimum winning coalition."[19]

Despite the geometric notion of "a nonpositively-sloped characteristic function," Butterworth demonstrates his principle algebraically rather than geometrically. If we generalize the assumptions involved in his proof, we can restate his principle in a fuller form without implicitly restricting it to symmetric games:

> The number of players necessary to compose a minimum winning coalition sets the upper limit on the number of positive gainers in any *n*-person zero-sum game where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational and have perfect information, and where, if S is a winning coalition, then for every i not in S,

$$v(S) \geq v(S+i). \tag{4}$$

The final condition in this statement can be met by some games which are not strictly symmetric, that is, whose characteristic functions are not single-valued functions of coalition size. Games which meet this condition can be called "quasi-symmetric."

In general, to assume that a genuine social interaction is analogous to a symmetric game is to assume that much of social structure is irrelevant to explanations of coalition formation. Unless we live in a state of anarchy, we are likely to play symmetric games only in the laboratory. Hence, it is useful to ask just how asymmetric a game can be while still qualifying as quasi-symmetric and thus coming under Butterworth's principle.

Consider a perfectly symmetric game of n players whose payoff structures are identical. Now let various payoffs be altered marginally while maintaining the zero-sum condition. If some players enjoy marginal gains while others suffer marginal losses, winning coalitions of a given size, say r, will no longer all have identical values. Rather, there will be a marginal spread from the maximum, $v_{\max}(R)$, to the minimum, $v_{\min}(R)$. Butterworth's logic would now not be violated so long as the minimum value at size r is greater than or equal to the maximum at size $r+1$, i.e.,

$$v_{\min}(R) \geq v_{\max}(R+i).$$

This condition will determine the amount of variance from symmetry permitted in individual players' payoffs. Other things being equal, one would expect that the larger the number of players in the game, the less the variance which

---

[18] The 50 units are the difference between the value of coalition BCD (which is 60) and the sum of the payoffs to B, C, and D in coalition ABCD (which is 10).

[19] Butterworth, "A Research Note," p. 744.

would be permitted. For situations in which social structure matters very much, the condition of quasi-symmetry might be met in very small committees but not in large committees. Hence, Butterworth's version of the size principle might apply to coalition formation in such small bodies as the United States Supreme Court,[20] but not to such large bodies as the United States House of Representatives (see further the discussion in the section on empirical issues).

Shepsle's Defense of the Size Principle. Endless circularity such as that implicit in the demonstration of the "Insufficiency of Riker's proof" (above) is the bane of game theory. All too often, if there is a second outcome which is superior to a first, then there is sure to be a third which is superior to the second but inferior to the first. Shepsle's apparent recognition of such paths of reasoning has led him to seek justifications for the size principle other than Riker's argument from incentives. Shepsle adduces an argument for a perfectly symmetric 5-person game (the game is not supersymmetric). But the argument is extraordinarily tenuous and abstruse: it is based on the notion of the "bargaining set" of Aumann and Maschler.[21] Riker's argument from incentives is substantially more compelling, as is perhaps even Representative Gillet's assertion from common sense.

When it comes to generalization beyond the 5-person case, Shepsle notes that "although existence results have been provided for stable sets in an impressive variety of games, the results, to a nongame theorist, appear highly incomplete and idiosyncratic."[22] The results are impressive for their variety only because such variety indicates how ungeneral and ungeneralizable the results are. And this pessimistic realization is likely to impress game theorists far more strongly than nongame theorists. Yet Shepsle concludes that, if "the usual assumptions about n-person zero-sum coalition processes are supplemented with assumptions about coalition intentions and capabilities, there are good reasons to expect minimum winning coalitions in all but the most extreme instances."[23] This claim is not supported by Shepsle's paper or any of his references. The strongest claim which is supported is that there are weak reasons to expect minimum winning coalitions in the instance of perfectly symmetric games with not more than five players. (With fewer than five players the problem is uninteresting: In majority rule games of fewer than five players, the losers cannot number more than one.)

Against Shepsle's claim for our good reasons to generalize from the 5-person case, von Neumann and Morgenstern hint of awe when they discuss the enormous rapidity with which the complexity of the analysis of games grows as the number of players increases.[24] With each additional player there is qualitative change. For three players there is a unique zero-sum game (it is symmetric). For four players, the space of all zero-sum games is 3-dimensional; for five players, 10-dimensional; for nine players, 246-dimensional — it seems absurd to contemplate the nature of such games. To turn to the symmetric games with which Shepsle deals, the 4-person symmetric game is unique. The space of the 5-person symmetric games is one-dimensional; of 9-person games, 3-dimensional; of 101-person symmetric games (the class which the United States Senate might be thought to play when in full attendance), 49-dimensional.[25] Above five persons, game theory virtually collapses. The results are so few and so trivially narrow that Riker had no hope of deriving a general theory of coalitions within extant game theory (for more than two persons, game theory is largely a theory of coalitions). He therefore intelligently abandoned game-theoretic solution theory and resorted to an ad hoc but intuitively plausible argument from incentives, an argument which is commonplace in economics. The thought of reverting to solution theory at its present state of development cannot be seriously entertained by anyone whose purpose is as ambitious as Riker's effort to generalize about an important, broad class of political phenomena.

---

[20] David Rohde argues that the size principle applies to the formation of "opinion coalitions" in the Supreme Court. Hence, although all nine members might agree in upholding or reversing a lower court ruling, the actual opinion of the majority is likely to be written through compromise among only five members (while the other members are left to write their own opinions, if they choose). The raw data Rohde presents do not support the size principle (as can be seen by combining his Tables 2 and 3 and comparing them to the random results of his Table 1). Therefore, he subjectively splits the cases according to whether they involve "threats" to the Court. The threatening cases yield greater than random occurrences of unanimous and overwhelming opinion coalitions and less than random occurrences of minimum coalitions, whereas the non-threatening cases yield greater than random occurrences of minimum "winning" opinion coalitions (as well as, oddly, greater than random occurrences of eight and nine member coalitions). See further Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 176–177.

[21] Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," pp. 508–509. The notion of the bargaining set is developed in Robert Aumann and Michael Maschler, "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games," in *Advances in Game Theory*, ed. Melvin Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 443–476.

[22] Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," p. 515.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Von Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, esp. pp. 330–332, 339, and 403.

[25] If the Senate does not confine itself to symmetric games, then it plays in a space of 10^{30} dimensions — a number which would stymie even the appropriations committee. But see Shepsle's footnote 8 and the paragraph to which it is footed; Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," p. 506.

Addendum on Simple Games. Supersymmetric games resemble von Neumann and Morgenstern's *simple* games, but they are not equivalent. In supersymmetric games, as in simple games, losing coalitions are flat (see footnote 16) — that is, every player in a losing coalition loses as much as if he were standing alone against a coalition of all remaining players. Simple games differ from supersymmetric games, however, because in simple games every coalition is either winning or losing. It follows that if S is a coalition in a simple game and T is its complement, then either S or T is winning and the other is losing.

Hence, straightforward majority voting games for even numbers of players cannot be simple, although they can be supersymmetric. Similarly, majority games which require over-large majorities (e.g., two-thirds) can be supersymmetric but not simple. Majority games for odd numbers of players are called *direct majority games* by von Neumann and Morgenstern.[26] Such games can be both simple and supersymmetric.

In a phrase of von Neumann and Morgenstern, a losing player is "completely defeated" if his payoff is his security level.[27] We can generalize this descriptive phrase into an instructive definition: a coalition is *completely defeated* if its value is the sum of the security levels of its members, i.e., if it is flat. Obviously, a single player coalition is completely defeated when opposed by a coalition of all other players. In a simple game, every losing coalition is completely defeated. In a supersymmetric game in which a winning coalition has formed, the losing coalition is completely defeated. If we plot the values of winning coalitions by size for a simple or a supersymmetric game, the points will fall on the topmost graph in Figure 1.[28]

The very fact that losing coalitions in a game are completely defeated allows the size principle to be applied to the game. Among symmetric games it applies only to the supersymmetric games, which include the symmetric cases of simple games, i.e., the direct majority games. Since von Neumann and Morgenstern gave more than 80 pages over to simple games,[29] one might expect that Riker would have pursued their discussion in his derivation of the size principle, as in fact he appears to have done. After briefly mentioning simple games, Riker comments that they "are probably rare in nature," and "hence, little of practical value is likely to result from studying them."[30]

Riker's dismissal was perhaps too hasty, because the size principle is of little greater "practical value" than the study of simple games. Indeed, supersymmetric games are little more than an extension of the symmetric simple games to include games with even numbers of players and games in which winning coalitions must be larger than merely simple majority. The validity of the size principle is restricted to just such games (and to their asymmetric counterparts). But there seem to be no clear a priori grounds for declaring that such a restricted size principle is useless — as Riker's remark suggests it is.

Summary. In sum, both Riker's and Butterworth's claims appear to have analytical merit. But the merit of each is highly circumscribed. Under the terms of Riker's proof, his size principle can apply only to the rarefied class of supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. As Riker has well understood, even when the principle applies, there may be enormous coalitional instability. Butterworth's principle applies to the class of all symmetric zero-sum games as well as to those asymmetric games which meet the condition of equation 4, i.e., to quasi-symmetric games. Again, there may be enormous coalitional instability.

It should be clear that both principles apply to some games (the supersymmetric games). And it can easily be shown that each principle applies to games to which the other does not apply. The size principle applies to those asymmetric games in which the number of positive gainers will necessarily be more than minimal winning size because their security levels are greater than zero. And Butterworth's principle applies to *all* symmetric games.

---

[26] Von Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,* p. 431.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 423.

[28] See further, *ibid.,* p. 428.

[29] *Ibid.,* pp. 420–503.

[30] Riker, *Political Coalitions,* p. 260.

Butterworth's principle is somewhat more general. But it is concomitantly perhaps less interesting, since it is not about coalitional size but about the number of positive gainers in a game. Hence it requires a clear notion of what constitutes a positive gain. Ironically, one of the greatest appeals of Riker's initial statement of the size principle was that it specified characteristics of a winning coalition rather than the apportionment of winnings within that coalition. As Anatol Rapoport notes, the results of game theory have been almost exclusively concerned with apportionment; but behavioral scientists are more typically concerned with coalitional structure. In politics, coalitions are conspicuously more tangible than payoffs (there may be exceptions, such as in the politics of graft). In game theory, the reverse is generally true. "In fact, seldom if ever can the behavioral scientist define payoffs in a conflict situation precisely enough to be realistically concerned with the question of their apportionment."[31] By modifying Riker's principle to require explicit measurement of payoffs, Butterworth has reasserted the inutility of game theory for generating predictive theories of political behavior.

It seems unlikely that Butterworth's principle can be applied outside the laboratory. It was a virtue of Riker's principle that it seemed testable in real situations. Alas, Butterworth's principle may be untestable, while the set of games to which Riker's principle can be applied may be too restricted to be of interest, as Riker's dismissal of simple games suggests.

Empirical Issues

Shepsle comments that "it is extremely unfortunate that much of the research on and criticism of the size principle is empirical in nature."[32] On the contrary it would seem that this is the point of a contribution to "positive political theory": to be empirically researched and criticized. If there is misfortune in the empirical work, it is that there is enormous disagreement over the empirical results. In positive theory, factual claims should be either true or false — not both.

A principal reason for disagreement among researchers has been a general failure to propose what constitutes a fair test of the size principle.[33] Those who assert that coalitions in legislatures tend to be of minimal winning size do not give us a base, or null model, for comparison. We need to know what might happen if the theory failed to apply. Since the size principle has the ring of a statistical assertion, it should be possible to find statistical null models against which to compare data from actual games such as legislative coalition formation. For instance, a null model which seems much too easy would be a mean winning coalition size halfway between minimal winning and unanimous size. If the data showed that the mean winning coalition size were merely closer to a bare majority than to unanimity, then the size principle would be supported; otherwise it would be rejected. Perhaps many of us would be surprised if even a Congress composed of all Democrats or all Republicans failed this test. Hence, we would want the size principle to survive a harsher test, such as the random voting behavior model which follows.

A Random Legislature. Assume for a moment that we have a legislature in which the conditions of Riker's principle are met and which is supersymmetric. Every vote by this body determines a winning coalition and a losing coalition. Each player, or legislator, faces the same matrix of outcomes as every other player. Assume also that each player is indifferent about which players join in his coalition — his concern is to be a winner and to gain as much as possible. (This assumption is implied in Riker's statement of his principle.) Under this set of conditions, the size principle is theoretically deducible. The assumption which Riker considers crucial in political analysis is that of individual rationality. It is this assumption which precludes larger than minimal winning coalitions. Let us therefore drop it for the moment and simply look at all winning coalitions which might form, including those which are not minimal winning.

If the legislature is not extremely small, the set of all winning coalitions in it will include many coalitions of minimal winning size, but only one coalition of the whole legislature. A plausible null model under the conditions of Riker's principle is one in which all winning coalitions are equiprobable. If every legislator flipped a coin to decide whether to join the heads or the tails coalition on each vote, the distribution of winning coalitions by size would fit this null model. This distribution is presented in Table 1 for legislatures ranging from

---

[31] Anatol Rapoport, *N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), pp. 286–287.

[32] Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," p. 516.

[33] Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court," is an exception.

Table 1. Percentage of Winning Coalitions by Size of Legislature and Percentage of Members in the Winning Coalitions

Percentage of Members in Winning Coalition	50–55%	50–60%	50–65%	50–70%
Size of Legislature				
5	*	62.5%	62.5%	62.5%
9	*	49.2	49.2	82.0
15	39.3%	69.8	69.8	88.2
21	61.7	81.1	92.1	97.3
41	65.1	88.3	97.2	99.6
61	69.4	92.8	99.0	99.9
81 (Senate)	73.4	95.5	99.6	**
101	76.8	97.2	99.9	**
201	87.9	99.7	**	**
301	93.5	**	**	**
401 (House)	95.4	**	**	**

* The smallest winning coalition has more than 55% of the membership.
** More than 99.95%.

5 to 401 members in which a simple majority wins. The United States Senate would correspond roughly to a body of 81 members, and the House of Representatives to a body of 401 members, depending on attendance. In Table 1, the columns present the percentage of all winning coalitions which include more than half but less than 55, 60, 65, and 70 per cent, respectively, of the members. So for instance, in an 81-member legislature, 99.6 per cent of all winning coalitions include less than 65 per cent of the legislators.

From Table 1, it is clear that in large legislatures, the overwhelming majority of all winning coalitions will be near the minimal size just by statistical chance in this simple-majority, random-voting legislative model. Admittedly, this is a crazy model of legislative voting behavior.[34] Traditional discussions of congressional voting are concerned with those structural and attitudinal variables which prevent such random behavior. But the size principle abstracts from such traditional concerns to analyze voting as strictly an individualist effort to maximize utility. To test the size principle is to determine whether such an abstraction is valid in a particular instance, as is done for the House of Representatives below.

House Roll-call Voting. David Koehler has analyzed roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives and claims to "demonstrate empirically that the members do tend to form minimal winning coalitions."[35] What he actually demonstrates is that the average size of winning coalitions on contested roll-call votes does not correlate very well with the size of the dominant party's majority. In order to determine more directly whether the size prin-

Table 2. Frequency of Occurrence of Majorities by Size

Size of majority %	House of Representatives (83rd–90th Congresses)[a] n	%	Random voting in a 401 member body %
50–55	347	21.8%	95.4%
55–60	264	16.6	4.56
60–65	211	13.3	0.0061
65–70	170	10.7	0.00000016
70–75	145	9.1	—
75–80	121	7.6	—
80–85	120	7.5	—
85–90	83	5.2	—
90–95	132	8.3	—

[a] In "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," Koehler presents the data graphically; hence, these figures are taken from David H. Koehler, "Coalition Formation and the Legislative Process" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 1971), p. 48. The total number of House roll-call votes listed is 1,593. In addition there were 450 votes in which the majority exceeded 95%; these votes have been omitted from the percentages above, which therefore sum to 100 per cent.

---

[34] I owe this characterization to an anonymous reader of an earlier draft of this paper.

[35] Koehler, "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," p. 155. For a contrary interpretation of House roll-call voting, see Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress: Size and Ideological Distance."

ciple fits House voting behavior, we would want to compare the actual frequencies of coalitions of various sizes with their expected frequencies under a plausible null model, such as the random voting model of Table 1.

If the size principle applies very well to the House, then we should expect that the frequency of larger coalitions would be reduced, and the actual vote distribution should be nearer minimal size than the null model distribution. Table 2 presents Koehler's House roll-call data for eight Congresses and the null model distribution for a 401-member legislature. The size principle does not seem to apply. Whereas in actuality only 52 per cent of winning coalitions contained less than 65 per cent of those representatives voting, in a 401-member legislature run by flipping coins, 99.999999 per cent of all winning coalitions would contain less than 65 per cent of the membership. Furthermore, whereas very large coalitions are quite common in the House,[36] they would almost never happen in a random legislature.

Perhaps the random legislature is far too severe a test. The House data, however, do not even do well against the extremely easy test above in which the mean winning coalition size is halfway between simple majority and unanimity. If all the data are included (see the note to Table 2), then the mean winning coalition in several years of House roll-call voting comprised between 72 and 77 per cent of those voting,[37] as compared to the easy null model's 75 per cent.

It appears that legislative voting, at least in the recent House of Representatives, does not sufficiently approximate a symmetric n-person zero-sum bargaining game to permit application of the postulated size principle. It might be that for certain classes of issues, the House would more nearly approximate the conditions of the principle than it does for the general class of all roll-call votes. Unless such a case is found, however, Koehler's data suggest that what we should wish to explain is just the reverse of what the size principle implies, i.e., we should wish to explain why there is such a high degree of agreement on roll-call votes in the United States Congress.

Conclusion. The data in Table 2 imply merely that the conditions for the size principle are not met in the House of Representatives. Suppose there were a legislature in which those conditions were more nearly met. The figures of Table 1 suggest that in a body as large as the House, even if the inordinately stringent conditions for the size principle were actually met, then the principle would be virtually useless on a priori grounds. In a 401-person zero-sum bargaining game with supersymmetry and perfect information, *more than 95 per cent of all possible winning coalitions would be within five per cent of minimal size by chance.* That is, less than five per cent of all possible winning coalitions include more than 55 per cent of the players. Hence, at best the size principle, if it operated, could reduce this five per cent slack.

It follows that, even for the restricted realm to which it is applicable, the size principle could at most produce a marginal improvement in our expectations of coalition behavior in such a large body. And direct statistical test of the principle in a large legislature would probably be inconclusive at best. Since the conditions for the principle are extremely stringent, and since its import decreases as the size of the body to which it is applied increases, it seems unlikely that the principle is either useful or testable in bodies much larger than committees.[38]

This last point is a conclusion similar to that reached above for Butterworth's modification of the size principle. Butterworth's principle might be expected to apply to small bodies such as committees, but not to large bodies. Again, however, Butterworth's principle requires a measure of gains and losses, so that empirical tests of it will be far more complicated than tests of Riker's principle. Indeed, it seems utterly implausible that Butterworth's principle could be tested against House roll-call voting behavior, or even against nine-man Supreme Court behavior. One of the attractions of Riker's principle is that it is simply and directly testable even though the conditions which make for it are beyond easy test. The conceptual difficulties in testing Butterworth's principle, on the contrary, seem as severe as those involved in testing the conditions for it.

Summary

The proof of Riker's size principle is inadequate for the general class of zero-sum bargaining games (whether symmetric or asymmetric), and the principle is valid only for a very restricted class of games — the supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. Butterworth's modification of the size principle (the maximum number of positive gainers principle) can be extended to cover games which are only approximately symmetric.

---

[36] Note that more than 20 per cent of the House votes were nearly unanimous, and these votes are *not included* in Table 2.

[37] Koehler's data are reported in 5 per cent clusters. Hence, the mean cannot be calculated any closer, but a safe guess is probably near 74 per cent.

[38] Riker and Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory*, p. 177, suggest on the contrary that the advantages of the size principle over other game theoretic solution notions lie "especially in games with very large numbers of players."

Roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives overwhelmingly violates the size principle; hence, the House does not generally play a supersymmetric zero-sum bargaining game. More generally, both Butterworth's and Riker's principles seem inapplicable to large bodies. Thus, game-theoretic coalition theory adds little to our ability to explain legislative coalition formation.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent

To The Editor:

In "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections" (*APSR*, 69 [Sept., 1975], 795–811) Richard Funston attempts to relate certain decisional patterns in the Supreme Court to national political realignments. Specifically, his primary question is whether "During realignment phases or, as they might be called, critical periods, was the tendency of the Court to declare federal legislation unconstitutional significantly greater than during noncritical periods of stable party competition" (p. 804). This is an interesting and important question since it is frequently asserted that the Court follows election returns. But the author goes on to assert that "To answer that [his] question, all that is necessary is to calculate the arithmetic mean for the total years of critical and noncritical periods" (p. 804). He then proceeds to make such calculations under various control conditions and concludes that " . . . as hypothesized, there has been a significantly greater tendency on the part of the Court during realignment periods to utilize its power to declare federal legislation unconstitutional, i.e., to oppose the law-making majority will, than during periods of political stability, when the Court is part of the dominant political majority" (p. 805). Unfortunately, given the author's procedures, we can have no confidence whatever in the validity of such a proposition for the reasons provided below.

We will bypass in the text the author's errors in data collection and the calculation of arithmetic means.[1] Although bothersome, their correction would not fundamentally alter the nature of the data or, presumably, the arguments Funston makes about them. But we must note other more worrisome problems at some length. Basically, Funston is suggesting a nonspurious correlation between critical/noncritical periods and the frequency of Court decisions nullifying congressional legislation. The distribution of such decisions, however, makes it clear that no such case can be made from the author's data. Of the 18 incidences of counter-majoritarian behavior by the Court during critical periods, 14 occurred during its famed 1933-36 clash with Congress over New Deal legislation. Similarly, 12 of the 14 decisions nullifying a law within four years of enactment occurred in 1933–36. The grossly disproportional contribution of this unique conflict detracts from the vitality of Funston's hypothesis. For in his own words, the hypothesis covers "long periods of time" and refers to "transitional periods" as plural phenomena (p. 796). It is therefore fair to consider how his hypothesis holds up when the New Deal realignment period is separated from the other realignment periods. Table 1 presents computations of Funston's counter-majoritarian coefficient for each of his tables after eliminating in the (a) row the New Deal realignment period and in the (b) row both the New Deal realignment period and the years

---

[1] Funston misclassifies one case. He lists *Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S.*, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), as one which strikes down legislation within four years of enactment. In fact, however, the statute found unconstitutional here was passed in 1888 or five years earlier. He also omits two cases from his list altogether: *Leary v. U.S.*, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), and *O'Callahan v. Parker*, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). Both are cited as declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional in Funston's only source book published after 1969, Philip Kurland, *Politics, The Constitution and the Warren Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 24–25, and are also so cited in *The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1617. None of the laws struck down by these cases had been enacted within the preceding four years.

More serious is the author's miscounting. His realignment or critical periods constitute nine years rather than eight because they are inclusive of both election years. This inclusiveness is clear because the author includes cases from both the beginning and ending years in his computations of cases occurring in critical periods. Yet Funston explicitly says that there are only eight years per critical period (see, e.g., the commentary in his Table 2); moreover, his total number of critical years is 32 or four times eight. Thus the true denominator in his indices should be 36 and not 32 for the critical periods and 132 instead of 136 for the noncritical periods. The changed ratio of critical to noncritical years lowers the coefficients of counter-majoritarianism from 1.20 to 1.05 in his Table 2 and from 3.10 to 2.60 in his Table 3.

In making our calculations for this communication, we have used the same cases as Funston, a list of which he has kindly provided us. However, appropriate corrections have been made for the *Monongahela* case, and the *Leary* and *O'Callahan* cases have been added. In addition, in order to utilize critical periods of eight years as called for by Funston's research design, we have placed the first year of the realignment periods as he reports them (and the cases decided therein) in the noncritical period immediately preceding. Thus, Funston's inclusive nine-year period of 1928–1936 is replaced by the period 1929–1936; 1888–1896 by 1889–1896, and so on.

Table 1. Recomputation of Indices and Coefficients after Elimination of Selected Periods, by Funston's Tables 2–5.*

Author's Table *	Period Elim.	Critical Yrs. Index	Noncritical Yrs. Index	Counter-Majoritarian Coefficient
2	(a) 1929–36	.167	.559	.299
	(b) 1929–69	.167	.505	.331
3	(a) 1929–36	.083	.169	.491
	(b) 1929–69	.083	.204	.407
4	(a) 1929–38	.057	.187	.305
	(b) 1929–69	.057	.228	.250
5	(a) 1929–40	.122	.178	.685
	(b) 1929–69	.122	.218	.560

* The recomputations are based upon corrections discussed in footnote 1.

between the end of that period and 1969 inclusive. The latter years were eliminated because Funston argues that increased population, legislation, etc., produce more opportunities for counter-majoritarian behavior. If Funston is correct here, the elimination of both the New Deal period and subsequent years will control for this.

As the coefficient of counter-majoritarianism in each of the eight calculations presented in Table 1 is a fraction, it is clear that with either the New Deal realignment period alone eliminated or with both that period and subsequent years eliminated, the ratio of nullifications in noncritical periods exceeded that in critical periods. This finding, of course, is the direct opposite of Funston's conclusion and dramatically demonstrates the unique contribution of the New Deal cases to his analysis.

In a footnote Funston indicates his awareness of the New Deal era's disproportionate contribution of cases. He nonetheless defends his analysis by arguing that the burgeoning population, increased congressional legislation, and an expanding Supreme Court docket created more opportunities for the exercise of judicial review; and he concludes that judicial review in "the New Deal era appears to be less unique, though it remains one of great judicial activity" (fn. 67, p. 804). This defense is unconvincing. Indeed, with regard to caseload, it is erroneous in one respect. In the 1933–36 terms the Supreme Court averaged less than 200 opinions per year, while in the 1889–96 realignment period, the Court averaged more than 475 opinions per term. Even in the late 1850s, the Court was deciding nearly 300 cases per term.[2] One might argue, of course, that the Court was refusing to decide more cases in the 1930s than in earlier years, but most such denials do not consume much of the *justices'* time. It is true that Congress was passing more laws in the New Deal period than in earlier realignment periods, and intuitively we might expect a relationship to exist between the number of laws passed and the frequency of judicial review. In the 1889–96 period, Congress passed an average of 202 public laws per year; in the 1929–36 period the average was 334. While this is a 66 per cent increase, it pales in comparison to the 500 per cent increase in the number of times the Supreme Court struck down legislation passed within the previous four years. Finally, we can see no particular reason to believe that population is very closely related to the incidence of judicial review. Even so, there is again a considerable difference between the five-fold increase in the latter and the 95 per cent population increase between 1890 and 1930.

Even if one feels that it is not fair to exclude the New Deal realignment period from the calculations or, alternatively and despite our analysis just concluded, still feels the New Deal cases are not unique, it is possible to demonstrate that Funston's conclusion regarding tendencies in the Court is invalid. We have computed the index for each of the five non-critical and four critical periods for Funston's Tables 2–5. (The index is the average number of nullifications per year; averaging is necessary to control for the length of the periods surveyed.) We scored the noncritical periods as 1 and the critical periods as 2 and computed a product moment correlation coefficient. If Funston's hypothesis is correct, the index should rise in the critical periods and fall in the noncritical periods. A perfect matching of the rising and falling of the index and the critical/noncritical scoring would produce a correlation coefficient nearing 1.00; thus to the extent that the coefficients attain or approach this figure, Funston's hypothesis would be supported.

---

[2] See Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, *The Business of the Supreme Court* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), pp. 60 and 297, for data on the Court's cases in the periods cited. Opinion frequency from the New Deal era came directly from the *U.S. Reports.*

The results, however, are as damaging to Funston's claims as are those presented in Table 1. While the correlations are in the direction needed to support his hypothesis, they are insignificant — ranging from .054 to .312.

Given the distribution of the data, these findings are hardly surprising. After all, in Funston's Tables 3, 4, and 5 there are no nullifications in the first four periods and in Table 2 there are none in two of the first four periods. And in all tables, the index for the critical periods beginning in 1889 is less than that for the subsequent noncritical period. The long and short of it is that there is simply no systematic rise and fall of Supreme Court counter-majoritarian behavior in conjunction with critical elections.

It may be speculated that a more logical approach than that used by Funston will bear out the hypothesis that the Supreme Court's tendency to counter-majoritarianism increases during the so-called critical periods surrounding party realignment. Funston's research design identifies the SRC's eight year realignment phases as the critical years when counter-majoritarianism is expected to be at its greatest. But three of these four phases were *fully complete before* the new law-making coalition acceded to power, i.e., captured control of the Presidency and Congress. And in the fourth period (1929–36), four years went by before power shifted. It seems only logical, however, that the motivation and opportunity for the Supreme Court to strike down acts of Congress will occur after the new coalition is in a position to adopt legislation. It is anomalous to expect this beforehand. Yet seven-eighths of Funston's so-called critical years come beforehand. We think it makes more sense to use as the critical years the lag periods — *and the lag periods only*.[3] We define the lag period as that

Table 2. **Breakdown of Laws Declared Unconstitutional During Lag Periods**

Lag Period	Years	All Cases Declaring Acts of Congress Unconstitutional	Cases Declaring Acts Unconstitutional Within 4 years of Enactment
1829–36	8	0	0
1861–65	5	1	1
1897–1909	13	11	4
1933–40	8	13	12
	—	—	—
Totals	34	25	17
Indices		.735	.500
Totals for Non-Lag Periods	134	71	21
Indices for Non-Lag Periods		.529	.157
Coefficient of Counter-Majoritarianism		1.389	3.185

Table 3. Computation of Indices and Coefficients Using Lag Periods as Critical Years and Eliminating Selected Periods, for all Cases and Four-Year Cases

Cases	Period Eliminated	Critical Years Index	Noncritical Years Index	C-M Coefficient
ALL	(a) 1933–40	.462	.529	.873
	(b) 1933–69	.462	.419	1.103
FOUR-YEAR	(a) 1933–40	.192	.157	1.223
	(b) 1933–69	.192	.181	1.060

---

[3] In his Tables 4 and 5, Funston introduces and uses the concept of the lag period, but he combines the lag periods with the realignment period rather than making calculations for them separately. He describes two variations of the lag periods, neither of which coincide with our definition of it.

period between the time the new coalition assumes control of the elective branches of government and the time its President appoints a sufficient number of justices to control the Supreme Court's decisions.

We have calculated the lag periods following the realigning elections. They are 1829–36, 1861–65, 1897–1909, and 1933–40. In Table 2 we show the incidences of counter-majoritarianism over the lag periods. The skewed contribution of the New Deal cases declines considerably for all cases declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional but it is still predominant (nearly 70 per cent) for the four year cases. The overall coefficients of counter-majoritarianism increase somewhat but not dramatically. In Table 3 we parallel Table 1 by eliminating the New Deal lag period and then the entire 1933–69 period. Here three of the four coefficients are not fractions. They are so minutely above the fractional level, however, as to offer no support for Funston's hypothesis. Finally, in the manner described earlier, we compute product moment correlations. For both all cases finding acts of Congress unconstitutional and the four-year cases, the result is positive but insignificant. (.129 and .375 respectively).

In sum, we obtain better results (in terms of supporting the hypothesis) by using only the lag periods rather than the realignment periods or a combination of the two. Nonetheless, this approach still does not enable us to confirm the hypothesis. Taken together, the best interpretation that can be put on the data is that, overall, there is no significant difference between the Court's counter-majoritarian behavior in the lag periods and that in noncritical years.

We can approach Funston's hypothesis from yet another angle — namely that of focusing on counter-majoritarianism during the noncritical years. If, as Funston argues, "the Supreme Court reflects the will of the dominant political forces" (p. 796) during these years, it would follow that the Court would not best serve the incumbent coalition by declaring its newly passed laws unconstitutional. Rather, to the extent that the Court engaged in judicial review, it would aid the incumbent coalition by striking down the laws adopted by the previous coalition. We would especially expect this in the first decade or so after the new majority had obtained control of the Court through the appointment process. The data dramatically belie this presumption, however. Sixteen of the 17 laws found unconstitutional during the ten-year periods were passed by the incumbent coalition. And the one exception was not passed by the previous coalition but by two coalitions preceding.

Finally, as everyone knows, the Court must sit and wait for prospective nullifying cases to be brought to it. The rate at which they are brought cannot be expected to be constant across periods. Nor can we assert that the rate will vary with length of period or with number of cases docketed in each period. Yet — whatever that rate — its variation is crucial to any inference regarding the inclination of the Court in the periods analyzed. Imagine, for example, that in a critical eight-year period the Court nullified legislation in 24 of 100 opportunities while in a noncritical eight-year span 16 of 32 statutes were voided. Funston would report the ratio of 24 to 16 as supportive of his "tendency" inference. But, clearly, the Court would be striking 24 per cent of the challenged statutes in the critical era as against 50 per cent of those questioned in the noncritical period. It follows inevitably that no inference about "tendency" of the Court to nullify federal law can be drawn absent appropriate attention to the opportunities for nullification.

As a consequence of the problems we have outlined, an overall conclusion about the Funston paper has two dimensions. First, if there were no other shortcomings, the null hypothesis — that there is no difference between the tendency of the Court to nullify congressional legislation in critical and noncritical historical periods — cannot be rejected given the distribution of the cases used by Funston. But of greater importance, the null hypothesis could not have been rejected — whatever the distribution of the cases — because of a basic defect in Funston's research design, as outlined above.

Having said all this, can we dismiss the notion that the Supreme Court has a greater tendency to overrule the Congress in certain historical periods than in others? Our analysis does not suggest that this inquiry should now be dismissed. It will remain an interesting but open question until evaluated by appropriate design and testing procedures mainly lacking in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections."

BRADLEY C. CANON
S. SIDNEY ULMER
University of Kentucky

Funston Reply to Canon and Ulmer

TO THE EDITOR:

I very much applaud the refinements which Professors Canon and Ulmer have brought to the continuing study of the relationship between judicial policy making and change within the larger American polity. In "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," I noted (p. 807) that "much more work can and should be done in this area," including the use of "different and more sophisticated statistical techniques . . . to analyze the data presented here." Canon and Ulmer have done exactly that, and I can hardly complain if my own prescription generates conclusions different from those which I presented.

The essence of their criticism, however, has already been stated, more tersely and more elegantly, in Professor Paul Beck's letter commenting upon my article which appeared in this September's issue of the *Review*. Rather than reiterate at length fundamentally the same points already made in my response to Beck, I will simply refer the interested reader to that earlier exchange. Simply put, I believe Professors Canon and Ulmer have largely misconstrued the purpose and thrust of "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections." As I wrote in my response to Professor Beck, the article "was intended — and, I think, can and should so be read — as a synthetic rather than an original analytic effort. It was an attempt, as I stated in several places, to both integrate and test the assertions of certain leaders in our profession — most notably Dahl, but also Burnham — *on their own terms*."[1] Canon and Ulmer (note 3) credit me with introducing the concept of a "lag period" and criticize the logic of my use of that concept. Quite apart from the fact that I acknowledged this (pp. 807–08) and commented at length upon it, I did not introduce the concept. Professor Dahl did, and my use of the concept was the result of my understanding of his discussion of it, as I suggested in my footnote 72. Because I was seeking comparability with Dahl, I was not free to redefine his concept, though I would agree that Canon's and Ulmer's lag periods are more logical. Similarly, I am taken to task (note 1) for my use of *Monongahela Navigation Company* v. *United States,* 148 U.S. 312 (1893). But, again, comparability dictated its use, as a reading of Dahl's footnote 11 will show.[2]

My omissions of *Leary* v. *United States,* 395 U.S. 6 (1969), and *O'Callahan* v. *Parker,* 395 U.S. 258 (1969), were not an oversight. As I commented in the appendix, different people count the cases differently,[3] and within the bounds of reason Canon and Ulmer are free to count them as they wish. But the way I read these cases they are not examples of what I was talking about in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections." I was concerned with cases declaring congressional statutes to be unconstitutional in whole or in part and not merely as applied. The criminal statutory presumption involved in *Leary* was held to be irrational and hence unconstitutional *unless* it could be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact was more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it depended.[4] To me this suggests that a change in the American drug scene would reinvigorate section 176a of the Narcotic Import and Export Act. Regarding *O'Callahan,* it need only be noted that the majority never specifically invalidated the three articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice under which O'Callahan was charged; it merely held that they could not be applied to this fact situation. As the dissenters point out, it was tradition rather than explicit provisions of the statute that were voided on this occasion.[5] That my reading of *O'Callahan* is at least plausible is, I think, supported by the result in *Relford* v. *Commandant,* 401 U.S. 355 (1971), sustaining a successful prosecution under the very same provisions of the U.C.M.J. involved in *O'Callahan.*[6] Nevertheless, as I have said, Canon's and Ulmer's inclusion of these decisions is arguable. But, if they wish to count *Leary,* they should be consistent and include its companion case, *United States* v. *Covington,* 395 U.S. 57 (1969), as well.

---

[1] I accepted Dahl's and Burnham's evidence and assumptions for purposes of replication. But the work of both has recently been subjected to serious criticism. Jonathan D. Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," *American Political Science Review,* 70 (March, 1976), 50–63; Dorothy Buckton James, Book Review, *Political Science Quarterly,* 91 (Spring, 1976), 147–148. It is far too facile, however, for me simply to observe that Professors Canon's and Ulmer's quarrel lies with others than myself. I shall, therefore, attempt to respond to the more important of their specific objections.

[2] Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," *Journal of Public Law,* 6 (Fall, 1957), 279–295, 287 n. 11.

[3] C. Herman Pritchett, *The American Constitution,* 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 166, and *The Constitution of the United States of America,* Sen. Doc. no. 39, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1964), pp. 1387–1402, report that sixty-five laws were voided by 1937. On the other hand, Professor Abraham identifies seventy-six; Henry Abraham, *The Judicial Process,* 3rd edition (New York: Oxford, 1975), pp. 288–291. Even for more recent decisions there is no agreement; thus, Professor Casper states that for the period 1958–74 there have been 28 instances of the exercise of the power of judicial review, while Professor Dionisopoulos counts thirty-two. Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," pp. 53–54; Allan Dionisopoulos, "Judicial Control of Congress," (paper, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, 1976).

[4] 395 U.S. at 36.

[5] 395 U.S. at 274 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

As for Canon's and Ulmer's discussion of the Court's caseload, I must confess that I am puzzled about its relevance to "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections." That the Court averaged less than 200 opinions per year in the 1933–36 terms, while averaging more than 475 opinions per term during 1888–96, may or may not say anything about opportunities for the exercise of the power of judicial review. What was the percentage of *federal* legislation involved in these cases during these terms? Moreover, the consequences for judicial review of the change in congressional legislation from 1889 to 1936 cannot be fully explained simply by focusing upon the number of public laws enacted per year. Surely one must recognize a qualitative transformation in the scope, subject matter, and potential social impact of federal legislation during this period. Finally, my point concerning population increases was, I thought, simple enough. I didn't suggest that such increases were "very closely related to the incidence of judicial review." Rather, the point was that an increase in population, particularly when coupled with an expansion of the number and scope of federal laws, would increase the probability that the application of any one law to a particular individual or group would create a situation giving rise to a constitutional challenge and, thus, would increase the *opportunities* for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

At best, Canon and Ulmer have suggested that the conclusions based upon my analysis were potentially a product of the asymmetry in the coding rules as well as of the nature of the evidence itself,[7] a possibility which I did not attempt to conceal (p. 804, n. 67). The fundamental argument, however, is by no means disproven. It is true that Canon and Ulmer rather freely use words such as "invalid." But, upon careful reading, their criticisms seem excessively stated, going beyond that which their own analysis will support. For example, some of their findings "are in the direction needed to support the [Dahl-Dooley] hypothesis," though given their techniques these do not rise to the level of statistical significance. And, using their own definition of lag periods, they obtain "better results" than I. I do not, therefore, understand Canon and Ulmer to argue that the Court is more likely to act in a counter-majoritarian manner during noncritical periods than during critical periods of partisan realignment, although at one point they do appear to do just that. Rather, their essential conclusion is much more modest: The evidence is inconclusive. Instances of judicial review, however, are but one body of data which may be used to examine the hypothesis that conflict between the judiciary and the popular branches does not occur randomly but is correlated with periods of electoral realignment, and a significant amount of research exists to sustain that hypothesis. Professor David Adamany's extensive historical survey of Supreme Court decision making during critical periods, though it reaches normative conclusions about the Court's function in American government much different from my own, offers support for the thesis advanced in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections."[8] Sheldon Goldman and Thomas Jahnige have reported a distinct coincidence between Stuart S. Nagel's "Court-curbing" periods and realigning election cycles,[9] a finding corroborated by others.[10] And Adamany has adduced evidence, though slight, that Justices are more reluctant to resign after a realigning election.[11] In short, I may not have operationalized the variables well (though, I reiterate, that operationalization was dictated by concern for comparability), but Canon and Ulmer have not directly addressed — let alone invalidated — the fundamental thesis concerning periodicity in Supreme Court behavior which was advanced in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections."

Finally, I emphasize again that mine was a preliminary study designed to stimulate further inquiry. Whether future research should proceed along Canon's and Ulmer's statistical trail or Adamany's historical path I leave to the interests and skills of future researchers. However, in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," I noted (p. 807) "that this study represents but a very tentative first step. Not only does it suggest ways in which concepts and research from other areas of the discipline . . . can be utilized to address one of the classic problems of public law, it also illustrates the methodological and conceptual problems involved in such borrowing." While Professors Canon and Ulmer take issue with other points of my analysis and interpretation, it seems to me that their criticisms buttress me on this one.

---

[6] Neither did Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," include *O'Callahan* as an example of the exercise of the power of judicial review.

[7] See also Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," p. 56.

[8] David Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court," *Wisconsin Law Review* (September, 1973), pp. 790–846.

[9] Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, *The Federal Courts as a Political System* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 261–268; Stuart S. Nagel, *The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969), pp. 245–279.

[10] E.g., Wallace Mendelson, "Judicial Review and Party Politics," *Vanderbilt Law Review,* 12 (March, 1959), 447–457; John Roche, *Courts and Rights* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 22–24, 46.

[11] Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court," p. 824.

RICHARD FUNSTON
San Diego State University

Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game

TO THE EDITOR:

Guillermo Owen's recent discussion of the disparities in power under the electoral college system for presidential elections (*American Political Science Review,* September 1975) ignores several important factors. The use of the Shapley value concept from game theory to evaluate the presidential election game is helpful in the exploration of the constitutional biases in the electoral college system. It is important to note, however, that the assumptions underlying the value are somewhat too restrictive for the electoral college game. Moreover, some of the simplifying assumptions made by Owen to facilitate his analysis appear to be of somewhat dubious empirical validity.

Though my criticism is specifically aimed at the paper by Owen, it also applies to other attempts to use an a priori constitutional index as a descriptive theory of electoral power. My remarks point to some of the limitations inherent in the use of the Shapley value for the analysis of voting games. The analysis of voting situations by the Shapley value from game theory certainly uses a theoretically interesting approach, though its utility as an empirical explanation of electoral power is somewhat questionable.

Owen shows, using appropriate simplifying assumptions, that disparities in power in the electoral college system stem from (a) the requirements that the number of electors for a state both be integer ("integrity factor") and include two electors to correspond to the state's Senate representation ("Senate factor"); (b) the usual practice of casting all of a state's electoral votes for the winner of the state, thereby increasing slightly the power of the largest states ("unit rule factor"); and (c) the greater influence a voter usually enjoys in the largest states because his ability to influence his state's vote tends to drop more slowly than the number of electoral votes the state casts ("decomposition factor"). Such factors have been discussed by others, including John Banzhaf.[1]

An analysis based on Shapley values ignores several other differences — not acknowledged by Owen — in the power of voters under the electoral college system. If some states had the same number of voters and electoral votes, for instance, then voters in these jurisdictions would have the same power under the Shapley value's assumptions. The disparities discussed by Owen do not occur when some jurisdictions are the same size. The actual power of voters in different states of the same size can vary, however.

Differences in actual power result because not all coalitions of states (or voters within a state) are equally likely to be formed. Equiprobable coalitions are required by the Shapley value as the value ignores "affinities" between players. A candidate's performance in a state, however, is frequently positively or negatively correlated with his performance in another particular state; indeed, the decision by individual voters within a state may be correlated. Thus the coalitions are not equiprobable. A candidate's performance in an individual state in the farm belt, for example, may be more indicative of his success in other states in the group than in the country as a whole. This results because voters in some subsets of states tend to have common interests and outlooks.

Voters in different states have different probabilities of influencing the selection of their state's electoral college slate. The Shapley value ignores this except through the "decomposition factor" in which the probability of a voter's influencing a state declines with state size, but less rapidly than state size (thus the total influence of a voter tends to rise with state size). The probability distribution of the median voter in a state will become more concentrated as state size increases as a consequence of the decomposition factor.[2] The decomposition factor does not capture all the reasons why the probability that a voter influences his state's result differs among states. Different probabilities, for example, might apply to voters in different states of equal size, even though the decomposition factor does not apply. Voters in close states are much more powerful than those elsewhere. States that are solidly in the camp of one party are less important than swing states in determining the winner of close elections. The swing state is more powerful because it is decisive in a larger proportion of the coalitions that actually form. This is illustrated by three-person arbitration panels in which neither the labor nor management representative matters. It is unlikely that those states on one side of the spectrum will ally themselves with those on the other side (except in a landslide). Coalitions which include swing states are most likely to form winning coalitions. This is another way in which the assumption of the Shapley value that all coalitions of states are equiprobable is violated. The individual voter is more crucial in a close state. The system also always disenfranchises those who do not support their state's winner because in no circumstances would it have mattered if such individuals did not vote. Banzhaf,[3] for example, does concede that the power measured by Shapley values does not equal the actual ability to affect the outcome of an election, but reflects the theoretical biases in the electoral college arrangement. Though Banzhaf believes that theoretical inequalities are the only type of bias on which we can focus in determining the fairness of a system, I argue that the system itself produces these other sorts of inequalities. This occurs because some states are biased or not independent of one another in presidential elections.

---

[1] See John Banzhaf, "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College," *Villanova Law Review,* 13 (Winter, 1968), 304–332.

[2] See p. 85 of Lloyd S. Shapley, "Political Science: Voting and Bargaining Games," pp. 37–92 in *Notes of Lectures on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences: Lectures Given at the 1973 MAA Summer Seminar at*

The Shapley value provides a measure of some of the constitutional biases inherent in the electoral college system. But because of assumptions underlying the value, the use of it implies by definition the neglect of certain disparities of power. The specific features of the real situation that ought to be captured in the power index obviously depend on how the numbers will be used. The symmetry imposed by the Shapley value might be useful in some situations, but it should not be utilized in all applications. The recognition that some coalitions form more easily than others led Owen to offer elsewhere[4] another concept to supplement the Shapley value. Owen's idea drops the assumption that all coalitions are equiprobable by permitting the players to have "affinities" with other players, thereby relaxing the symmetry inherent in the value.

In addition to my observations on the implicit assumptions made in using the Shapley value I also wish to comment on the plausibility of two of Owen's explicit assumptions. Although they facilitate the analysis, they are somewhat questionable. I think it is appropriate for Owen to use the assumptions in an abstract model. My point is that Owen overstates the plausibility of the assumptions, not that they should not be used. Owen assumes that all of the electoral votes in a state are cast for the candidate who carries the state and that the election is decided in the electoral college without reaching the House of Representatives. In order to justify the latter assertion he notes the infrequency of referral to the House (1800 and 1824 only) and maintains that George Wallace in 1968 expressed interest in making a deal in the electoral college rather than letting the House decide. It is certainly not clear that correctly characterized Wallace's 1968 objective. Even if such a deal occurred, it would then have violated the prior assumption that the electoral votes of a state are cast for the candidate who carries the state. Thus, an example cited by Owen in support of his assumptions must violate either that one or another. In the recent past the 1960 election also exemplifies a contest that that could have easily reached the House, even without a national third party.

Owen justifies his assumption that all the electoral votes in a state are cast for the candidate who carries the state by expressing doubt that the wandering electors of recent decades would have behaved in that manner in truly close elections. I would argue the reverse, however. Both the power and incentives of individual electors and groups of them to defect rise as the split of electoral votes gets closer. The close election, though, is the most relevant case for the computation of marginal power. This argument, in fact, suggests the desirability of abolishing the electors, even if the electoral college system is retained.

I think that the approach of Shapley values in the examination of the electoral college is useful. I also think, however, that one must

---

Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts. Notes by Henry A. Selby, Mathematical Association of America, 1973.

[3] See Banzhaf, p. 308.

[4] See Guillermo Owen, "Political Games," *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, 18 (Sept., 1971), 345–355. This is also discussed at pp. 76–78 of Shapley.

explicitly recognize the limitations imposed by its assumptions. The Shapley value develops only some of the sources of bias created by the constitutional framework of the electoral college system. Other kinds of bias caused by the electoral college must also be considered in the constitutional debate.

CHESTER SPATT

University of Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Spatt's Comment brings up some points which I would like to answer. My hope is not to deny their validity or importance, but rather, to explain why such problems must arise. In general, his points fall into two categories: in the first place, there is the question of whether the Shapley value can actually measure the power of players in such a game; secondly, there is a question as to whether — in view of my simplifying assumptions — my calculations actually give a good approximation to the "true" Shapley value. I shall attempt to deal with these in turn.

1. The Shapley value, as originally developed (in an axiomatic manner), assigns an expected payoff to each n-person game — with the understanding that the game is entirely defined by its characteristic function. Thus it can take into account nothing which does not appear (at least implicitly) in the characteristic function; in particular it does not take into account personal affinities among the players, nor — as is here the case — the strong existing tendencies for the electorates of certain states (e.g., Alabama and Mississippi) to vote similarly.

Under the circumstances, I am the first to admit that the Shapley value does not properly evaluate the several voters' "ability to influence election outcomes." Two questions naturally arise: (a) Why, then, should we bother to study the Shapley value for such games? (b) How should the value concept be modified to take such affinities and voting patterns into account?

To answer (a), I feel that, from a theoretical (constitutional) point of view, the inequities reflected in the Shapley or Banzhaf values are more serious than those which are due to voting patterns, i.e., that constitution-writers should avoid the Shapley-value-measured inequities more seriously than they should avoid the others.

To make this point clear, let us consider the case of a Southern state, such as Alabama or Mississippi, in which the overwhelming majority (say 70 to 80 per cent) of the population belongs to the Democratic party. In that case, the remaining 20 or 30 per cent, who style themselves Republicans, are effectively disenfranchised: they cannot influence, say, the outcome of the gubernatorial or presidential elections, nor have they any hope of being elected to such office. To avoid this problem, there is perhaps something to be said for "breaking up" the Democratic party (as some Republicans would doubtless like); there is even something to be said for declaring Alabama (legally) a one-party state, outlawing the Republicans and all other parties, in much the same manner as Iran has recently been declared (by the Shah) a one-party state. One or the other of these measures might conceivably work; I would not however endorse them. I do feel, on the other hand, that the inbuilt inequities of the system (i.e., those measured by the Shapley value) should be corrected unless there is strong reason to maintain them.

To answer (b), I believe that the voting affinities among states should first of all be measured by some statistical technique such as, e.g., a factor analysis of election results. (I have in fact some unpublished results in this direction.) Once these affinities have been measured, some modification of the Shapley value concept should be used; footnotes 2 and 4 to Mr. Spatt's letters refer to two such modifications. (There may be others in the literature, but I am unaware of any.) We would then probably find that it is such "swing" states as New York and Ohio that influence elections most strongly. In any case, this is certainly something that should be done, if only to help presidential candidates plan their strategy.

2. It is clear that, in each of my simplifying assumptions, I was doing what all model-builders must do: willy-nilly one sacrifices accuracy for the sake of tractability. The trouble with a perfectly accurate model is that it would be as complex as the original system; thus the question is not whether my model was totally accurate, but rather whether the inaccuracies introduced were (a) small enough to make my results valuable as they stand, and (b) justified by the consequent economy of time and effort.

With regard to (a), I must admit that it is difficult to estimate the error introduced by my simplifications. I feel quite certain, however, that the errors are negligible when compared to the inequities measured; i.e., these inequities do exist and are almost exactly as given in my paper. I feel this is so because a deadlock in the electoral college is simply of such a low probability as to make very little change in my calculations; similarly the probability that an election be changed by electors reneging on their pledges is too small to make much change in my figures. (I agree however with Mr. Spatt that it would be advisable to abolish the individual electors if not the electoral college; the fact that such an event has negligible probability does not mean that it should not be prevented.)

With regard to (b), I believe that there is simply no question; an attempt to dispense with my simplifications would have increased the necessary effort and computer time to astronomical levels, for what I consider a minimal increase in accuracy.

In brief, I thank Mr. Spatt for his comments, and agree with much of what he says. I wish moreover that someone would continue this work along the lines mentioned above. I feel nonetheless that my analysis is valuable both for practical and theoretic reasons, and believe that my paper gives accurate results.

GUILLERMO OWEN
Rice University

A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief

TO THE EDITOR:

I never expected to find myself defending Philip Converse's conception of the instability of political attitudes, but Christopher Achen's reinterpretation in the December, 1975 issue of the *Review* seems so strikingly mistaken that there is no alternative. These authors and others have struggled to explain the low correlations over time associated with administration of the same attitude questions to the 1956–58–60 SRC panel, and the following factors have been variously advanced:

A. "Real change." What everyone seems to have in mind here is measurable change in some definite metrical variable associated with the respondent—the sort of change we might measure in body weight, blood pressure, etc.

B. "Measurement error." A disturbance (generally assumed to be stochastic) imposed on the measurement process by imperfections in the measuring instrument: slop in the manometer gear train, keypunching errors, and what Achen refers to as "vagueness" in the questionnaire items.

C. "Randomness internal to the respondent, and his fault." This is the source advanced by Converse, and it has no clear parallel in (classical) physical measurement: the respondent, although lacking a real opinion or possessing only a very vague one, just blurts something out "at random," avoiding the embarrassment of admitting to no opinion.

After Achen develops a stochastic model used to estimate item unreliability (factor B), he exhibits corrected correlation coefficients associated with readministration of the items. For six of the eight political attitude items administered in 1958 and 1960, the corrected correlations range from 0.96 to 0.99; the housing and electricity item discussed by Converse yields a striking 0.98, compared to an uncorrected correlation of only 0.37 (the other uncorrected coefficients range from 0.44 to 0.57). It is evident that almost all of the very considerable change in responses between 1958 and 1960 must be attributed to measurement error; indeed, when one takes into account several approximations and imperfections in the process (sampling error, the use of the Pearson correlation coefficient in the absence of continuously distributed data, the probable correlation of Achen's disturbance terms u_1 and u_2, etc.), Achen finds no positive evidence whatever of changes due to factors A or C in responses to the housing and electric power item. Unfortunately, Achen's model begs the question: it is not only incapable of distinguishing between factors B and C — it attributes any C-type variance that may be present to factor B.

Before we begin to examine the model it is worth noting that although Achen refers to the critique of Pierce and Rose (in the June, 1974 *Review)* as "idiosyncratic" and to the reply of Converse as "powerful," Achen's approach is rather closer to that of Pierce and Rose than to that of Converse. The latter's "black-and-white" model assumes heterogeneity in the population: different dudes are subject to different stochastic processes — specifically, there is a group whose responses are quite stable over time, and a group whose answers obey some probability distribution. Both critical papers, however, assume homogeneity in the population: each respondent is subject to the same process.[1] Achen's model is as follows, where x is the respondent's "observed opinion" (his response), p is his "actual opinion," e is "measurement error," and $u_t = p_{t+1} - p_t$, with subscripts indicating observations at successive points in time. (Achen appears to regard factors A and C to be somehow combined in the u's — or alternatively the p's — with the e-terms isolating the effects of factor B, measurement error.)

---

[1] These comments refer principally to the first part of Achen's paper, to p. 1226; most of them apply as well to his multiple regression analysis, pp. 1227ff., but the latter does assume heterogeneity. This is purchased at the considerable price of assuming each random variable is realized only once (all sample sizes are one), introducing—obviously—a really desperate problem of sampling variation and estimation. It seems to me almost incredible that anyone would use estimates derived under such assumptions as the dependent variable in a multiple regression, but the whole issue is mooted by the fundamental problems in Achen's model that are discussed below. The sampling problem itself is considered in some detail in the Hunter and Coggin letter.

$$x_1 = p_1 + e_1$$
$$x_2 = p_2 + e_2 = p_1 + u_1 + e_2$$
$$x_3 = p_3 + e_3 = p_1 + u_1 + u_2 + e_3$$

All these quantities are to be interpreted as random variables, and by "suitable" assumptions Achen estimates the variance of the e's, establishing that (in the case of the housing and electricity item) the e's greatly dominate the u's.

Stochastic models like this one are subtly pernicious, permitting definite algebraic manipulations and numerical conclusions while at the same time rendering the mind almost totally incapable of straight thought. And they appear so powerful: Achen's model, indeed, permits us to assess the relative influence of the u's and the e's, although neither p's nor u's nor e's is observed for any respondent. The reader should not blandly admire such an achievement, but should ask himself *if it is possible,* ignoring, for a moment, the details of the model itself. In this case, we have quantitatively distinguished the relative influence of question vagueness and what we might call respondent vagueness, although question vagueness is not some simple thing like a bloodstain on an interview schedule, but is only realized in the mind of the respondent, alongside the respondent's own vagueness, if any. Certainly every professor should realize that the distinction between vagueness in an (exam) question and vagueness attributable to the respondent is something about which we may form judgments and talk at length, but surely such a distinction will not yield fully and unequivocally to a nearly trivial application of the algebra of expectations. I convince no one by saying this: you are all intimidated by algebra.

So let us confront the algebra. Note that disturbances of type B and type C manifest themselves rather similarly to the outside observer, and that what Achen calls the "actual opinion," p, already includes whatever Converse disturbance may be present. It would be natural to represent this as follows, where w is the Converse disturbance and q is the real-underlying-honest-to-God-no-kidding opinion:

$$x_1 = q_1 + w_1 + e_1$$
$$x_2 = q_2 + w_2 + e_2$$
$$x_3 = q_3 + w_3 + e_3$$

In this case the w's and e's enter the equations symmetrically, and it is obvious that the separate variances cannot be estimated from the data. (Ah, but do we wish to assume there *is* such a thing as a q? One is uneasy with either answer, but for many respondents, much of the time, opinions are assuredly not merely white noise, and any model that assumes homogeneity of the population has little alternative but to include something like q. The letters column is obviously no place to resolve core issues in the philosophy of attitude measurement, or even to consider in detail the relationship between Achen's model and the far more elaborate Coombsian model — for categoric responses — which Achen briefly discusses. The technical deficiencies of Achen's model are quite independent of such considerations.)

Formally, Achen avoids the natural symmetry of the B-type and C-type disturbances by forcing them to enter his model unsymmetrically:

$$x_1 = p_1 + e_1$$
$$x_2 = p_1 + u_1 + e_2$$
$$x_3 = p_1 + u_1 + u_2 + e_3$$

Opinion *changes,* the u's, are said by Achen to include the Converse disturbances, and large estimated variances for the u's are said to indicate large Converse disturbances; small u's and large e's, on the other hand, indicate that measurement errors are dominant:

> In summary, when a voter is stable in his views and *all* observed variability is measurement error, correlations will be equal across time periods. At the other extreme, when a voter is unstable and there is *no* measurement error, correlations should become smaller at a predictable rate as time periods become more distant from each other. By observing where the data fall between these polar cases, the model estimates the measurement error in each survey question. (Achen, p. 1221)

But there are not *two* poles but at least eight, since each of the three factors A, B, C, may independently be present in varying amounts. Achen's summary is simply bizarre — the (affirmative) evidence for Converse disturbances is a particular pattern of declining (positive) correlations between more distant responses, although Converse made essentially the opposite inference: that declining correlations imply "real" opinions and real opinion change, while constant correlations are to be explained by the black-white model. Strangely, Achen does not discuss this reversal.

Although Achen believes he has combined Converse-type and "true" changes in the u-terms, he has in fact caused C-type disturbances to be included in the estimated variance of the e's. The C-disturbances, like those of type B, are present equally in all sets of observations over time — they do not somehow magically cumulate as do the u's. The role of the u's is indeed peculiar: although their expectations have a simple interpretation (change in the mean of the responses over time), we will obtain large estimated *variances* for the u's only in a rather rare situation: heteroscedasticity in the observations over time, the variance of the observations increasing with the passage of time, for to each successive response is added a new random variable, which Achen generally assumes to be independent of the earlier u's. In the model each respondent sets off on his own random walk in one dimension, and they collectively drift farther and farther apart, a kind of expanding opinion universe. The failure of the data to look this way leads to low estimates of the u-variances, which Achen proceeds to misinterpret. The model is absurd: note how u_1, the "actual" opinion change between time 1 and 2, lies as a sort of mortmain on all subsequent responses, influencing them with undiminished force to the end of time. There are almost inexpressibly subtle confusions here between thinking of the u's as mere algebraic representations of changes, and thinking of them as random variables representing causes.

It is easy to see how a single scholar in the assiduous search for publishable results could create a paper such as this. Nevertheless, and without wishing to indict Achen, his friends or referees, I must say I am alarmed that such a bizarre and misleading model could find its way into print in the *Review*. There are, after all, a number of features of this paper which should cause any alert and careful reader to become suspicious:

(1) We should beware of any correlation of 0.98 in survey data, especially when it arises by "correcting" a correlation of 0.37, so that the vast majority of the relationship *lies in the correction.*
(2) The u's are said to represent changes in "actual" opinions, although Converse's thesis was that many responses lacked the foundations that the word actual ordinarily implies.
(3) The model purports to separate questionnaire vagueness from respondent vagueness, but no substantial explanation is given of how such a surgical separation may be achieved.
(4) The use of correlational evidence is virtually the reverse of Converse's use, again without explanation.
(5) The pattern of cumulation of the u's over time should cause any reader to suspect the model may not be stationary, and may establish $t = 1$, the beginning of the measurement process, as a preferred time with implications for behavior. It does have this fault, and again no explanation is offered.

That so much of this must have been missed by so many readers does indeed suggest there is a bit of vagueness around here—somewhere.

STEPHEN V. STEPHENS
Baltimore, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR:

In his article "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response" (*ASPR*, 69 [December, 1975], 1218–1231), Christopher Achen has added another interesting chapter in the attempt to refute Converse's[1] argument that many of the people who respond to a survey question actually have no opinion on the point asked. Achen takes Converse to task for ignoring the possibility of unreliability or measurement error in survey items. It is perhaps fitting then that we take Achen to task for ignoring measurement error in *his* main dependent variable. In a nutshell the argument to be spelled out in this letter is this: The mathematical model presented by Achen is *not* mathematically inconsistent with the model presented by Converse. Thus evidence in favor of the Achen model is *not* evidence against the Converse model. The only evidence in Achen's paper which might differentiate between the two models is the evidence which Achen cites concerning individual differences in the amount of error of measurement in the survey response. Achen claims that the variability in error of measurement is too low to be consistent with the Converse model. However his evidence takes the form of multiple correlations between an *estimate* of the error for each person and various indicators of political interest and activity. Achen claims that the low multiple correlations which he observes are the result of a nil difference in the size of the errors of measurement from one person to the next. It is our contention that the low multiple correlations are the result of unreliability or error of measurement in the variable used by Achen to estimate the size of the error in each individual. We will show that reliability is at best .25 and may be as low as .09. With reliabilities that low, multiple correlations of .10 to .20 represent much stronger relations than is the case for well-measured dependent variables. Moreover, low reliabilities mean an increase in the relative impact of sampling error and hence a greatly lowered probability of finding statistical significance in individual beta weights. Thus if our calculations of the reliability of Achen's dependent variable are correct, then Achen's evidence against Converse is completely emasculated. This doesn't mean that Achen's claims are wrong, it just means that Achen presents no evidence to back up that claim. Actually Erikson[2] has offered *direct* evidence that political interest variables are not related to either test-retest correlations or to correlations between opinions in the SRC data.

---

[1] Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–61. Also Phillip Converse, "Attitudes and Nonattitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. Edward R. Tufte (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 168–89.

Achen's dependent variable

Both Achen and Converse assert that the survey response can be analyzed into two components: i.e., written $x = t + e$, where t is the "true score" or expected answer to a series of hypothetically perfectly analagous questions, and e is a random response component. Converse goes on to assert, however, that people can be broken into two types: those who actually hold opinions for whom $e = 0$, $t \neq 0$; and those who actually hold no opinion for whom $t = 0$, $e \neq 0$. If we could directly measure the error term e, there would be no problem in testing the Converse model: we would simply tabulate σ_{ei}^2 for individuals i and see if the resulting distribution was bimodal at $\sigma_{ei}^2 = 0$ and $\sigma_{ei}^2 = {}_e^2\sigma$. But alas, the error component cannot be observed for single individuals unless we consider repeated measurements at different points in time, and then we have a confounding between apparent change due to independent errors of measurement and real change in true opinion. Thus the Converse black-and-white model is only asserted to fit perfectly for issues on which there is no change over the time interval considered. Similarly, the Achen measure of response error is only unconfounded with real change if there is none. Fortunately, the test-retest correlations corrected for attenuation shown in Achen's Table 1 show that there is little real change on most of the issues considered in the SRC data.

Consider the Achen estimate of the response error in an individual subject:

$$s_i = (x_{2i} - x_{1i})^2 + (x_{3i} - x_{2i})^2 - (x_{3i} - x_{1i})^2 + \text{constant}.$$

In the pure case in which there is no change over time in true score, this estimate becomes

$$s_1 = e_2^2 - e_1e_2 - e_2e_3 + e_1e_3.$$[5]

This score s_i is not the actual error variance σ_{ei}^2 for individual i but is related to the actual variance in precisely a true-score/observed-score relation. That is, the person's true score on s_i is the average of his scores on a hypothetical series of questions which are equivalent in content but with independently sampled errors of measurement. This average for the Achen estimator s_i is given by

$$\underset{i}{E}(s_i) = \sigma_{ei}^2$$

That is, the true score for s_i is the desired individual response error. However there is random variability in the score s_i produced by the randomness of the errors e_1, e_2, and e_3. The extent of this error is assessed by considering the same hypothetical set of equivalent responses as is considered in obtaining the true score; the error in s_i, however, is not the mean of those scores, but the variance:

$$\underset{i}{\text{Var}}\ (s) = \underset{i}{\text{Var}}\ (e_2^2 - e_1e_2 - e_2e_3 + e_1e_3)$$

The scores e_1, e_2, e_3 are the successive response errors for person i. These response errors are independent, identically distributed (if there is no change in true score), and have mean 0. From these facts, we can show that the four components of the score s are uncorrelated (though not independent). For example, the lack of correlation between the component e_2^2 and the component e_1e_2 follows from the calculation of the following covariance

$$E(\{e_2^2\}\{e_1e_2\}) = E(e_2^3e_1) = E(e_2^3)E(e_1)$$
$$= E(e_2^3)0 = 0$$

The lack of correlation between components e_1e_2 and e_2e_3 follows from the covariance

$$E(\{e_1e_2\}\{e_2e_3\}) = E(e_1e_2^2e_3)$$
$$= E(e_1)E(e_2^2)E(e_3)$$
$$= 0\ E(e_2^2)\ 0 = 0.$$

---

[2] Robert S. Erikson, "The SRC Panel Data and Mass Political Attitudes," presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco.

Since the four components of s are uncorrelated, the variance of s is the sum of the four variances of the four components. That is, the variance in s for person i is

$$\operatorname*{Var}_i(s) = \operatorname*{Var}_i(e_2^2) + \operatorname*{Var}_1(e_1e_2) + \operatorname*{Var}_1(e_2e_3) + \operatorname*{Var}_i(e_1e_3).$$

The three product terms all have the same variance (since the errors are identically distributed if there is no change in true scores). The variance in e_1e_2 for person i is

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname*{Var}_i(e_1e_2) &= E(\{e_1e_2\}^2) - \{E(e_1e_2)\}^2\\ &= E(e_1^2e_2^2) - 0\\ &= E(e_1^2)E(e_2^2) = \sigma_{ei}^2\sigma_{ei}^2\\ &= \sigma_{ei}^4.\end{aligned}$$

The variance in the component e_2^2 for person i is

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname*{Var}_i(e_2^2) &= E(\{e_2^2\}^2) - \{E(e_2^2)\}^2\\ &= E(e_2^4) - \{\sigma_{ei}^2\}^2\\ &= (\text{Raw kurtosis of } e) - \sigma_{ei}^4\\ &= \sigma_{ei}^4\,(\text{standardized kurtosis of } e)\\ &\quad - \sigma_{ei}^4.\end{aligned}$$

If we denote the standardized kurtosis of e for person i by K_i, then we have

$$\operatorname*{Var}_i(e_2^2) = \sigma_{ei}^4(K_i) - \sigma_{ei}^4 = (K_i - 1)\sigma_{ei}^4.$$

The value of the kurtosis K_i is the only number in our calculations which depends on the actual shape of the distribution of errors for a given subject. In the Achen analysis which preserved the original five point scale, the errors of measurement would usually be assumed to have an approximately normal distribution in which case the kurtosis would be $K_i = 3$. However if the data were reduced to a two point, pro-con scoring as was done by Converse, then the kurtosis would be that of a binary variable which would vary with the probability of that binary. The minimum kurtosis would be the smallest possible value for a kurtosis: $K_i = 1$ at a probability of .5. For probabilities different from one half the kurtosis increases to infinity near 0 and 1; with a kurtosis of 3 taken on at either a probability of .21 or .79.

We now have the true score of the error estimator s_i which is σ_{ei}^2. The variation of s_i about that true score for person i is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname*{Var}_i(s) &= \operatorname*{Var}_i(e_2^2) + 3\operatorname*{Var}_i(e_1e_2)\\ &= \sigma_{ei}^4(K_i - 1 + 3).\end{aligned}$$

In order to get the reliability of the error estimator s_i we need to consider averages and variances over people. For a given population, the true score variance is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname{Var}(\sigma_{ei}^2) &= E(\{\sigma_{ei}^2\}^2) - \{E(\sigma_{ei}^2)\}^2\\ &= E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4,\end{aligned}$$

where σ_e^2 is the overall or average error variance in the item response x. The error variance in the estimator s_i is the average of the error variances for each person separately, i.e., the error variance of s is

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname{Var}(\text{error in } s) &= E(\operatorname*{Var}_i(s))\\ &= E(\sigma_{ei}^4\{K_i + 2\}).\end{aligned}$$

The reliability of the Achen estimator s is then given by

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname{Rel}(s_i) &=\\ &= \frac{\operatorname{Var}(\text{true scores for } s_i)}{\operatorname{Var}(\text{true for } s) + \operatorname{Var}(\text{error for } s_i)}\\ &= \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}{\{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4\} + \{E(\sigma_{ei}^4\{K_i + 2\})\}}\\ &= \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}{E(\sigma_{ei}^4\{K_i + 3\}) - \sigma_e^4}.\end{aligned}$$

What are reasonable numerical values to expect for the reliability of the Achen estimator? That depends on assumptions about the kurtosis of the error distribution and upon the extent of variance in the individual response variances. For example, in the Achen five-point scoring, the roughly continuous error distribution for each person should have a typical kurtosis of about three. If the kurtosis were uniformly three, then we would have the following formula:

$$\operatorname{Rel}(s_i) = \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}{6E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}.$$

There is no lower bound on how low this reliability can be, but there is an upper bound. The upper bound would be taken on if σ_e^4 were 0, i.e., if the original responses were all perfectly reliable. Thus setting σ_e^4 to 0 in the equation above yields an absolute upper bound on the reliability if the kurtosis is three:

$$\text{Rel }(s_i) < \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4)}{6E(\sigma_{ei}^4)} = \frac{1}{6}.$$

That is, the most reasonable estimate of the reliability of Achen's response error score is that it is somewhere less than .17. How much lower? That depends on the extent of the variability in the error variance from subject to subject. To the extent that Achen's main contention is true, there is little variation in σ_{ei}^2 from one subject to the next and hence the value of σ_e^4 would be very nearly as large as $E(\sigma_{ei}^4)$ and the reliability of the estimator score s_i would be very near zero.

What is the maximum reliability of the Achen response error estimation score s_i if we consider all possible statistical distributions? Believe it or not, the Achen estimator would be at its largest if the Converse black-and-white model were true! Assume that the black-and-white model is true and that half the population holds an opinion while half the population has none. For this Converse model, we have

$$\sigma_{ei}^2 = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if person } i \text{ holds an opinion} \\ \sigma^2 \text{ if person } i \text{ has no opinion.} \end{cases}$$

The true score variance of s_i is then

$$\text{Var }(\sigma_{ei}^2) = \frac{\sigma^2}{4}$$

For binary scoring, a person who has no opinion has an error distribution with kurtosis of one. Thus

$$\operatorname*{Var}_i\ (s) = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if person } i \text{ holds an opinion} \\ 3\sigma^4 \text{ if person } i \text{ has no opinion} \end{cases}$$

The error variance of the estimator s_i is then given by

$$E(\operatorname*{Var}_i\ \{s\}) = \frac{0 + 3\sigma^4}{2} = \frac{3}{2}\sigma^4.$$

Finally the Achen response error estimation score s_i is given by

$$\text{Rel }(s) = \frac{\frac{\sigma^4}{4}}{\frac{\sigma^4}{4} + \frac{3}{2}\sigma^4} = \frac{1}{7}.$$

To generalize this, let the proportion of persons who hold an opinion be p while the proportion of persons who have no opinion is denoted $q = 1 - p$. Then the reliability of the Achen estimator is given by

$$\text{Rel}_p\,(s) = \frac{pq\sigma^4}{pq\sigma^4 + 3q\sigma^4} = \frac{p}{p+3}.$$

As the number of persons who hold no opinion shrinks to zero, this reliability approaches the highest possible value for the Achen estimator, namely $\text{Rel}_1(s) = .25$.

What would Converse predict for the reliability of Achen's estimator? Converse never says just what portion of the population he believes to be in the "elite" category, but we can make estimates from other numbers which he does discuss. For example, in the original black-and-white model he presents an estimate of $r = .47$ for those who were constant on the first two observations of their attitudes. A little algebra shows that this implies that the proportion of persons who hold an opinion must be 31 per cent. The corresponding reliability would be .09.

Achen's multiple correlations

In response to our prepublication letter, Achen simply reiterated Footnote 20 which admits the existence of measurement error in his estimator, but claimed that it makes little difference. Consider, however, that Achen reported a range of .11 to .19 in his multiple correlations between estimated error s_i and composites of sophistication measures. Even if the reliability of his error estimator were as high as .25, it would mean that the multiple correlations corrected for attenuation would increase to a range of .22 to .38. Moreover, had a perfectly reliable measure been used, it is likely that the number of significant multiple correlations would have risen from 3 out of 8 to 8 out of 8.

In fact, if Converse is right then his data tend to suggest that the proportion of persons who have no opinion is not near 0 per cent, but is more like 69 per cent. If so, then the reliability of Achen's measure would only be .09. Correction for attenuation would then raise the multiple correlations from a range of .11–.19 to a range of .37–.63 and that would be very respectable for the Converse model.

It is our conclusion that although Achen's analysis was very sophisticated, it was vitiated by a failure to consider the reliability of his main dependent measure. The upshot of this error is that it leaves no evidence which tends to contradict the Converse model.

JOHN E. HUNTER
T. DANIEL COGGIN

Michigan State University

To The Editor:

The nonattitude hypothesis of Philip Converse is one of the most important developments in political science in recent years both because of its implications for the methodology of survey research and because of its relationship to democratic theory. I was pleased, therefore, to read the article by Christopher H. Achen in the December 1975 *APSR* titled "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response" (pp. 1218–1231). Achen has given the discipline an alternative hypothesis to explain the Converse panel data: measurement error due to the ambiguity of the survey items.

However, Achen has not shown to my satisfaction that his explanation is a better way of accounting for the essentially random variation found by Converse. Perhaps I have missed something in his article, or misunderstood his model. If so, I am sure I will be corrected.

The heart of the Achen argument is found on page 1221. He states: "By the nature of the assumptions, all sources of observation error are implicitly counted as 'measurement error.' " Although he is referring in this passage to other kinds of error, such as assuming interval level data, the statement indicates what his mathematical notation confirms: that he is begging the question.

Achen has given us a method of separating out real attitude changes from random variations. This may be an advance over the Converse "black and white" model which assumed that respondents were absolutely stable in their opinions or picked the answers to Likert-type survey items at random. Thus by using the methods given by Achen we can see that the proportion of individuals giving random responses was not as great as Converse suspected. There still remains, however, a large group of individuals who are responding in an essentially random fashion. I cannot determine how Achen can tell whether these people are responding in this way because they do not understand the question or because they do not have an opinion on the question (nonattitude). Achen seems to have "assumed" that this variation is a product of question nonintelligibility.

Nor are his references to the social psychology literature on this subject very helpful. The tests which these folks use to determine reliability such as split-half, test/retest, and manipulation of shades of grey are not possible with the Converse panel data.

While Achen's computations will not help us determine whether the random responses are a product of item ambiguity or nonattitudes, the rest of his article sheds some light on this subject. It seems to me the low rate of random response on the party identification question shows, as Converse argued, that the cause of these strange responses is nonattitudes. If the voter can understand the difference between being a "strong" Republican and just being a regular old run-of-the-mill one, why can't they differentiate between strong and weak agreement on issues? Similarly, if the respondents seem able to understand the idea of "leaning" toward the Democrats, they should be able to comprehend issue questions.

On the other hand, the high level of random response to the church attendance question would seem to indicate that item ambiguity is the villain. The church attendance question seems to be much simpler than the issue items, and Achen is certainly right that such behavior is quite stable over time. So we have a rather mixed record on this point.

The regression results reported in the article are not much help either. Achen is correct when he indicates that Converse seems to base his mass/elite distinction on education or perhaps socioeconomic status in general. Thus the finding that random responses are not greater among those with little education seems, at first glance, to be evidence against the nonattitudes hypothesis. But this is cold comfort for the alternative item ambiguity argument. For the inability to comprehend fairly simple Likert items is surely related to education. In fact, I would argue that the Achen hypothesis is severely damaged by his regression results.

It is fairly easy to make the nonattitude hypothesis coincide with the Achen regression results. It seems likely to me that the formulation of attitudes on particular issues is not a product of education but a matter of interest. People have nonattitudes not because they are dumb but because their interests lie elsewhere. It is only the arrogance of political scientists which causes us to assume that people who are smart and well educated are more likely to share our concern with the political aspects of life in all instances.

If the random responses in the Converse panel data are the result of item ambiguity, that ambiguity might arise primarily from the differences between "agree" and "agree strongly" and between "disagree" and "disagree strongly." Achen suggests that this may be the case (p. 1220). I for one would certainly think that these measures of "strength" resemble the "shades of grey" choices used by C. H. Coombs in his book, *A Theory of Data,* cited by Achen. It would be fairly easy to test for this possibility. Achen, or someone else who has access to the data, should collapse the responses into a simple trichotomy (agree, indifferent, and disagree) and apply appropriate statistical tests to see if the tendency to respond at random decreases greatly or disappears altogether. If it does not, this would seem to be additional evidence for the nonattitude hypothesis. I cannot believe that the "zone of greyness" around an individual's "most-preferred point" can extend from agreement to disagreement on these SRC questionnaire items. If it does, then I would argue that the real most-preferred point is indifference, which is more or less what the nonattitudes hypothesis posits.

My conclusion at this point is that at least some of these random responses are a product of item ambiguity and at least some are a product of nonattitudes. I suspect both Converse and Achen would agree. The question is the relative proportions of each kind of error source. There is no reason to believe that the proportions do not vary from question to question and from sample to sample in ways that are at this point unclear. The implications of this conclusion for survey research are the same as they were following the original Converse work. If we wish to measure attitudes on issues accurately, we will have to go to the extra trouble of using open-ended questions. And we will have to suffer the inconvenience of receiving responses that are ambiguous because of the variety of responses. We will have to search for new structures to give order to these responses. The implied structure of Likert items and additive scales does not reflect the reality of public opinion.

The implications of the nonattitude hypothesis for democratic theory are important, but in my opinion not as extreme as Achen suggests. My reading of Converse does not convince me that he believes the failure of an individual to have attitudes on one particular issue means he or she does not have attitudes on other issues. And democratic theory does not demand (recently) that the voter have an attitude on all issues, only that he or she have an attitude about some issues and vote accordingly. My own peculiar view of "democracy" is even less restrictive. I believe in the absolute right of political abstention (an activity that seems more and more reasonable). If one does not really care about things political, why should his or her participation be necessary for the fair and civilized process of decision making by everybody else? As long as the individual can move in and out of the political arena freely, why is lack of participation by the uncommitted important? In fact, such nonparticipation helps to solve some of the problems of "intensity" pointed out by Robert Dahl in his *Preface to Democratic Theory.*

THEODORE S. ARRINGTON
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

TO THE EDITOR:

Let me begin by concurring with Professor Stephens that in the *first* part of my discussion of "measurement error," I did not try to distinguish culpable vagueness from vagueness due to question wording. It is not statistically possible to do so in the first simple model I presented, so I temporarily lumped them together as part of the e terms (the measurement error). Indeed, later in the article, I state this explicitly: "Might it not be that this 'measurement error' is really a simple matter of not understanding the question?" (p. 1226)

Having used the first part of the article to separate real change (Stephens's type A) from measurement error, I then spent the final third of the text trying to disentangle culpable and nonculpable vagueness (Stephens's types B and C). I argued that if we are to assign "blame" for vagueness, we need some standard of judgment. For example, if we ask whether Hegel is inherently vague or merely difficult, we use the judgment of persons well acquainted with the subject matter. For survey questions, we may ask whether political sophisticates have less difficulty with the questions than the uninformed. To investigate this issue, I compared the estimated measurement error (the total of B and C) for well-educated citizens interested in politics, etc. with the error for the less educated, concerned, and so on. When these groups turned out to have similar average scores, I concluded that acquaintance with the subject matter did not seem to help much, and therefore most of the vagueness was probably due to the questions.

Mr. Stephens simply misinterprets the u terms (which are composed solely of real opinion change), and he seems to have overlooked the latter part of my paper entirely. His critique of the first part — that I do not distinguish types B and C — recapitulates my own criticisms on p. 1226, and I have no quarrel with it. I simply wish he had read on.

Most of Mr. Stephens's other complaints

about my work are based on mistakes in arithmetic. Three examples:

(1) He argues that my model forces real opinion change to appear small. Statistically speaking, he claims that the u terms are required to have small variances if the variance of the observations does not increase over time, e.g., that if $var\ (p+u_1) = var\ (p)$, then $var\ (u_1)$ must be zero. But of course, $var\ (p+u_1) = var\ (p) + var\ (u_1) + 2cov(p,u_1)$, so that it is perfectly possible for $var(u_1)$ to be large even if $var\ (p)$ and $var(p + u_1)$ are equal. We require only that p and u_1 be allowed to be negatively correlated, which indeed they were in my estimates. Mr. Stephens was no doubt thinking of the situation in which p and u_1 are uncorrelated, but I made no such assumption.

(2) He writes that I assume that all respondents behave the same. This is like saying that the calculation of a mean requires that we assume all individuals sampled are identical in score. In my estimates, with one exception, all the quantities needed are simple sums of individual scores, and the exception (the term, $E(x_2\text{-}x_1)E(x_3\text{-}x_2)$) reduces to a similar calculation if the expected true opinion change is the same across individuals. (This requires some similarity among respondents, but not too much.) Then, since the individual-level calculations are unbiased estimates of individual's measurement errors, so also is the sum an unbiased estimate of the *average* measurement error. Professor Stephens is surely familiar with the following result from the ordinary regression case: under fairly general conditions, we can interpret regression coefficients as estimates of the average coefficients in the sampled population, and there is no need to assume that every individual has the same true coefficients. The same kind of argument applies here. We can interpret my estimates as averages without requiring anything like perfect homogeneity.

(3) Mr. Stephens believes I am making a substantive assumption when I measure real opinion change from the position at the previous period, which makes the term u_1 appear at each time period. He says: "Note how u_1 the 'actual' opinion change between time 1 and 2, lies as a sort of mortmain on all subsequent responses, influencing them with undiminished force to the end of time." This is roughly like saying that making the unit of distance the foot influences all subsequent calculations of distance. Of course it does, but distance is still distance. It is perfectly possible here to rewrite the model so that u_1 appears only once, namely at time 2. Substantively, this means measuring opinion changes from the position at the *first* (rather than the previous) time period. If we rewrite all the old assumptions (Mr. Stephens doesn't suggest any new ones) in terms of these new measures, all the estimates will be the same as before. The difference is cosmetic. (I might add that Converse and I draw precisely the same conclusion when correlations among the observations decline over time: that real change has occurred.)

Finally, I should make it clear that I have no desire to defend my article to the last word. Some of the assumptions (mostly those Stephens doesn't mention) are very approximate, and the regression approach to separating the two kinds of vagueness is clumsy. Models are to be used, not believed; and they should be discarded when other scholars show how they can be superseded by other, more general approaches. John Jackson and Robert Erikson have both pointed out relevant difficulties in my procedures, and go on to improve and extend previous work with new models but, happily, similar conclusions. Similar findings or not, criticism of that sort can only be applauded. Among Professor Stephens's remarks, by contrast, the calmer and more accurate consist in reminding us that our models are far from perfect; and that is pretty tame stuff.

My comments on the other two letters are brief. Hunter and Coggin have performed interesting calculations to estimate the upward adjustment in R^2 that would occur for my regression results were the measurement error in the dependent variable corrected. Their findings are no doubt worth having, but they are irrelevant to my argument in the article. Contrary to these authors' belief that I based my case upon the R^2, I wrote precisely the opposite: "In fact, however, multiple R's and significance levels provide very little statistical evidence for the hypothesis in question (or, indeed, for most social science hypotheses)" (p.1227). I went on to make the point Hunter and Coggin raise, that the R^2 is biased downward, but I added that the regression coefficients were the relevant statistics and that they remain unbiased in the presence of measurement error in the dependent variable (footnote 20). Thus it is quite unimportant how much larger the R^2 should be; my argument, founded on the regression coefficients, would be unaffected.

Finally, I feel that Arrington's suggestions and speculations are interesting, and I am in sympathy with many of his remarks. Let me simply suggest one correction. As I mentioned in replying to Stephens, the dependent variable in the regression incorporates both item ambiguity and failure to understand the question. Thus if a variable like education or interest in the election influenced comprehension and comprehension were the major part of the dependent variable, "measurement error," as Arrington believes, then the variable should have a large coefficient in the regressions I calculated. Neither these two nor any other variables possessed such a coefficient, and I therefore concluded that measurement error was mostly item ambiguity.

Arrington's intuition suggests that an individual can be vague between "agree" and "strongly agree," but not between "agree" and "disagree." If true, this hypothesis would certainly make possible far simpler discrimination between non-attitudes and item ambiguity. In fact, I tried for other reasons the test Arrington suggests (namely, collapsing the ends of the scale — see footnote 14) and found that measurement error was not much altered. On Arrington's view, the error must then be composed largely of non-attitudes. But of course this implication depends heavily on the supposition that vagueness never extends past the middle of the scale, and that postulate is in need of further research. For the present, my own intuitions are too vague to let me "agree" or "disagree."

CHRISTOPHER ACHEN
University of California, Berkeley

REVIEW ESSAYS

Government and the Media*

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The decline in public confidence in all institutions (the presidency, the Congress, the churches, business, education, and the press) stimulates evaluative literature about each. This review examines recent literature on the press.

The crisis of legitimacy is worldwide, so its causes are presumably also global. Consider some commonly offered explanations and how they apply to the press.

The demands for expanded participation in power: Addressed to the press, this claim is a demand for "access." Despite rebuff by the Supreme Court in the Tornillo case concerning the right of reply for a candidate (41 L. Ed. 2nd 730, 1974), there have been increasing calls for changing the concept of freedom of the press from that of a property right of media owners to a right of citizen access.[1]

Acceleration of social change (what Toffler calls future shock): Mass newspapers circulated for a century before radio and movies, but the latter reigned for only a quarter century before TV took pre-eminence as the public's news source, and now a quarter of a century later TV is beginning to face pay-TV, CATV, cassettes, and video recorders. Time, the great bestower of legitimacy, is hardly allowed to operate.

A general decline of illusions: High principles are debunked by exposing the "real" motives behind them. Legitimizations of authority such as the journalistic claim to objectivity are challenged, for example, by psychoanalysis, sociology, or agnosticism.

**Behind the Front Page*. By Chris Argyris. (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1974. Pp. 305. $12.50.)

Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio. By James Aronson. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972. Pp. 327. $8.95.)

The Press and the Cold War. By James Aronson. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974. Pp. 308. $8.00.)

Congress and the News Media. Edited by Robert O. Blanchard. (New York: Hastings House, 1974. Pp. 506. $10.75, paper.)

The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America. By Lee Brown. (N.Y.: David McKay Co., 1974, Pp. 224. $6.95.)

Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion. By Robert Cirino. (New York: Vintage Books, 1972. Pp. 339. $2.45, paper.)

The News Twisters. By Edith Efron. (Los Angeles, California: Nash Publishing, 1972. Pp. 225. $7.95.)

News From Nowhere: Television and the News. By Edward Jay Epstein. (New York: Random House, 1973. Pp. 321. $7.95.)

Television and Presidential Politics. By Robert E. Gilbert. (North Quincy, Mass., The Christopher Publishing House, 1972. Pp. 335. $9.75.)

Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause. By John Hohenberg. (New York.: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 514. $9.95.)

The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television. By Joseph Keeley. (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971. Pp. 320. $8.96.)

Politics and the Press. Edited by Richard W. Lee. (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1970. Pp. 186. $3.95.)

Lippmann, Liberty and the Press. By John Luskin. (University: The University of Alabama Press, 1972. Pp. 270. $7.95.)

What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion. By Lester Markel. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1972. Pp. 288. $2.95.)

The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy. By John C. Merrill. N.Y.: Hastings House, 1974. Pp. 228. $5.95.) $5.95.)

Presidential Television. By Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, Lee M. Mitchell. (New York: Basic Books, 1974. Pp 232. $8.95.)

The Adversaries: Politics and the Press. By William Rivers. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. Pp. 274. $2.95.)

Reporters and Officials. By Leon V. Sigal. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973. Pp. 221. $11.50.)

To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World. By William Small. (New York: Hastings House, 1970. Pp. 302. $8.95.)

Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents. By Jeremy Tunstall. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971. Pp. 304. $9.60.)

Your Right to Know. By Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1973. Pp. 207. $5.95.)

Press, Politics and Popular Government. Edited by George F. Will. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1972. Pp. 52. $3.00, paper.)

[1] Cf. Barron, "Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right," 80 *Harvard Law Review*, 1641 (1967).

Rising moral standards: Just as campaign practices that were once usual are now scandals, so yellow journalism is increasingly a thing of the past. Newspapers are now criticized if they are not balanced and probing — something few papers have ever been. There is a revolution of rising expectations.

These processes of delegitimization help account for the current spate of critical literature about the media of communication; attacked by some as sources of dissent, the media are labeled by others as establishment apologetics. In a polarized society any institution is berated by true believers from each side for not serving the truth as they see it.

Another factor behind the growing interest in the political role of the media in this country has been the decay of the class-based New Deal coalition that since 1932 shaped American politics. For a quarter century the central political debate was about social reforms proposed by the national Democratic leadership. For many voters the posture of that leadership provided a decision rule for issues. About three fifths of the California public had no trouble telling pollers whether they were for or against the (nonexistent) Metallic Metals Act; it was enough that it sounded like New Deal legislation. In the 1970s for many voters such an easy rule no longer holds. As class, ethnicity and party have waned as determinants of voter behavior, other forces, such as the media, become residual legatees of political influence. Since 1956, presidential elections have been in large part television shows, along with such other video events as the Army-McCarthy hearings, assassinations, and Watergate. In the 1930s and 1940s election analysts focused on ethnicity, party, and SES as explanatory variables. In the 1960s and 1970s, media campaigns and their imagery (sometimes called issues) have become increasingly interesting to election analysts.

Debate about the media in the hot summers of 1967 and 1968 centered on whether the eye of the TV camera promoted rioting, and also on its effect on the first TV-covered war: Did the media treatment of it betray the government or, alternatively, "the people"? In the first Nixon term, thanks to Spiro Agnew, the debate centered on charges of left-wing-elitism and on the media's reactive fear that a right-leaning government might clamp down on their freedom. In the second Nixon term the debate centered on Watergate; the media believed they saved our constitution, while the losers saw the media as a juggernaut before which even the presidency was helpless.

For political scientists these fleeting dramas in public debate are instances of general issues of political theory. The "adversary relationship" between media and government is an instance of checks and balances, with the media a "fourth branch of government."[2] Each branch has relations of competition, conflict, division of labor, and coordination with each of the other branches. The media supply information to the Congress and the Executive; they enable politicians to mobilize the public; and they criticize or check officials. Political scientists will recognize in the relationship not only adversary roles but also all the classic aspects of decentralized allocation of power including *both* competition and coordination.

Political scientists know the elusiveness of the concept of power, be it political power or the power of the press; it is hard to measure and it is reciprocal between superior and subordinate. Little of that subtlety enters the literature on the media. Its lack of sophistication is illustrated by pervasive use of the notion of "bias." Historiographers and social scientists understand the inevitable incompleteness and bias of any description of the empirical world. Description is selection, and selection applies obscure and value-laden notions of relevance and importance. That applies to reporting in the media too, but is seldom thoughtfully discussed in that context. Often the notion of bias is reduced to the question of whether each of two sides was given equal space. More abstruse matters such as "nonissues" or organizational imperatives that are familiar to political scientists, rarely appear in the literature on the press. Thus, though relevant to political scientists because of their subject matter, the books reviewed here, with exceptions, are faulted as social science analysis.

Organization Theory and the Media

First let us note some exceptions. Three significant books apply organization theory to the media. *Reporters and Officials* by Leon V. Sigal argues that "organizational processes and bureaucratic politics account for more of news content than, say, the political proclivities of individual newsmen" (p. 5). *News From Nowhere* by Edward Jay Epstein relates network news to the organization of the teams that produce it. *Behind the Front Page* by Chris Argyris does likewise for an unnamed but barely disguised *New York Times.*

---

[2] Douglass Cater, *The Fourth Branch of Government* (New York: Vintage, 1959).

Argyris, a psychologist, has published case studies on organizational pathologies in business firms, the State Department and now a newspaper. His book is essentially a study in human relations, but it can be read differently by those interested in the social structure of media institutions. It describes the power conflict and mutual misperceptions between the editorial and news departments, and the relation of both to the publisher. An issue that arose during the period of Argyris's observation concerned the establishment of an op-ed page. Despite agreement on it, years went by without action. The news staff wanted it to be their channel for thoughtful interpretive writing, which they craved the opportunity to do. The members of the editorial staff were unwilling to breach the wall between news reporting and their own monopoly on expression of opinion; they opposed the increasingly political impulses of younger reporters. The publisher, in a classic bureaucratic stalemate, was unwilling to impose a divisive decision.

Sigal, Epstein, and Argyris describe how the structure of media organizations affects the content that emerges. Epstein describes how the budget constraint to a dozen camera crews shapes the network news' image of the world; he notes the consequences of the television networks' having few reporters, mostly generalists without close ties to those they cover, unlike newspaper reporters with beats. These authors avoid the naive notion of "bias," while explaining how stories are affected by the processes that generate them. The theme of Sigal's first chapter is "What the News Means Depends on How the News Gets Made." Using *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* as cases, he examines how cooperation, competition, and bargaining in a hierarchical organization with limited resources to allocate "makes" the news. We shall return to these three books later in this review.

Moralism and the Media

One sophisticated treatment of bias is *Press, Politics and Popular Government* (ed. George F. Will), with an essay by Robert Bartley, and thoughtful comments by Irving Kristol, Douglass Cater, and Paul Weaver. Bartley, of the *Wall Street Journal,* argues that the changing recruitment base of journalists from lower middle-class high school graduates to better-off college graduates promotes idealistic liberalism.[3] Irving Kristol, following Walter Lippmann, argues that despite college education, journalists lack the technical expertise to analyze complex matters. They substitute, he says, populist ideological formulae. But Paul Weaver maintains that the definition of the task as much as the character of the men shapes the content of the product; journalism is what Aristotle called epideictic writing whose method is amplification and whose purpose is praise or blame, rather than the deliberative writing for which Irving Kristol asks. The product may be good in its genre, but as analysis the product is "simpleminded moralism."

Journalists writing on journalism are moralistic too. Witness the discussion of "bias" among writers who charge the media with leftist leanings. Edith Efron presents the case best. Anecdotal instances, such as "The Selling of the Pentagon," can support any charge, but what is the overall balance of bias? Edith Efron at least has tried to count. She classified network news coverage of the 1968 campaign pro and anti the two sides and found that the TV news treatment was much more favorable to Humphrey than to Nixon.

Efron's content analysis was challenged in two CBS-commissioned studies, a methodological critique by Charles Winick and an independent content analysis by International Research Associates. Winick scores some points: Efron presents no check on coding reliability. Also "a candidate who conducts a cautious campaign, like Mr. Nixon in 1968, may get substantial favorable exposure which would not be counted at all in a content analysis of expressed opinions because it contained no opinion content."

On the other hand, on most of Winick's buckshot charges one has to rule for Efron. She used only the audio, not the video messages and covered only the 7 p.m. network news, but there is no obvious reason for rejecting that sample. The unpublished INRA content analysis of the pre-election Cronkite broadcasts gives evidence of both a scrupulous network attempt at mechanical equality and also of Efron's thesis of a more favorable treatment of Humphrey. Campaign news stories distributed mentions as follows: Nixon 63 per cent, Humphrey 61 per cent, Agnew 10 per cent, Muskie 10 per cent, other Republican campaigners 13 per cent, other Democratic campaigners 15 per cent. The parallelism hardly seems coincidental. When classified by favorableness, however, "19 per cent of the paragraphs in which Nixon was mentioned were classified as favorable to him, and 19 per cent as unfavorable; the figures for Humphrey are 26 per cent favorable and 17 per cent unfavorable." Note that the neutral proportion was large and that this is less "bias" than Efron found, even though in agreement with her main claim.[4]

---

[3] Cf. also Chandler's comments in Lee, *Politics and the Press,* p. 82.

Network defenders have used Efron's weaknesses in execution as evidence that the very attempt to measure bias by counting the incidence of "pro" and "anti" items is impossible and evil. Yet the networks do the same thing to prove how systematically they even things up in minutes alloted to each candidate. The issue is not whether counts are possible, but whether they make for good journalism. Any journalistic rule other than deliberate matching will produce uneven coverage of different actors; counting can document the resulting difference.

But is deviation from 50-50 bad reporting? Under FCC regulation TV has to offer equal time to candidates under comparable terms, but that does not apply to news coverage. Are the media failing their duty if one campaign generates better news stories than the other? Should the media misreport reality so as to make the campaign an even contest? In covering scandals should equal space be given to the allegations and to denials by the accused? Should pleas for racial tolerance be balanced by equal expressions of bigotry? Must inculcations of national pride be balanced by masochistic self-denunciations?

Left-wing and right-wing critiques of the media have a common intellectual content, namely that the major media have a definable viewpoint far from their own. They show that the views of those who control the major media are neither randomly distributed nor their preferred ones. Undoubtedly the major media present a specialized picture of reality. One would welcome a study that dispassionately identified the character of newsmen's special perception of reality. Works such as Keeley's, Aronson's, and Cirano's are useful, if at all, only as sourcebooks for anecdotes about improper actions — in Keeley's case by those on the left, in Aronson's and Cirano's by those on the right. Consider, for example, Aronson's *The Press and the Cold War*. Many of the horror stories in it are accurate; the problem is to know which ones. Aronson impressively catalogs advance stories that appeared in the U.S. press about preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion and how the press downplayed them. He notes the extensive contemporaneous reports on the so-called secret bombing of Cambodia, as well as the unwillingness of the press to argue with government denials. But then he denies that there were North Vietnamese sanctuaries across the Cambodian border or that a Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos existed. Given reporting like that, one can hardly allow much credence where one does not happen to know the facts independently.

Another criticism of the media is that they are corporations for profit with financial and personal links to other firms. One looks in vain for a good book on the implications of that, a book just as preoccupied with surprising findings about the looseness of couplings in the system as with surprising findings about the tight ones.

When that book appears it will use organization theory in noting how imperatives of the job shape the output. The organizational analyses already available (e.g., Sigal, Epstein, Argyris) deal with the editorial side of the news business: how editors, reporters, and video producers do their jobs. Those books do not explore the processes by which publishers raise capital, arrive at business judgments, and relate those judgments to editorial activities. The existing studies show that editorial and business processes are disjointed enough so that those in either world know relatively little about what goes on in the other. The few linking individuals are often immobilized by a conflict of roles. In the newspapers studied by Argyris and Sigal the result was neither financially or journalistically optimal.

The Journalist's Craft

Journalists' books on their professional problems resemble the media accounts based on organization theory in reflecting pragmatic awareness of the complex social and structural constraints on news production and in explaining why journalists do what they do. To understand is to forgive; the faults of the media emerge as consequence of life's complexities. While such books moralize over a spectrum from the defensive to the critical, what is more important is that they are usually informed accounts.

---

[4] The dispute between Efron & CBS became so bitter as to prompt a second book: Edith Efron, *How CBS Tried to Kill a Book*. Los Angeles, Nash Publications, 1972.

Their viewpoint is reflected in the title, *To Kill a Messenger,* chosen by William Small, then manager of the CBS Washington Bureau. It alludes to one of newsmen's favorite clichés: when politicians or others complain about media stress on bad news, newsmen reply that the critics have turned their "anger on the messenger, the bearer of bad news." A similar cliché is the metaphor of the mirror. The media, we are told, reflect society; if we do not like the warts that we see, blame society, not the media.

There is little left to that neutral view by the time Edward Epstein finishes dissecting it. The organization of the news staff, economics, and time constraints shape what goes out as news. The news no more exists before newsmen create it than do issues before politicians create them. Whatever the seeds from which the news grows, the institutions of journalism shape the growth mightily.[5]

Small does not question that. Journalist that he is, he reports; he neither asserts nor denies. He relates the great moments of television; the Army-McCarthy hearings, the Checkers speech, the Kennedy assassinations, the 1968 Democratic Convention, the Vietnam War, and the urban riots. His book is a skillful defense of television which lays facts before the reader and lets the reader draw his or her own conclusions. He does not hide violence, the vast wasteland, network retreats before political pressure, and arranged news events such as the "Pot Party." He invites the public to share the existential dilemmas of media professionals who must cope with ratings, sponsors, political pressures, and uncertainty as they perform their job of public information.

Such journalists' books on government and the media, although written well, may be thin as social science. Three propositions sum up the theory in many of them. (1) The media are the people's tribune against government oppression. (2) Hence, media and government are adversaries. (3) A journalist should, therefore, publish whatever he can learn, however damaging to the government. John C. Merrill's *The Imperative of Freedom* argues for such journalistic autonomy as a normative philosophy. Merrill rejects such other journalistic criteria as the people's right to know, serving as a fourth branch of government, providing access to public debate, or professionalism, for these imply a responsibility, not just a freedom for the press. John Hohenberg, in *Free Press/ Free People* elevates a similar approach to the organizing principle of a world history. He skips interestingly from ancient Sumeria through the invention of printing and the evolution of the newspaper, to the World Wars and the Cold War with the single theme of the courage of men who were resolved to get the news out. One is baffled by such declarations as "fifty years after Gutenberg, every necessary ingredient of a free press except one was in existence. The missing quality was courage."

Four normative issues loom large in journalists' books on their profession. First, should a journalist ever fail to publish what he knows? Several books here reviewed (e.g., Small's and *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You* by Lester Markel) describe episodes in World War II, the Bay of Pigs, and the Pentagon Papers, in which journalists who possessed secret information had to decide whether to publish it. Similarly, during riots the question arises whether the eye of the camera itself stimulates violence (or the reverse)[6] and whether the journalist should worry about being a causal agent. Such dramatic decisions, while important, are rare. One would like to read more about how reporters' and editors' everyday decisions are governed by such criteria as waiting till the moment is ripe, or until the whole story is at hand, protecting privacy on matters of no public significance, lack of reader interest, or just plain unimportance. Is a Senator's drunkenness a news story or not? The journalistic literature says too little about decisions *not* to publish, except for the dramatic cases of suppression of big stories in the supposed national interest.

A second normative issue concerns newsmen's privilege. Should a newsman have to reveal his sources to a court or grand jury? (That is the subject of Whalen's *Your Right to Know.*) The newsmen's argument (not generally accepted by the courts)[7] is that they must keep sources secret to obtain information for the public. Social scientists find themselves in the same situation. Political scientist Samuel Popkin went to jail rather than identify interview respondents. A pollster should presumably take the same stand. But journalists generally argue that the press deserves a special privilege not to be confounded with the claims of scholars. Nonetheless, journalists are divided (exactly as the founding fathers were about a bill of rights) as to whether their privilege is protected or compromised by laws exempting them from testifying. An explicit grant of privilege implies that the granter also has the right *not* to grant.

---

[5] For a collection of papers on selectivity of reporting on various topics, see Stanley Cohen and Jack Young, eds. *The Manufacture of News: A Reader* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973).

[6] Cf. Lang, pp. 153ff. In Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press.*

[7] See Branzburg v. Kayes, 33 L.Ed. 2nd 626, 1972.

A third widely discussed question is how far journalists' relation to government should be adversarial. Sigal's description of the many forms of cronyism between reporters and those on whom they report refutes definition of the actual relation as simply adversarial. The usual conclusion, however, is that they *should* be just that. The "clear responsibility" of American journalism, William Rivers says in *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press,* is "to stand as an adversary of government." Rivers nonetheless notes such complexities as the fact that if news is defined as conflict, conflict may be manufactured by reporting rather than just reported (p. 243). I have criticized the simple adversary notion in a contribution to the *Aspen Notebook on Government and the Media* (for that reason not reviewed here). That is a minority view among journalists; the prevailing view among journalists is that departure from an adversary role is corrupting. Sound or not, that belief is one source of the crisis of legitimacy or both government and the media.

A fourth normative issue that bothers newsmen is where, when, and how much their work should be criticized. Their usual justification for their profession is the value of criticism to society, but like most of us, they take criticism of themselves to be another matter. Lee Brown's *The Reluctant Reformation* presents a history of news criticism, including muckraking exposes, such as Upton Sinclair's *Brass Check,* professional codes such as ASNE's canons, reviews such as A. J. Liebling's columns in the *New Yorker,* as well as the more recent growth of journalism magazines (most notably the *Columbia Journalism Review),* and the institution of ombudsmen on some newspapers. He describes the formation of the National News Council, a citizen panel which issues findings on cases of alleged press abuse. Many, if not most journalists deplore such institutions. They see in the sanctionless News Council, whose judgments are but the free expression of views of some private individuals, the thin edge of a wedge of regulation. When public officials berate the press the usual press rejoinder is to charge a chilling effect on press freedom. Is not freedom of expression valid for those who criticize the press?

Beyond Journalism

The journalists' literature on journalism raises important issues, whether or not one accepts the answers. What is missing is something which has been at the heart of modern social science, the attempt to explain behavior in terms other than those of which the actor is himself aware. Microeconomics predicts an equilibrium different from any businessman's expectations. Dynamic psychology uses unconscious reactions to earlier experience to explain behavior. Voting models predict outcomes by variables other than the purposive campaign moves of the protagonists. Budget simulations are interesting because they deny that politicians' programs make much difference. The journalists' literature on journalism is mostly phenomenological reportage of what journalists think they are doing. Social scientists want a literature that explains journalists' behavior by variables of which the subjects themselves may be only partly conscious.

Three books already mentioned — Epstein's, Sigal's and Argyris's — meet that test. Media people do not like them because their authors do not share the newsmen's own perceptions of themselves; no one enjoys hearing his behavior explained in ways at odds with his own rationalizations.

A similar book from 1968 is *Politics and Television* by Kurt and Gladys Lang.[8] The Langs skillfully improvise quick but rigorous research on current events, documenting thereby how organizational and mechanical imperatives of TV coverage shape what reaches the viewer. In one nominating convention they observed how different network decisions on mechanics of coverage resulted in quite different portrayals. Their best-known study was of the return of MacArthur from Korea after he was fired by Truman. A TV camera van led the general's limousine down Chicago streets, photographing cheering people. For those standing at any one corner on the sidewalk the cheering was a minute's brief ebullience as the limousine went by. It was the camera's aggregation of those brief moments into a sustained clamorous ovation that made the news event.

A useful book representing another social research tradition is Jeremy Tunstall's *Journalists at Work,* which analyzes the careers and roles of 207 British specialist correspondents, their organizations, news sources, and competitive and collaborative relations. The author's basic instrument is a lengthy questionnaire covering recruitment, career line, motivations and satisfactions. Tunstall notes such organizational issues as the fact that only about one-tenth of the news reported finds its way into print, but mostly analyzes the professional orientation of journalists.

---

[8] Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968.

A popular subject of political campaign research in 1976 is the role of the media. That is a marked shift from the 1950s and 1960s, when election studies tended to minimize the media. Whatever conclusions are about to be reached concerning the media's effect on voting, they certainly do affect campaign styles. Gilbert, reviewing presidential campaigns from 1952 through 1968 notes how strategy has shifted from organizational maneuvering to direct television presentation of the candidate to the mass public. Television has also profoundly affected the manner of the presidency, offering unprecedented opportunities and temptations for charismatic leadership. Minow and his colleagues examine the changing practice of presidential press conferences and coverage with an eye to reforms.

Some Classic Formulations

Several older works anticipate much of what is being said today. Little was added between 1940 and 1970 to the insights already offered by George Simmel, Robert Park, Lincoln Steffens, Leo Rosten, or Walter Lippmann. As Tunstall notes, among organizational studies by 2,000 authors listed in March's *Handbook of Organizations* (1965), only one, Warren Breed's "Social Control in the Newsroom" (*Social Forces* [May, 1955], 326–335), dealt with the press. David Manning White's study of "The Gatekeeper" (*Journalism Quarterly* [Fall, 1950], 383–390), analyzed what the editor chose to publish and what to spike. Douglass Cater's *The Fourth Branch of Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), and Bernard Cohen's *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) examined the role of the press in the Washington scene. Cater's book is most notable for its identification of the press as a channel of communication essential to the management of government itself. Cohen deals, as do the later organizational analysts, with the reporter's job, his problems in getting and explaining foreign policy news, his interaction with policy makers, and the perceptions and use of the press by policy makers. Rosten in 1937 delineated the social system and psychology of *The Washington Correspondents* and their relationship to the men of power whose anterooms they inhabit. Earlier, Lincoln Steffens in his *Autobiography* (1931) described a symbiotic relation in which the newsman holds back some damaging things he knows about a politician as blackmail to obtain cooperation and information.

Still earlier, Walter Lippmann opened up most of the current issues about politics and the media *(Liberty and the News,* 1920, and *Public Opinion,* 1922). Lippmann's views, as recently presented by John Luskin, in *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press,* are often at odds with the accepted catechism of American newsmen. Lippmann was not a libertarian. He supported censorship in wartime, objected to obscenity, castigated yellow journalists for invading the privacy of public figures, and argued that the usefulness of journalistic crusading (now called investigative reporting) was over; what he preferred was informed analysis. He also argued against open diplomacy and destruction of administrative confidentiality. "In 1951," Luskin tells us,

> when Congress proposed to investigate the conduct of the Korean War and to publish secret papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the proposal to publish, Lippmann said, though based on "the sacred right of the people to know all the facts," could result only in eventual concealment and falsification. Aware that letters they wrote, that memoranda and documents they signed might soon be publicized, officials would eventually utter words which would look good in print (p. 43).

Regardless of the current unpopularity of Lippmann's conclusions, one must admire the perceptiveness of his analysis of the forces operating on news production.

His treatment of stereotypes is still well remembered. Less remembered is what Luskin calls "his dissection of the press apparatus." Lippmann distinguished news from truth. "While the press can report the news well or badly, it can report the truth scarcely at all. 'The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them in relation to each other' " (p. 53). Lippmann analyzes factors in newspaper production, the pattern of recruitment, the economics of mass publication, competition, and the pressure of deadlines which restrict the press to reporting stereotyped fact. He ends by appealing for a greater role for the analyst, for the expert political scientist engaged in elucidation rather than crusading.

"The press," he said, "is like the beam of a searchlight . . . Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone." "For other, less refractory light," Luskin says, Lippmann "suggested his favorite source of revelation, cadres of experts, proposing the establishment in each of the ten federal departments . . . of intelligence services divorced from policy makers" (p. 54). Today we call these think tanks.

Does social science analysis provide an antidote, as Lippmann believed, for the alienated, disruptive character of the press's reflection of society? One wonders. Perhaps if social scientists do not act with the social objectivity that Lippmann's ideal-type suggests, it may be because few of them have the social role and recognition that Lippmann proposes.[9] Those who come nearest to that mandarin-like status are working in places like Rand or the Council of Economic Advisors. The little available evidence on the personal political views of newsmen (cf. Epstein and Tunstall) and of academic social scientists (cf. Lipset) does not suggest systematic political differences between them. Yet independently of their own self-consciousness, perhaps differences arise from the organizational structure in which they are placed. Differences in their product may reflect differences in their degree of autonomy, their criteria of evidence, the impulse towards value-detachment among social scientists and toward moralism among journalists, or the frequent assumption of policy responsibility by social scientists in place of the adversary posture of the journalist. Such differences led Lippmann to view social research as less socially abrasive than journalism.

Lippmann argues, in effect, that while journalism contributes to a crisis of legitimacy, political science fosters healing. In the language of social critics, that distinction would be phrased as degrees of capture of each by the establishment. Regardless of the language used, Lippmann's point remains to be proved.

Books like Epstein's, Sigal's and Argyris's may start a serious effort to understand the journalist's role in relation to the political process: but a comparison of journalism's role with that of other intelligence professions such as social science remains to be made. The pattern of rewards in each profession is quite different. University professors of political science have in the past been paid more money and given more respect, more job security, and much more autonomy, but journalists have been given more access to public officials, and more recognition of their right to information. How each profession contributes to society's ability to function coherently or to the exacerbation of relations within it remains unclear.

---

[9] Cf. Everett C. Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset: "The Politics of American Political Scientists," *PS*, IV (Spring 1971); and Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Everett G. Ladd, Jr.: "The Politics of American Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78, (July, 1972).

Détente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT*

COLIN S. GRAY

Hudson Institute

The books reviewed in this article demonstrate that strategic studies are today in a condition of conceptual contention and even innovation.[1] The purpose of this discussion is to explore some of the more important issues of strategic weapons and arms control policies as they are affected by the ongoing SALT process and as they are understood from the perspective of arms control theory and arms race management. The central questions that are posed throughout this analysis are, in general, "What do strategists think that they know about the interstate arms race and arms control adversary?" and, in particular, "What conceptual presuppositions are American strategists employing in assessing Soviet arms behavior and options for United States' strategic and arms control policies?". No review of "frontier" literature on the subject of the Soviet-American arms race and related matters can be policy-neutral; certainly no such claim is advanced here. Indeed, one persisting source of analytical weakness in strategic studies has been the under-recognition of hidden premises, tacit theories and communal biases that have, of necessity, colored analyses and policy recommendations. All strategic analysis is "interested" analysis.[2]

The works discussed in this article are addressed, at root, to one or more of the following questions: What drives the nuclear arms race? What does the record of 1958 to 1974 tell us concerning the nature, dynamics and purposes of arms control negotiations? What are the criteria of a desirable strategic posture for the medium and long terms? In what ways do Soviet strategic concepts, negotiating practices, and policy-making processes differ from those of the United States and which differences matter, and in what ways? In fact, a good proportion of the works here considered — and certainly of the reawakening journal literature — is not concerned explicitly with the systematic thinking through of problem areas in strategic studies. Rather is it devoted to policy appraisal, policy prescription, and what may politely be termed prophecy. These works are discussed on the basis that they typify contemporary strategic and arms control theory. It is my intention to explore theoretical concerns which transcend the shifts in focus in the more explicitly prescriptive literature. Although many of the books and articles discussed here were published several years ago, their relevance to theoretical understanding is in no important way diminished by that fact.

Prophecy is understood to refer to prognoses that do not rest upon systematic analysis. Even if a policy maker does not begin to understand how, for example, the Soviet system functions with respect to strategic policy processing, he might still predict future Soviet policy quite accurately because of his native wit, his general knowledge of international behavior, or his "feel" for the clearly emerging choice situations of the Soviet leadership. The inspired official prophet, however, should be able to make better use of his intelligence, his

**Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.* By John Newhouse. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. 302. $7.95)

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973. Pp. 447. $11.95)

SALT: Problems and Prospects. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973. Pp. 251. $5.95)

Soviet Decision-Making For Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. By Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. (New York: Praeger, 1972. Pp. 102. $12.00)

SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. Edited by Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander. (New York: The Free Press, 1974. Pp. 361. $9.95)

The Future of the International Strategic System. Edited by Richard Rosecrance. (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972. Pp. 219. No price quoted.)

---

[1] On the sources and nature of the strategic theoretical renaissance, see Colin S. Gray: "The 'Second Wave': New Directions in Strategic Studies," *RUSI Journal,* 118 (December, 1973), 35–41); and *Strategic Studies and Public Policy* (forthcoming), Chapter 11.

[2] Note the judgment in Arthur L. Burns, "Scientific and Strategic-Political Theories of International Politics," in *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–69,* ed. Brian Porter (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 58.

general knowledge, and his empathy, if he also understood the intellectual structure of his subject. American policy makers neither have understood the nature of the arms race that they were seeking to conduct and control, nor have they confounded this condition of ignorance by means of inspired accurate guesswork. Ideology has tended to occupy the space that should be filled with knowledge of the arms race adversary. When in doubt — as, for example, over Soviet intentions vis-à-vis SALT — all too few analysts have demarcated frankly a region of ignorance; instead Western ideas have been projected upon Soviet officials.[3]

The SALT exercise may be said wonderfully to have concentrated strategic minds. SALT has promoted a long overdue attention to the "arms race phenomenon," and has encouraged a widespread skepticism concerning the historical accuracy of erstwhile-presumed "driving forces."[4] Also, SALT has provided a well-nigh ideal forum for that "strategic dialogue" that many arms controllers believed would promote conceptual convergence and hence — probably a *non-sequitur* — parallel, mutual arms race restraint.[5] The trinity of "Détente, Arms Control and Strategy" in the title of this article reflects the fact that there are strategic and political analysts who tend to focus upon one to the relative neglect of the other two. As Ian Smart has explained, most Western European strategists and politicians value SALT as an instrument of political, rather than strategic, détente.[6] The small print of missile trade-offs and, indeed, even of United States targeting strategy, is deemed to be strictly of secondary significance provided two conditions are satisfied. First, the American security connection with NATO-Europe must continue to be seen to be firm; second, special NATO-European interests must not be the subject of exclusive superpower negotiation.

Next, one finds arms control advocates who are relatively unimpressed with whatever political confidence SALT I and SALT II may have engendered; they desire arms control agreements that do more than appear to promote a fragile political détente. According to the classical criteria, arms control should contribute signally to the diminution of the risk of war occurring; to the reduction of the probable damage likely to result from war; and to the reduction of the costs of defense preparation. The arms control technician, logically if narrowly, is unimpressed with such a *pro forma* arms control flourish as the SALT agreements of June 1974. He is similarly uninterested in many of the more usual criteria for a good — or, perhaps, a better — strategic posture. The SALT agreements on further restricting ABM deployment (to one site only) and the provision of a 150-kiloton "threshold" for underground nuclear tests were held to be strictly cosmetic, and if anything mildly supportive of the strategic arms race. Nevertheless, the "arms control should be about arms control" school of thought damned the Vladivostok accords of November 1974 with faint praise. *Arms Control Today* and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* left their readers in no doubt that Vladivostok was not very promising as an arms control event — whatever it might or might not accomplish for détente.[7] The aggregate ceilings on strategic offensive forces and on MIRV launchers were too high (at 2,400 and 1,320 respectively), while the defense communities of both superpowers could continue to pursue qualitative improvement without any serious let or hindrance.

Finally, there are analysts who approach SALT in particular and arms control in general, almost solely with a view to improving a national strategic posture. Three different problem areas are addressed by the adherents to the three schools of (1) "SALT must succeed" — in aid of general political relations; (2) "SALT must produce meaningful measures of arms control"; and (3) "SALT must enhance or, at least, not detract from the effectiveness of our strategic posture." Though on very different grounds, school (3) has been scarcely less discontented with the Vladivostok framework agreement than has school (2). After all, Vladivostok endorsed a Soviet strategic postural transition from zero to 1,320 MIRV launchers — in a context of an American MIRVable (land-based) missile throw-weight of 2 million pounds, compared with an easily predictable Soviet throw-weight of 12 million pounds. Vladivostok prevents the United States from chasing the total Soviet throw-weight advantage: American throw-weight could not be augmented on a large scale before the mid-1980s."[8]

---

[3] This argument permeates Gallagher and Spielmann.

[4] See Colin S. Gray: "The Arms Race Phenomenon," *World Politics*, 24 (October, 1971), 39–79; and *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Farnborough, Hants., England: D. C. Heath, 1976).

[5] The pioneer statement of the promise of dialogue was Jeremy J. Stone, *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations Through Dialogue* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

[6] Smart, "Perspectives from Europe," in Willrich and Rhinelander, pp. 187, 195–196.

[7] See the "ACA Policy Statement on the Vladivostok Accords," *Arms Control Today*, 4 (December, 1974) 3.

Although the protracted SALT experience has lent some urgency and focus to strategic issues, the renewed public debate over nuclear strategy reflects also the "ripening" of technological possibilities,[9] the personal convictions of particular public men, and the state of the Soviet-American strategic balance.[10] The essentiality of SALT for the revival of innovative strategic analysis cannot be demonstrated. It is more likely than not that the Soviet weapons programs that have been publicly cited as the catalyzing agents for American strategic postural revision, would have proceeded either with or without SALT.

There can be no strictly military-strategic analysis of the prospects for SALT. Interstate arms control negotiations and agreements reflect synergistic combinations of domestic and of international factors, while many texts on arms control betray an innocence of political considerations.[11] It is easy to dismiss assertions of innovation in strategic theory and analysis. The complexity that confronts an analyst of the nuclear arms race has, item by item at least, been apparent to strategists since the beginning of the nuclear age. For example, it can hardly be a revelation that bureaucrats play games. Nonetheless, resting in part upon an analytical confusion, "bureaucratic politics" is today one of the leading contenders in the arms race analytical stakes — for being *the* driving factor in the arms race.[12] The confusion is that what has been discovered, largely by former short-term academic bureaucrats, was the necessary truth that all large-scale public activity requires bureaucratic activity. Bureaucracy, and hence bureaucratic politics, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for there being an arms race. I am not implying that "bureaucratic politics" is really just a synonym for bureaucratic activity: those who analyze in this vein have presented a fairly detailed theory of American bureaucratic activity. My contention is that the concept of "bureaucratic politics" promotes a level of analysis confusion. Academic strategists and foreign policy analysts who are sensibly persuaded that the analysis of "bureaucratic politics" has insights of importance to impart, need constantly to ask themselves "what kinds of question can and cannot this mode of analysis answer?"

There is much to recommend the aphorism that "strategic doctrines don't die; they just await the next policy review." While granting the historical recurrence of strategic conceptual debates, and the enduring features of arms races, there are still significant items of novelty to be discovered in present strategic contention. More important, novelty for its own sake has no value. To some degree each new generation of strategic and political analysts must rediscover, with undue fanfare, those nuggets of wisdom concerning, for example, desirable negotiating behavior or a preferred strategic posture, that comprised the intellectual currency of its forebears. Given the laudable quest for innovation that is one of the hallmarks of American political science, it is scarcely surprising that guardianship of past wisdom should often be neglected.[13]

Strategic Debate: The Role of the Scholar

Logical and reasonable arguments abound in the present strategy debate over United States strategic posture. But, in the best — really, the worst — American legal tradition, the issues in dispute are the subjects of the adversary proceedings of countervailing polemics. Damage Limiters, Minimum Deterrers, and Defensive Emphasizers put forward the best case they can make for their own wares. The result, predictably, is a barrage of overstatements. Strategic choice is a political exercise. In the interest of professional soul-purgation, the APSA might consider requiring the more robust strategic advocates among its membership to write a hostile critique of their own, recent *interested* strategic analyses.

The very public debate over the succeeding ABM proposals of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations *appeared* to effect a polarization within the defense/arms control community.[14] It is probably more accurate, however, to argue that ABM deployment provided a litmus test issue which required analysts to adhere to their basic reference group. The ABM was a personal identity issue — the specific details of the argument were strictly secondary. In generic terms, one was pro or contra ABM.[15]

---

[8] The significance of a large disparity in missile throw-weight is debated in Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs,* 54 (January 1976), 207–232; and Jan M. Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View," *Foreign Affairs,* 54 (April 1976), 462–481.

[9] See Elizabeth Young, *A Farewell to Arms Control?* (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 195, fn. 51.

[10] See the testimony of James Schlesinger in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies,* Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 4, 1974), pp. 13–14.

[11] See Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 111.

[12] "Bureaucratic politics" may be approached through such works as Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), particularly chapter 5; and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

[13] See Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969," in Porter, ed., *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–69,* pp. 48–54.

To the eventual benefit of all contenders over the protracted ABM issue, the most extreme of the ABM advocates, the Defensive Emphasizers led by Donald Brennan, developed a systematic critique of the extant dominant deterrence doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD).[16] Although very few strategic analysts chose, to endorse Brennan's proposals for thick urban ABM defenses, to be deployed in the context of an arms control regime requiring a severe reduction in the arsenals of offensive weapons, very few strategic analysts were immune to Brennan's cogent denunciations of MAD doctrine. Brennan anticipated much of the fundamental challenge to orthodox deterrence doctrine that has emerged in recent years. Of considerable interest to future aspiring strategy innovators, is Brennan's belief that one important reason his critique of MAD was taken so seriously was that he was offering a very specific alternative (both conceptually and technologically).

The current debate over strategic forces is focused essentially upon three closely related issues: (1) their character, (2) their size, and (3) their firing and targeting doctrine.[17] Within the arms control community in the United States over the past decade, it has been believed that the political value of strategic forces must derive solely from their military worth. Hence, the pursuit of a militarily meaningless symmetry of strategic capabilities can result in no political rewards.[18] The proper measure for the sufficiency of strategic posture is thus held to be the demographic yardstick of assured destruction. Considered in terms of the threat of surface damage required in order to ensure that the consequences of a retaliatory strike would be unacceptable, it was calculated in the mid-1960s that the delivery of 400 "one megaton equivalents" (EMT) represented the cost-effective level of an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union. As Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith have explained, 400 EMT represents the "elbow" of the marginal cost curve.[19] Sharply diminishing *returns* (prompt Soviet fatalities and the percentage of Soviet industry destroyed) set in above that level of force loading. As a conceptual brake upon the expansion of offensive forces the assured destruction criterion of sufficiency has much to recommend it. If transposed from the realm of force structure planning into the realm of strategic war planning, however, assured destruction could bias the United States' strategic war plan in the direction of what Herman Kahn has termed a "wargasm" — an orgy of politically and militarily meaningless civilian slaughter.[20]

Closely allied to the conviction that the United States requires only sufficient EMT to devastate Soviet urban-industrial areas, is the notion that some kinds of flexibility in strategic planning are destabilizing. All hard-target (command and control facilities: ICBM silos) counterforce capability is suspect, because it can only threaten the pre-launch survivability of the ICBM leg of the deterrent Triad of the other side. In other words, it must erode the confidence in its assured destruction capability.[21] These paragraphs have stated the core beliefs of what may fairly be termed the arms control establishment.[22] The Boswell of SALT I, John Newhouse, has written: "Thus, stability, a truly divine goal in the nuclear age, becomes the product of secure second-strike nuclear offenses on both sides. This offensive capability is known as assured destruction; it is the supreme dogma of the ascendant branch of the defense and arms-control communities."[23]

---

[14] Illustrative of the divisions within the community was the (quite proper) investigation by the Operations Research Society of America of the professional quality of the operations research conducted pro and contra the ABM. See *Operations Research,* 19 (September, 1971). Even more revealing of animosity were the readers' letters in reply. See *Operations Research,* 20 (January-February, 1972), 205–246.

[15] See Herman Kahn, "The Missile Defense Debate in Perspective," in *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy,* ed. Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1969), pp. 298–290.

[16] For example, Donald Brennan, "The Case for Population Defense," in *ibid.,* pp. 100–106.

[17] The principal official contributions to the strategy debate are James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 4, 1974), pp. 3–6, 25–45; James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and 197T* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 5, 1975), pp. I-10–12, 13–17, II-1–11; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies;* and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, *Briefing on Counterforce Attacks,* Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (September 11, 1974).

[18] For example, see Abram Chayes, "Nuclear Arms Control After the Cold War," *Daedalus,* 104 (Summer 1975), 27.

[19] Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 207-208. Also see Ian Bellany, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence," *RUSI Journal,* 118 (March, 1973), 28–34. EMT is a measure of the expected surface damage that should be inflicted by a number of re-entry vehicles, expressed as EMT = N.Y. 2/3. N is the number of warheads and Y is their total yield. Useful explanation may be found in Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Part I: Targets and Weapons Systems,* Adelphi Paper 106 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1974), p. 26.

[20] Note the observation in Newhouse, p. 266. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger contended that, despite the rhetorical attention accorded strategic flexibility over the past decade, until the early 1970s the Department of Defense did not engage in a dedicated effort to program limited strategic use options. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies,* pp. 9, 18, 26.

Very few arms controllers do adhere, any longer at least, to what might be termed a pure version of assured destruction doctrine. Partly in response to perceived changes in the state of the strategic balance, most advocates of an assured destruction-emphasizing strategic posture express some concern over the possible political implications of gross numerical and capability disparities. Above all, they deny their critics' contention that they are uninterested in targeting flexibility.[24] Straw targets and hyperbole on both sides have marred recent debate. Of importance for this article is not whether Albert Wohlstetter has been fair to Herbert York,[25] or vice versa,[26] still less which of the two is correct. Rather is it important that some students of strategy are beginning to consider — in some cases to reconsider after a long period of conceptual rigidity — the adequacy and even the validity of the strategic wisdom that was generated in the decade 1955–1965. This wisdom was codified, became fashionable, and was *the* set of respectable opinions in the middle and late 1960s.[27] Until very recently, it could be said that "the terms in which the area of nuclear weapons policy is discussed consist mostly of a rigidification of ten- or twenty-year-old doctrine."[28] In other words, we have been living off our strategic theoretical capital. As a number of the works cited in this article attest, the protracted SALT experience has revealed the undue narrowness of our strategic concepts. The Emperor has no clothes for a new era. Nonetheless, much of the evidence to which strategic contenders refer is inherently ambiguous, or even unknowable.

Much of the babel of approval and disapproval that marked the announcement by former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger of a revised firing and targeting doctrine for the strategic war plan (the Single Integrated Operational Plan — the SIOP) was little more than the ritual utterances of rival strategic ideologies. Beneath the competing prescriptions for an effective negotiating posture for SALT, the charges that Dr. Schlesinger's limited strategic options would be "destabilizing," and the disagreements about the strategic and political value of technologies recommended in the FY's 1975, 1976, and 1977 defense budgets, lurk the following questions: Upon what premises does the proposition rest that some hard-target counterforce capability is destabilizing? Is stability a quality inherent in certain technological relationships, or is it a very subjective quality liable to strategic ideological variations in meaning?[29] What functions do super-power elites believe to be performed by strategic weapon arsenals? What drives the nuclear arms race, and from such an analysis, how can SALT reasonably be expected to induce reciprocal arms-race restraint? Any competent analyst is able to produce a good case for a variety of policy prescriptions, but such should not be his function — that is not what should be meant by a more *relevant* political science. If the so-called "post-behavioral revolution" in political science is to refer to anything that merits the title of scholarship, it must be to the systematic exploration of areas relevant to public policy.

---

[21] Prominent examples of this argument may be found in Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," *Foreign Affairs,* 52 (October, 1973), 109–118; Herbert Scoville, "Flexible MADness?" *Foreign Policy,* 14 (Spring, 1974), 164–177; George W. Rathjens, "Flexible Response Options," *Orbis,* 18 (Fall, 1974), 677–688; and Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), chapter 6.

[22] See Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Is About Politics," *Foreign Policy,* 9 (Winter, 1972–73), 123–127.

[23] *Cold Dawn,* p. 9. Stability may be "a truly divine goal," but—in common with such other divine goals as peace and order—its empirical referents and the proper path to its attainment are far from being self-evident.

[24] See Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," p. 113; and Scoville, "Flexible MADness," pp. 168–170. On the fighting retreat currently being conducted by MAD adherents, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era," *Orbis,* 17 (Winter, 1974), 1134–1138.

[25] See Albert Wohlstetter, "Alternative to Mass Destruction—Comments on the Addresses of Professor York and Mr. Clifford," in *Pacem in Terris III, Proceedings,* Vol. II (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1974).

[26] A forthright assault by York upon counterforce reasoning is "Reducing the Overkill," *Survival,* 16 (March/April, 1974), 70–74.

[27] Very much to the point are the comments and arguments in Donald Brennan, *Fashions in Military Technology Fifty Years Hence,* HI-951-P (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, February 12, 1968), pp. 4–7; and Young, *A Farewell to Arms Control?* pp. 139–140.

[28] Michael M. May, *Strategic Arms Technology and Doctrine under Arms Limitation Agreements,* Research Monograph 37 (Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, October 1972), p. 15.

[29] See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Rationale for Super-power Arms Control," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, p. 4. For contrasting policy positions that share a devotion to a very technical understanding of stability, see the contributions by Richard Garwin (chapter 4) and Richard Perle (chapter 5) in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects.*

The SALT Experience

Although SALT began in November 1969 and has brought forth three principal bursts of agreement (May 1972, June 1974, and November 1974) and a series of minor accords,[30] confident answers to the question posed by Bernard Brodie as the title of the first chapter of his magisterial study, *War and Politics* — "De quoi s'agit-il?" are in short supply.[31] The voluminous SALT literature yields such assertions as that SALT is *about* the meaning of deterrence; the codification of mutual deterrence via MAD doctrine; the ratification of parity; the future of détente; the curbing and eventual reversal of the nuclear arms race; the fashioning of a more cost-effective strategic posture; and the balance of bureaucratic power in Washington and in Moscow. The whole truth about SALT is to be discovered neither in the only extant "inside" account of American decision making—John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn* — nor in the less privileged prose of more scholarly analysts. It would seem that practically an entire generation of American arms controllers has expected the Soviet leadership to behave like a slightly backward collective American arms controller. These negative thoughts are prompted by the multitude of worthy, naive, and — for the Russians — rather insulting assertions that have studded the SALT, and more general strategic, literatures of recent years.[32]

For a blow-by-blow account of SALT policy making in Washington and of SALT negotiations in Helsinki, Vienna, Washington, and Moscow there is, unfortunately, no substitute for, or reliable cross-check upon, John Newhouse's book, *Cold Dawn*. Although many details of the United States' evolving negotiating stance in SALT I were revealed via the self-serving leak to such well-connected journalists as William Beecher (then) of *The New York Times*[33] and Chalmers Roberts of *The Washington Post*, *Cold Dawn* is no mere collage of previously revealed material. The book is indispensable as a behind-the-scenes interpretation of the history of SALT, but only in a very limited sense could one endorse the publisher's jacket blurb, which claims that *Cold Dawn* is "The Definitive and Revealing Account of The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." Even allowing for commercially motivated hyperbole, readers' credulity should be restrained by two factors. First, although Newhouse was granted unique (in the SALT context) investigative privileges in interviewing Washington policy makers and in perusing many very sensitive documents (for example, *possibly* some NSSM's and NSDM's),[34] there is no way in which we are able to check his interpretations against his sources. In other words, only a person with full access to SALT personnel and documentation could assess the degree to which Newhouse was granted free-range privileges and the extent to which his sources were deployed in print in a balanced fashion. Second, *Cold Dawn* is a strongly committed work.[35] Naturally enough, Newhouse was granted access precisely because he was known to be trustworthy — a safe and friendly writer.

---

[30] The texts of all of the SALT—and SALT-related — agreements through and including the results of the Brezhnev visit to the United States in June 1973, may be located in Willrich and Rhinelander, Appendices 1–10. A useful SALT bibliography is provided on pp. 348–354. Documentation on the Vladivostok accords is in *Survival*, 17 (January/February 1975), 32–33.

[31] (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1–28. Brodie attributes the question to Marshal Foch (p. 1).

[32] For example, see Roman Kolkowicz et al., *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 34–37.

[33] The most notorious, or celebrated, of these leaks was the so-called "Beecher leak" of July 23, 1971. See *The New York Times*, July 23, 1971; Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 224–225; and the testimony of Elliot L. Richardson in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger*, Hearings, Part 2, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), pp. 276–277. A more recent example of a major leak is Aaron Latham, "Kissinger's Bluff Is Called," *New York Magazine*, 9 (April 12, 1976), 30–35. In this article the author claims to reveal how Kissinger negotiated very poorly indeed over cruise missiles and the *Backfire* bomber during his visit to Moscow in January 1976. Strong circumstantial evidence supports Latham's case, but the absence of specified sources for SALT leaks means that they must be regarded skeptically.

[34] NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum; NSDM: National Security Decision Memorandum. For Kissinger's version of what Newhouse was and was not permitted to investigate from original sources (human and documentary), see *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger*, Part 1, pp. 109–112; and *ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 330–332. A very different perspective upon the access granted to Newhouse has been provided in William R. Van Cleave's review of *Cold Dawn*, "The SALT Papers: A Torrent of Verbiage or a Spring of Capital Truths?", *Orbis*, 17 (Winter, 1974), 1396–1401.

Newhouse has written a most valuable work, Nonetheless, a more skeptical writer granted similar in-house privileges should have been able to write a more balanced and a more valuable work. In the face of unknowable Soviet motivations (possibly uncertain and confused even to the Soviet leaders themselves), Newhouse does not admit that there might be a variety of tenable propositions; rather he plugs the lacunae with American arms controller-style Russians. Whether or not one shares Newhouse's strategic beliefs, it is difficult to excuse statements such as the following: "The talks were launched, not from a common impulse to reduce armaments, but from a mutual need to solemnize the parity principle—or, put differently, to establish an acceptance by each side of the other's ability to inflict unacceptable retribution in response to a nuclear attack";[36] ". . . both great powers want to stabilize spending on arms";[37] "Each [Super Power] assumes the other is negotiating because parity has been achieved.[38]

Newhouse may be correct, but no sources available to him could have offered convincing proof that his *postulated* rough symmetry of super-power concern was indeed the case.[39] John Newhouse's ideology has been singled out for particular attention here, solely because his is the only publicly available, detailed study of the course of SALT I. In the interest of balance one cannot turn to an alternative, unfriendly history. *Cold Dawn* offers a mountain of fascinating fact that is not available elsewhere, but the reader must be warned that the book also contains a mountain of supposition—and, unlike the case of a work of scholarship, there is no way in which fact and fancy (or possible fact) can be checked independently by a reviewer.

Given the classified nature of the relevant documentation, and the nonattributable status of much private official revelation, it must be admitted that a scholarly work, with sources that may be checked independently, could not be written. It is a law of life that officials, among others, tend not to reveal information or attitudes that are likely to damage their place in historical appraisal. *Cold Dawn* was written from the point of view of the National Security Council system in Washington. Newhouse was denied effective access to the SALT delegation. The frustrations of the SALT delegation, in the context of Henry Kissinger's "back channel" SALT diplomacy via Ambassador Dobrynin, are not very sympathetically covered in *Cold Dawn*.[40] For an understanding of SALT from the perspective of the delegation, *Cold Dawn* needs to be supplemented by a reading of the articles that Paul Nitze has written since he resigned from the delegation in June 1974. Nitze was the senior representative of the Department of Defense on the delegation from the very first SALT session beginning in November 1969.[41]

From the SALT literature, three edited works endeavor to analyze the diverse implications of the SALT experience for a variety of strategic and political problem areas, and adequately represent the scope of the strategic debate. The works edited by Morton Kaplan and by William Kintner and Robert Pfaltzgraff tend to the orientation that security is a function of defense capabilities, while the work edited by Mason Willrich and John Rhinelander is more sympathetic to the view that security is best attained via arms control and arms reductions.[42] Although few edited works ever present clear collective messages, it is not unfair to state that the analysis in the works edited by Kaplan and by Kintner and Pfaltzgraff tends to be highly critical of the strategic assumptions that guided American policy makers in their approach to SALT. The authors in the Willrich and Rhinelander volume tend to a more friendly analysis. Unfortunately, the two defense-oriented and highly critical works contain, with very few exceptions, analyses completed prior to the signing of the SALT I agreements on May 26th, 1972.

---

[35] Newhouse's former Brookings colleague, Morton Halperin, emerges as a heroic figure in the quest for arms control. Reference is made to Halperin's "sturdy arms control bias" (p. 112), to "his open aversion to ABM's in all forms" (p. 112), and to the fact that "arms control is his passion" (p. 50). Newhouse's robust, almost lyrical, approving prose suggests very strongly that arms control concern has transcended scholarly enquiry and has become ideology.

[36] *Cold Dawn,* p. 2.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[39] For discussion of Soviet-American asymmetries, see Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 369–371; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Superpowers and Arms Control* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 35–36, 59–61; William R. Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I," in *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control,* ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 10–21; and Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race,* chapter 3.

[40] See Alton Frye, "U.S. Decision Making for SALT," in Willrich and Rhinelander, p. 93. For a good example of possible (Kissinger's) image-damaging information not made available to Newhouse, see Clemens, pp. 43–44, fn.a.

[41] A fairly comprehensive statement of Paul Nitze's views on American SALT-related practices is "The Strategic Balance Between Hope And Skepticism," *Foreign Policy,* 17 (Winter 1974–75), 136–156.

[42] All three works are cited fully at the beginning of this article.

All three works attest to the renaissance of fundamental thinking on the frontiers of the sub-sub-discipline of strategic studies. In each book, authors question the orthodoxy that has been *de riguer* in the arms control citadels of the United States since the middle 1960s. Following on the protracted SALT experience, catalyzed by the need to sharpen analytical frameworks in order to cope better with SALT material, each work casts doubts upon the following beliefs: that mutual assured destruction is the final word on deterrence theory toward which all sophisticated strategic thinkers, of whatever national culture, must ultimately strain; that Soviet strategists either conceptualize in a fashion very similar to American strategists, or that such conceptualization may be induced as the product of American educational endeavor; that the nuclear arms race is driven essentially by an action-reaction mechanism between nation-states; and, finally, that arms control negotiations *are really about* the control of the arms race for mutual benefit.

With their firm adherence to the semi-organized arms control interest,[43] the contributors to the Willrich and Rhinelander work tend to be less thorough-going in their critique of the still-orthodox wisdom. With few exceptions, each contributor fairly frankly admits ignorance about the decision-processes and motives of the Soviet Union. The broad position of most of the authors about the soundness or unsoundness of the SALT I agreements is well known. In healthy contrast to John Newhouse, however, these authors indicate definite areas of ambivalence.[44] In his chapter in Willrich and Rhinelander, Marshall Shulman endorses the achievements of SALT I, but he also offers a balanced and sophisticated appraisal of those Soviet-American asymmetries—conceptual, decisional, political and economic—that could frustrate aspirations for a more civilized Soviet-American relationship.[45] Shulman concludes his chapter with the following judgment: "Here perhaps is the real significance of SALT I, for its most important accomplishment is to be found less in the substantive agreements reached than in the educational effect of the negotiating process."[46]

Shulman has implied on previous pages that Soviet leaders have *yet* to attain the level of strategic conceptual sophistication common to American arms controllers, but he also implies that there could well be some merit in the Soviet way of thinking about strategy and arms control. Shulman's argument contrasts sharply with the intellectual hubris to be found in Newhouse. Consider the following example of John Newhouse's thought:

> . . . defending people is the most troublesome of all strategic options, for stability demands each of the two societies stand wholly exposed to the destructive power of the other. Acceptance of this severe and novel doctrine illustrates the growing sophistication of Soviet thinking and some willingness to break with fixed attitudes, including the old Russian habit of equating security with territorial defense. And it points up the American interest in raising the Russian learning curve—in creating a dialogue that will encourage, however gradually, a convergence of American and Russian thinking about stable deterrence. Thinking about deterrence is mind bending even for initiates. It takes time and some knowledge of the weapons as well as the issues.
>
> The gap in such thinking is not just between the U.S. strategic community and the Russians, whose concern with these concepts is more recent. It is also between the Americans and their European allies, and between those Americans directly involved ["inhouse"] and those observing from the sidelines of academia.[47]

This is an example of intellectual arrogance that is usefully revealing of an attitude of mind that has limited the effectiveness of the strategic and arms control policies of the United States over the past decade. With this presumption of American conceptual superiority, a whole series of errors in prediction and possibly in policy action is more easily understood. It is now fully revealed that the United States' intelligence community fairly consistently underestimated the rate of growth of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces after 1965.[48]

---

[43] Apart from the operation of friendship networks, arms control interests now have extra-government institutional form in the Arms Control Association (ACA), while the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has long conducted itself as an arms control lobby (for example, providing witnesses and prepared testimony for congressional hearings). *Arms Control Today* (monthly publication), published by ACA, was created to be both the "house journal" of the arms control community, and an effective instrument for the dissemination of the views of that community to interested outsiders.

[44] Most useful are the lists of identified gaps in current knowledge provided in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 103, 381–382.

[45] "SALT and the Soviet Union," pp. 101–121.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[47] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 3–4. This is very close to an assertion that "I (Newhouse has since moved "in-house," to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and my official friends know best, are the most expert—*by definition.*"

The more defense-minded of the contributors to the books edited by Kaplan and by Kintner and Pfaltzgraff argue that the Soviet approach to the political utility of strategic forces, to the opportunities available in an arms control forum, and to the military functions of strategic forces are very dissimilar from dominant conceptions in the United States. Moreover, it is argued that a convergence of Soviet thought and practice with American thought and practice should not be expected. Indeed, Johan Holst suggests that it is far from obvious that doctrinal convergence would be conducive to a safer world.[49] This does not mean that serious business cannot be conducted in the SALT forum, nor need it mean that the dominant American approach to American strategic postural questions is invalid. What it does mean is that Soviet behavior must not be translated, by conceptual reflex, in terms of models drawn from and reflecting American behavior.

Although Shulman and others sensibly point to the "educational effect of the negotiating process itself," it is now apparent that SALT were better not viewed as a Soviet-American arms control seminar using American textbooks. SALT has undoubtedly raised the level of information concerning strategic issues at the most senior levels in both Moscow and Washington. In a sense, SALT has probably "politicized" particular strategic programs in that there has been higher level interdiction of the standard operating procedures of lower levels of bureaucracy. As of 1976, preliminary conclusions may be drawn with some confidence concerning the "educational effect" of SALT. Despite some of Dr. Kissinger's claims, there is no evidence that the American defense community has "cracked the code" of Soviet thinking about the structure and purposes of their strategic weapons posture.[50] Our comprehension of Soviet strategic thinking should have improved over the past six and a half years, if only because we have had that much extra time to observe and interpret the expansion and qualitative improvement of the Soviet strategic posture. It would seem, if the excellent chapters by Thomas Wolfe and William R. Van Cleave (in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff), by Johan Holst (in Kaplan), and by Marshall Shulman (among others) are to be believed. that Soviet strategic thinking provides no conceptual self-limiting features at all analogous to the American notion of a sufficiency of force for assured destruction.[51] Furthermore, Soviet leaders have offered no evidence that they believe it to be an important function of SALT to enhance American conceptions of strategic stability; and we still do not understand the role of strategic doctrine in the development of Soviet strategic posture. Indeed, as Johan Holst has suggested, it may be "the Soviet way" to develop the weapons first and to select the appropriate doctrine afterwards.[52]

Backward Russians?

Very many American arms controllers have seen in SALT a unique opportunity for the education of misguided or backward Russians. To those analysts skeptical about the arms control wisdom of the late 1960s, the SALT experience has yielded strong evidence supportive of their initial premises and prejudices. It is quite clear from the Soviet literature on America and on arms control that Soviet strategists are not ignorant of the fine flourishes of Western strategic thought. The unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept American strategic conceptual tutelage would seem to stem from the uncongenial nature of Western thought; from a satisfaction with domestic strategic thought; and from a proper recognition of Soviet national interest.[53]

As many observers of American arms control diplomacy have noted, "the American way" both in *strategic* analysis and in arms control theorizing and practice has tended to be technical rather than political.[54] Unfortunately, the dominant Soviet—and, indeed, the NATO-European—approach to strategy and to arms control has been political. The technical arms control approach to SALT has been dominated by a laudable concern to ensure the maintenance of a condition of strategic stability, commonly defined as a context wherein the "first strike bonus" is close to zero. In other words, the smaller the difference in military effectiveness between a first strike and a second strike, the greater the measure of stability. If we subscribe to the adage that "by their deeds shall ye know them," it is apparent that Soviet leaders have elected to remain indifferent to American lectures on the subject of strategic stability. Despite a decade of American educational effort, Soviet leaders persist obdurately, by their weapon program deeds, in asserting that they are the best judges of their own security interests. They may be misguided, but it is well to take them seriously. The political sensitivity to the possible foreign policy consequences of visible strategic imbalances was a feature of Dr. Schlesinger's stewardship at the Department of Defense.[55] The Vladivostok accord provided, and almost certainly a SALT II treaty would provide, for parity on strategic offensive force levels. Unfortunately, two issues that appeared to be of only minor importance in Vladivostok, the American long-range cruise missile (LRCM) programs and the Soviet *Backfire B* bombers, have since assumed pre-eminent roles as blocks to the completion of a SALT II treaty. These weapons systems are neither clearly *strategic* nor clearly *tactical* in character. Therefore, even if all the LRCMs and *Backfires* eventually to be deployed could be identified by satellite reconnaissance, there could be little confidence that their military missions would be unambiguous.[56]

---

[48] See Albert Wohlstetter, *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1975).

[49] "Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation," in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects,* particularly pp. 56–57.

[50] For example, see the optimistic prognoses given in Henry Kissinger's Press Conference in Moscow on May 26, 1972, in Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearing,* 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972), p. 99.

[51] In the words of George Rathjens, ". . . there is not the slightest evidence that it [the Soviet Union] accepts the concept of strategic sufficiency." In "Future Limitations of Strategic Arms," in Willrich and Rhinelander, p. 230.

[52] In "Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation," in Kaplan, pp. 66–67. A clear statement to the effect that students of the Soviet Union do not understand the role of Soviet strategic doctrine vis-à-vis procurement decisions is David Holloway, "Strategic Concepts and Soviet Policy," *Survival,* 13 (November, 1971), 364–369.

[53] On the strong and very particular roots of Soviet strategic doctrine, see William T. Lee, "The 'Politico-Military-Industrial Complex' of the U.S.S.R.," *Journal of International Affairs,* 26 (1972), 79–83, 86;

Many American arms controllers are still resisting the notion that each super-power is playing its SALT games in accordance with very different rules. Intimations that this might be the case may very occasionally be discerned in Newhouse and in Willrich and Rhinelander, but such unpleasant thoughts are not permitted seriously to muddy the text. Among the major edited works discussed here, this theme is developed only in the more defense-minded arguments deployed in Kaplan, in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, and somewhat unevenly before the congressional committees that considered the SALT I package. It is unfortunate that a subject as important as the Soviet approach to SALT should become an issue in the domestic strategy/arms control debate in the United States. The available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union approaches all negotiations in a tough, competitive spirit.[57] If a Western government wishes to avoid "losing" a round of negotiations, it needs a strong bargaining position and a tough-minded attitude.

Despite the unprecedented dangers that attend a *nuclear* arms race, there is every reason to believe that Soviet leaders are convinced that military competition yields political gains.[58] One may not approve, but it is difficult to see how any other interpretation can be placed upon the evidence available concerning the course of SALT. Skeptical readers are advised to consider the details of the Soviet negotiating posture for SALT II, and the erosion of the posture of the United States—with the dénouement in Vladivostok.[59] SALT II

Thomas W. Wolfe, "The Convergence Issue and Soviet Strategic Policy," in *Rand: 25th Anniversary Volume* (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Rand Corporation, 1973), 137-150; Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine," in *Comparative Defense Policy,* ed. Frank B. Horton III, A. S. Rogerson, and E. L. Warner III (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), 200–216; and William F. Scott, *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975).

[54] Frederick S. Wyle, "U.S., Europe, SALT, and Strategy," in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects,* pp. 142–143; Clemens, *The Superpowers and Arms Control,* p. 55.

[55] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T,* pp. I-13, II-7–8.

[56] See Richard Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," *Survival,* 18 (January/February 1976), 10–17.

[57] On the Soviet approach to SALT, see Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *Problems of Communism,* 19 (September-October, 1970), 1–10; Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 21–54; Lawrence T. Caldwell, *Soviet Attitudes to SALT,* Adelphi Paper 75 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1971); and Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Decision-Making and the Strategic Balance: Some Reflections," in Pfaltzgraff, *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control,* pp. 113–122.

[58] See Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications,* Memorandum by Uri Ra'anan, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).

[59] The Vladivostok accords comprise a very poor set of agreements in *the longer run,* for the Soviet Union. I base this judgment on the fact that the principal future questions of strategic stability are not addressed in the accords. Those questions pertain to the vulnerability of missile silos, "counterforce matching" and

will not "cap the arms race" in the sense of depriving a dynamic strategic posture of political meaning. Even before SALT I placed a ceiling upon ICBM and SLBM deployments, the Soviet Union was switching from a quantitative to a qualitative arms racing path. Soviet leaders believe in negotiating from strength, in exploiting military strength for political gain (and certainly for gain in terms of the fine print of arms control regimes), and in purchasing a strategic posture that might have some military and political value should war ever occur. These beliefs run contrary to the way in which many Western analysts believe that strategic power ought to be approached in the nuclear age, and they certainly run counter to many of the more optimistic, early prognoses for SALT. The evidence of Soviet adherence to these beliefs, however, is proof neither of Soviet aggressive designs nor of Soviet backwardness. Soviet analysts and politicians, save, for the consumption of gullible Westerners, have never endorsed the notion that SALT was an institution in which technical experts would seek to control a nuclear arms race that was evading political control.

The books by Newhouse, Kaplan, Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, and Willrich and Rhinelander necessarily eschew fundamental enquiry, given their topical mandates. These works, however, do not rest upon a well-ordered body of social scientific knowledge concerning arms race dynamics—either generic in scope or particular to the *nuclear* arms race. Authors differ about whether the United States should be more or should be less active in the arms race, but these opinions seem to stem more from fashions among their intellectual reference groups than they do from any deep understanding of which moves, in what circumstances, are likely to produce particular results.

The Schlesinger Shift

The reviving strategic debate of 1973–1976 has seen a struggle by analysts to emphasize the complexity of their subject matter. Such analysts as Fred Iklé, Albert Wohlstetter, Bruce Russett, and Graham Allison have been arguing that the more popular theorems that purport to explain how the nuclear arms race works and what the appropriate criteria should be for a sufficient nuclear deterrent are not good enough.[60] A large part of the present strategic debate is concerned with the appraisal of ideas and programs that their authors hope will remove the less satisfactory features of mutual assured destruction doctrine from the strategic policy of the United States.[61] Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger and his strategic advisers were not seeking simply to justify the latest products of the weapons laboratories, nor did they have as a dominant concern a determination to maximize American bargaining strength at SALT.[62] In his *Defense Report* for FY 1975, Schlesinger repudiated MAD doctrine, he affirmed the proposition that militarily marginal strategic forces might have political value, and—implicitly—he denied that the arms race was necessarily an exercise in futility.[63] The *Defense Report* for FY 1976 was even more explicit in its attempt at redefining the requirements of deterrence in an age of rough parity and mutual vulnerability.[64]

The present debate may center on the wisdom of pursuing a very substantial hard-target counterforce capability or the political salience of static criteria of strategic strength. But very close to the surface of debate are the still underanalyzed policy scientific questions pertaining to arms race dynamics, negotiating dynamics, and the appropriate criteria by which one should be able to design a *good* strategic posture.

Many adherents to a MAD-orientation are prepared to grant the limited validity of the criticisms that recently have been leveled at MAD doctrine. They are concerned, however,

---

to political perceptions of specific imbalances. See Colin S. Gray, "SALT II and the Strategic Balance," *British Journal of International Studies*, 1 (1975), 183–208.

[60] Fred C. Iklé, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (January, 1973), 267–285; Wohlstetter, *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race;* Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era"; Bruce Russett, "Counter-Combatant Deterrence: A Proposal," *Survival*, 16 (May/June, 1974), 135–140; and Graham Allison, "Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom?: A Bureaucratic Perspective," in Pfaltzgraff, *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control*, 31–72.

[61] A good way into the debate is via *Orbis*, III (Fall, 1974), which contains eight articles on "the Military Balance, U.S. Strategic Forces, and the New Targeting Doctrine."

[62] Laurence Martin, "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Interpretation," *Survival*, 16 (July/August, 1974), p. 160.

[63] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, respectively pp. 32–41 (MAD doctrine), 27, 43–44 (political consequences of perceived strategic imbalance). Schlesinger argued that unless the United States gives evidence of a willingness to accept the current Soviet arms race challenge, the Soviet Union will be allowed a politically advantageous measure of strategic imbalance.

[64] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T*, pp. II-1–9.

lest the pursuit of the best strategic doctrine fatally impair the efficacy of the working strategic doctrine that has, for nearly a decade, been the principal conceptual guide for United States strategic posture.[65] Furthermore, although it may be true that MAD doctrine is morally repugnant to civilized men, would be militarily irrelevant to any context, and is a prescription for a paralysis of political will, many strategists remain to be convinced that the proposed alternatives offer any significant improvement.

One of the more interesting statements in the books under review appears in Richard Garwin's contribution to Kaplan. Garwin writes:

> It is in the interest of both sides to have a stable but responsive strategic posture, but our knowledge of the structure and behavior of military-political-sociological systems is by no means adequate to support detailed analyses. Our posture must be simple if we want to be sure that it is really understood by the other side.[66]

Garwin might have argued that the United States should adopt a posture sufficiently simple to be understood by those Americans who are not strategic analysts—the President and (the present incumbents excepted) the Secretaries of State and Defense, for example. Unfortunately, the strategic postures that most obviously meet the criterion of simplicity are also, one could say necessarily, unlikely to be credible. MAD doctrine, understood to imply relatively massive attacks upon urban areas, is simple, but a diminishing number of Americans have any confidence that a MAD-orientated SIOP should be invoked in any resort save the last.[67] If strategic forces are to retain any political meaning, a president must ensure that his strategic posture allows for flexible employment. Clearly, the fewer options that one has, the less complex the calculations of the adversary should be. But the adversary will always confront the task of predicting political will. There should be some relationship between political will and strategic posture, but no amount of calculation can remove the residual unknowables.

Richard Garwin was correct to point to the limitations in American comprehension of the institutions and the processes that produce strategic policy decisions in the Soviet Union. However, Garwin does happen to be one of the firmest adherents to the arms control school which has imputed *American* concepts to the Soviet Union and has endorsed a mechanistic model of action-reaction as being crucial to the arms race. This model necessarily assumes that the super-powers act and react as collective strategic logicians. For example, Garwin writes that "the elimination of ABM would break a positive feedback loop leading to the arms race."[68] In simple action-reaction logic, Garwin is correct. But the history of Soviet and American MIRV programs after May 1972 demonstrates that the forces that drive major arms programs are more complex than many arms controllers had previously believed. Major weapons procurement is a field of redundant causation. Arms-race histories may be written that emphasize the momentum of technological innovation, or the games played by bureaucrats, or the threats perceived and misperceived abroad—all of which have partial validity.[69]

The congressional hearings held in the summer of 1972 to review the content and implications of the SALT I Treaty and Interim Agreement revealed that conceptual education was understood by the Soviet delegates to be beyond their mandate. The hearings offer a wealth of technical detail and reflect the imbalance of strategic theoretical opinion within the extra-official defense/arms-control community.[70] There were very few thorough-going critics of the ideas upon which the SALT I agreements were founded. A major potential value of the hearings, however, lay not in their role as a forum for the rehearsal of established attitudes and opinions, but rather in the possibility that officials—and particularly delegates—would hold forth about the insight gleaned into the working of Soviet strategic minds.

---

[65] The rise of assured destruction in official favor may be traced through Mr. McNamara's *Posture Statements* from 1964 until 1968. See Table I in Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," *Daedalus*, 104 (1975), 110–111. Revealing in (I suspect) an unintentional way is Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis* (New York: Dunellen, 1973), p. 142. Also see Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 66–68.

[66] "Superpower Postures in SALT: An American View," p. 98.

[67] *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T*, pp. II-1–2.

[68] In "Superpower Postures in SALT: An American View," p. 113.

[69] See Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975).

[70] The principal SALT-related hearings were the following: Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;* Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements;* Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).

Newhouse has written that "in the formal meetings as well as during informal dinners and lunches, each side discovered a great deal about the other's attitudes."[71] If the United States delegation did learn a great deal about Soviet attitudes in the strategic field, then—judging from the evidence offered in *Cold Dawn* and in the four sets of congressional hearings—it must have been one of the best-kept secrets of modern times. Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Chief Delegate to SALT, Gerard Smith, stated: "I think that the Soviets, as a result of the SALT negotiations, have moved toward accepting the concept of assured destruction. I would say that I don't know. I have no way of judging whether their doctrine, their national doctrine, says that this is their national strategic concept. I just don't know."[72]

As Hedley Bull has observed about the Washington and London Naval Arms Limitation regimes of the interwar years, common rationales need not be shared among the participants in an arms control regime.[73] However, given the scope for the qualitative improvement of weapons allowed to the Soviet Union in (and duly exercised during) the Interim Agreement of SALT I and in the Vladivostok accord for SALT II, more than idle academic interest is engaged in attempts to answer the questions of how the Soviet leaders conceive of the utility of strategic forces, and what they understand SALT to be about.

Facing Facts

If the Soviet Union is using SALT as a framework to support a détente that will gradually be redefined as the strategic balance moves more and more in the Soviet direction,[74] then a number of reasonable American responses are defensible. First, while eschewing short-term panic measures, one may endorse former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's pursuit of an "essential equivalence." In practice this entails a substantial revision in strategic thought. In the Schlesinger version of responding to the perceived Soviet challenge, one must seek a great measure of symmetry — even in particular weapon categories. Also, one must seek a rough balance of counterforce capability and endeavor to maintain a strategic posture of such proportions that no unsophisticated politician is likely to be so impressed by a contemplation of the "static measures" of strategic (im)balance that he believes that the United States will lack the political will to act. Second, suppose one grants that SALT thus far has produced only poor bargains for the United States; still one might elect to remain relatively unmoved. The critics of counterforce doctrine are saying that MAD doctrine is sound (as good a doctrine as technology permits) and should not be abandoned simply because backward Russians still refuse to face contemporary military-technological facts.

Strategists are becoming aware of the time-specific and ethnocentric roots of their strategic wisdom. Not merely are central tenets of our deterrence theories the products largely of American scholarship, they also tend to be predicated upon a dyadic interstate context. An urban area ABM defense system may be heretical in terms of a dyad of strategic actors that are striving to contain their strategic competition by the acceptance of MAD concepts, but such an ABM system should be viewed in a far more favorable light were the superpowers to move into a nuclear proliferated world. The contributors to a recent book edited by Richard Rosecrance[75] have contemplated the deterrence problems of a world that might contain not six nuclear powers, but 16 or 26 or 36. These authors have sought to alert strategic analysts to the possible long-run consequences of MAD doctrine. Undeterrable leaders, nuclear accidents and miscalculation may be unlikely for one year, or for five—with the present five nuclear weapon powers (six, if India is included)—but how unlikely are these events over 25 or 50 years, with an unpredictable number of nuclear powers? Better ABM systems may not be the answer, but unless one chooses to put one's faith in chiliastic fantasies,[76] it is none too soon for strategists to begin contemplating how one should think about such an unfamiliar world.

The world of an archetypal American arms controller has been, and remains, a comparatively simple one—dominated by clear dichotomies. Weapon systems tend to be *either* stabilizing or destabilizing in their effects. Weapon systems are either first-strike in orientation—which is *bad*—or are second-strike in orientation—which is *good*. On its own terms, this form of analysis is logically impeccable. Unfortunately, Soviet leaders have proved to be unsympathetic to it.[77] With differing conceptual frameworks, the potential for misperception of strategic and political intentions was and remains profound. Furthermore, one learns from much of the American arms control community's comments upon SALT, that one is *either* serious about seeking to control the arms race, *or* one is not. In the former case one should subordinate opportunities for unilateral advantage in the interest of reaching reasonably balanced accords. Also, one should adopt the attitude that the nuclear arms race is a threat to all of humanity, and not a vehicle for national political gain.[78] Soviet leaders do not inhabit this Aristotelian world of either/or choices.

---

[71] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn,* p. 173. A very different view is Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I," pp. 16–19.

[72] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,* p. 383.

[73] "Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties," in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects,* p. 50.

[74] Probably the most trenchant critique of SALT I along these lines is Donald Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review,* June 23, 1972; more recent analysis in a similar vein is Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente."

[75] *The Future of the International Strategic System.*

[76] For one example of such fantasies, see Clemens' aspiration that arms control may move the superpowers from detente to entente. *The Superpowers and Arms Control,* p. 134.

In the mid-1960s, it was expected that the Soviet Union would be content with a secure second-strike capability. According to American assured-destruction doctrine, this was all that the Soviet Union needed. Later in the 1960s, the Soviet Union was expected to be content with a parity in the "static measures" of strategic balance. As of 1976, the momentum of qualitative advance can only be explained plausibly as a bid for whatever political gain a favorable strategic imbalance will yield. In arms control terms, the Soviet Union may certainly be faulted for declining to explain the rationales behind her strategic programs, but the crucial and avoidable Western error was the enduring misconception that Soviet motivation could be explained in terms of American arms control theory.

In SALT I, as prospectively in SALT II, the Soviet Union laid the basis for a major hard-target counterforce capability vis-à-vis the United States which the United States would have great difficulty in matching. The Soviet Union was accorded the right to deploy 313 "heavy missiles" compared with none for the United States. Furthermore, the Interim Agreement failed to set any limits of importance upon the expansion of the volume of ballistic missiles and provided no lasting compensation for the greater throw-weight of Soviet missiles. In signing the ABM Treaty, the United States succeeded in trading an advanced American technology for an obsolescent Soviet technology, looking to a future in which Soviet missile throw-weight married to accurate MIRV's would put the United States in far more urgent need of a dedicated silo-defending ABM system than the Soviet Union.

Until the Vladivostok meeting, Soviet leaders asserted that the quantitative, asymmetrical limits upon the ICBM and SLBM inventories were completed business. The Soviet "concessions" at Vladivostok on equal aggregates for offensive delivery vehicles and MIRV launchers did not mark any change in the Soviet approach — appearances notwithstanding. Progress in SALT II negotiations was not registered prior to October-November 1974, partly because the United States was insisting upon an arms control regime that would discipline sharply the future hard-target counterforce capabilities of the Soviet Union.

The United States sought to secure an agreed level of MIRV launchers (in the region of 600–750) for the Soviet Union such that upgraded *Minuteman* silos (designed to resist blast overpressures up to 1,000 pounds per square inch) would be viable for more years into the 1980s than seemed likely without such an agreement. Because of the very large Soviet advantage in missile throw-weight over the United States, Dr. Kissinger sought a favorable asymmetrical limit on MIRV launchers. When this kind of proposal predictably failed to excite Soviet enthusiasm, the United States then proposed a common, relatively low limit for aggregate missile throw-weight. Such a scheme would, of course, have denied the Soviet Union any advantage from her large missile boosters and would place at a premium the American technical leads in missile accuracy and warhead design. The Soviet dismissal of these suggested bases for SALT II induced the United States to move from "fairly complex proposals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to an agreement."[79]

---

[77] A former member of the SALT I delegation, Joseph Kruzel, has asserted that the ABM Treaty "had the dual effect of shutting off a new avenue of strategic arms competition and legitimizing the doctrine of assured destruction" in "SALT II: The Search for a Follow-On Agreement," *Orbis*, 17 (Summer 1973), p. 361. Unfortunately, it may be argued that the Soviet Union was very interested in constraining an ABM competition because of the anticipated superiority of United States' defensive technologies.

[78] In the words of a SIPRI author: "The strategic arms race should be recognized as a malignancy and dealt with cooperatively by those responsible for it." *SIPRI Yearbook, 1973* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. xix.

[79] Dr. Henry Kissinger, Press Briefing in Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, official text (mimeo), p. 7.

Alas, the "breakthrough" at Vladivostok that, in Dr. Kissinger's euphoric words, enabled the superpowers to achieve "a cap on the arms race,"[80] was purchased at the price of future strategic instability. The very high common aggregates of Vladivostok mean that both sides are free to pursue the qualitative arms race as energetically as they choose;[81] that the missile silos of each superpower will be acutely vulnerable to a disarming attack in the 1980s; and that the Soviet Union, with her enormous advantage in missile throw-weight, will be able to dispense many more silo-killing MIRV's than will the United States. Whether or not these prospective facts should promote serious concern is a subject of current debate.

In a remarkable pioneering book, Matthew Gallagher and Karl Spielmann have sought to outline the ways in which American interpretations of Soviet behavior are probably in error.[82] Without seeking to present a portrait of an idiosyncratic Soviet Union impenetrable to Western analysts, the authors demonstrate the inapplicability of the simple logical models ("Shortcuts to Confusion" — the title of Chapter 1) that American arms controllers have wielded as the principal tools for the "cracking open" of the arms race system. The authors do not argue that American strategic concepts and notions of bureaucratic politics are necessarily invalid, for the United States; they argue that these notions should not be projected uncritically upon the Soviet Union. Only by accepting the divergence of Soviet practice in doctrine and procurement from the American model can the United States both compete effectively in the arms race and fashion a defense policy and a negotiating posture that is likely to induce cooperation from a very un-American adversary.

Conclusion

For the first time in a decade, the standard tenets of deterrence theory and of arms control doctrine are subject to widespread systemic criticism (the ABM debate of 1969 was, by and large, more limited in scope). Despite the prominence of such implicitly value-laden terms as "stability" and "parity" in the arms control literature, the notion of mutual assured destruction was conceived and rigidified in an era of quiet American confidence that a perpetual margin of superiority could be maintained. As of 1976, strategic theorists are beginning to realize that the past decade and a half has seen no substantial measures of arms control; that MAD doctrine reflected contemporary military-technological necessity and represented a very limited aspect of a deterrent relationship rather than a total and finite solution to nuclear strategic problems; that the Soviet Union is not usefully to be modeled by social scientific arms controllers in an American image; and that the rough and tumble of international politics cannot be avoided in the forum of protracted arms control negotiations.

American negotiating performance in SALT offers much negative instruction as to *How Nations Negotiate*.[83] Analysts seem to be so paralyzed by the conceptual difficulties attendant upon the use of such terms as "power" and "bargaining power" that serious study of the most important questions pertaining to negotiation is rare indeed.[84] Strategic analysts are coming to stress the urgent need to study Soviet policy on its own terms — and to seek to improve the level of our comprehension of how the Soviet political system processes strategic policy decisions.[85] A closer attention to Soviet behavior, a greater willingness to admit that there are regions of inquiry in which we are ignorant, and a diminished tendency to project our ideas upon others — all these should encourage strategic analysis that is less culture-bound, richer, and more relevant to a superpower strategic balance that is evolving in favor of the Soviet Union. The margin for tolerable error is diminishing.

---

[80] Kissinger, Press Briefing, Nov. 24, 1974, pp. 3, 6.

[81] For detail on the more important qualitative improvements that must be anticipated, see the section "New Strategic Technologies," in *Strategic Survey, 1974* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 46–50.

[82] *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.*

[83] Fred Iklé's book with this title (New York: Praeger, 1967) serves as a devastating indictment of American negotiating practice in SALT from 1969 until 1976.

[84] Very much to the point is I. William Zartman, "The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When," *World Politics*, 26 (April, 1974), 385–399. Also see Zartman, ed., *The Analysis of Negotiation* (New York: Anchor, 1975); and the special issue of *Journal of International Affairs*, 29 (Spring, 1975), "An Era of Negotiation."

[85] An important work in this area is Arnold L. Horelick, A. Ross Johnson and John D. Steinbruner, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches*, R-1334 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1973).

BOOK REVIEWS

Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage. By A. J. Ayer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 254. $8.75.)

Here is the record of Professor Ayer's William James lectures, delivered at Harvard University in 1970. It is a book largely given over to a tactful exposition of Russell and Moore; but there is nothing on Russell's purely logical work and, except for a brief section in which Ayer describes an interesting connection between the paradox of analysis and the naturalistic fallacy, nothing on Moore's ethical writings either. In his Preface Ayer writes that his original intention had been to issue this volume as part of his study of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James: the earlier work has been published under the title *The Origins of Pragmatism,* so the quartet is now complete.

Twentieth-century philosophy is segmented, rather like an arthropod. In major intervals there is the revolt against idealism, logical atomism, logical positivism, which has acquired something like a retrospective moral grandeur among social scientists, linguistic analysis and ordinary language philosophy, logical analysis and the exaltation of quantification theory—this in the sense of W. V. O. Quine—and more recently, under the influence of work originally begun in modal logic, a partial revival of speculative metaphysics. Despite Ayer's inventive judgment that ". . . those who look upon him as an exponent of ordinary-language philosophy . . . are doing him an injustice" (p. 245), G. E. Moore is fixed firmly as an enthusiast for the limpid vernacular. For linguistic analysis generally Russell had dry contempt. But his own work of the 1930s and 1940s sometimes seems thin. It is the startling and original volumes of his early and middle years that for all their unquestioned carelessness have entered completely into the great canon of English philosophy. So Russell seen as an historical figure looms bulkily over the first third or so of this century's analytic history.

Ayer's discussion is not historical, and readers interested in thematic development might prefer John Passmore's *One Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1957) or J. O. Urmson's *Philosophical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). The method works well in the long stretch of the book given over to Russell. Here are many of the famous doctrines: the theory of logical constructions; the theory of descriptions; logical atomism, broken by Ayer into two parts; neutral monism. The analysis is often adroit, especially in the section devoted to the theory of descriptions: Ayer neatly balances Russell's view against Strawson's. But there are certain matters of emphasis that seem unusual. Ayer urges that almost all of Russell's philosophy is driven "by his conception of what there is, or rather, of what there can rationally be thought to be" (p. 10), adding in frank perplexity that "the central part which this ontological question plays in Russell's treatment of philosophy has not . . . been at all widely recognized." But Russell's overriding concern has been with epistemology: ontology is a subject dominated by men with austere passions looking to record their conviction that the world is really the arena for a handful merely of the elementary particles, or the atomic facts, or that dynamically curved and empty space which, according to geometrodynamics, makes up the ultimate stuff of creation.

Ayer's discussion of Moore is less successful. Like Henry James, Moore wrote in a style at once persuasive and rebarbative. Ayer goes at it manfully in chapters that treat of Moore's refutation of idealism, the defense of common sense, abstract entities and Moore's concept of analysis. But Moore *is* a vastly more restricted philosopher than Russell, and it is difficult to maintain unflagging interest in a man who consumed himself with such questions as whether sense data have unexamined parts. Ayer concludes his discussion by drawing an interesting distinction between Moore's concept of analysis and Russell's: while Russell envisaged a *revision* of ordinary language as a result of analysis, Moore looked only to a more elaborate *description* of ordinary language. Curiously, Moore's commitment to description merely seems to have been offered in a largely ceremonial spirit, or so Ayer claims, since Moore's technical remarks on the theory of perception waddled over the bounds of ordinary language and the rules of usage that it suggests.

David Berlinski

University of Puget Sound

Frantz Fanon. By David Caute. (New York: The Viking Press, 1970. Pp. 116. $4.95, cloth; $1.65, paper.)

Fanon. By Peter Geismar. (New York: Dial Press, 1971. Pp. 214. $6.95, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Five years ago, on the dust jacket of his book, the publisher could announce without excessive advertising license that since Fanon's death in 1961, ". . . *The Wretched of the Earth* has become a key ideological document for radical movements across the globe, notably black militants in the United States." Today the book has its currency mainly in the reading lists of courses on revolution in academe. The militancy of the black movement in the United States has been suspended, and the blacks in Africa have found oppressors of their own race as their new rulers. Yet Fanon's work lives to remind us of the intensity of anti-white passion appeased neither by the achievement of political sovereignty in the former colonial areas nor by feeble attempts at amelioration of the black condition here at home.

The two biographies under review, sympathetic but not uncritical, differ in approach and quality. (A more recent biography, *Frantz Fanon, A Critical Study,* by Irene L. Gendzier [New York: Vintage, 1974]), provides a more comprehensive analysis of Fanon's politicization and evaluation of his influence on the Algerian revolution and elsewhere.) Caute's account is by far the more analytical and systematic presentation of Fanon's ideas. Geismar's, drawn largely from interviews and conversations with those who had known Fanon, is the more "personal," though it surprisingly lacks detail about individual and family influences on his early development. The portrait of Fanon that emerges from his admiring biographer is one of an intense and passionate—and often impatient, scornful and overbearing—man, who packed careers as a soldier, psychiatrist, writer, revolutionary and diplomat into the brief span of 36 years (1925–1961). He spent the last few months of his life ironically under treatment for leukemia in Bethesda Hospital, outside Washington, D.C., capital of the country he loathed, regularly visited by a member of the American diplomatic service who probably was a C.I.A. agent.

The sequence and themes of Fanon's writings are so interwoven with his own personality and personal development that psychological speculation is difficult to resist. In his review of the Geismar and Caute biographies (*New York Times Book Review,* March 14, 1975, p. 5), Albert Memmi, who, like Fanon, has had something original to say about the relations between colonizers and the colonized, suggests that Fanon ". . . sought the solution to his personal drama in political action and philosophy." Born in Martinique, Fanon thought himself French and white only to find in France that he was regarded as French West Indian and black. Nor did problems of color and solidarity among the oppressed resolve themselves in Algeria or Africa. He could neither assimilate with his oppressors nor could he return to his people and his past. Caught in this unresolvable tension, if I understand Memmi, Fanon was driven to propose a new man in a totally reconstructed world.

Whatever the merit of such psychological interpretation, Fanon's reputation and influence seem to rest now on *The Wretched of the Earth* (trans. Constance Farrington, [New York: Grove Press, 1966]), written in the last year of his life. The work hardly qualifies as a carefully constructed treatise in revolutionary theory. It is, as Caute notes, imprecise, lacking in clarity, bristling with generalizations usually unsupported by evidence, and often subsuming the activist and the ideal in a single categorical affirmation. Yet it is in Caute's opinion "one of the great political documents of our time" (p. 74). Geismar would take the edge off the criticisms leveled against *The Wretched* by characterizing it as an *"outil de combat,"* part of the war against colonialism, "the contribution of a skilled revolutionary propagandist" (pp. 200–201). True enough, but Fanon had intended it as a revolutionary theory for the Third World, and so it has been read.

The core of Fanon's theory is that the authentic revolutionary class in the Third World is the poor peasantry who have kept their moral values and their devotion to the nation intact. Based thus in the countryside and sparked by deviant nationalists who have become disaffected with the orientation of the nationalist parties, the revolution moves into the urban areas where the "Lumpenproletariat" —the classless idlers, pimps, prostitutes, and petty criminals—provide the spearhead. Fanon rejects the native proletariat, privileged in African society, as a revolutionary class, nor does he provide any role, as Mao Tse-tung did in his revolutionary strategy, for sections of the native bourgeoisie whom Fanon dismisses as "parasitical." Central to his theory also is the function of violence as a liberating force. Violence is the ultimate psychological cathartic. Through violence "organized and educated by its leaders," the people will come to understand social truths. Violence is a political necessity in armed struggle *and* a means of social and moral regeneration to reunite the community divided by colonial policy. Psychologically it would serve to eradicate the inferiority complex of the colonized, erasing apathy and despair and laying the groundwork for the creation of a productive citizenry. Decolonization cannot be represented by the mere establishment of nationhood. Rather "decolonization is always a violent phenomenon . . . quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men . . . the whole structure being changed from the bottom up" (*The Wretched of the Earth,* p. 29). Fanon calls for no less than a transformation of the consciousness of both the colonized and the colonizer.

Just as Marx has been faulted for expecting too much of the proletariat—a revolutionary consciousness that would provide the driving force for the transformation of society—so Fanon can be criticized for demanding too much of the peasantry and lumpenproletariat. Commentators along the political spectrum have not found it difficult to criticize Fanon's political ideas and the messianism embedded in his theory. (For a conventional Marxist critique, see Jack Woddis's, *New Theories of Revolution* reviewed in *APSR,* 68 [June, 1974], 1751–1752.) Among the *engagé,* however, there remains the conviction that Fanon's ideas are highly relevant to the most pressing problems of contemporary Africa: the improvement of the condition of the peasant masses and the materialization of values specific to the African context without reference either to capitalism or socialism. (E.g., Guy Martin's "Fanon's Relevance to Contemporary African Political Thought," *UFAHAMU,* vol. IV, no. 3 [Winter, 1974], 11–34.) At bottom, Fanon's life and work are testament to the psychological damage inflicted on both the colonizer and the colonized wrought by imperialism and to the inadequacy in human terms of any concept of decolonization that is equated with formal sovereignty.

Bernard S. Morris

Indiana University

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice? By William Sloane Coffin, Jr., and Morris I. Leibman. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. Pp. 93. $5.75.)

Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience. By Richard J. Regan, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972. Pp. 245. $8.00.)

Civil Disobedience and Democracy. By Elliot M. Zashin. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 368. $7.95.)

Civil disobedience is generally recognized to be an extraordinary form of illegal action. Both its advocates and opponents recognize that it is different in nature from ordinary lawbreaking, and most agree that the difference consists in the motive, manner, and aim of the disobedience. Unlike ordinary criminals, the civilly disobedient are thought to act out of moral concern, publicly and nonviolently, for the purpose of avoiding evil or doing good. This common understanding gives such extraordinary disobedience a cloak of respectability and tends to cast the public controversy aroused by such disobedience in terms of reconciling the claims of morality with the requirements of public order and stability.

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice? may serve as an useful introduction to the issues raised by conscientious disobedience in protest of public law or policy. It records a debate between William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, and their discussion of the title issue with a panel of distinguished citizens. It is a swift and eloquent debate, not without impassioned exchange or insight, in which reasoned rhetoric blends with platitudinous demagoguery. Dr. Coffin asserts the primacy of individual conscience over all, and defends civil disobedience as a political weapon for the downtrodden in righteous pursuit of their heartfelt desires. Mr. Leibman condemns such lawless action as essentially unreasoning, uncivil and undemocratic—a threat to just order and useless for solving the complex problems of a technological "conglomerate" like the United States. Their remarks concerning the primacy of reason or will in public affairs, of persuasion or force, form the most suggestive and least conventional exchange regarding the relation of law and conscience to justice in civil society.

This relation is not a simple one in which reason or wilfulness is necessarily to be found on one side or the other in a conflict between law and conscience. However, the fact that law is no longer viewed as a rule of reason but as the embodiment of a particular morality—if not merely the instrument of dominant interests—tends to make conscientious disobedience appear to be an authentic voice of righteousness raised in desperate opposition to established injustice. Richard J. Regan, S.J. rejects this common view of civil disobedience because it divorces legality from morality. He objects to the divorce because public laws in democratic societies express collective moral judgments and, in the United States at least, also recognize freedom of conscience. For this reason, "the issue in conflicts of conscience and law . . . is not simply one of morality versus legality, but, from the viewpoint of morality, one of competing moral judgments and, from the viewpoint of legality, one of conflicting legal claims" (pp. 185–86).

As a political scientist, Father Regan relinquishes to philosophers and theologians the task of assessing the competing moral claims of private conscience and public law. He has chosen instead to formulate generalizations descriptive of the legal status given to conscientious objection in the United States. To accomplish this object, he surveys the relevant Court decisions in an attempt to identify the different public interests at stake in the various conflicts with conscience, and to determine their relative importance. Similarly, he constructs a "typology of moral obligation" in an effort to distinguish the kinds of conscientious imperative and to determine their relative significance. The analysis is apparently intended to produce empirically grounded generalizations predictive of judicial behavior in future determinations of conflicts between law and conscience.

The result is disappointing for its formality. "The most salient conclusion from the cases surveyed is that no claim of conscience, however high, prevailed against a public interest ranked high"—or "even moderately high" (p. 190)—"by a majority of justices" (p. 188). On the other hand, "when Court majorities have rated unambiguously low the public interest at stake against private claims of conscience, the latter, of whatever quality, have been regularly vindicated" (p. 193).

This disappointing formality appears to be a necessary consequence of the formality inherent in Father Regan's method. It is impossible to make intelligible the relation of law and conscience in a political society without examining what each is. Perhaps recognition of this led Father Regan to include an interesting appendix outlining the prominent theories of conscience in the Western tradition, but he makes no attempt to determine which theory correctly describes what conscience is. Instead, he silently adopts one theory in constructing his typology of moral obligation, treats conscience phenomenologically as a matter of personal consciousness of guilt or moral integrity, and classifies the various claims of conscience as high, moderate or low according to the degree of obligation perceived in conscientious commands and prohibitions, or the degree of guilt felt for failure to follow them. Similarly, he makes no attempt to explain the Court's judgment of the high, moderate, or low significance of the public interest at stake in its decisions granting or refusing legal status to the claims of private conscience in matters of national security, public order, public welfare, the family or education.

This methodological modesty makes Father Regan's book valuable mainly for its succinct and comprehensive survey of the relevant Court cases. It also accounts for its almost fatal weakness—its failure to make intelligible the primacy of law which it amply demonstrates. In the conflicts of law and conscience, the public interest has always prevailed except in matters of little moment and, after all, it is the law which—in recognition of a public interest (p. 8)—accords to conscientious objection whatever legal status it happens to enjoy in the United States.

The destruction of this primacy of law in the minds of citizens appears to be a primary object of Elliot M. Zashin's *Civil Disobedience and Democracy*. As a product of the Berkeley milieu in the early 'sixties, Zashin became convinced that American society suffers from established injustices incapable of remedy by ordinary political action. Less theoretical than practical, his aim is to "legitimize civil disobedience as a democratic tactic," to actualize "its potential as an effective political technique" for securing social peace and justice in the United States (p. 1). His book aims overall to create the tolerance of civil disobedience necessary for its effectiveness as an instrument of the social and political change he so ardently desires.

To make civil disobedience respectable, to "legitimize" it, requires that law-abiding citizens be disabused of their conviction that conscientious disobedience in pursuit of political change is uncivil, undemocratic, and wrong. Zashin attempts to disarm them of this conviction through an interpretation of liberal democracy designed to support the view that civil disobedience is an unconventional but loyal form of political participation. His method is to weave by artful selection from the conflicting views of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson, Bentham, Mill, T. H. Green, and others, a coherent theory of civil disobedience as a natural extension of the liberal principle of government by consent of the governed. The argument is a prolix presentation of now familiar views of the "New Left."

Liberal democracy seeks to protect the individual as an autonomous moral agent. It intends "to minimize (his) subordination to purposes other than his own" (p. 35), and to avoid subjecting him to "ends and means with which he cannot feel any spontaneous interest in complying" (p. 61). The principle of consent is expressive of these ends. But genuine moral autonomy requires that consent be a fully informed expression of personal consciousness (p. 92), and voting studies have shown that most citizens do not consent in this way (p. 302). Certainly disaffected citizens do not assent to policies from which they dissent (p. 300). Government by consent thus appears to be a chimera rather than a genuine means of avoiding alienation (p. 303). (Indeed, feeling-put-upon may be a necessary consequence of government since all rule, even majority rule, involves ruling—a subordination of the ruled to the decisions of those who rule.) Fidelity to the principle of moral autonomy requires liberal democracy to find an alternative to rebellion and acquiescence for the powerless and the disaffected (p. 94). Politics, of course, is the true middle ground between rebellion and subjection. But for the politically ineffective civil disobedience seems a viable middle way between autonomy and alienation—between getting-one's-way and feeling-put-upon. By this subjectivist transvaluation of the aims of modern republicanism, Zashin can claim that "the intent of democracy is also the intent of civil disobedience" (p. 61).

But this tolerance-breeding charm may be broken either by the impatience of the alienated for what they desire, or by the fears of law-abiding citizens for the safety of the Republic. To assure the efficacy of civil disobedience, Zashin tries to persuade disaffected citizens of its utility and to convince satisfied citizens of its harmlessness. His method is to posit a suitable definition. To qualify as civil disobedience, unlawful political action must profess a higher obedience, intend neither open violence nor secret subversion, and accept punishment which is truly legal (p. 118). To still the fears of decent citizens he thus limits the lawless pursuit of conscientious desire, but the limits are not too stringent lest the alienated be driven to reject civil disobedience as a viable alternative to rebellion or acquiescence (p. 141). Civil disobedience is by definition made useful, harmless and loyal. Its advocates eschew "revolution . . . made in the old way." They wish only "to transform American political and social institutions in a radical way, but without betraying their adherence to democracy, equality and humanism" (p. 329).

It is perhaps pointless to criticize charming advocacy for superficial scholarship, conceptual confusion and fallacious argument. Certainly Zashin's tedious study is valuable for its unintended revelation both of the effects of ideology upon inquiry and of the nature of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience can be distinguished from both conscientious objection and ordinary lawbreaking by its emphatically political character. Arising here from a conscientious and abstract partisanship, it appears to be a timid—if not masked—species of civil war. At every decisive turn, the advocates of civil disobedience justfy this unlawful political action by their conscientious desire for a bloodless revolution in America.

Robert F. Sasseen
San Jose State University

Tradition, Change, and Modernity. By S. N. Eisenstadt (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973. Pp. 367. $14.00.)

I know of no sociologist whose books and essays produce in me so great a feeling of utter helplessness as do those of Professor Eisenstadt. In 1957 I published my first review of one of his books (*From Generation to Generation*). That was his first piece of work written under the spell of Professor Parsons, who had spent the previous decade or so writing in such a fashion as to give all of the individuals who were prematurely anti-Parsonian for the wrong reasons a perfectly tenable place to stand. Professor Parsons had gone into his binary stage. He and his disciples took a bunch of concepts—now called "pattern variables"—and treated them as rigidly mutually exclusive rather than as differences of degree. Neither Parsons nor his disciples ever used them as though they were in fact binary. I referred to that then as the fallacy of misplaced dichotomies; in private conversations Professor Eisenstadt agreed that the categories were not dichotomous.

I feel helpless when I confront the work of Professor Eisenstadt because I believe him to have an excellent mind. I am also rather arrogant about my own capacities. I find it extremely frustrating therefore when I cannot make head or tail of what he writes when I try to read it carefully. There are, after all, a group of people who consider themselves to be sociologists who have no truck with scientific analysis as such and are more properly to be judged on their humanistic contributions. Professor Eisenstadt has, as far as I know, no such pretensions to cover his tracks. Let me try to make the sources of my frustration explicit in terms of the text here for review rather than personal and autobiographical.

If the blurb for his book correctly represents his view of it, Professor Eisenstadt thinks the book focuses a collection of his essays on the patterns of change in contemporary and transient societies; explores the role of tradition in such changes; invokes comparisons among European countries, China, Japan, etc. to make his points; criticizes extant theories and suggests new approaches. I have tried to condense this fairly.

Professor Eisenstadt begins his book (pp. 4–5) by stating three qualitative dichotomies: liberty vs. authority, stability and continuity vs. change, and modern social rationalities vs. cultural orientations (presumably modern social rationality is not a cultural orientation). These qualitative dichotomies somehow get combined with ". . . the description and analysis of the structural and organizational aspects of different types of societies" (p. 7). Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic division of labor is cited as support for the relevance of such dichotomous tools (p. 8). What Professor Eisenstadt, along with most other sociologists, does not know is that Durkheim saw through this distinction in the very book in which he presented it (*De la division du travail social,* 1893). His discovery of "the non-contractual elements of contract" brought this distinction to a halt for him. As far as I know, he never used it subsequently. Of all the hundreds of people who created such a distinction, Durkheim alone saw through it and abandoned it. We do not give him appropriate credit.

Early in this book there is a subsection entitled "Modernization and Development—the New Paradigm" (p. 11). Professor Thomas Kuhn has taught us all to hitch up to the word "paradigm" where the less prestigious word "model" will haul all the intellectual freight aboard, but we need not pause for logomachy. Although "paradigms" are often referred to in this book, I do not recall a single clearly identified and stated paradigm.

As part of the promised "new paradigm" I expected a definition of the term "modern" or "modernization." Indices of modernization are often discussed, but I do not recall any clearcut definition of the concept. How can we tell (see page 25) what "modernization implies" when we cannot even tell what modernization *is,* except by empathy with Professor Eisenstadt?

I suppose my fundamental theoretical annoyance focuses on the word "tradition" as that term is used by Professor Eisenstadt. His index (see page 367) indicates that traditionalism is defined on page 156. I ask you to turn to page 156. There is something closer to a definition at the bottom of page 151, where we have the following quotation, "But whatever the difference between traditional societies, they all share the acceptance of tradition, of the givenness of some actual or symbolic past event, order, or figure as the major focus of their collective identity, as the delineator of the scope and nature of their social and cultural order and as ultimate legitimator of change and of the limits of innovation." But of course, by that definition, there are no nontraditional societies. No societies constitute a *complete* break with the past, no matter how radical their leaders and other members think of them as being. The problem with the word "traditional" as used in these contexts is that it is used to imply that some societies are that way and others are not. It is used as though it is a binary distinction, and that is false. There are societies whose members place a very heavy weight indeed on accepted precedent as the primary basis for legitimacy. (Incidentally, it is not true that the things done for "traditional" reasons are irrational. Given the means at their disposal, what people do for traditional reasons frequently coincides to a very high degree indeed with what it is rational to do.)

There are other peoples who, over a very much broader area of their social lives, justify performances by reference to rational scientific models, even though those are frequently spurious, but these peoples do not lack traditions. The remarkable thing about them is not that they have eliminated traditions but that they have managed to set them aside as much as they do. In the United States, for example—clearly a modern society in Professor Eisenstadt's eyes—state and local governance as presently constituted are clearly obsolete. We are not faced with a single problem, domestic or international, that has not had its solution impeded by state and local governance as presently constituted—and yet, those forms of state and local governance are supported almost entirely on traditional grounds. Consider our views of locally controlled schools, police forces, the Constitution, etc. The term "tradition" has its uses. Used as though some societies have traditions and some not—with all difficulties taken care of by ad hoc qualifications—it begs rather than answers questions. Durkheim understood this.

Nowhere does this emerge more clearly for me than in the sections on China (see pp. 261–280). For Professor Eisenstadt, terms like "traditionalistic" become synonyms for elements that don't seem to work as far as modernization is concerned. This term, along with the terms "transformative" and "patrimonial," puts robes on his and everyone else's hindsight, but all it seems to say again and again is that China failed to modernize.

To put the matter more simply, without the fancy words, the Chinese were faced with a classical problem: their requirements for high levels of coordination and control escalated at exactly the point in time that their previously existing bases for coordination and control—in this case, overwhelmingly, family stability—came apart at the seams as never before. Incidentally, without Professor Eisenstadt's advantage of hindsight, no one would have regarded modernity as the greatest threat to the Chinese. The Mongols completely conquered the Chinese in a sense that the forces of the "West" never did. Unlike the Japanese, who had a highly convertible basis for coordination and control, relatively independent of family and local political structures, the Chinese had to create a new set of controls. The leaders of the Kuomintang were not successful; the present leaders of China have clearly created such political structures. Where China will go from here remains to be seen. None of this comes out very clearly in Professor Eisenstadt's book, and he misses the point that would help him in the cases of Thailand and Japan, both of which were highly traditionalistic from many points of view. Presumably Japan was not "neo-traditionalistic" because she became highly modernized.

On page 268 we see the introduction of terms which again put robes on hindsight. No matter how radical and revolutionary the revolution of Sun Yat-Sen may look, we find out that, instead of being transformative, rational and modernist, it was nontransformative, neotraditional, and semipatrimonial. None of these terms is very clearly defined. With their qualifications, they simply mean that the regime in question was not "successful." Taiwan is a special puzzler for Professor Eisenstadt. The "success" in Taiwan, and to some extent that in Thailand, leads essentially to a conclusion with regard to his hypotheses—if one can identify them clearly—"sometimes yes; sometimes no."

On page 270, we find a reference to the relative mutual autonomy of the "social, cultural and political orders." This can only imply that it is possible for the social to be noncultural and nonpolitical, the cultural to be nonsocial and nonpolitical, and the political to be nonsocial and noncultural. Do such implications merit further discussion? Such usages lead Professor Eisenstadt further down in the same paragraph to observe, "This, of course, was also related to the fact that no church or cultural organization in China existed independently of the State." That whole way of putting things is so at variance with what we know about Buddhism that it is hard to know where to start. Yes, the Chinese government could license monks and nuns, but in no ordinary sense was there any sort of churchly dependence on the State—assuming the Imperial Chinese government to be a State. Should one even use the term "church" for the Buddhist organizations? The Buddhist organizations in a single *hsien* didn't necessarily relate to one another, much less did all of them combine into one sort of national organization or church. Professor Eisenstadt should know better than to impose Christian religious concepts on other religions. Buddhism is a puzzler for him. Taoism would be a howler, and that's not the end of religions in China. Professor Eisenstadt is so overwhelmed by what he sees in China of the elements of centralization—quite extraordinary for a relatively non-modernized society—that he almost completely misunderstands the role of decentralization there.

On page 277, Professor Eisenstadt refers to "partial groups such as families and regions." Whatever does he mean by the concept of "partial groups"? It seems to be self explanatory for him. I wish it were for me. On page 280 we have something of a conclusion about China—Professor Eisenstadt's last paragraph before going on to India. It seems that the present Chinese regime may or may not be successful in doing what the Nationalists attempted, but, either way, the Chinese heritage will prove to have been of great importance in "shaping the destiny of its encounter with modernity." Not only in China! Unless one is a mystic, the historical basis from which change takes place is one of the most important factors in affecting the destiny of anything. (Incidentally, even in this he seems unalert to the fact that the historical base from which change took place for the Nationalists was after all somewhat different from that for the present People's Republic.)

Finally, Professor Eisenstadt's conclusions, pages 357–363, represent an interweaving of advice and analysis that is not to my taste. Taste aside, however, where I know the materials best, as in the case of China, I more often find myself in disagreement than agreement with him. I deeply regret that.

Marion J. Levy, Jr.
Princeton University

Socialism and Affluence. By The Fabian Society. (London: Fabian Society, 1967. Pp. 93. 12s.)

The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals. By The Fabian Society. (London: Fabian Society, 1970. Pp. 159. 30s £1.50, cloth; 18s 90p, paper.)

The Fabian pamphlet *Socialism and Affluence* was first published in 1967 and was reprinted in 1970. It is a group of four lectures, three of which were given by academics and the fourth by the late Richard Crossman a member of the Labour Cabinet from 1964–1970. Professors Abel-Smith and Townsend both make very strong pleas for larger expenditure on social services which they justify by reference to numerous social surveys recording widespread poverty amongst low earning families and pensioners. Unfortunately, the humanity and compassion which makes the works of Titmuss, Abel-Smith, and Townsend so attractive is not matched in these essays by a full analysis of the economic or political costs of providing better services to all those in need. With hindsight it is easy to see the danger of ignoring the harsh reality of economic circumstances; in 1966 the British could still delude themselves by referring to "affluence" as if American socioeconomic problems were similar to those of the U.K. The pressures imposed upon the 1966–70 Labour Government to pursue redistributive and other social welfare aims resulted not only in an increase in taxation from 36 per cent to 52½ per cent of national income (D. R. Myddleton, *The Power to Destroy* [London: Johnson, 1969]) but also to the party's decisive defeat in the 1970 election. Crossman in 1966 still had the moral courage to chide academics who could hope "that with luck the [economic] crisis should be over in a few months" (see p. 88 of Socialism and Affluence which refers back to Brian Abel-Smith's lecture, "Labour's Social Plans"); but with mounting political pressure for better social services and the organization of social welfare lobbies all efforts to curb expenditure failed.

The Fifth Social Service is a collection of nine essays published in 1970 which exemplify the gulf that exists between economic reality and the dreams of Fabians. The "fifth" service relates to the personal social services which provide for the needs of children, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups such as discharged prisoners and homeless families. In 1968 the Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Services (Seebohm Report HMSO 3703) was published and recommended very extensive changes in the organization of these services. Five of the Fabian essays constitute a critique of the Seebohm Report (essays by Peter Townsend on the objectives of the personal social services departments; Adrian Sinfield on social work, Peter Mittler on community mental health care, Michael Meacher on the needs of the elderly, and John Agate on hospital and community care of the aged).

Peter Townsend in the first essay suggests that the objectives of personal social services should be examined in the light of (1) the subjective views of consumers and experienced suppliers, (2) policy outcomes, and (3) a level of provision determined by "true objectivity." His concept of objectivity is not fully defined or operationalized and would appear to rest upon utopian ideals. The other authors develop Townsend's theme of "true objectivity" and therefore give relatively little thought to the identification of priorities or costs. Meacher supports a proposal for a one hundred per cent registration of elderly people so that they may be visited and have their needs assessed and satisfied. As most of the services are free or very heavily subsidized, the demands made by the elderly would inevitably absorb a large share of budgets intended not only for the elderly but also for other age groups. A lack of recognition of prevailing budgetary constraints is also apparent in other essays which recommend increases in expenditure without relating these to the amount of distributive justice already attained by increasing social security benefits and other services to which low-income consumers have access.

In Adrian Sinfield's essay the role of social workers is defined as the imparting of information about rights, making services available, helping to communicate needs to those in authority, and encouraging action by the individual, family, and group on behalf of themselves and the community (p. 31). David Bull examines the difficulties encountered by voluntary workers giving information to the general public about a number of means-tested benefits administered by national and local government authorities. He discusses the political dilemmas which confront pressure group organizations campaigning for the withdrawal of selective benefits, and the introduction of universal schemes such as family allowances or higher basic pensions; and he expresses his anxiety that by increasing the efficiency of means-tested schemes, selective policies will thereby be strengthened and appear to be condoned by those who are politically opposed to them.

DELLA NEVITT
London School of Economics

Lexikon Zur Soziologie. Edited by Werner Fuchs et al. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973. Pp. 783. DM 29.)

The terminological apparatus of sociology is in a notoriously parlous state. The diversity of the linguistic, theoretical, and empirical traditions which contribute to (and contend for dominance within) the discipline; the practitioners' eagerness to signal the real or claimed novelty of their contributions through the use of neologisms; the fuzziness of the boundaries separating sociology from other disciplines—all these factors make the working vocabulary of sociologists cumbersome, discordant, imprecise, ill-ordered, often obscure. Hence the difficulties (and the attractions) of the enterprise, attempted in the book under review, of producing a reference book which would register, codify, possibly order that unwieldy patrimony of terms.

Such an undertaking involves, it seems to me, two basic "design decisions." In the first place it can strive to reduce that multiplicity, order that diversity, by giving the status of entries to relatively few terms, subordinating to each of these a number of others mentioned only within the presentation and discussion of the former; alternatively, it can treat as entries as many terms as possible, instead of ordering them into sets of more or less tightly coordinated terms. In the second place such a reference work may include only terms originating and circulating primarily within sociology *as such* (however understood), or on the contrary take up any terms in use within sociological discourse, whatever their origins and (so to speak) their citizenship.

The title itself of this thick, small-format book (A lexicon not *of,* but *for* sociology); the acknowledgment in the preface of differences not just in the interests and competences, but in the theoretical, methodological and ideological orientations of the five editors and eighty-two contributors; and above all the very large number of entries (some 6,000)—these characteristics indicate that with respect to each "design decision" the *second* of the above alternatives has been chosen. This is a repertory of definitions and capsule treatments of such terms as one may come across in reading sociological literature, whether themselves specifically sociological or not; in fact a great many of those here treated as entries are primarily in use in fields as diverse as ethology (e.g., "Imprinting"), statistics ("Histogram"), political science ("Division of powers"), or philosophy ("Erfahrungswelt"). Great care has been taken to present as clearly as possible each term; much less effort has gone (intendedly and, in my view, advisedly) into stipulating relations between individual terms. Furthermore, when a plurality of definitions or usages exist for a given term, each is distinctly articulated; thus four definitions are given for "Ideology," and six for "Law," for instance; and within many entries (e.g., "Feudalism"), a broadly Marxian/Marxist usage is juxtaposed to one or more others with different systematic backgrounds and ideological resonances. Furthermore, even somewhat idiosyncratic terms, specifically identified with only one author or school, are entered; and one may in fact wonder whether in selecting these the editors may have been rather *too* permissive. It is one thing giving entries to Max Scheler's "Ideal factors" and "Real factors," but another to treat as entries Dieter Claessen's "Sequence expectation" or F. H. Allport's "Pluralist ignorance."

To continue with a few doubts and criticisms, it is unclear what criterion has been followed in treating as entries the titles of a very few books (among these "Streetcorner society" and "Soldier, American"). Non-German terms (mainly English, some French) are very frequently referred to; but again it is not clear why in certain cases they are followed by a definition (as with "Career patterns"), while in other cases they are entered but only to refer the reader to the German equivalent for a definition (as with "Contrat social"), and finally in other cases yet they appear after a German term, purely as a translation of it (as with "Skewness"). Furthermore, though the coverage of terms is impressive, the absence of some important ones appears unjustifiable. There are numerous entries beginning with "State," but no entry for "State" itself; "Weltanschauung party" and "Cadre party" are entries, but "Party" is not one. There are no entries for "Tax," "City," "Property," "Politics," "Cost-benefit analysis," "Hegemony," or "Contract." The book has no index, presumably because it has so many entries that it constitutes, as it were, its own index; yet one might like to have listed, for instance, all the authors and books mentioned *within* entries.

To test the quality of the treatment (always a tricky matter with reference works) I have read closely many hundred entries, as varied in theme and significance as "Curtosis" and "Ethnomethodology," or "Counterculture" and "Hermeneutics," and only very few of these have seemed to me lacking in clarity, precision, or insight. I have set a question mark, for instance, against the entry "Spirit of capitalism," which of course refers to Max Weber but fails to recognize that Weber treats strictly religious elements as causally connected with that "Spirit," but not as constitutive of it. And the last sentence of the entry "*Rechtsstaat*" ("A formal *Rechtsstaat* is sometimes found in dictatorships, e.g., in Germany at the beginning of the thirties") puzzled me: between 1930–33 the German republic may have been a purely formal Rechtsstaat but was no dictatorship; after 1933 it was a dictatorship, but was it a Rechtsstaat, formal or otherwise?

On the whole I find this a well-conceived and well-executed reference work, much to be recommended to those with enough German to make use of it, and not just to resolve difficulties originating from the reading of specifically *sociological* literature.

GIANFRANCO POGGI
University of Edinburgh

Interpretations of Fascism. By A. James Gregor. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974. Pp. 281. No price listed.)

During the past decade A. James Gregor has become the most prolific and acute analyst to be found outside Italy of the philosophic components of Italian fascism. Even within Italy his work in this regard is only equalled or surpassed by that of Renzo de Felice, the great biographer of Mussolini. The present volume follows Gregor's study of *The Ideology of Fascism* (1969) and his *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics* (1974); it will be followed by Professor Gregor's forthcoming study of the political and philosophical ideas of the young Mussolini.

The study of fascism comes rather more easily in the United States than in Western Europe, for even after thirty years, detachment is hard to achieve in countries that have actually experienced some form of fascism. This is perhaps demonstrated most graphically by the recent outpouring of abuse on Renzo de Felice in Italy following the appearance of the latest volume in his Mussolini biography, together with the brief *Intervista sul fascismo* (1975). If fascism is no longer a problem of West European politics, it is still a problem for West European ideology and culture.

Some of the reasons this is so are amply illustrated in the volume under review, which is the first systematic analysis in English of the principal theoretical efforts of the past fifty years to interpret Italian fascism. Ernst Nolte's introductory essay in his *Theorien uber den Faschismus* (1967) was a perspicacious attempt in the same direction, but limited by its very brevity, while the analytical essays in De Felice's *Il fascismo: Le interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici* (1970), while much fuller, lacked the systematic clarity and conciseness of Gregor's work.

Gregor has organized the attempted interpretation of fascism, with primary reference to Italy, under six general themes or categories: (1) The consequence of "moral crisis"; (2) The consequence of psychological disabilities; (3) The consequence of the rise of "amorphous masses"; (4) The consequence of class struggle; (5) function of a particular stage of economic development; and (6) a manifestation of totalitarianism. In each case he presents a brief summary of the arguments of the leading exponents of the theory, and then proceeds to analyze each interpretation critically in terms of its logical consistency and verifiability, and the degree to which it can be corroborated by the known facts of the history of Italian fascism. The result is effectively to demolish the various conflicting loose general sets of ideas that have passed for theories or interpretations of fascism.

Somewhat surprisingly, among those scholars and writers reviewed, the ones who seem to have done the best job of self-criticism and correction of the most extravagant or flagrantly inaccurate aspects of the theories of their own "school" are some of the more serious and relatively objective East European

Communist scholars of the past fifteen years, such as Alexander Galkin in the Soviet Union and Mihaly Vajda in Hungary. Western Marxists, by contrast, seem proportionately almost more disposed to repeat the hoary Marxist shibboleths of the 'thirties in unrevised form.

Gregor concludes that what we are left with does not add up to an empirically verifiable theory of fascism, but rather some loose general suggestions and ideas that merely provide the beginning of an approach to the topic, once the more extravagant and demonstrably false theories have been discarded. This conclusion is convincingly supported by direct data and rigorous analysis.

One position that is largely overlooked by this approach, though Gregor does mention it in passing, is the general skepticism shared by such diverse scholars at Henry A. Turner, Jr., Karl D. Bracher, and Renzo de Felice that such a general political category as "generic fascism" can even be demonstrated to have existed. The significant differences between the various radical nationalist movements of Europe in the 1920's and '30's were so great that it has never been easy to establish their common identity completely or systematically.

I myself agree with Gregor that such a thing as "generic fascism" did exist in Europe during the period 1920–45, though I would restrict the category simply to fascist movements rather than speaking of "fascist systems" or regimes. Mussolini himself in his final reassessment did not believe that his dictatorship had been a fully fascist regime, and the study of interwar Italian institutions largely bears him out. The Mussolini regime was a political dictatorship geared to a large degree of institutional pluralism in the nongovernmental institutions of Italian society—monarchy, army, church, business, and even to some extent the judiciary and culture. The Fascist party did not itself rule but was increasingly constituted as a bureaucracy within and under the official state, quite distinct from the structure of either Nazi Germany or Communist Russia. This would leave us with only Nazi Germany as a "fascist system"—not enough to constitute a genus.

Whether or not such an interpretation is correct, it serves to underscore the main thrust of Gregor's book: the limitations of our empirical knowledge, but above all the weakness of our conceptualization of the fascist phenomenon in interwar Europe. The clearing away of useless, obfuscatory theoretical debris is indispensable before genuine progress can be made, and in this task Gregor's book serves the study of fascist politics very well indeed.

STANLEY G. PAYNE
University of Wisconsin

The Ideological Imagination. By Louis J. Halle. (Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1972. Pp. xiv, 174. $6.95.)

Professor Halle has written an urbane and learned "tract for the times" (p. vii) about ideology—not ideology in general, but a particular version called "totalitarian ideology." It is a personal "speculation" that skips along from topic to topic, thinker to thinker, in pursuit of a viable alternative intellectual and political commitment, which turns out to be, antithetically, "the commitment to non-commitment" (p. 140). Continuity is provided by the author's determined attempt to account for the origins and impact of ideological thinking and the attitudes he sees associated with it: intolerance, dogmatism, bigotry, mass irrationality, and the bifurcated *Weltanschauung* of what he labels "Manicheanism." Needless to say, Halle's opposition to "ideologists," past and present, and their mode of thought and action is manifest throughout.

The argument begins with the standard distinction between the liberal's accommodation of diversity, associated with Locke, and the totalitarian's imposition of conformity, identified initially with Rousseau. The author's own "ideological" orientation is revealed by his insistence that only the latter qualifies as "ideology," strictly speaking (pp. 5–6). "Ideological thinking" is correspondingly "normative thinking so sure of its own rightness as to be intolerant of dissent" (p. 116). The road to this kind of dogmatism is marked, first, by Hobbes's "subversive" elimination of the "authority of God" in matters political (pp. 18–22), and next by the introduction of a fictional popular sovereignty, which achieves its apotheosis in the Rousseauean myth of the general will. The political utopia of Rousseau is then nicely complimented by the asocial romantic rebellion of Jean-Jacques. This unique confluence of institutional myth-making and introverted romanticism, Halle contends, is the ideological basis for all subsequent experiments in totalitarian politics and professional revolutionary careers.

From here it is a short step to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mussolini, and the whole pantheon of ideological anti-heroes, left and right, so familiar to this genre of writing. (Parenthetically, Hegel is notably absent because of enlightenment provided the author by Walter Kaufmann.) Marx and Marxism stand out as the *pièce de résistance* for post-1789 developments, and also supply the subject matter for Halle's most fruitful analysis. In these passages Marx emerges as a masterful "dramatist," setting the stage of history, composing lines for his actors, plotting a suitable dénouement, winning an audience. His facts were often mistaken, his concept of human nature dangerously dualistic, his predictions wrong, Halle maintains, but he possessed the ideologist's gift to command belief. It is precisely "as a dramatic vision, not as truth" (p. 75) that Marxism and other ideologies become historically influential. Of course, Halle also believes that the rise of ideology brings about an historical retrogression, even a "general intellectual debasement" (p. 121).

Having identified the forces of darkness, Halle goes on to propose a solution for the modern age, an odd amalgam of elements seemingly from J. S. Mill, Ortega, and W. G. Sumner. It rests on a demand for more profound "appreciation of our own ignorance" (p. 131). Because our knowledge consists at best of "partial, contingent, and tentative truths, mixed with error" (p. 134), Halle argues, creation of an open marketplace of ideas becomes the only rational social policy. Hope for salvation from mediocrity and mass society then lies with "individual minds." In one memorable aside we learn that Jefferson's America and Elizabethan England "were sordid and pitiful societies except as they were exalted by the virtue of a few individuals" (p. 130)! Man, we are told, is responsible "for himself alone" and is required only to "respect the rules" that make toleration possible. The measure of seriousness here is seen in an admonition to renounce "the common commitment to raising the moral standards and enhancing the understanding of others . . . to teaching others what is right and true" (p. 145). Evidently this is what "commitment to non-commitment" means. Placed alongside such advice, Halle's final assurance that we shall all profit from studying Plato's *Apology* (attached as an appendix) appears wholly incongruous.

As the author warns in his preface, much of his speculation is "wrong"—*responsibly* wrong, as he says—yet hopefully insightful. But how responsible and insightful? Aside from obvious limits to the individualistic prescriptions, the weaknesses of the diagnosis of ideology's pathology are those of any writing in this genre: accountability of past authors is assigned with summary justice, their explicit intentions are deliberately ignored, historical and social context is set aside, and the passion for synthesis becomes an obsessive preoccupation. Important differences among writers, distinctions among ideas, and effects of non-ideological factors are simply ignored. How interesting is a revival of the discredited view that Rousseau was the world's first ideologue, in face of all else that might be said about him? Is it enlightening, not to mention plausible, to hear that Schopenhauer, Darwin, Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, Freud, and Sorel all assisted the "revolt against reason" (pp. 97–8)? Surely the "ideological imagination," if it exists, is no more remarkable than the reactions it provokes.

LAWRENCE A. SCAFF

University of Arizona

From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought. By Donald W. Hanson. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. xiv, 469. $15.00.)

This book has two central theses, both stated by the author in the opening chapter (pp. 39–40). It is, first of all, "an assessment of the place of medieval ideas in the achievement of constitutional government," and the author argues that "the medieval contribution was very slight." Second, it attempts to identify the "perspectives which not only contributed to the emergence of constitutional government but which also are central to its continued vitality"—summarized by Hanson as "the birth of public consciousness" in England in the seventeenth century.

As the title indicates, only English thought is considered, thus excluding both ecclesiastical and continental theory. Even in England no attention is given to the thought of Hobbes and Locke, although there are lengthy treatments of Bracton, Fortescue, Hooker, St. Germain, and Coke. The focus is on operative theory, closely related to contemporary English practice, and the argument is that there is only a very tenuous connection between "traditional" English political theory and practice before the Commonwealth period in the seventeenth century and the modern "consciousness of the public dimension" which emerged at the time and formed the theoretical prerequisite for constitutionalism. What is often mistaken for an earlier English constitutionalism, according to Hanson, is the medieval notion of "double majesty"—the belief that both the king and the magnates should have a share in the government of England. Political authority in medieval England was personal and local. On a national level it was characterized by alternating periods of cooperation and violence between the king and the nobility—with the commons associated with them both in a minor and "distinctly subordinate" way in the late Middle Ages.

Utilizing this framework, Hanson then argues for a revision of the conventional views of pre-seventeenth century English constitutional theory. Bracton was not really arguing for the subordination of the king to the law but only for joint legislation by king and barons; Fortescue was not a theorist of mixed monarchy—because that theory is based on a differentiation of governmental functions which he did not hold; Hooker's work is "shot through with ambiguities" (p. 279), arguing at various times for the sovereignty of the king, the law, the body politic, and "the traditional doctrine of the joint supremacy of king and parliament,"; and Coke reformulated the doctrine of double majesty to apply to the relation of the common law and the royal prerogative and did not espouse either judicial review or the absolute supremacy of the common law. The doctrine of natural law provided an ethical standard which kings should observe, but not a higher law which could invalidate legislation that had been adopted jointly by the king and parliament. It was only with the assumption of omnicompetence by the Long Parliament in 1642 that Englishmen were impelled to undertake "a completely general discussion of the nature and purpose of society and government from a humanistic standpoint" and to achieve the "consciousness of the public dimension of political issues that separates the modern from the traditional political order of the Middle Ages" (p. 310).

What are we to make of this argument? The analysis of the individual theorists is careful and on the whole persuasive. Insofar as the book emphasizes the central importance of the theoretical changes in the seventeenth century, it makes a useful contribution—although, surprisingly, only one 25-page chapter is devoted to documenting the shift "from kingdom to commonwealth." There are serious problems, however, with the often-repeated insistence that medieval English political thought rested exclusively on a "traditional" notion of "double majesty" which had almost nothing to do with modern constitutionalism. The term itself does not appear in the sources, and (as the author's own conclusion on Hooker indicates) the thinkers he examines held different and potentially incompatible theories about the origin and exercise of political authority—theories which finally came into conflict in the seventeenth century. The participation of parliament in legislation and taxation was justified by all the medieval English theorists, however, because it was the corporate representative of the community of the realm, and this belief was not confined to what Hanson calls the "often hopelessly remote speculations of the sophisticated theorists of the age" (p. viii). As Fortescue noticed, this made a difference in the way that England was governed, and that difference can be described as a medieval form of constitutionalism, with "public," indeed even "civic," consciousness providing part of the justification for parliamentary participation. In reacting to the Whig "seamless web" theory of the development of English government, Hanson has downplayed the community-based elements in earlier English thought which enabled that theory to be persuasive in the first place, (e.g., Locke's quotations from Hooker). The medieval cases of royal deposition which he tries to argue away provide specific examples of the existence of an inchoate but operative "public consciousness" well before the seventeenth century. Even the civic consciousness—the awareness of one's role as citizen rather than subject—that resulted from the overthrow of the monarchy in the seventeenth century had its antecedents in concepts of community control of the ruler in earlier theory and practice (e.g., the conciliarists and the Huguenots whom the Puritan theorists cited at the time). What was novel in the seventeenth century was that constitutional theorizing (e.g., in Locke) now began with the individual, not the community. This important shift gets almost no attention from Hanson.

A final word should be said about the last chapter of the book which takes on a variety of issues that are only marginally related to its main purpose. It begins with a discussion of the applicability of liberal constitutionalism to the developing nations concluding that while a public consciousness exists among the leadership of the third world, it is unlikely that the historically particular political and ethical preferences embodied in liberal constitutionalist ideology will be adopted elsewhere. Then it criticizes a supposed tendency of modern liberalism to treat the state and government as epiphenomenal when in fact it was governmental needs and decisions that decisively shaped the course of English history and made modern liberty possible. Finally, the work concludes with an impassioned defence of pluralism against the radical critics of liberalism on the left and the right. The three different topics, reflecting the intellectual history of the concerns of social scientists of the 'sixties (the book was completed in 1969), are only loosely connected with each other and with the rest of the work.

In sum, this is a provocative and original analysis which, despite some overstatement of its central theses, is useful in compelling us to reexamine and refine our understanding of the development of English constitutional thought.

PAUL E. SIGMUND

Princeton University

Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. By G. C. Harcourt. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. x, 272. $10.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Professor Harcourt reviews a body of doctrine challenging the foundations of standard economics. The challenges, if valid, would confer increased respectability on ways of organizing production and income distribution guided more by politics and oriented less toward profit than the ways most amenable to standard analysis.

The title *Cambridge Controversies* is apt. The challenges emanate mainly from Cambridge University in England, while several prominent controversialists on the other side are based at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The English challengers are trying to resurrect and extend an approach to economic theory associated with David Ricardo and Karl Marx. They see an economy as more fully pervaded by technologically determined ratios of factor inputs to each other and to product outputs than modern orthodoxy envisages. Orthodoxy puts relatively more emphasis on how prices influence the proportions in which businessmen employ labor and other factors in particular lines of production, on how production and consumption patterns respond to prices, on price determination by supply and demand, and on the subjective element of human preferences in the market processes of determining outputs, prices, and incomes. Orthodoxy views an economy as a price system; the English challenge, more nearly as an interlocking of technologies.

Though this contrast is not of black and white, the two approaches carry different implications. In particular, orthodoxy upholds, and its English critics challenge, the marginal-productivity theory of functional income distribution. That theory sees the prices of factors of production (wage and interest rates, land rents, and so forth) as determined basically by supply and demand, with demand reflecting a factor's marginal contribution to the value of output. The theory is concerned with explaining, not justifying, the incomes of suppliers of productive factors.

In rejecting this explanation, the English critics take particular aim at the notion that the rate of interest or profit (they blur the distinction) corresponds to the marginal productivity of "capital" (in some sense or other of the word). They concoct numerical examples involving two (or more) techniques for producing a particular good. Technique A is the more economical at high rates of interest, B at intermediate interest rates, and A again at low rates. If the change from a higher to a lower rate of interest at one of the switch points brings a switch from the less to the more capital-intensive of the two techniques (which seems normal enough), then the switch back as the interest rate becomes still lower through the other switch point is paradoxical. The reduced interest rate brings adoption of a less, not more, capital-intensive technique. The whole idea of the interest rate as a price that rations a scarce factor of production seems shaken. Extensions of the analysis shake traditional notions of the productivity of thrift. The whole productivity explanation of factor prices and incomes—and with it, much of modern economic theory—runs into embarrassment.

Harcourt's book, especially if read in conjunction with *Capital and Growth: Selected Readings*, edited by Harcourt and N. F. Laing (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), serves as an introduction to an extensive literature. Cambridge-trained, Harcourt inclines toward the English side of the controversy.

In this reviewer's opinion, his side is wrong. It seems enamored of paradox for almost purely destructive purposes. Yet the would-be defenders of orthodoxy have not pinpointed the exact source of error. The trouble, it seems to me, lies in searching for a purely physical conception of "capital" (or whatever it is whose yield or price is the rate of interest). The paradoxes dissolve when we recognize that the amount of that factor required in a physically specified production process does indeed depend on its own price. (Gustav Cassel aptly called that factor "waiting"—waiting for value over time. To avoid technicalities here, may I refer to my "Toward Understanding Some Paradoxes in Capital Theory," *Economic Inquiry*, September, 1976.)

The controversies that Harcourt reviews would be terribly important if they referred to the real world. Actually, they refer not to reality but to paper-and-pencil exercises, to spurious problems spawned by inappropriate theoretical concepts. Economic theory has become its own subject matter; academic narcissism reigns.

Perhaps to compensate for his highly technical subject matter, Harcourt strains to write in a sprightly style. He uses arch, allusive language. Chapters or sections have headings such as "Main bout, round one," "Mouth guards out while we arrange a return bout," and "Excuse me, Professor Kaldor, but your slip is showing." Unfortunately, attempts at humor are not the same thing as clear exposition.

LELAND B. YEAGER
University of Virginia

Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist. By Robert Havemann. Trans. by Salvator Attanasio. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972. Pp. 255. $7.95.)

This is a passionate statement on behalf of the union of socialism and freedom by a man living through their radical separation in the German Democratic Republic. Robert Havemann is "East Germany's most celebrated heretic," to use the inane formulation on the dust-jacket; he is also a most lonely heretic. Beyond his close friend, the political balladeer Wolf Bierman, and a tiny circle of kindred spirits, among them, Havemann's two sons, there is precious little. Revisionists of the older generation, such as Ernst Bloch and Hans Mayer, long ago departed for West Germany, while those somewhat younger, such as Wolfgang Harich, who was jailed for conspiratorial activities after the Hungarian Uprising, have made their peace with the regime. Havemann does not hesitate to attack the conformism of his fellow intellectuals (for example, Stefan Heym and Kurt Hager) in the face of neo-Stalinism, and in the face of his own expulsion from the Party, the Academy of Sciences and his chair as a theoretical chemist at the Humboldt University. Yet, and extraordinarily, he is neither despairing nor bitter. He grants, in a related context, that "as an old Communist I find all this especially depressing," yet an old Communist he remains. Otherwise, I think, he would be nothing.

The book, very cleanly translated, has a simple but potent format consisting of segments of Havemann's interrogation by State Security in 1966, interspersed with flashbacks to his experiences under Gestapo arrest near the end of the Second World War. Throughout, he weaves fascinating anecdotes relating mostly to Party history since 1945, and a series of succinct if often flawed discourses on the crisis of Marxian theory and movements today. The book closes with Havemann's depiction and denunciation of the 1968 trial, conviction and sentencing of his son, Frank, to eighteen months imprisonment for having distributed leaflets and painted wall-slogans in solidarity with the Prague Spring. Like his earlier political book, *Dialektik ohne Dogma?* (1964), originally a controversial series of lectures presented at Humboldt, this one has not been published in East Germany.

Havemann, it should be said, is clearly not in the philosophical current of many of the better-known (in the West) revisionists such as the Yugoslav *Praxis* group, Karel Kosik, and the associates of the "Budapest School." He is instead what might be termed a Left-wing Engelsian, that is, one who believes in an objective dialectic of nature, opts for the dynamic rather than mechanistic features of this position, and opposes on principle any "dogmatic occlusion." This begs certain questions raised long ago by Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness,* but in its East German context it is flammable enough, and one hesitates to stress its undialectical qualities.

The flashbacks to the Brandenberg-Görden Penitentiary point to the obvious question, and Havemann does not avoid it: are the differences between fascism and Stalinism significant enough to justify continued commitment to those states which call themselves socialist? As he realizes, to pose the question this way is virtually to answer it negatively, yet Havemann does not: "in spite of everything," including the "numerous practices in the GDR that, at least formally and most embarrasingly, recall the Thousand Year Reich," he proclaims the GDR a "decisively progressive step in German history"; he insists that it and other socialist states "have not irrevocably missed the connection with the future" (pp. 254–55); and that "the fruits of the Bolsheviks' victorious struggles have not yet been wholly squandered" (p. 131).

These convictions are not based—at least not in this book—upon analysis of concrete tendencies in the GDR or the socialist bloc. In fact, they appear to be refuted by the actual tendencies Havemann does see: on the one side, neo-Stalinism, and on the other—as the Chinese, toward whom he is not entirely unsympathetic, have said—a plunge into the waters of petty-bourgeois, Goulash socialism. Moreover, he offers two proposals for the realization of genuine socialism which, while bold, are ephemeral: first, "the semirevolution [October Revolution + Stalinism] can be made total only if the workers themselves take possession of the expropriated property of the capitalists. This means they must fight for full control over the means of production and the products produced" (p. 128). In this regard, Havemann elsewhere in the book relates his own anguished and unsuccessful attempt to talk restraint to rebellious workers in Berlin in 1953, adding that neither then nor now does he accept the official claim that the uprising was the work of the Western secret service.

If he is quiet regarding the actual prospects of an authentic socialist transformation of the GDR, Havemann is equally silent on the real chances of his second, broader proposal:

> The Czechoslovakian tragedy can lead to the tragic defeat of the whole world revolutionary movement. With fear and anguish we must contemplate the possibility of a war between the Soviet Union and China. . . . The unity of the world revolutionary movement must be restored, created anew. If a new barbarism is to be warded off, the Communists in the Soviet Union must draw the correct lessons from the events in Czechosolvakia and themselves embark upon the path they are at present fighting against with all the means at their disposal (pp. 170–171).

In both instances, between the ideal and reality lies the proverbial abyss, bridged only by the categorical imperative of the old Communist in a very bleak situation: "we must not," Havemann asserts, "succumb to hopelessness." He *still* holds to the 20th Party Congress as a beacon for rejuvenated socialism; earlier he had placed great store in Walter Ulbricht as a bearer of de-Stalinization; and he continues to see in the Czech experiment not a flicker of light decisively snuffed out, but a continuing ray of inspiration. These are at best fuzzy ideas which virtually announce the very hopelessness they were meant to overcome. Beneath them, however, lies a sensibility that is firm enough. It is crystallized in this passage, describing a small feature of one of his interrogations by State Security:

> There I was, sitting in my semicircular easy chair, which was slightly too small for comfort. These chairs with their greasy arms are like a poor man's imitation of the real thing, standing in a director's office in their hideous magnificence. I sat in a wretched little chair whose sham elegance was supposed to make it seem as though the person sitting in it was still a free man. It bothered me that my State had made something like this, that it did not find it beneath its dignity, and that I had now ended up in such a chair (p. 96).

Earlier this year, Havemann's essay, "Freiheit als Notwendigkeit," a compact critique of "consumer socialism" in the GDR, appeared in a volume on Solzhenytsin, the USSR and the Western Left, edited by Rudi Dutschke, long one of Havemann's admirers. Apparently, he was recently and may still be under house arrest.

PAUL BREINES

Boston College

Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. By Frederick Jameson. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 432. $15.00.)

The success of fascism and Stalinism in the 1930s dealt a fatal blow to Marxist theoretical discourse in more ways than one. Whereas the forcible repression could have been weathered, the irreparable damage to traditional Marxist schemas arising from the new developments necessitated either a total rejection or a radical reconstitution. Efforts at reconstitution have been under way at least since the outbreak of World War I, when the bankruptcy of the Second International sent people like Lenin back to the books to figure out what had happened and rethink Marxist theory from its very roots. But the failure of the middle-European revolutionary surge around 1920 and the rise of the Third International within the remaining theoretical ruins choked out the promising work of those theoreticians whose efforts were already beginning to yield interesting results. Thus, kicked out of the German Communist Party, Korsch moved to the U.S., where both the isolation and the ensuing events gradually led him away from the Hegelian Marxism that he had sought to develop. No kinder fate befell the other two major Marxist thinkers, Gramsci and Lukács. One withered away in fascist jails from 1926 on, while the other, under pressure from both the official leadership of the Communist International as well as from internal theoretical inadequacies, capitulated to the prevailing travesties of Stalinism.

The facile enlightenment idea of universal history that Marxism had inherited, which held that communism, freedom, and equality were to be found at the end of the capitalist political rainbow, seemed rather to have led to Auschwitz and Siberia. And even after the defeat of fascism, the "Free World" countries incorporated its *content* in the very process of rejecting its *form*. The Marxism that avoided degeneration into an ideology of Stalinist legitimation, had to be qualitatively different from any mode of enlightenment thinking. Thus, those few thinkers who remained Marxists managed to do so only by carrying out theoretical reconstitutions so profound that their Marxist credentials have been under constant attack from official Communist sources during the last forty years.

What further compounds their difficulty is the growth of the "culture industry" in a social context where all opposition is readily integrated and rendered functional to the very system which it opposes. In order to prevent this, the new Marxists have had to clothe themselves consciously in a prohibitive linguistic style which has greatly contributed to their remaining unknown and largely impenetrable to scholars more conventionally trained—especially in the English-speaking world. This is what makes Jameson's *Marxism and Form* such a welcome and much needed contribution. The book provides the first comprehensive English introduction to this new Marxist tradition whose relevance has yet to be fully evaluated. Although comprising a series of previously published essays on Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Bloch, Lukács, and Sartre, plus a concluding chapter on "Towards a Dialectical Criticism," the whole hangs together very well and provides a lucid systematic presentation of an extremely difficult subject matter.

The subtitle, however, is deceptive. This book is *not* a mere treatise on literary criticism but, first and foremost, a work on political theory. In fact, in coming to grips with late capitalism, Marxist categories themselves undergo a fundamental change resulting in a shift of emphasis from economics as the primary conditioning dimension, to politics and culture as the new domains of class struggle. The decline of entrepreneurial capitalism and the rise of authoritarian states (mediated by welfarism whenever possible and fascism and Stalinism otherwise) collapsed the never too sharply separated "base" and "superstructure" in such a way that the cultural arena displaced the shop floor as the focus of Marxist theory. What in political *practice* presents itself as Maoism (the primacy of politics over economics), in political *theory* becomes, at least in the West, *critical theory* (the primacy of cultural criticism over political economy). Thus, Jameson's presentation ends up by covering the entire field of Marxist theory, notwithstanding his more limited avowed aims of merely dealing with aesthetics.

Of course, there is much room for controversy in Jameson's account of hermeneutics and phenomenology, and in his latent structuralism. More painstaking analyses than can be developed in a short review will probably show significant shortcomings in these areas. Yet Jameson's deficiencies are those of pioneers: hence their positive didactic function far overshadows their character as inadequacies. The book is a must for anyone interested in contemporary Marxist theory. Whether one ultimately agrees with Jameson is not as important as what can be gained by reaching that point through four hundred pages of first-rate presentation.

PAUL PICCONE

Washington University

Work, Creativity, and Social Justice. By Elliot Jaques. (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1970. Pp. 262. $6.50.)

The Harried Leisure Class. By Staffan B. Linder. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 182. $7.00.)

Work in America. Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Prepared under the Auspices of W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973. Pp. 262. $2.95.)

Work, Society and Culture. By Yves Simon. Edited by Vukan Kuic. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971. Pp. 234. $7.50.)

It is hard to say which of these books is best; it is easy to say which is worst. The latter distinction goes to the collection of papers printed or read in the 'sixties, mostly in psychoanalytic journals and to psychoanalytic societies, padded by the addition of a few miscellaneous notes and articles, assembled by their author, Elliott Jaques, and published in 1970 under the title, *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice*. The data therein are old, the propositions limited (mainly to English factory workers and employees in one time and place), the theories antiquated (based largely on Melanie Klein), the language ingrown, sources few and isolated, standards low, narcissism high. The author expresses the hope that his work will be a contribution to interdisciplinary thought in art, literature, the social sciences, business and law. What the book does is reveal how non-interdisciplinary are the author's own study and perspective.

The working population of industralized nations, has undergone a massive change in the twentieth century, moving from self-employment to wage/salary employment. The vast employment complex people find themselves in constitutes a new zone of society lying between state and family/individual, in the author's words, "The Intermediate Zone" (p. 2). The zone is organized hierarchically, perforce: in order to get work done and to make large-scale technology possible. Hierarchies, however, have not been arranged properly. As a result, work in industrial society contributes to the strengthening of psychopathological processes and to the eruption of violence. "All the conditions are present for the revival of the primitive paranoid schizoid situation" (p. 16). The industrial relations approach to overcoming these problems is grossly inadequate. What is needed is "apolitical science of the intermediate zone, with standards derived not from ethics or religion, but from the objective analysis of the nature of man" (p. 16).

What we have seems to be a political ideology in which the key phrases are work, hierarchy, conformity to consensus, equity and the right of individual appeal for same, the last being social justice. They remain, despite all claims, as the author himself said of other ideologies, a matter of opinion and political debate. It is not encouraging to see, in this work, that the application of psychoanalysis has moved so short and ragged a distance.

Three of these four books pay a homage to work that borders on devotion. The sole exception is Staffan B. Linder's, *The Harried Leisure Class*. The title is a misnomer, for the subject is not the leisure class; nor is the author interested in leisure. His main concern is time and what happens to it during periods of economic growth.

According to Linder, economists in their studies have concentrated too much on the concept of goods. When they first defined their central interest as the allocation of scarce resources, the evident problem was scarcity of goods or low productivity. Consumption, however, is not instantaneous, contrary to what standard economic theory takes for granted. Whatever is bought takes time to consume, maintain, and enjoy. "One may possibly *buy* more of everything, but one cannot conceivably *do* more of everything" (p. 83). The income elasticity of goods is not to be confused with the income elasticity of time. Their relation is not always constant and positive, as those have assumed who believed that as the general welfare increased, people would become successively less interested in further rises in income. Over the life cycle, consumption-time is inversely related to work-time and thus typically to income-producing time, as those might have pondered who have noticed that in rich countries a still higher economic growth rate has become the overriding goal of nations and individuals, the reduction in work-time has ceased, the service sector has not maintained resources, the reduction of material worries has not led to noticeable cultural advancement, and people are everywhere gasping for time.

Reduced to outline, the author's theses involve the effects of increased productivity on the allocation of time between work and non-work activities and between different consumption activities, on the volume of consumption goods, on the volume of personal (service) work, and on the quality of services. As they pass before one's eyes, one sees these effects as a procession of beggars: the deterioration of hospital care . . . the impossibly high costs of "servicing" the aged . . . the disutility of taking time to make rational decisions. And they have a new ineluctability. "We scrap old cars, but hang on to old bodies" (p. 54). How long will we continue to hang on to old bodies as the costs of their maintenance weigh heavier and heavier?

Whether the pricing mechanism does, or whether existing economic theory can, encompass the scare commodity of time is a problem the author throws down to economists. The conception of time he consciously adopts, however, time ticking off in a straight line, going from t_1 to t_2 along a continuum, running in a uniform, irreversible flow—this is the time of the world of industry, clock-time, machine-time. The author has himself adopted the work-world's "moving belt of time units" (p. 2). The conception, a simplified one, can profitably be used to add a temporal dimension to economic analysis. Deeper reflection, as the author might admit, would indicate that any culture with this conception already suffers from a shortage of time, and of space, too, exterior and interior.

This book of the Honorable Staffan Linder (member of the Swedish Parliament) comes from a tradition of economic theory. Each of the four books under review stems from a different intellectual tradition. Professor Jaques's book harks back to applied pschoanalytic theory. Yves Simon, whose book will be reviewed last, belongs to a line of Catholic philosophers, while *Work in America* relies essentially on the methods of the American socioeconomic survey and employee relations studies of the last quarter century or so, and unknowingly, on the modern tradition of *le travail attrayant,* started by Charles Fourier, a century and half or more ago.

Work in America had its formal beginning on December 19, 1971 when Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot Richardson charged a "task force" (why not "study group"?) with "examining health, education and welfare problems from the perspective of one of our fundamental social institutions—work" (p. xi). On the whole the report is informative and useful. It is also somewhat important because it is "trendy": it discloses the way some college professors who have come to the attention of some businessmen and government officials are thinking. The book is useful for anyone who wishes to be brought up to date on recent studies and liberal thinking about the function of work in the United States, the work problems of various segments of the country—blue and white collar, young and old, managerial, female, and minority—the physical and mental health of jobholders, the design and redesign of jobs for job satisfaction, training and retraining for jobs, and job creation objectives in federal policy with particular reference to welfare programs. There are other things to commend it for. It was put together quickly (in about a year, evidently), in a moderately conscientious way and with a certain comprehensiveness. It is at its best when it unveils dreadful facts about the health, education, and welfare of workers—the mounting of industrial accidents, overeducation and the unemployment hidden within it, the mishandling of welfare policy.

But time and again the authors bump into, only to shy away from, the fundamental ideological problem of the report—the conflict of political democracy and economic exigencies. Thus, jobs of high status are "satisfying" (p. 19); yet most old and new jobs are "largely in middle and lower levels" (p. 20). What to do to raise the bottom level to the apex of this pyramid and keep it up there? The answer is to redesign jobs at the bottom so that they look like jobs at the top. "It then becomes crucial to infuse middle- and lower-level jobs with professional characteristics" (p. 20). The execution of this magnificent *trompe-l'oeil* would make a counter-Reformation painter blanch.

The ethical problems remain: in redesigned jobs the worker does not have autonomy, nor does he participate in those decisions that affect his life. He cannot elect to raise his own pay, promote himself, pick out which days and how many he would like to work, how much money he gets in retirement and when he should begin to take it, and meanwhile who, if anybody, should be his boss.

The report refers airily to the work ethic as though it were a superstition one should outgrow with one's second teeth. Yet one would have to return to Samuel Smiles, Poor Richard, Horatio Alger, and the monastic orders to find such a richly embroidered version of the Work Society. It even improves on the idea of competition: workers now should compete not with others but "with themselves over time" (p. 144). The complete individuals can learn to convenant with themselves in schools. As a matter of fact, schools—the last redoubts of non-work activity—have to be captured. They should be looked on as workplaces like any other workplaces, "influenced by and influencing other workplaces." There should be manpower training for all. "Also, if we all could type . . ." (p. 148)!

So fierce is its focus on work that the report did not dream of considering alternative directions for America. The new cloud-cuckoo-land it depicts goes beyond the Work Society into the workhouse. Leisure, which offhand one might expect to have some bearing on health, education, and welfare, not to mention on work, gets a single reference in the index: "Leisure, boredom in, 88."

The tradition of leisure is absent from *Work in America,* as it is also from *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice.* In the *Harried Leisure Class,* leisure appears faintly yet convincingly. In *Work, Society, and Culture* the tradition appears but only to be summarily judged and tossed aside.

The last, and least timebound of the four works in review is this *Work, Society and Culture.* It is least timebound in the sense that more than others, it could have been read a decade ago or can be read a decade hence with equal profit.

Unlike the half-anonymous authors of *Work in America,* Yves Simon says that "we must all acknowledge that there exists in work a permanent foundation for irksomeness" (p. 32). Giving the worker a dispatch case in which to carry his lunch will keep neither his coffee warm nor his beer cold nor his job satisfaction high. The irksomeness of work follows from a definition based on Veblen's classic formulation in *The Theory of the Leisure Class:* to work is "to turn things to human use," which in Simon's reformulation takes on emphasis: to transform "physical nature for the purposes of man" (p. 113). Physical nature has laws of its own which anyone working on it (and the worker is the one who does the working) will soon find cannot be changed to suit personal convenience. Nature except in paradise is stubborn.

Simon knows that an important part of work—the part that includes most of the pleasure it allows—is the social aspect of working together. It is this aspect of work that recommends itself to him. While work in its sociality does not have the same profundity as acts of knowing, enjoying, or loving the same thing together, "it has something else: it occurs daily and it occupies far more space and time in human life than any other activity" (p. 72). Undoubtedly the sociality of work helps shape man into a social and political animal. It also provides the basis for the solidarity of workers.

Simon likes other things about work, such as the habit of honesty that grows out of wrestling with obstinate matter. The manual worker has either succeeded or not, and cannot hide his results, whereas the artist and intellectual can conceal their cheating. He likes the seriousness of work, too. It has to be done of necessity, and is therefore in earnest. One might suspect that the author after showing so much favor to work might not be displeased to see it develop into the prevailing ideology that the other three of these books under review recognize. Simon's enthusiasm does not carry that far. As he puts it, work has brought the "prevalence of the demiurgical ideal in our societies, sometimes called materialism" (p. 186), and this is not good.

Here the author might have taken recourse to the ideal of leisure, since he himself is no stranger to the classical tradition. The author frowns on leisure because it is not serious like work; it is frilly and flowery like *les honnêtes hommes* and the dandies.

Simon's remarks on leisure are haphazard. He is more interested in opposing to work the pole of contemplation and more interested still in religious contemplation. He feels he must offer a form of contemplation to offset today's obsession with physical nature. "Our best immediate chances to begin to develop the culture with a contemplative ideal may lie in promoting collaboration between all kinds of technical work and the fine arts" (p. 187).

The few remarks on technology seem naive; but evidently a platform of naiveté may be just the place, sometimes, from which to make penetrating insights. Whoever reads this book will find many things to turn his mind to.

SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA

Rutgers University

The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950. By Martin Jay. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1973. Pp. 382. $3.95, paper.)

This book is based not only on a very large amount of published material but also on interviews with past and present members of the Institute of Social Research; on the unpublished correspondence between Max Horkheimer, its Director since 1932, and Leo Lowenthal; on Horkheimer's scrapbooks and other unpublished documents and writings in the collections of Friedrich Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, and Paul Lazarsfeld. As a result, Professor Jay's work is indispensable for anyone interested in the intellectual activities of this circle of leftwing, bourgois radicals in exile. To a lesser extent it is also informative on the early history of the Institute under Carl Grünberg.

Professor Jay painstakingly presents the so-called "critical theory" developed by Horkheimer and Marcuse; Pollock's and Neumann's conflicting analyses of Nazism; and the integration of psychoanalysis into "critical theory," including the objections which Adorno and other members of the "inner circle" raised against Erich Fromm's ideas. The book contains also a chapter on Adorno's, Walter Benjamin's, and Leo Lowenthal's contributions to musicology, literary criticism, and popular culture, and a discussion of most of the work on prejudice and the "authoritarian personality." The final chapter deals with *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, written by Horkheimer and Adorno during the war and published in Amsterdam in 1947, as well as some other writings related to their "philosophy of history."

While the work published in English is well known in this country, other parts of the Institute's remarkable production have not received as much attention because of what Paul Lazarsfeld once referred to as "the idiocy of the Institute group," i.e., its decision to continue for many years publishing its writings in German. Horkheimer simply remarked that other refugees in America wrote English, because language served them "more in the struggle for existence than as an expression of the truth" (p. 114). Similarly, in 1942 when the Institute rejected proposals to be integrated into the Sociology Department of Columbia

University or Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research, Horkheimer complained, "People don't want to [!] understand that there can be a group of scholars working under a director not responsible to big business or to mass-culture publicity" (p. 116). Surely, Horkheimer was not a happy man; in a sad letter to Lowenthal, written in 1943, he expressed his sense of isolation. At the same time he was strong-willed, and "the inner circle" accepted his autocracy. When Ernst Kris asked Lowenthal about the Institute's attitude toward Freud, Lowenthal forwarded the inquiry to the Director for a response.

In some passages of Professor Jay's account his admiration for the work he presents goes too far. For example, he reports without a smile, ". . . even when discussing such artists as Valéry, Proust, George, and Hoffmannstahl [sic], for whom he had great respect, Adorno chose to discuss them in dialectical pairs in order to transcend the inherent insufficiency of individual accomplishments" (p. 178).

If such passages are minor flaws in an otherwise valuable study, the same cannot be said of Professor Jay's polemics: Especially, his views of the University in Exile established in 1933 by Alvin Johnson at the New School for Social Research are distortions of the truth. Without proof, Emil Lederer, the first dean of the University in Exile, is labeled "an old Institut foe" (p. 164), the Graduate Faculty itself as "the Institut's old competitor" (p. 284), and "the New School's ire" is said to have been aroused by "the Institut's Marxist tinge" and its "enthusiasm for Freud" (p. 133). This "ire" appears in Professor Jay's comments on *Studien über Autorität und Familie,* published in 1936. Professor Jay does not mention the very favorable reviews of this work by George A. Lundberg in *Social Forces,* by John Dollard in the *American Sociological Review,* and by T. H. Marshall in *The Sociological Review.* He states instead that the American academic community was slow in assimilating the "findings and methodology" of the volume "largely because of its appearance in German." But then he adds, "This process was not abetted by the extremely hostile review the work received in the New School's journal, *Social Research,* at the hands of Hans Speier," which reflected not only the aforementioned ire but also Max Wertheimer's "disdain for psychoanalysis" (p. 133). It should have been easy for Professor Jay to get his facts straight. Emil Lederer, an economist, had been close to the Austro-Marxists. While uninterested in speculation, he thought highly of Pollock's work. As far as I know, he was on good terms with Horkheimer, whom I met as a guest in Lederer's house in New York in 1936. The New School never competed with the Institute. It had a tradition of supporting radical and Communist American and European scholars before and after the Frankfurt refugees arrived in New York. Apparently, Professor Jay believes that criticism must be equated with hostility. Wertheimer was indeed critical of psychoanalysis, but this did not prevent him from offering a seminar at the New School jointly with Karen Horney as well as Kurt Riezler (who had recommended Marcuse to Horkheimer in 1932) and myself. I collaborated closely for several years with Ernst Kris, a distinguished psychoanalyst, who became a member of the Graduate Faculty at the New School. Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and Herbert Marcuse were friends of mine, especially during the years we worked for the Federal Government. Prior to 1933, I had published many reviews in the Institute's *Zeitschrift,* and to this day Leo Lowenthal is my close personal friend. My review did not reflect any views but my own, and it was not hostile.

This is not all. Professor Jay reports that prior to publication the Institute excised the words "fascism," "communism," and "imperialist" in a manuscript submitted by Walter Benjamin. "It is abundantly clear," he concludes, "that the Institut felt insecure in America and wished to do as little as possible to jeopardize its position" (p. 205). In explaining this feeling of insecurity no sense of truth or honor restrains Professor Jay: he speaks of "the accusations of other refugees at the New School . . . previously mentioned" (p. 205). They are not mentioned.

To most of the unattached intellectuals of the Institute, political history was a subject for moral indignation, and one suspects that the everyday life of simple people was rather alien to them. Professor Jay has noticed the political myopia of the group: for many years, it denied the existence of anti-Semitism among the Germans during the Nazi period. In 1946, Horkheimer thought the Soviet Union the only country free of any anti-Semitism. Similarly, the group never felt challenged by its own theories to account for the fact that American capitalism had not turned fascist. Efforts to develop a political theory were made only by Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer.

Professor Jay's book has been widely discussed in leftwing intellectual circles since its publication. Under the assumption that debate engendered by a work is a yardstick of its merits, the book is a major contribution to social theory. Even those who do not make this assumption should readily admit that the book sheds a great deal of light on the pre-Nazi origins of certain intellectual trends in the Federal Republic.

HANS SPEIER

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics. By Barry D. Karl. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. Pp. 337. $15.00.)

Barry Karl's biography of Charles Merriam is excellent social and intellectual history. It is written in good evocative prose. Post–Civil War small-town Iowa, the New York of Seth Low and Henry George, the Chicago of Julius Rosenwald, Jane Addams, and Hinky Dink McKenna all come to life as settings in which Merriam sought and found himself.

Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics ought to have a prominent place in all those courses in which we initiate our students into the political science discipline. Merriam's life—the department he built, the students he trained and the students they trained, the research approaches and methods he fostered, the research programs he initiated, the institutions he created, the relations between research and public policy which he explored and tested—is a good part of the history of modern political science. Most of the major polemics of our contemporary intellectual life are illustrated in the problems he confronted; and something may be said in favor of the gentle and ironic way in which he usually finessed issues of this kind. An intellectually unpretentious man himself, he could spot a phony dilemma a mile away, scorned debaters' points, and sought to dissuade his students from the cultism into which their shiny new tools tempted them. If someone had told him that there were five methodological fallacies a political scientist could commit, he might have taken another sip of Scotch in the Shoreland bar and replied with his equivalent of "just as long as he loves his mother."

The father of behavioral political science was the son of that marriage of philosophy, law, and history out of which our discipline emerged, and he understood science as providing an increment of rigor added on to these older disciplines rather than an alternative to them. He took historically literate, legally and politically knowledgeable men like Leonard White and Quincy Wright and got them to look systematically at public attitudes affecting political recruitment, or the quantitative incidence of types of war over time. He gently chided Harold Gosnell when statistics carried him away, and stood in awe and bemused wonder at some of Harold Lasswell's turns of phrase and formulations. He would not have recognized our quantitative and mathematical types as *political* scientists at all; and he might have asked of the psychological reductionists who now see the limited explanatory hold personality variables have for politics, "Why this long detour?" And yet while their onesidedness might have troubled him, it cannot be said that he did not anticipate it. Somewhere in *New Aspects of Politics* is a remark to the effect that political scientists might have to lose their way in order to find it again. And he had both psychology and statistics in mind.

In a book consisting of fourteen chapters, Professor Karl devotes only three to Merriam as a professional political scientist: chapter 2, which provides a view of political science at Columbia at the turn of the century; chapter 3 on the University of Chicago and its department prior to his assumption of control; and chapter 8, which deals with the Chicago School, properly speaking. The other chapters deal with Merriam's years as a reform politician in Chicago, his role as chief of the American propaganda mission in Italy during World War I, his role in the formation of the Social Science Research Council in the 1920s, his interests in civic education at home and abroad, his leadership in what now seems to have been an early experiment in "Social Indicators"—the "Recent Social Trends" study of the Hoover administration—and finally his part in the New Deal National Resources Planning Board and the President's Commission on Administrative Management.

The bulk of the book thus deals with Merriam as politician, as institution-builder, and as research entrepreneur, and relatively little with the Chicago School and the behavioral revolution. The brief treatment of Merriam's building of the Chicago department whets the appetite for more. Actually the Chicago School, which has acquired mythic proportions in recent decades, was a quite small group of faculty and students who were creative over two decades, 1920 to 1940. By the end of the 1930s, Hutchins and those associated with him, through a combination of public scorn, affirmation of the intellectual superiority of logical formalism, and denial of promotions, had brought the golden age to a close, and shortly thereafter and quite literally put the department under the control of a committee.

The School thus was quite limited in time and number and was dependent on Merriam's continued influence and vitality. Both had waned by the late 1930s, and Karl tends to gloss over this tragic denouement.

In his treatment of the Chicago School only the trail-breaking "Non-Voting" study with Gosnell is described in any detail. There is nothing on Leonard White's *Prestige Value of Public Employment,* Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War* and *Psychopathology and Politics,* Quincy Wright's *Study of War,* V. O. Key Jr.'s *Techniques of Graft,* and the many studies of the politics and government of the Chicago metropolitan area. The treatment of the Chicago School cries out for more substance.

In his narrative of the various facets of Merriam's career Barry Karl stresses the political maneuvering in which Merriam was the leading operator. At his best Merriam was a great intellectual coalition-maker. His earlier ventures as "reformer" and as populist in the pre–World War I period left him somewhat disillusioned and a bit cynical. He never mounted a white horse again. He combined a constant pursuit of good causes both within and outside the university, with a shrewd sense of where the resources were and how they might be brought together in winning coalitions. He was a winner in the university for enough time to give political science and the social sciences a new impulse for some time to come. He was a winner in the battle to form the Social Science Research Council, and gave national and even international scope to this vision of the social sciences. His ventures in national policy involved him in far more complicated games which he understood but could not effectively dominate. Barry Karl tells these stories very well indeed.

This image of Merriam as an institution builder and intellectual coalition maker doesn't square at all with the flat and tendentious treatment which Bernard Crick gave of Merriam and the Chicago school in his book on *The American Science of Politics* published in 1959 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press). At the time that Merriam was making decisions about political science at the University of Chicago he was pluralist to the core, and he understood political parties, interest groups, the media of communication, and public opinion very well indeed. He was a man who pursued the good consistently and never lost his sympathy for the weak. But he understood what political power consisted of, and the tragic span between means and ends. And in political science, in contrast to some of those who believe they have been following in his wake, he never lost the thread of connection between a rigorous and empirical political science and the moral issues of political philosophy.

It is intriguing to speculate on Merriam's quandary in 1922 on the eve of the "Behavioral Revolution," when the offer came to take the Lieber chair at Columbia after Dunning's death. This was *the chair* in American political science, and Merriam was viewed as the natural successor to his old teacher and mentor. He had indeed half decided to accept the offer, and only wished to delay his decision while he was preoccupied with preparing the report of the Committee on Political Research of the American Political Science Association. He had unfurled the flag of the new political science in the May, 1921, issue of this journal, and was then engaged in converting his colleagues to his point of view. The probabilities are that had he followed Dunning at Columbia the profession would have gained a more conventionally productive scholar, but not the great adventurer and entrepreneur that he became by remaining at Chicago. He could bargain and get his own way in that brash and crude city of Chicago, and throw his weight mightily for a while in that university whose students—irreverent then as now—were wont to sing "Praise John from whom oil blessings flow."

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

Stanford University

The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition. By Leonard Krieger. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. 540. $12.00, cloth; $3.75, paper.)

The German Idea of Freedom was first published in 1957. Its author is one of the many American historians of Germany whose education was interrupted by the war and finally completed in the late 'forties and early 'fifties. But the book itself belongs to a tradition of historiography which flowered in Germany after the turn of the century and was imported into the United States by émigrés such as Hajo Holborn, Krieger's teacher at Yale. Like the founders of this tradition (Wilhelm Dilthey, Friedrich Meinecke, Ernst Troeltsch), Krieger focuses on a series of major thinkers, whose ideas are seen in terms of their historical setting and influence. Moreover, the central questions which inform Krieger's book occupied all of this tradition's founding fathers: How did Gemany come to differ from the West? Why did the ideas and institutions which helped to sustain liberal social and political institutions west of the Rhine fail to shape German realities? As the title suggests, Krieger concentrates on one strand in this complex of issues, what he calls the "peculiar German attitude toward liberty," an attitude which, he believes, persistently undermined Germans' ability to find theoretical and practical alternatives to the authoritarian power of the state.

Krieger begins his analysis with the concept of *Libertät,* "the representative expression of German political liberty in the old regime" (p. 14). *Libertät* was initially advanced by defenders of the aristocracy's corporate power, but it soon became inexorably linked with the theory and practice of state sovereignty. This linkage between freedom and the state remained the essential characteristic of the German idea of freedom, even when its social components and political dimensions changed. During the eighteenth century, for example, when "middle-class" officials moved into the vanguard of political reform, the ends and means of their efforts involved a commitment to both freedom and the expanding nexus of bureaucratic rule. In what are perhaps the finest and most fully realized sections of the book, Krieger shows how this tradition continued during the era of revolution and reform. In a series of brilliant chapters, the philosophical basis and the politics of reform are analyzed in order to demonstrate how Germans tamed and transmuted the revolutionary impetus into a bureaucratic "revolution from above." By 1815, Krieger argues, the basic typology of German liberalism had taken shape: on the left, a few radical critics of the state; on the right, bureaucratic reformers; and in between them, advocates of a constitutional "dualism" who sought a means of synthesizing popular participation and state power. At the same time, by 1815 nationalism had begun to be seen as a potentially powerful instrument for reconciling *Volk* and *Staat;* this became, as Krieger shows, an important element in the state's eventual triumph over the defenders of freedom.

The second half of the book traces the unfolding of these themes before and during the revolution of 1848, in the constitutional struggles of the 1860's, and in the new nation created by Bismarck after 1866. In the conclusion, Krieger looks ahead to the twentieth century and the experience of National Socialism, which was at once the most tragic consequence of liberalism's failure and the volcanic upheaval through which the "primal association between freedom and the traditional state" was finally destroyed (p. 470).

This summary obviously does not do justice to the range and depth of Krieger's analysis. His book, especially the first two-thirds, is beautifully crafted. His treatment of individual thinkers is always informative and provocative, even on those rare occasions when it is not fully convincing. Furthermore, his fine sense of social, economic, and political developments enables him to locate these individuals in a vividly drawn historical setting. By analyzing how external reality affects both the shape and significance of ideas, Krieger enriches the historiographical tradition within which he works. In my judgment, his chapters on Kant and Hegel are a model of how intellectual, political, social, and economic history can be joined in a coherent vision of the past. The book, of course, is not without flaws. Krieger's treatment of the period after 1850, for instance, strikes me as excessively schematic and elliptical. But on the whole, this is one of the three or four most important books on German history published by an American since 1945.

Despite its virtues, I do not think this book has had the impact and influence it deserves. It is often cited, but it has not been fully absorbed into the historical literature. Nor have those who are not specialists in German history paid as much attention as they should have to its substantive and methodological achievements. An important reason for this neglect is Krieger's style, which makes his work inaccessible to anyone unwilling to expend the time and effort a careful reading of the book requires. This stylistic difficulty, it should be noted, does not come from awkwardness or imprecision, but rather from a density which renders some passages almost impenetrable on first reading.

It is unfortunate that nothing was done to make Krieger's work more accessible in this edition. In fact, the University of Chicago Press simply reprinted the original version of 1957 without change or comment. It is also regrettable that the new edition contains no references to the work done on German history since the late 'fifties. While it is good to have *The German Idea of Freedom* back in print, it would have been even better if its reappearance had led the author to examine the relationship between his analysis and the scholarship which has appeared in the past two decades.

JAMES J. SHEEHAN
Northwestern University

Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans. By Vincent Lemieux. (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1971. Pp. 250. $10.00.)

As the title indicates, this work explores the relationship between kinship and political life. Lemieux's central concern is with how different types of kinship structure might induce quite different kinds of political activity. Lemieux contends that such an effect of kinship on politics may be much more pervasive than has been generally recognized. Even in modern societies, politically relevant subgroups may roughly parallel kinship networks. The pattern of these kinship networks can greatly affect characteristics of the political action of these subgroups.

Lemieux proceeds to test this proposition by examining the kinship structure of a long-settled island in the St. Lawrence River near Quebec City—l'Ile d'Orléans. First, he compares the six parish communities on this island in terms of what he calls the "density" of kinship structures (as measured by the proportion of marriages that are endogamous to the parish and by the length of time that property has been held within the same family). He is able to show positive associations between the rank order of these communities along this "density" variable and their rank orders in levels of support for the federal Progressive Conservative Party and the provincial *Union nationale* party. Lemieux seeks to interpret these associations as a function of historical party policies, alleging that the policies of both parties were less prone to accentuate social differences and thus, were less interventionist than those of the Liberal Party. On this basis, he argues that these policies were more attractive to communities characterized by density of kinship ties. The interpretation is certainly provocative, allowing a greater role for "ideology" in the electoral processes of these communities than one might expect to find. At the same time, the argument might have been strengthened by more extensive supporting data—especially with respect to popular perceptions of the two parties. Lemieux's analysis is more fully persuasive when he explores the association between kinship structures and political competitiveness. Here, the aspect of kinship structures receiving the greatest attention is the proportion of marriages involving social mobility (*hypergamie de statut*). Lemieux argues that such a pattern is motivated by a social competitiveness among families that results, in turn, in a greater degree of competitiveness in the political arena. Using several different measures of *hypergamie* and of political competition, Lemieux once again finds the expected association of rank orders among the six parish communities. Finally, Lemieux seeks to show how aspects of kinship patterns affect political life in a more indirect fashion through their influence on levels of information, economic prosperity, and social solidarity. While Lemieux can show rank-order associations between kinship patterns and each of these variables, he acknowledges that in each case other factors might also have contributed to the state of the variables.

The final step in Lemieux's demonstration of the importance of kinship patterns to the political life of l'Ile d'Orléans is to construct a model to explain variations across the parish communities in support for political parties. A control is introduced for levels of long-standing party identification. The model is restricted to the remaining variation in party support. It seeks to explain this variation as a function of the relative ability of the parties to relate appropriately to four characteristics of the parish communities (all of which have been interpreted as consequences of kinship patterns). These variables are political competitiveness and the three above-mentioned variables of information, prosperity, and social solidarity. In terms of the data on party behavior that Lemieux presents, the model has a very high predictive power in each of three general elections. To this extent, Lemieux's overall thesis is sustained. (At the same time, an unknown proportion of the predicted variation may be traceable not to aspects of kinship structure but to other antecedent variables.)

Especially stimulating is Lemieux's concluding chapter, in which he attempts to relate his findings about l'Ile d'Orléans to the political life of Quebec as a whole. Lemieux contends that prior to the 1960s, Quebec was marked by a lower level of politicization than was true of the other Canadian provinces. For him, this can be explained in terms of the five characteristics of kinship patterns that he analyzed in l'Ile d'Orléans. Each of these variables, he indicates, has been less favorable to politicization in the case of Quebec. This argument does raise questions that can be adequately resolved only through further research. Nevertheless, it provides the basis for a highly suggestive interpretation of Quebec politics, offering a significant alternative to the dominant explanations of Quebec politics which have focused primarily upon the social composition and ideologies of French-Canadian elites to explain lower levels of politicization.

In sum, *Parenté et Politique* is an impressive and highly significant work. Through an imaginative use of anthropological materials, Lemieux has developed a strikingly innovative and promising approach for the study of political life in even relatively "modern" societies. It can only be regretted that this volume, like much of the work of *québécois* social scientists, has not yet been translated into English and thus has failed to receive as widespread a recognition as it deserves.

KENNETH MCROBERTS
York University, Toronto

Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer. By Eugene Lunn. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 448. $13.75.)

This is a good book, in spite of some weaknesses; it is also a timely book, because Gustav Landauer's ideal of a society without a state, without big industries and cities, organized into small communities and based on human fellowship has a close affinity to tendencies in the New Left. Professor Lunn has on the whole succeeded well in drawing a picture of the very complex mentality of Landauer, who based his anarcho-socialist ideas upon mysticism, who was a romanticist, an admirer of the Middle Ages, an anti-Marxist, a Shakespearean scholar and a historian, concerned with the analysis of revolutions. Only at a few points does Lunn's effort to explain Landauer's thinking and striving break down. Lunn, for instance, is not very successful in explaining why Landauer took little cognizance of the important developments in the libertarian movement outside Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A leading philosopher of anarcho-socialism, one would think, should have paid attention to the rise of revolutionary syndicalism in the French and Italian labor movements, to the abandonment of anarchism proper (but not of all libertarian ideas) by Paul Brousse and other Frenchmen, and to the heated controversies among anarchists in the Latin countries and in Russia about terrorism. Yet Lunn merely says that Landauer was at times "mesmerized by the conditions in Germany" (p. 207) and that he was opposed to anarcho-syndicalism because it was an urban movement. But if a man of Landauer's intellectual breadth really limited his scope so much and even failed to appreciate the tendencies similar to his own in so large a movement as the Confédération Générale du Travail, one would like to know more about the reasons.

Less satisfactory than Lunn's analysis of Landauer's personal development is his discussion of the societal framework within which Landauer had to operate. The book tries to explain the socioeconomic milieu of Swabia to which Landauer was so much attached, but the attempt does not reach far below the surface. The same is true of the milieu in Munich which became the scene of Landauer's tragic attempt to realize his ideas in the South Bavarian *Raeterepublik* of April 1919. Lunn adduces a number of important facts that could have helped to explain the relationship between Landauer's anti-urbanism and the *Blut und Boden* mystique of the German reactionary romanticists. But the effort at such an explanation remains unconvincing because the author does not have enough insight into the forces at work in Germany during the early 20th century. Moreover, he creates a semantic obstacle to an adequate analysis by applying the term "*voelkisch*" to all romantic ruralism, not only to that of the racist variety; I do not think that the term has ever been free of racist connotation, at least not since the 1870s.

Lunn deals with the great riddle of the last phase of Landauer's life: how he could have brought himself to support the Munich *Raeterepublik*. Of course, it was not the Communist *Raeterepublik*, which was established only in the backlash of the abortive Social Democratic coup of mid-April 1919, but the much milder form which had been created by left-wingers of the Independent Socialist party. But how could a man of Landauer's intelligence fail to see that in the Europe of 1919 any government of workers' councils could only maintain itself through the support of Soviet Russia and that it would therefore inevitably drift toward communism, which Landauer hated as much as Social Democracy? Lunn says that "through personal tragedies"—the loss of his wife Hedwig in 1918—"and severe disappointments with the course of the revolution . . . , Landauer had become a very impatient man" (p. 327). Perhaps not only was he impatient but also his judgment had been impaired by these circumstances; lacking a better explanation, we shall probably have to accept this as the most plausible. Landauer's assassination by "white" soldiers, however tragic in itself, spared him the pain of having to realize that for his concept of communitarian anarcho-socialism there was no room between the forces of conservatism, of the centralized welfare state of the Social Democrats, and of totalitarian communism.

CARL LANDAUER
University of California, Berkeley (Emeritus)

Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class. By Steven Marcus. (New York: Random House, 1974. Pp. xiii, 271. $8.95.)

The experience of Friedrich Engels in Manchester is a shock felt round the world, now registered as far as Moscow, Peking, and Havana, and still reverberating. In 1844, after twenty months of Manchester, full of walking and thinking about the city, Engels wrote *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* which was not translated into English until the American edition of 1887. Marcus, a specialist in Victorian literature who teaches in Columbia University, offers a work of "historical reclamation" to rescue the meaning of that text from its two inadequate English translations and to place it in a new context. He demonstrates that it is larger than a monument of socialism, wider than an interpretation of the industrial revolution, and greater than a document of urban history, locating it as an early classic in the modern-postmodern literature of incomparable extreme experience.

He argues persuasively that in Manchester, the paradigm of the modern city, the industrial revolution wrought such demoralization and dehumanization that experience passed the boundaries of language and imagination. Words failed. Convincingly, he demonstrates that the literary critic, whose domain is the whole realm of discourse, can interpret that breakdown of language and consciousness. He suggests that while Marx and Engels were busy detaching themselves from German philosophy, the very method of Hegel offered Engels a way of grasping the order of contradictions, a way to a new consciousness, and a language to represent the horrors of the industrial city. He also exposes the life, work, and personality of Engels to different kinds of analysis.

The book refreshes the context of Engels's work. It is an important study, but excruciatingly mannered. It is also inconclusive. We are led away from an interesting beginning through a disappointing middle to a place without conclusion (the last chapter is named "In Place of a Conclusion"). With all its promise, the inquiry carries the seeds of its own distraction, turning the inspection of Engels into a display of fashions that range from ethology—informing us that shelter is important—to inspirations drawn from ego psychology. The author fumbles with psychobiography, dressing Engels in the latest styles of identification and ambivalence, and rendering scant justice to the condition of Engels in 1844, or to the genesis of certain "men of a new kind"—the revolutionary critics—in the new age. The personal crises of Engels's life cycle do not illuminate his response to the collective crisis of language and consciousness, or penetrate what Marcus calls (p. 108) "the relation of writing to praxis."

Today, we may still read the surface of the city by walking the Engels trail in the streets of Manchester. If we pause near where he stood on Ducie Bridge, viewing the most hideous dwellings he had ever seen, we find the old horrors displaced by the railroad. The walls of the present bridge are too high to reveal anything but a large graffito which reads, "All Out on May Day." Since Engels stood there, language and consciousness have never been the same.

E. V. WALTER
University of Manchester, England

Patterns of Dominance. By Philip Mason. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 377. $4.50.)

Race relations, undoubtedly, are one of the most meticulously researched subjects in the social sciences. Anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists, of course, have long been engaged in prolific analyses of its various aspects, and recently there has been a spate of contributions by economists (e.g., Gary S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957]) and political scientists (e.g., Alvin Rabushka, *A Theory of Racial Harmony* [Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1974]).

The issue, therefore, highlighted in this work has been treated by a host of scholars either following the trail blazed by their predecessors or striving to carve out some territory of their own. As in other fields so crowded with contributions, truly original studies have been few and infrequent.

Yet, Mason explicitly (although rather unpretentiously) aims at breaking new ground. More specifically, taking a skeptical view of inquiries in which methodological and theoretical precision are sometimes bought at the high cost of removing the analysis from total reality, he relies (in a manner reminiscent of S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962]) on the comparative method, abstracting items from different societies in an attempt to find, so to speak, the "laws" of racial history. Thus:

> A lack of sufficient width seemed to me a weakness in many studies of race relations; again and again one found writers putting forward explanations for some phenomenon which did not hold good as soon as the terms of reference were broadened. . . . This book began many years ago with one simple thought. Why was the situation as between black and white in South Africa so different from that in Brazil or the Caribbean? Was it in fact so different as it seemed to be on the surface? It seemed worth trying to analyze, in various parts of the world, situations in which different ethnic groups were living together in harmony or tension, and to enumerate and assess the changing factors present in each case, trying to reach some conclusions as to why one situation was tense and another relaxed (p. ix).

The particular societies singled out for the purpose of this commendable comparative attempt comprise the African empires, Athens and Sparta, the Aztecs and the Incas, Brazil, the Caribbean, India, South Africa and Spanish America, but considerable insight is also provided into the dynamics of race relations in several other parts of the world, (both in the geographical and temporal sense). The investigation is comprehensive in coverage, often illuminating and eminently readable.

The principal contribution of the undertaking lies in its determining of the main patterns of racial dominance to have crystallized throughout the world prior to and following the European colonial expansion. The author questions the empirical validity of the sequence designed for the United States (presupposing smooth unbroken progress toward racial harmony) and establishes that racial encounters ordinarily assume forms such as complete *domination* of one group over the other (e.g., South Africa), *paternalism* (e.g., British India) or *competition* (e.g., American North). The anatomy of each of these three configurations is carefully dissected and their emergence firmly grounded in appropriate historical and socioeconomic contexts.

The presentation, however, is not without limitations. To begin with, the work is so saturated with minutiae that the reader has to stretch his faculties in order to see the theoretical wood behind the factual trees. Evidently Mason, not unlike the bulk of his colleagues at the Institute of Race Relations in London, is more concerned with generating new data than interpreting them theoretically. And in view of the frailties of some of the recent theoretical constructs, his strategy of letting the facts speak for themselves is likely to be sympathetically received in certain quarters. The general value of the study, though, would have been enhanced had he imposed on these reams of useful information a tighter analytical framework and struck a better balance between data and theory. Schermerhorn's "inductive typology" illustrates the potential of such an approach (R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* [New York: Random House, 1970]).

By the same token, it might be argued that the theoretical explications resorted to in the book are of insufficient scope. There is, for instance, no dearth of reference to the writings of Banton and van den Berghe. No serious attempt, on the other hand, is made to turn to account the propositions of additional "macro-level" theorists and none of the "micro-level" ones. The writer is admirably unwilling to over-simplify a complex factual reality, but to a point of rendering it too simple (compare, for example, with Hubert M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* [New York: Wiley, 1967]).

Finally, nowhere in the text is there any substantial discussion of the methodological questions involved in the study of comparative race relations. In tracing and juxtaposing the patterns of racial dominance, Mason implicitly faces problems of combining the diachronic and synchronic perspectives, deduction, induction and the like. Still, he appears reluctant to bring them into the open (along the lines of Henry Teune and Adam Przeworski, *A Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* [New York: Wiley, 1969]).

In conclusion, the author has delineated painstakingly and vividly most of the major racial conflicts. At the same time, he has fallen short of producing a much needed macroscopic theoretical framework for his subject.

M. MUSHKAT, JR.
Victoria University of Wellington

The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras). Edited and introduced by J. S. McClelland. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971. Pp. 320. $2.45, paper.)

Gobineau: Selected Political Writings. Edited and introduced by Michael D. Biddis. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971. Pp. 254. $2.25, paper.)

Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own. Selected and introduced by John Carroll. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974. Pp. 266. $3.45, paper.)

Race and Race History and Other Essays by Alfred Rosenberg. Edited and introduced by Robert Pois. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974. Pp. 204. $2.95, paper.) (Roots of the Right. General Editor: George Steiner).

The rule of the road is a paradox quite,
Both in riding and driving along;
If you keep to the left, you are sure to be right,
If you keep to the right you are wrong.

Henry Erskine, who penned these lines, was an eighteenth-century Englishman; but his words, *mutatis mutandis*, apply in our time as well.

"Much of the crisis of identity and society that has overshadowed twentieth century history comes from an impulse towards total politics," writes George Steiner in the General Editor's Preface that opens every volume in the series "Roots of the Right." This he connects in turn with the attack upon the theory of man as a rational animal, an attack whose most radical version, using the concept of the Fall of Man, has come from elitist, racist and totalitarian dreamers and publicists of the Right. Hence these "black books" designed to provide source material concerning political and philosophical programs that have "come so near to destroying our civilization."

A good idea! But it is not quite clear what civilization this material helped to destroy, or what it did to destroy it. The strands of thought revealed or, rather, ravelled in these books are scarcely peculiar to the Right; and a useful task, not here performed, would be to disentangle them from similar tendencies that are politically neutral, or put to different uses in some other camp. The impulse toward totalitarian politics, for example, is visible in many past societies, not to speak of the present, and the modern means to satisfy it are products of technology, not ideology. Elitist views are no monopoly of the Right, from the Old Testament to *What Is To Be Done?* The basic contradictions between liberty and equality had revealed themselves as early as 1793. Nationalistic doctrine was associated with the Left (Gobineau scorned it) until a more convenient rationalization of conflict took its place. The popular mind, weaned on Christianity and envy, did not need theorists of race to suspect aliens and hate the Jews. Liberalism and parliamentary institutions were criticized by Left as well as Right, and discredited by their own failures (or successes: nothing fails like success!). The men whose texts are cited in these volumes provided not inspiration but rationalization of attitudes based on traditional prejudices and current experience.

But here is a thread to follow: "What unites the Right ideologically in France is the fundamental attack on reason and the rights of man," writes J. S. McClelland in his introduction to the volume on *The French Right,* which runs from Joseph de Maistre to Maurras, by way of Taine, Drumont, Sorel, Le Bon and Barrès, to culminate with Claudel's ode *to the Marshal* [Pétain]. Yet the attack on reason was less fundamental than he (or Steiner) claims, and it was directed not against its utilization but against its exaggeration. Taine, for whom reason, like health, is only a momentary achievement and a happy accident, wanted to put its possibilities in perspective. He simply agrees with Robert Bridges, whose

Reason kens he herits in
A haunted house. Tenants unknown
Assert their squalid lease of sin
With earlier title than his own.

That was a point of Barrès as well. As for Maurras, his belief in reason, armed with logic, subjected him to that *folie de la raison* which is the penalty of ideas carried to their logical conclusion.

It was not reason such men opposed, but abstraction. All claimed to pit liberties against liberty, concrete against abstract notions, and, as Maurras stressed, *interests*. They opposed or claimed to oppose those for whom ideas have more substance and personality than men. They did not realize that they themselves identified general interests with particular ones (connected with certain social groups or intellectual traditions); but neither did their opponents, who argued from concrete wrongs to abstract rights. All this could be quite interesting. But such complex aspects of the relationship between Right and Left are never broached; indeed, the Left is practically absent from these pages. Yet what was the Right about, if not about the Left?

The reader's bewilderment (or the absence of an indication that bewilderment might be an appropriate beginning in his quest) is emphasized by the inclusion in the series of Max Stirner, whose ideal society was a union of selfish individuals, enemies of the state against which he preached rebellion intended to exalt and to assert not a new order, only the self.

Though Stirner influenced Nietzsche and was attacked, viciously and at length, by Marx, his extreme anarcho-egoism led rather to the exploits of the *bande à Bonnot* than to those of the *fascios*. The suggestion that it provides one of the roots of the Right is certainly unorthodox. Mr. Carroll fairly admits that the case for inclusion is scarcely overwhelming, but argues from Mussolini's enthusiasm about "Stirner, Nietzsche, Goethe, Schiller, Montaigne, Cervantes, etc." We might ask why from this list of *agents provocateurs* we (or Mr. Carroll) should pick Stirner rather than Montaigne—or "*etc.*"? We would do better, though, to accept the suggestion implicit in this method, and extend the search for roots to include Karl Marx, a far less equivocal contributor to Mussolini's thought.

No student of fascism can afford to ignore the socialist (and syndicalist) roots of that radicalism which, disillusioned with the growing bureaucratization, *embourgeoisement,* perhaps humanization, of the organized Left, took up positions "of the Right." McClelland, aware of this problem, includes Georges Sorel; and also Maurice Barrès, whose youthful politics were explicitly socialist, although increasingly and, after 1896, insistently, "national." In France, but not only in France, the origins of socialism lay in nationalism, the origins of nationalism in the philosophy of reason and the rights of man. A pretty tangle of roots, worth some attention.

Nor does racism, represented by Gobineau and Rosenberg, yield a less equivocal harvest. Arthur de Gobineau, of course, elitist and anti-democrat, is properly brought forth as a source (or confirmation) of prejudices inextricably connected with a certain section of the Right. But Gobineau was no anti-Semite in the contemporary sense of the term: his Semites were negroid inhabitants of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including obviously Arabs, harbingers of the historical decline that was his obsession and the major theme of his works. His elitist racial theories suggested how one could be a patriot (he wasn't) while despising one's fellow-citizens (he did). More important, though, anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century was no preserve of the Right. Quite the contrary. Gobineau's contemporary, Alphonse Toussenel, was a radical "of the Left," and passages from his *Les Juifs, rois de l'époque. Historie de la féodalité financière* (1845) would have deserved inclusion in the series. Racism, duly enhanced by Darwinist strains, was for the cultivated. Anti-Semitism was endemic in the masses. Until revealed as the socialism of fools, resentment of Jews rising to truculent hatred was characteristic of socialist propaganda right through the century (see the works of Edmund Silberner).

There as on other planes, the cry for justice, first raised on the Left, was echoed on the Right as well. In both cases, justice *for* as often as not meant justice *against*—against those who had something others wanted. Typically, the *numerus clausus,* devised in East and Central Europe against "encroaching" Jews, reappears today in the United States in the shape of educational quotas and other proportional affirmations of a "fairer" social policy. Meanwhile, Right or Left, the essence of politics remains the same: who gets what, and from whom. The rationalizations, devised to philosophize on the way to the trough or to the slaughterhouse, continue to differ.

Professor Steiner, who must know this, evidently had a deeper reason for launching his series: to show those readers who may have doubted it how excruciatingly boring such writings can be. He has succeeded. This reader at least, staggers forth from the search for roots and makes a wild grab for lighter reading—perhaps the *Critique of the Gotha Program!*

EUGEN WEBER

University of California, Los Angeles

Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them. By Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970, 1972. Pp. 201. $7.95.)

This publication traditionally divides books for review into four major fields. Perhaps the most telling comment upon the work under review is that it fits into each of the categories and more. It is, indeed, global in its vision, both in the geographical sense and in the way it cuts across the traditional fields of inquiry. Yet while Professor Moore's work is in the unified social science tradition of Marx and Weber, it does not purport to provide definitive answers to the problem of human misery; rather, as the title suggests, it offers reflections and invites the concerned reader to join issue with the author on them. Few readers are apt to agree with most of Moore's wide-ranging arguments. The book's net effect upon most readers will be alternatively to enlighten, infuriate and challenge them. And, I suspect, this mixture of responses is precisely what Moore hopes will occur.

The book's central purpose is to explore the problem of that portion of human misery which arises from institutional arrangements. Misery which stems from one's individual psyche is outside the scope of the work. While he concedes that the notion of happiness is highly relative, misery cuts across cultural and national lines and is, therefore, unitary. The four principal categories of social misery are: "(1) the ravages of war; (2) poverty, hunger and disease; (3) injustice and oppression; and (4) persecution for dissident beliefs" (p. 2). Moore's cardinal premise is that "human beings do not want a life of suffering, at least for its own sake. . . . [Therefore] human society ought to be organized in such a way as to eliminate useless suffering" (p. 5).

At the outset one wonders whether Moore's conception of human suffering as unitary is an adequate one. Clearly much suffering and its acceptance by large numbers are closely connected with institutional arrangements and social action, but it may also be inevitable or unforeseen. For example, while the scandalous failure of American society to care for many of its elderly is attributable to institutional failure, medical advance simply does not permit the alleviation of much additional suffering of the aged. But of even greater consequence is Moore's failure to note explicitly that suffering is often inextricably bound together with happiness, and is therefore much less absolute than Moore allows. For example, one may put up with and indeed relish suffering here and now in order to achieve happiness in the future. Virtually any World War II battle film graphically illustrates the point; soldiers suffer the privations of the war in order to achieve the "better world" which will surely come after the termination of hostilities.

Unfortunately for Moore's concept of unitary misery, a multitude of situations arise in which participants perceive suffering to be well worth the cost because of some gratification which will take place in the future. Further, the gratification may occur in either the realms of the natural or mystical. Moore's hypothesis thus does not aid us in responding to the difficult problem of differentiating the circumstances in which suffering should be borne from those in which it should not be. His hypothesis does not advance an argument which would, for example, help us to distinguish "good" wars from "bad" ones, and unless we accept his unconditional implication that suffering has no future benefits, we cannot join issue with Moore's *prescriptive* arguments.

The problem is further complicated by the justification often given for inflicting suffering on others, that we may be saving them from even greater suffering. Sometimes, of course, this may constitute a rank rationalization, but at other times it may largely be true. The bulk of cases in which we are called upon to make such judgments, however, are unclear in their implications. According to Fogel and Engerman, Negro slaves lived better than the urban proletariat and far better than African peasants. Perceptions of these conditions might have been used in part to justify slavery. But obviously the case of slavery is far more complicated. Again, the infliction of a great deal of misery upon Vietnamese peasants by American forces has been justified by some on the ground that it saved them from worse fates. Again, the issue is complicated, and again Moore's unity of misery notion does not advance us very far in evaluating such events, even within a shared preference for altruism.

Notwithstanding one's difficulties with this central notion, Moore's book has so much substance that I would strongly urge anyone concerned with the human condition to read it and reflect upon its arguments. At times the brevity of Moore's formulations is admirable, particularly in his discussion of the conditions which may lead to revolution, a subject on which he is an acknowledged expert. At other times, however, the brevity of his discussion leads him to oversimplify the issues of a complex subject. For example, his discussion of various Marxist explanations of the phenomenon termed "imperialism" simply does not do justice to the arguments criticized; no matter how fairly opposing views may be stated, ten pages are simply insufficient to deal adequately with a subject on which volumes have been written. A reader who has examined both Magdoff's work supporting the Leninist thesis and Benjamin Cohen's attack upon it, will be grossly dissatisfied with Moore's brief treatment. Yet even here the reader will profit by some of Moore's insights.

The final chapter of the book is Moore's attempt to forecast the future of American society. Aware that "the inevitable is seldom what anybody expected" (p. 104), he proceeds cautiously in this endeavor. The four possibilities examined fit within the traditional terms "reaction," "reform," "revolution," and "chaos and near-total collapse." The chapter was obviously conceived during a period in which student unrest and radicalism were far more salient than they are in the middle 1970s. The discussion appears to be somewhat dated; the notion that youth will lead us through a social transformation is not taken seriously today. Moreover, Moore's major concerns—high military expenditures, scientific effort devoted toward destructive ends, "compulsive and socially wasteful" forms of consumption, poverty and the failure of the public sector to provide adequate services and amenities—have become supplemented in the short period since he wrote the chapter by other crucial issues. The problems of stagflation and high levels of unemployment and the supply-demand-price issue of scarce resources, especially those providing energy, have risen rapidly to the top of the agenda. Any discussion of America's and the world's prospects for revolution, reform, reaction, or "coming-apart" would have to take these facts very much into consideration. Yet they are absent here. This is not to fault Moore, but merely to point out the dangers of such prognostication, even given the author's disclaimers.

Toward the end of this book Moore states that there are enough questions raised "to keep many scholars busy for their whole lifetime." If one views the book as raising crucial questions and providing acute insights and not answers, which is what I believe the author intended, it must be highly recommended. Moreover, it is extremely well-written, and completely free of social science jargon. One hopes that other scholars will take up the gauntlet thrown by Moore, thereby justifying Moore's efforts in providing us with his valuable book.

Alan Stone

University of Houston

Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes. Edited by A. E. Keir Nash. (Washington, D.C.: The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, 1972. Pp. 342. $3.75.)

In his introductory chapter to this collection of essays, Nash advises the reader not to expect many conclusions or in-depth analyses. Because relationships between demographic and political variables have been generally neglected by political scientists, this volume is primarily exploratory. Nash hopes, however, that these works will "kindle the interest of students and scholars of political science in the implications of population changes" (p. 13).

The essays are divided into three general areas: the impacts of population changes on the American political system; potential policies available to U.S. governments to reduce the population growth rate; and the consequences of population size, growth rates, and other characteristics for international relations.

Eight chapters in this volume deal with the interrelationships between population levels and distribution, the structure of U.S. governmental institutions, and the implications of these interrelations for effective representation, the efficient production of public goods, and equity in the distribution of these goods. As Professor Nash indicates, these essays can be placed within the existing debate over the adequacy of pluralism as a system of political decision making.

The inclination of most of the contributors to this section to accentuate the negative aspects of population growth is perhaps best demonstrated in Roger Davidson's analysis of population and the adequacy of political representation by the U.S. House of Representatives. Davidson concludes that there is little room to question an overall negative relationship between the increasing size and heterogeneity of governmental units and effective representation in Congress (p. 78). This conclusion is based on the deduction that if a representative has a larger, more heterogeneous population to represent, he will not be able adequately to meet the larger number and variety of demands.

Although such a conclusion may seem reasonable, it ignores some rather critical issues which might have been examined. For example, do we have any evidence that once we are at the level of hundreds of thousands of constituents per representative, it is significantly more difficult to represent 400,000 than 300,000 persons? Davidson presents no evidence that senators, who generally have much larger constituencies, are less representative than congressmen. He ignores the history of groups, especially minorities, that have turned to the President, the representative with the largest and most heterogeneous constituency, rather than to local, state, or congressional officials to secure representation. Davidson nowhere mentions the possible beneficial consequences which increased size and heterogeneity may have for the protection and representation of minority interests. Certainly Madison's *Federalist No. 10* would suggest that there may be such benefits.

The consequences of increasing population levels and heterogeneity are also important issues in the chapters dealing with state and local governments. Issues quite familiar to students of urban politics are raised in the debate over the desirability of consolidation of existing special districts and large numbers of local governmental units within SMSA's.

In possibly the best of these chapters, Daniel Elazar presents his familiar arguments for the opportunities for both adequate representation and efficient production of public services provided by a federal rather than unitary system. He adds to his previous work by suggesting means by which federalism effectively copes with the problems created by increasing population size and heterogeneity. Along with the arguments provided by Elazar, Robert Drury presents data attempting to show that local governments have adequately responded to population shifts through changes in their expenditure patterns.

Countering the chapters by Elazar and by Drury are essays by John Grumm, Michael Danielson, and Allen Manvel who argue that the fragmented patterns of local governments encourage both inefficiency in the provision of services and inequities in the distribution of these services. Again using familiar arguments, these writers suggest that consolidation would lead to economies of scale and reverse the financial problems faced by center cities when citizens with greater resources but lesser needs move to suburbs beyond the taxing power of the core areas.

Although these five essays effectively present many of the issues involved in the debate over consolidation of local governmental units, the analysis of these issues is generally superficial. While Elazar and Danielson take completely opposite positions on the ability of fragmented versus consolidated governments to represent their constituents, neither of the authors attempts to develop a definition of representation, much less measure it. In the discussion of the efficient production of public services, expenditure data are used rather than measures of service levels or quality. In addition, no writer examines arrangements whereby revenues might be collected on a regional basis for equity reasons, but dispersed in a more decentralized manner so that neighborhoods with different preferences for various public services could have a greater opportunity to maximize these preferences.

In the section dealing with potential and acceptable population policies the most useful chapter is that of Theodore Lowi who uses his previously developed typology of distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policies to show that those policies which are likely to be acceptable to either decision makers or the general public are not likely to have major impacts on fertility rates. Lowi's essay is valuable in showing that frameworks previously developed in political science may be profitably applied in the population field.

The two essays dealing with international relations are quite different both in the substantive material examined and in the quality of the work. The chapter by A.F.K. Organski and his associates is one of the best in this collection. The distinction made between a nation's total population and the portion of that population which is useful to the nation for the purposes of influencing actions in other nations is a useful contribution to the literature. In sharp contrast to the Organski et al. chapter, is the essay by Robert North and Nazlie Choucri. Their contribution appears carelessly written and inadequately documented. (For example, the reader is told that "the correlation between China's violence behavior toward the Soviet Union is .89" [p. 266]. The reader is not told, however, how this correlation was produced, to what time period or events it refers, or what other variables, if any, are controlled.) The inadequacies of this chapter are especially unfortunate because North and Choucri develop important questions concerning the complex interrelationships between population characteristics, natural resources, and international conflict. Since their chapter in the Commission Reports is a preliminary analysis of data which they are currently analyzing in greater depth, it can be expected that their later publications will be more clearly and carefully written.

In summary, Nash's warning concerning the general lack of depth in the analyses presented in the volume is certainly appropriate. Nevertheless the volume is useful to political scientists in at least two ways. First, the essays remind us that Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and many of the utopians were correct in assuming that the population levels and characteristics of a citizenry are important in determining a government's representative potential. And second, the essays make clear that in almost every subfield of political science demographic variables must be included in our theories and models, and their omission seriously weakens the potential contribution of our work.

R. KENNETH GODWIN
Oregon State University

Anarchy, State and Utopia. By Robert Nozick, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974. Pp. 334. $12.95.)

Anarchy, State and Utopia is a salty pemmican of candor, argumentative wit, brilliant language, reactionary naughtiness. It is, above all, stunningly simple. One examines the pages again and again to make sure that Robert Nozick has indeed offered up a philosophy of state whose main argument is, in its intricacy, roughly on par with an ordinary mousetrap:

(1) people have some inviolable rights of person and property (cock the spring),
(2) any state which tries to do more than protect these rights must use means, such as taxation of earnings, which violate some of these rights (latch the bar),

so that,

(3) only "minimal," rights-regarding states are legitimate (snap!)

The mice whose necks fall to this device have scampered about the pantry for a long time. In constitutional form, Nozick would bring us back to an idealized eighteenth-century state, concerned to protect the voluntary ebb and flow of market towns, unconcerned by the misery of dislocated (or merely incompetent) workers, unrevulsed by vulgar prejudice, tolerant of economic inequality, unconcerned by market-determined inequities in the essentials of medicine or the frills of child-rearing. His analysis would likewise liberate us from the nagging criticism of souls like Jefferson (e.g., the Declaration), Marx, the Fabians, Tawny, Fanon, Mao, even John Rawls and his detractors. Most of all, Nozick's theory promises to free us of the suspicion that we should use state power to amend the inequalities of income and property worked by the market. We are given the libertarian slogan,

> *From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen (p. 160),*

by which the author evidently intends,

> From each as they choose *within the limits of wealth and income,* to each as they are chosen *by those with wealth and income.*

The central implication is that one is *entitled* to whatever he earns or inherits under the rules of market capitalism. If the ends cannot justify the means as Lenin would have it, then the means can on Nozick's telling justify the ends. Justice concerns itself not with *what* you have but with *how* you got it. Both moral philosophy and the state are enjoined to let the market work its way. This is, so far as I can see, the book's main point.

Why does an argument so simple (so stubbornly unresponsive to our trouble, so blithely *innocent*) read so well and win for itself such acclaim in American life? I can think of three answers, each partial and incomplete.

First, the book is comforting. We—the "we" who bestow literary and intellectual acclaim—are creatures of modest privilege in market society. One needs no vulgar Marxism, only common sense, to see a seductive *liaison* between ourselves and the libertarian right. What a marvelous book it is which attacks both the Internal Revenue Service and the whining moralism of our recently departed students. I must, for example, admit smiling at the look of my June payroll stub on Nozick's view that, "Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor" (p. 169). And it is fun to think about applying some tincture of Nozick to the federal bureaucracy. These titillations have their reality, but it would be wrong and unfair to credit the book's success to them alone.

A second thought: the book is in fact a subtle and compelling analysis of the state and its problems. It is true that the main thesis sketched out above is accompanied by several companion arguments, some of them interesting and at least one of them genuine. Some of these are interesting without being relevant. Nozick asks us to wonder whether man can look upon animals as his (edible) inferiors without risking the prospect that some still cleverer race will eventually look upon (eat?) him in the same way. This (like his analysis of "experience machines") is a chilling moral joke. Here, and in his good-natured *badinage* with the reader (e.g., p. 87), Nozick is a charming companion. But if the book is to cash any deep philosophical claim, it must do so in connection with one of three themes:

(1) *The side-constraint theory of rights:* Some rights, notably those which protect person and property, are to be given absolute value. Government is to do what it can without *any* infringement of these rights, without any "utilitarianism of rights," under which one right (say, open housing) is traded off against another (say, the right to sell or not to sell a house as one pleases). This is, of course, just a restatement of the book's main argument: How does Nozick justify it? By reference to the individual's inviolability and by the way market voluntarism corresponds on its surface to the Kantian requirement that each be treated as an end in himself.

This, however, assumes that markets *do* treat persons as ends in themselves; This is a mixed truth in the best of cases (in every transaction, each of us is *both* end and means), and it is simply false if some of us occupy the position of marginal labor in an unregulated economy. There is a hint here about the book's third and deepest appeal: It assumes away our worst trouble, here by ignoring the vulnerability of persons who lack market leverage.

(2) *The hidden-hand derivation of a minimal state:* Beginning somewhat vaguely with a Lockean state of nature, each of us wants to protect what he possesses from aggression by others. Protection becomes a commodity, sold by competing firms or associations. Eventually, a *de facto* monopoly is arrived at and transformed into a minimal state which protects everyone's rights *de jure*. Given the author's strictures, the process of development is arrested here, and further state power never comes into being. Hence, the minimal state is explained and justified.

This is, I think, twice defective as an exercise in justification. First, we are never convinced that the process of development as given holds any justificatory force. Second, the story as Nozick tells it assumes away the major reasons for a more-than-minimal state. Imagine what would become of the "hidden-hand" if either: (i) there were a proletariat which had nothing to gain from protection and everything to gain from anarchic change, or (ii) there existed a subpopulation, X, (say, Blacks or Jews or heretics) which was hated and despised by another subpopulation Y. In either case, a demand would exist not just for defense but for *aggression,* and nothing like Nozick's result could be expected. No noncoercive solution would present itself in these less equalitarian cases. I draw the inference that Nozick sees no need for a redistributive, nonminimal state precisely because the cleavages which provoke the demand for such a state are assumed away. A third thesis seems to me more genuine:

(3) *The Wilt Chamberlain critique of end-state theories for allocation:* Suppose we adopt some principle which, like Rawls's difference principle, judges social allocations good or bad by their net results (end-states) without regard to the historical path by which these results are achieved. Then suppose someone, like Wilt Chamberlain with his basketball, devises a way to make a bundle of cash not given him in our end-state distribution at T_1. By T_2, the rest of us will have happily paid up, Wilt will be rich, the T_1 allocation destroyed. It seems to follow that we must either abandon our principle or renege on the freedom to dispose of one's just share.

This is a deadly serious problem. It is no newer than the old story of freedom versus equality, but it is not less deeply problematic. Its shadow is readily discerned by the meddlesome compromises of welfare policy by government (e.g., A.F.D.C.). Its implications for political economy in general are numerous, complicated, and important. It needs facing, and Nozick forces it upon us with wit and candor.

This is not to say that Nozick himself entirely escapes the dilemma. His minimal state argument presumes the caveat that earnings are properly won, and (one infers) that earnings are not arbitrarily denied. But suppose we switch from the Chamberlain example to the very different cases of Satchel Page and Jim Thorpe. It is not that they earned too much but too little, and they earned so little because of raw and simple prejudice worked out in the marketplace. Here, as before, Nozick assumes away the arbitrary and unjust effects of market life which precede the just demand for state intervention. This, in addition to its moral comfort and its intrinsic quality, is a third major appeal of the book—it invites us to assume away our trouble. To finish: this is a finely crafted work, ultimately too optimistic to suit our case.

DOUGLAS RAE

Yale Universiy

Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective. By Nicholas Rescher. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972. Pp. 186. $7.95.)

American welfare policy has tended to be the province of economists, sociologists, and professionals in welfare practice. The field badly needs philosophical treatment, especially in relation to democratic theory. This admirable book provides such a treatment in outline. It is an individual and original statement nonetheless well connected to the work of other philosophical social theorists, primarily in Britain. Political scientists will find its clarification of concepts distinctly helpful for the analysis of policy and implicitly suggestive about the political conditions of the "welfare state."

Starting with ordinary language Professor Rescher defines welfare as, primarily, the requisites of personal well-being in physical health, material circumstances, and mental or emotional condition. He insists on distinguishing welfare from happiness; welfare simply consists in certain "consensus requisites" of happiness. It is a profile (not a single, central tendency) of its several components. Thus, as a subject of policy, it comprises several categories in each of which the aim is to sustain a sufficient minimum condition subject to objective statement and evaluation. The attributes of minimality (Rescher's term) and objectivity are critical both in defining and limiting state responsibility; and, in Rescher's view, they permit the direction of large sectors of welfare policy by social indicators. Although the justification of a sufficient modern welfare policy lies in social interdependence and "system malfunctions," the focus of welfare policy can be posed in terms of personal needs, not "wants," that are "socially actionable"—i.e., mensurable and administrable.

Issues of method—for example, the relative roles of income supports and social services—are not much considered here, but Rescher's succinct discussion of conceptions of poverty (Chapter 6) is easily worth the price of the book for anyone supporting a family of four on an academic salary. The most general methodological recommendations—that increasing productivity is politically preferable to pure redistribution, as is indirect promotion to relief, and that the comprehensive provision of sufficient welfare is economically feasible in modern, affluent societies—are conceptually unexceptionable, though they leave a host of technical difficulties unaddressed. But *Welfare* is not intended as a technical treatise in social policy. The critical issues for Rescher have to do with values and their rational malleability. A society whose members will internalize the welfare of others through the recognition of interdependencies and the pragmatic common understanding of needs can resolve or obviate numerous technical issues of welfare. "Beyond the welfare state" the trick is to transcend *distributive* welfare through *collective* welfare "regarding the publicly shared conditions of our common environment."

Thus it turns out that the "welfare state," ministering to welfare as Rescher has defined it, presents some inevitable disadvantages: a negative, categorical emphasis on disaster prevention rather than life enhancement; a growing threat of centralization and state control; a utilitarian economic preoccupation; an endemic failure to redeem the dependent population on which it concentrates rhetorically; and a set of malign side effects for initiative, responsibility, authority, and contentment. Rescher is arguing, as he observes at the outset, that men tend to misjudge their own welfare despite (or because of) its proper limitations and distinction from "happiness," and that democratic political and administrative measures necessarily tend to default on welfare. The policies of a postwelfare state and the values of a postindustrial society would entail the substantial dismantling of centralized welfare bureaucracy while sustaining the appropriate minimal elements of welfare. Indeed, Rescher argues—or, at least, asserts—they *will*. Here the argument takes a familiar postindustrial turn in its prognosis of a "positive" politics of improvement, satisfaction, and quality of life; an altered balance and articulation of governmental and voluntary action; "a new emphasis on the subcultures, regionalisms, and parochialisms of a pluralistic society. The forging of social cohesion amid the multiplicity and variety needed for a full life in a mass society is beyond doubt a central problem of the postwelfare state" (p. 175).

For Rescher this argument is more than prognosis; it is a diagonsis of our present condition. The frustrations of the welfare state are ineluctable; the advocated transformation of the welfare state is, while apparently not inevitable, nevertheless desirable and consistent with certain emergent welfare-state values. The argument is schematic, leaving qualifications and negations to the imagination; but it is not at all an argument of radical perfectionism, and it amply suggests the tensions of tomorrow implicit in the politics of today. Among many such arguments, that of this book is particularly worth attention. Its conclusions are debatable, but its perspectives on the substance of "welfare" and its emphasis on the elements of "value" in the politics of welfare are important.

Charles E. Gilbert

Swarthmore College

The Government of Poland. By Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Willmoore Kendall. (Indianapolis, Ind. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1972. Pp. xxxix, 116. $6.00.)

Rousseau's *Government of Poland* is an important but little-read part of his works. Kendall's offering is thus a real contribution to the literature of political theory.

An outstanding merit of this offering is Kendall's own fine introduction. The translation to which it is keyed is adequate but not particularly outstanding. Kendall's essay is nearly one third as long as the translation it introduces and, since most of its interesting points refer to that translation, its relatively pedestrian quality is disappointing. But in my opinion, the introduction by Kendall, together with the scarcity of translations of the work, make the whole offering well worth reading.

Kendall's introduction, "How to read Rousseau's Government of Poland," is both subtle without being obscure and precise without being dry. Its peculiar charm is, perhaps, that in it Kendall manages to demonstrate his points without insisting. He does this by showing us how he reads Rousseau, rather than by lecturing us on how we ought to read Rousseau. This is not to say that his conclusions are, or ought to be, universally agreeable to the concerned student of this relatively unknown work —a work which Kendall, correctly I think, calls, "this pearl of great price" (p. xviii); but, even when we disagree, either with a particular point made or, as is more likely to be the case, with the scope of applicability claimed for a point made, we note a combination of quiet reflectiveness and quick canniness which is encouraging to the tyro in these studies as well as sobering to more advanced students.

Kendall's treatment is more than broadly reflective, however, since it is also learned and detailed. We find here a refreshingly straightforward presentation of the quite complicated system of election-electors-voting mechanics, etc., in operation in Poland during the period addressed by Rouseau's text. Kendall's presentation of Poland's factual (a) militiary situation (p. xix), (b) imperative mandate (p. xx), (c) system of elector-selection (xxi-xxii) and, (d) federal machinery (p. xxii) is terse and crystal clear.

After having laid out the historical constitution of the historical Poland of Rousseau's lifetime, Kendall then shows us that Rousseau's *Government of Poland* does not address itself substantively to any of these characteristics of the historical Poland's historical regime. His address to the *oddness* of Rousseau's gift to a "Poland" which is far different from the historical Poland whose regime Kendall describes so clearly is very provocative, and this point is then used to provide a soberly persuasive groundwork for his central thesis that the *Poland* is to be read with extreme care if its true purpose is to be grasped. That true purpose, Kendall argues, can be seen best by a consideration of Rousseau's thoughts concerning the children of Israel under Moses; these were to become the dispersed, displaced Jewry which, without a homeland, was still a "national" people 2 millennia later (xiii). Kendall argues that Rousseau envisages the Poles groaning under the Russian yoke as constituting the new Jews—which suggests, if we may be permitted to follow out Kendall's thought further, that Rousseau ironically enough presents himself in the *Poland* as a new "Moses" to the Poles in the Russian house of bondage, and the *The Government of Poland* is presented as a new *"Exodus."* Kendall's argument encourages us to wonder whether perhaps Rousseau does not here indicate a future evolution of all of Europe into a congeries of Swiss-like federations of relatively autonomous cantons. This quite distinct possibility made good sense out of Rousseau's text of the *Poland* in critical places; without it, we are led to wonder if after all—as Rousseau himself so modestly suggests —Jean-Jacques is not accurate when he says of himself (p. 2) "Now, . . . I am barely able to tie one idea to another. . . ." Kendall's argument leads to the likelihood that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is thinking very well indeed, and that he wishes to teach each of the "enchained" peoples of Europe to be, so to speak, a new "Jewry" until all the other, hitherto oppressive "Philistines" or "Egyptians" become liberated from what in them makes them foolish enough to undertake self-destructive expansionist wars, (see chap. XII, pp. 79-81). Under Kendall's reading, Rousseau is a new Moses to the Poles and a new St. Paul, at the very least, to the militarists of his Europe.

And finally, before a word on the translation, we must mention Kendall's remarks relating the *Poland* to the *Social Contract* as Plato's *Laws* are related to *The Republic* (xvii). The notion of the *Poland* as supplying Rousseau's practical *"morale provisoire"* to his theoretical *Social Contract* is a most provocative one—since it adumbrates what is perhaps *the* political phenomenon of the non-Western blocs, i.e., infinitely "socialized" peoples being thereby prepared for a millennium lacking any social impositons.

Kendall's translaton seems less vigorous and pointed than his commentary. On p. 7, (Pléiade, III, 957), we find Rousseau praising Numa as the true founder of Rome. Kendall makes two sentences out of one and in the process quite badly misemphasizes the original, a critically important statement of Rousseau's. Kendall has Rousseau say that Numa *first* united the members of Romulus' robber-band to one another and all of them to the soil by means of certain mild institutions; and that Numa *then* made the city sacred using apparently frivolous rituals. Kendall's translation has:

> He did this by transforming the robbers into citizens, not so much by means of laws, however—of laws they had, in their rustic poverty, scant need—as by mildly restrictive institutions that bound each of them to the rest and all of them to the soil; and, finally,

> by making their city sacred in their eyes by means of those rites, apparently idle and superstitious, whose strength and influence so few people have understood. . . .

The correct emphasis is:

> He did this by transforming them into citizens, less by laws . . . than by certain mild institutions which attached them to one another and all of them to the soil by means of finally making their city sacred. . . .

That is, Rousseau says that these robbers were transformed into citizens through (*par*) certain mild institutions which bound them together and to the soil *because finally* Numa rendered the city sacred—*en rendant enfin leur ville sacrée*. . . . (Cf. *Social Contract,* I, Ch. VI for a definition of *ville* and *cité.)* In this crucial passage of the *Poland,* the problem is precisely for Numa to render, finally, *une ville*—a village —into *une cité*—into a city.

For Rousseau, a city *is* a village rendered sacred and, ultimately, Rousseau's ambition, if we may judge from the *Poland,* is to be the new Numa to Europe.

RICHARD B. CARTER

Windham College

Historians of Modern Europe. Edited by Hans A. Schmitt. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. 338. $11.00.)

Historians of Modern Europe is a collection of thirteen essays by former students of S. William Halperin. The authors, with one exception, currently hold academic posts in American universities. The exception, Pierre Renouvin, is at the Sorbonne. In the introduction, the editor, Hans A. Schmitt, describes the book as part of the University of Chicago tradition of presenting to a retiring, esteemed professor a *"Festschrift* with a theme" (xviii). Schmitt also provides a brief summary of Halperin's academic accomplishments.

The theme of *Historians of Modern Europe* is historiography, meaning here the study of historians rather than the methods of historians, the philosophy of history, or even the history of historical writing. Each of the thirteen essays is about a different historian. The book is divided into two parts: "Anglo-American Perspectives", with essays about Arnold Toynbee, Carlton Hayes, Oscar Halecki, Hans Kohn, A.J.P. Taylor, and J.L. Hammond, and "Continental Perspectives" with essays about Adolfo Omodeo, Gaetano Salvemini, Federico Chabod, and Gioacchino Volpe (Italian); Gerhard Ritter (German); and Ernest Labrousse and Jacques Chastenet (French). Each of these historians lived in the twentieth century and wrote at least one essay about modern European history.

Unlike *Ideas in History,* edited by Richard Herr and Harold Parker, a previous volume in the Chicago tradition, *Historians of Modern Europe* does not have a conclusion. The introduction does not mention the thirteen essays, and one must infer from the dedication page and the tradition that the authors are former students of Halperin's. The essays are not related to each other and are not uniform in the subjects they treat. In short, the book lacks unity. Each essay must be taken on its own merits.

Edward Whiting Fox discusses Arnold Toynbee's paradoxical commitment to prophecy and free will and Toynbee's resolution of the problem by distinguishing between "sub- and self-conscious action" (p. 9). Carter Jefferson describes Carlton J.H. Hayes's belief that the "idealism of the masses causes war, not economic imperialism or combative instinct" (p. 20). Hayes justified his belief on the grounds that nationalism produces international anarchy (his phrase) which was the "general cause of World War I" (p. 18). Kenneth Lewalski shows how Oscar Halecki resolves the dichotomy between the specific and the general by maintaining that only the "triumph of the kingdom of God and the end of time" are "predetermined" (p. 60), and those general ends are unspecifiable.

Perhaps Louis L. Snyder's analysis of Hans Kohn's treatment of nationalism will most interest political scientists. Kohn maintains that there have been many different types of nationalism which need to be distinguished from the current deterioration of nationalism into a kind of "primitive pagan tribalism" (p. 68). H. Russell Williams criticizes A.J.P. Taylor's *Origins of World War II,* while Henry Winkler surveys the "historical achievement" (p. 119) of J.L. Hammond in defending the idea that the industrial revolution made worse the conditions of the working classes in Europe.

The four essays on Italian historians emphasize the connection between history and politics, particularly the treatment of Italian unification and the rise and rule of Benito Mussolini. Charles Delzell's essay on Adolfo Omodeo, A. William Salomone's on Federico Chabod, and George Peck's on Gaetano Salvemini describe academic opponents of fascism who helped bring about the Republic. Edward R. Tannenbaum finds that Gioacchino Volpe willingly embraced fascism. Volpe's accommodation to the regime cost him his post after the defeat of Italy in World War II.

William Harvey Maehl's essay on Gerhard

Ritter depicts the fascinating way responsibility for the emergence of Hitler is translated into an historiographical controversy about Bismarck. Ritter opposed the Nazis while defending Bismarck against the charge that he prepared the way for Hitler.

William Savage portrays Jacques Chastenet's attempt to understand the fall of France in 1940 as a loss of faith resulting from the accomplishments of a patriotic objective—the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine at the end of World War I. Pierre Renouvin's study of Ernest Labrousse describes the popularity of the *Annales* school in France and it's emphasis on social-economic history. Labrousse's four volume *Economic and Social History of France since the 16th Century* is typical of this school in its focus on internal social conflict as the principal, but by no means the only, cause of domestic and international policies.

This book would be of greater interest to political scientists if it had a conclusion. Such a conclusion could have been built around the historians' different uses of inevitability, their working resolution of such problems as that of "presentism," or their contribution to twentieth-century historiography. As they stand, these essays will probably be of greatest interest to readers who want to know the historian before they read his history.

ROBERT WOITO
YMCA Community College, Chicago

The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden. Edited by J. Lyndon Shanley. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 409. $10.00.)

The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods. Edited by Joseph J. Moldenhauer. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 486. $12.50.)

The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers. Edited by Wendell Glick. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 403. $13.50.)

The first three volumes in the new Princeton collection of *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* surpass all existing editions of these particular Thoreau writings in both content and quality. Indeed, their publication is the fruition of attentive scholarship at its best. For those interested in the political philosophy of Thoreau, the respective editors of these volumes have restored purity to the manuscripts, insofar as possible, and have aided considerably in renewing an interest in Thoreau. Approved by the Center for Editions of American Authors, the volumes are prepared according to the Center's guidelines of copy-text, which are to produce the author's writings as closely as possible to his intention—i.e., unmodernized texts that would have met with his approval. The respective editors, all of whom are acknowledged scholars in the field of American literature, display meticulous and exhaustive editorial skills. All of the writings are appended with indexes, historical and introductory essays, textual notes, and where appropriate, tables of emendations and variations. No interpretation of Thoreau's philosophy is attempted.

It is an understatement to say that Thoreau's writings are more relevant today than when first written, offering refreshing inquiries of the hyperactive technocratic society. But Thoreau also furnishes alternatives by providing an intellectual handbook for purposeful living, not simply a retreat from civilization. Rather, he promises a life of deliberate simplicity designed to allow everyone to share in the products of nature as well as to liberate the psyche from crass materialism. Thoreau may not be the savior for postindustrial society but clearly he must be consulted in developing norms for its political guidance.

Walden, of course, is Thoreau's classic and most comprehensive expression of his philosophical assumptions. The editor, J. Lyndon Shanley of Northwestern University, reviews the cosmopolitan appeal of *Walden,* pointing out that previous editions have been translated into more than twenty languages. Thoreau worked on *Walden* for approximately eight years from 1846 to 1854. Hence, it is perhaps his most carefully developed work. It is the single best record of philosophical underpinnings—his basic tenets of transcendentalism, individualism, economics, society and politics.

Much of the commentary on Thoreau concentrates on his deification of nature and his political individualism. Yet most commentators fail to link the two. Indeed, the pristine physical environment is fundamental to Thoreau's thought as the real-world reflection of higher laws. It provides the raw material for the physical needs of life as well as important intellectual and spiritual lessons. Similarly, nature is the reflection of diversity and freedom, values to be emulated in political society. Political individualism for Thoreau, however, is not possessive individualism allowing for an unrestricted appropriation of nature. The acquisition of food, shelter, clothing and fuel—"the necessaries of life"—are justified by "whatever, of all that man obtains by his own exertions, has been from the first, or from long use has become, so important to human life that few, if any, whether from savageness, or poverty, or philosophy, ever attempt to do without it" (p. 12). Material possessions are thus essential only to satisfy basic physical needs. Possession beyond these needs is a violation of higher laws and contributes to an economy of waste. Consequently, property held unnecessarily also is a violation of the natural rights of those seeking sustenance.

Thoreau makes few explicit references to the state in *Walden,* but he clearly establishes his complex relationship to the state both in his refusal to pay taxes and consequent imprisonment and in his dictum that the individual must be obedient "to the laws of his being, which will never be one of opposition to a just government, if he should chance to meet with such" (p. 323). Obviously, Thoreau is not in opposition to all government but only to those not in conformity with his notion of justice, a matter of individual conscience.

The Maine Woods, edited by Joseph J. Moldenhauer of the University of Texas, consists of three essays based on Thoreau's journeys to the Maine wilderness. Written sporadically over a fifteen year period (1846–61), it includes "Ktaadn," "Chesuncook," and "The Allegash and the East Branch." Essentially a detailed record of his journeys, the essays are frequently overlooked by political theorists in their assessment of Thoreau. Although much of *The Maine Woods* may be politically irrelevant, what does emerge of significance is Thoreau's endorsement of positive governmental actions. In "Chesuncook," Thoreau, learning that the state of Maine had voted to grant money to each school district for providing a water-trough by the roadside to be used by travelers, responds: ". . . a piece of intelligence as refreshing to me as the water itself. That legislature did not sit in vain" (p. 88). Thoreau concludes "Chesuncook" by arguing for the establishment of "national preserves" for the purpose of protecting against the commercial exploitation of the wilderness. These explicit expressions of support are rare indeed for Thoreau.

Reform Papers is edited by Wendell Glick of the University of Minnesota at Duluth. Included in this volume are eleven of Thoreau's essentially political essays: "The Service," "Paradise (To Be) Regained," "Herald of Freedom," "Wendell Phillips Before Concord Lyceum," "Resistance to Civil Government," "Slavery in Massachusetts," "A Plea for Captain John Brown," "Martyrdom of John Brown," "The Last Days of John Brown," "Life Without Principle," and his heretofore unpublished essay, "Reform and the Reformers." Although the latter essay never received Thoreau's finishing touches, Glick felt it was near enough to completion to be included in the volume.

In "Reform and the Reformers," written before 1845, Thoreau does not focus on a particular political problem but addresses the matter of reform in general. The reformers, as distinguished from conservatives (whose heads have "a puny and deficient look"), are those people attempting to change established norms and institutions—political, social, or religious. While Thoreau admires their zeal and agrees that "something must certainly be done" to correct the servile condition of humankind, he maintains the reformer is not much more credible than the rest of the ignorant masses. Thoreau asserts that the reformer preaches reform because of his own personal failures or weaknesses. The real prescription for reform, to convince Thoreau, is the deed. Not until the reformer can demonstrate "a small specimen of his own manufactures" (p. 184) is the reformer worthy of a sympathetic audience. Clearly, one of Thoreau's "specimens" is resistance to the State; in its most forceful form, resistance is revolution. And here, "Reform and the Reformers" provides an important and relative perspective to Thoreau's notion of revolution: "Most revolutions in society have not power to interest, still less alarm us, but tell me that our rivers are drying up, or the genus pine dying out in the country, and I might attend" (p. 195). Given the role of nature in his world view, it is not surprising to find Thoreau supporting revolutions in behalf of the natural environment.

There is a great deal more to Thoreau's political ideas in these volumes (particularly *Reform Papers),* all of which emanate from a superstructure of nature. But no single label is an appropriate representation of his thought. Only a strange mosaic of impressions begins to explain his brand of politics: transcendentalist, theist, temperate revolutionary, individualist, libertarian, humanitarian and pragmatist. Obviously, more of Thoreau's political philosophy is found in his other writings, particularly his journal entries. Should forthcoming volumes in this new collection be of comparable scholarship (as it appears they will be), political theorists will have new and authoritative material to work with. Indeed, the Princeton edition of Thoreau's writings is a welcome tribute to his political ideas.

David M. Atkinson
Pacific Lutheran University

Politics and Deviance. Edited by Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1973. Pp. 217. $2.10, paper.

Inheritors of a Marxist tradition in social science have revealed how an explicitly political body of research and theory might confront an under-laborer conception of theory and research, shaking the latter from its prepolitical slumbers. The Taylor collection is an addition to that literature; it contains eight original essays designed to correct the belief that deviance is an individual pathology by showing how it can be judged properly only by considering the goals and outcomes of laws and customs rather than by examining only what societies define as deviant. Genuine deviance entails inegalitarian goals and outcomes injurious to people's physical needs and human dignity. In essays on such diverse subjects as: excesses of heroes in mystery stories, the psychiatrist's defense of tradition on college campuses, lawful and unlawful crimes among American corporations, and self-conscious deviant actions among hippies and the Weathermen, the contributors expose current standards of deviance and criminality as reflections of the ideology of the powerful.

Constructing the basic criterion of deviance on a measure of social injury, the essayists still leave the meaning of the concept a puzzle. If one takes seriously the contemporary argument that man has no essential or given nature, then there may be no respectable way for one to judge the goodness of the new conditions, or to know that the claims of progress are genuinely more humane. In the absence of a principle of humanity, it is hard to determine which kinds of criminality are justifiable and which are not, because they are injurious to a person's humanity. It is difficult to know if current practices should be called deviant because they are socially injurious or socially injurious because they are deviant. One is forced to retreat to political or conventional claims about justice and injustice or criminality. Such claims and their limitations are to be found in the opening of Plato's *Republic*. If criminality is only a set of conventions, then any empirically based theory of deviance will only reflect some set of customary practices or political values.

The essays were initially papers read at an annual National Deviancy Conference, over a period of six years, beginning in 1968. The Conference was a forum for those social scientists committed to raising the political consciousness of students of deviance. The language of the essays is designed to appeal to both the reason and emotions of the reader. One technique used by some essayists is ridicule, accompanied by minor exaggerations and simplifications. My understanding of ridicule is that its effectiveness depends upon being able to touch those weaknesses in an opponent about which he is likely to feel sensitive, and when combined with some form of exaggeration, its effectiveness depends on its ability to shock one's opponents into moderating their objectionable practices. This advice is found in treatises on rhetoric and can be found in operation in the work of even such a sober political thinker as Machiavelli. Disappointingly, the ridicule and exaggeration in the Taylor collection are more viscous and lacking in grace. Even a reader sympathetic to the writer's position is not likely to find the efforts succeeding in their aims. For example, it seems to me to be heavy handed for writers on deviance to defend their own theoretical and empirical efforts by calling current research by others not sharing an ideological bent, deviant and inherently spurious. Two other minor difficulties are worthy of note. On occasion an author will admit the unavailability of adequate hard data to support the argument of the essay. Moreover, there does not appear to be a consistent use of the term "ideology" among the various papers.

There may be no way to delineate clear criteria for deviance that would soften the vicious character of labeling people as naturally different. One might even be drawn to conclude that all discussion of deviance in a contemporary context is, in theoretical terms, indistinguishable from silence, and that the subject of deviance is ineffable and thus a matter about which there can be no legitimate theory. One may counter such exaggeration in considering vigorously the arguments presented in this volume edited by the Taylors. The essays present a concerted effort at understanding a most complex subject, and, as such, constitute a testament to the concerns of contemporary social scientists for an escape from ideology, in its original sense. By reminding us all how the character of present political systems are revealed in the ways they demarcate the bounds of normalcy, this book reveals its most significant virtue—it leads the theoretically-minded reader to consider more completely such questions as: Is it true that all political societies rest on a foundation of perpetual crime? Is there some similarity between changes in definitions of deviance and the process of middle-classification? Is age, both in individuals and polities, a significant independent variable in explaining the way deviance is defined? And what are the necessary elements for a philosophically justifiable theory of deviance?

MARTIN PLAX

Cleveland Heights, Ohio

Campaign Finance in America. By David W. Adamany. (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972. Pp. 274. $4.50, paper.)

Professor David Adamany has provided us with another carefully researched and highly informative study of campaign finance. Although the book's title (*Campaign Finance in America*) claims too much, for this is primarily a study of political finance in Connecticut, the book is more than a narrow monograph on a single state. Adamany is an experienced and knowledgeable student of campaign finance, and this book represents an extension and enlargement of his earlier work in the field, especially his excellent study of Wisconsin. Moreover, the author's empirical interest is guided by both a theoretical and comparative perspective that places his discrete findings in the widest possible context.

The book is divided into eight chapters: an introductory theoretical chapter; four descriptive chapters analyzing campaign costs, the allocation of campaign monies, and the sources of campaign funds; three chapters exploring regulatory problems and public policy issues. The study begins with a theoretical overview of the role of money in the political process. Borrowing from Dahl's resource theory, and supplementing it with concepts from exchange and incentive theories, Adamany views money as an important political resource which politicians use to influence the specific choices or strategies of others. Because it is so easily converted into other resources and transferable from place to place, it is one of the most useful ingredients of political combat. Yet, as he correctly notes, money is only one of many political resources, and there is little evidence to support the commonly held view that money is the basic determinant of electoral victory. Money's effectiveness depends on how wisely politicians exchange it for other resources or use it as an incentive for political action.

The core of the book consists of an intensive analysis of campaign finance in Connecticut based on empirical information gleaned from campaign finance reports for the years 1966 and 1968. Every effort is made to broaden the findings by placing them in a comparative context. Meticulously the author explores the overall costs of campaigns in Connecticut, and while he finds that these costs have risen sharply (from 20 to 40 per cent annually), he argues that it depends on one's perspective whether they are to be judged too high. If these costs are evaluated in terms of the total wealth of our society, then they seem to be a small price to pay for democratic selection of our leaders. Indeed, it might be argued that our elections are underfinanced. But if these costs are viewed from the perspective of the politicians who must raise the money from private sources, these costs might be considered as exorbitant. This latter view has obviously led to recent legislation on how much candidates can spend.

After demonstrating the sharp increase in campaign expenditures, the author undertakes an examination of some factors which might explain these rising costs. In a simple and direct way he explores the relationship of the following factors to spending: constituency size, campaign technology, price level, political organizations, and electoral competition. He concludes that "a review of the elements determining the level of political expenditures suggests that most are related to changes in the social or economic structure of the society, to political circumstances beyond the control of individual politicians, and to changes in technology" (p. 77). Unfortunately, most of this analysis is purely descriptive, merely demonstrating that there is an association between these variables and spending. It does not "explain" the variance in spending in any statistical sense. With variables that can be operationalized, it might be more useful to develop a statistical regression model and actually find out how much of the cost of politics can be explained in these terms.

How politicians allocate money among the various items of expenditure and why they choose these spending strategies are little understood. The relative effectiveness of mailers, newspaper ads, and television, is widely disputed among politicians. It has been said, facetiously, that although half the money spent on campaign activities is wasted, no one knows which half. Adamany shows that situational factors such as size of district, density of population, congruence of media areas with political boundaries, incumbency, and electoral strength introduce considerable regularity in the political expenditure patterns of candidates.

Adamany's discussion of the policy issues raised by the American system of political finance should be required reading for every reformer interested in improving the present situation. In the last two years since the completion of this book, the federal government and forty or so of the states have adopted new campaign finance regulations. While on the whole the old laws were mostly ineffective, many of these recent statutes are based on the false assumption that money buys elections or that it is the root of all evil in politics. As Adamany correctly points out, any controls over campaign finance should be designed to sustain, not restrict, legitimate campaign activities and to expand, not limit, political competition.

JOHN R. OWENS
University of California, Davis

The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. By James David Barber. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972. Pp. 479. $5.95, paper.)

It is very much to the credit of James David Barber that in his *The Presidential Character* he tries to break new ground by shifting the focus of discussion in political science from institutional or role analysis to the interaction of "character, world view, style, power situation, and climate of expectations" in determining presidential performance. Since terms such as "character" do not admit of universal definitions, and since, further, Barber attaches special and sometimes shifting meanings to certain words and concepts, the reader cannot always evaluate for himself the predictive interaction of the key variables, or assess their individual weights, in specific cases. But overall, "character is the way the President orients himself toward life—not for the moment, but enduringly" (p. 8). "World view," on the other hand, refers to a president's "primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time" (pp. 7-8). "Style," by no means the same as "stylishness, charisma, or appearance . . . is how the President goes about doing what the office requires him to do. . ." (p. 7).

The interactions of character, worldview, and style with the "power situation" and "climate of expectations" determine and are even predictive of presidential behavior. They also make possible comparisons between presidents organized in terms of what Barber calls "baselines" of "activity-passivity" and "positive-negative affect." If I understand Barber correctly, he has in mind here not so much a fourfold table with each box scored simply plus or minus, but a scale, the values of which display a considerable range of possibilities. Between the extremes of activity and passivity, Barber notes, "Presidents array themselves on the high or low side of the activity line" (p. 11). The other "baseline" of "positive-negative affect" refers to "how [the President] feels about what he does. Relatively speaking, does he seem to experience his political life as happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging, positive or negative in its main effect" (p. 11).

Applying these "baselines" to the presidents, Barber includes among the "active-positives" Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy. Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson, the "active-negative" presidents, revealed in their performance a "contradiction . . . between relatively intense effort and relatively low emotional reward for that effort" (p. 12). The "active-negative" president is "ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking. His stance toward the environment is aggressive and he has a persistent problem in managing his aggressive feelings. His self-image is vague and discontinuous" (pp. 12–13). Barber regards Taft and Harding, the "passive-positive" presidents, as "receptive, compliant, other-directed . . . whose life is a search for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative rather than personally assertive" (p. 13). Finally, the "passive-negative" presidents, Coolidge and Eisenhower (the latter so classified with certain reservations), are those "who do little in politics and enjoy it less. . ." (p. 13).

It should be interesting for the reader of this review to pause now and ask himself two questions: (1) Where did Barber, whose book apparently was written in late 1971, place Nixon on his performance scale?; and (2) Where would the reader himself, applying Barber's "baselines," place Nixon *now*, that is, from the vantage point of 1976? Barber in 1971 viewed Nixon as an "active-negative" president—although, as was the case with Eisenhower, not without qualifications—and almost five years later, I, at least, if I confined myself to Barber's typologies would not challenge that designation. Indeed, it is all the more remarkable that *The Presidential Character*, which is not free of major weaknesses, was extremely accurate in predicting Nixon's performance in the remaining years of his White House tenure. Certainly, one can argue with this or that interpretation of a president's behavior in office, but with the exception of Gary Wills, no one before Watergate came as close as Barber to penetrating Nixon's character armor and delineating the inner dynamics of his *modus operandi*. Barber's comprehension of the essential Nixon necessarily relates to his concept of the "active-negative" president, but the "fit" of concept and man is so close as to suggest that the concept could almost have been developed with Nixon in mind, and indeed almost a quarter of the book is devoted to Nixon.

Consider, for example, Barber's description of the "active-negative" character as "an accumulative personality, one which tends to experience compromise as an erosion of the ego. . . . The process takes time: the frustrations of power pile up slowly but steadily, until the temptation to reassert one's integrity and manhood by some adamant stand becomes irresistible" (p. 418). Or:

> With his remarkable flexibility regarding issues and ideologies, Nixon can be 'defeated' any number of times on specific questions of policy without feeling personally threatened. His investment is not in values, not in standing fast for some principle—although, if he were to stand fast, his doing so would certainly be rationalized in terms of principle. His investment is in himself, and Nixon's self is taken up with its management (p. 442).

Or even more:

> "Threats to his independence in particular—the sense that he is being controlled from without because he cannot be trusted, because he is weak or stupid or unstable—will call forth a strong inner response. . . . Only when a crisis gathers around him, one he cannot escape by moving on to some alternative crisis, and he experiences a sense of entrapment is he likely to move toward the classic form of rigidification" (p. 442).

Certainly this 1971–72 assessment of Nixon is impressive, even taking into account the fact that Barber did not foresee, any more than any one else foresaw, the rigidifications of Watergate, the diversion of campaign funds to personal expenditure, and the income tax returns. And if Barber in the end turned his back, so to speak, on his own analysis in writing that Nixon after re-election in 1972 would have before him presidential "models of heroes" in pursuing virtue rather than power, thereby implying that Nixon might yet become a great president, so did many another political scientist foreswear Nixon's unsavory political history in supporting him against McGovern. While there were features of Nixon's involvement in Watergate that were unprecedented even for him, the lying and cheating, the evasiveness, the sordid money-grubbing, and the attempt to manipulate public sentiments and emotions were hardly new.

Perhaps the principle merit of *The Presidential Character* is that it emphasizes the importance of character structure in political behavior, whether or not it develops typologies that are useful in understanding and predicting presidential performance. As Barber himself notes, the typologies require a good deal of further refinement, but since the presidency exists in an increasingly uncertain and chaotic world, it is far from clear how far they can or will be refined in the direction of accurate prediction. Unfortunately, such refinement, quite apart from the world situation, is not promoted by Barber's use of language that is exceedingly loose and imprecise where it is not downright folksy or whimsical. A question that asks whether a president experiences political life as "happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging" is poorly phrased. One suspects that Barber took pains not to write his book in the language of pedantic academese, but he was not careful enough on the other side to avoid a breezy conversational and occasionally overdramatic form of expression. Terminological precision, we all need to remind ourselves, is the enemy of neither creative thinking nor felicitous writing.

But even had Barber fully satisfied the requirements of methodological rigor and clarity of expression, he would have failed to capture the complexities of character that surfaced during the presidency of Nixon, most of which were unpredicted and remain unexplained. For it is the training of the clinic, not of the academy, that provides at least some understanding of Nixon's behavior, and insofar as the Nixon presidency serves as an introduction to future presidencies, the newer as well as the traditional approaches to that institution cease to be relevant. It is not that Nixon was a liar and a bungler, or that he swore more than his predecessors; other presidents have lied and bungled, and Johnson probably used as many four-letter words off-the-record. Nixon may have been the first White House incumbent who endeavored to become rich by corruptly exploiting his position, but what makes the Nixon presidency truly unique is the climate of paranoia that permeated the White House and clouded the thinking of Nixon and his closest associates. It was a climate that generated the worst suspicions of opponents and critics, and produced opinions that were guarded even in their estimates of friends. It was also a climate that did not hesitate to bend the Constitution, laws, and customs of the land to Nixon's own use, which use included the systematic abuse, on a scale still not fully known, of the powers and prerogatives of his office. Finally, it was an angry climate of vindictiveness and the relentless pursuit of those stigmatized as the enemy, a climate that treated politics as a war in which there are no atrocities, no victims, no regrets—only winners and losers.

For these reasons alone, it seems both incorrect and unfair to place Nixon in the "active-negative" company of Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson, although there is a sense, *not* Barber's sense, in which Nixon was both active and negative. "The loss of the leader in some sense or other," Freud wrote in 1922 (Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* [New York: Liverright, 1949; first published 1922], p. 49), "the birth of misgivings about him, brings on the outbreak of panic . . . mutual ties between the members of the group disappear, as a rule, at the same time as the tie with their leader. The group vanishes in the dust. . . ." That the United States has been moving in this direction for some time, partly as the result of successive crises of the presidency, and that the Nixon debacle vastly accelerated the move, seem all too apparent.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW

The City University of New York

Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis. By Steven B. Canby. (Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 320. $12.50.)

Faculty seminars of the Harvard Institute of Politics have produced some genuine contributions to our discipline. Now a 1967 seminar on Selective Service has led to this thorough and excellent policy study.

Readers, however, should be forewarned. This is a reference book for researchers and serious students of the subject. The book has all the grinding efficiency and functionality of a Rand study (parts of it were) or a tech manual for an M-60 tank.

Students from many disciplines who dabble in policy analysis will want to examine this book even if they do not read it from cover to cover. For it is an example of first-rate policy analysis which makes it painfully clear why such analysis is more talked about than done. It requires data, analytical skills, an unflagging thoroughness and a "white paper pragmatism" few of us possess. Nor are publishers battering down professional doors to publish books like this. (Heath-Lexington deserves credit.)

The essence of the book is simple; the analysis exhaustingly complex. Chapter I sets forth 17 criteria for assessing the relative merit of alternative military manpower procurement systems. Chapter II, which Professor Canby rightly feels is the heart of the book, discusses the criteria in detail and uses them to assess six alternative procurement systems: selective service; voluntarism; lottery; universal service; sequential service; and mixed systems.

The basic framework that underlies Canby's analysis and the 17 criteria for assessment is drawn from Samuel Huntington. It posits that viable military policies must rest upon an equilibrium of contending national security needs and domestic demands. The resulting dynamic tension is often expressed by juxtaposed concepts like "nation in arms" and "maintaining a strong, scientific and economic mobilization base"; or by "equal treatment" vs. "differential treatment based on state needs."

It was the loss of just such an equilibrium which led to the effective demise of the Selective Service and to analyses by Canby and others.

The criteria for analysis and evaluation of procurement alternatives are comprehensive, examining virtually every facet or aspect of military manpower procurement. The footnotes and relevant bibliography will be particularly useful to students.

The conclusion Canby draws is that some methods of procurement meet certain criteria better than others. Which criteria should be met and therefore which procurement system is appropriate depends on the circumstances: total mobilization; limited war; or peacetime deterrence. Logically then the ideal system would be a gear shift or sequential system that permitted moving from one to another to match conditions.

Unfortunately, Chapter 2, which is so central to the book, is unnecessarily "heavy going" in spots. For example, "The draft subsidy (or externality) places society at point 1 on the lowest shown Scitovsky community indifference curve. If all the inefficiencies and externalities could be removed, society could reach the social optimum of mutual tangency at point 5 on the highest attainable Scitovsky curve" (p. 15). It may be a little unfair to cite the quote without the chart, but not very.

I was puzzled by the bases for some assertions or conclusions. For example Canby asserts that "The five most important criteria are manpower demands, industrial production, budget cost, ex-ante equity, ex-post equity" (p. 62). These might indeed be the most important but it depends on whom you asked. How the author reached that conclusion is not clear. He makes no claim that his preceding analysis led him to it.

There are some small publishing flaws that are particularly annoying to someone using the book for reference purposes. The type face used on subheadings is inconsistent, as is the numbering of appendices.

The other chapters in the book are really ancillary to the first two. Part two (chaps. 4-7) are, as the author says, "highly specialized" (p. xix). Each is important and useful but less so to casual readers than to students of some special aspect.

Chapter 3 explores the claims and counterclaims for exemptions and shows that deferments, in anything but a total mobilization like World War II, create more costs and problems than they solve. Chapter 4 is a short but esoteric discussion of factors to be considered in "costing out" military manpower. Chapter 5 is an in-depth treatment of the existing military pay system, its budegtary costs, and the costing of a volunteer military. The constant influx of cheap draft-induced labor, efforts to raise professional pay over the years, and poorly perceived income-in-kind to professionals led to a badly skewed military pay system. No one, not even the careerists and retirees whom the system relatively favored have been satisfied. The author insists that this picture can be reversed and better aligned with civilian practices at lower costs than most economists and the Department of Defense have estimated.

Chapter 6 considers the budget cost of a volunteer military. The author claims that his estimates ($2.1 to $2.5 billion) are much lower because of a methodology that considers long-run cost implications. Chapter 7 is a short one reviewing the faulty assumptions and the air of unreality in which decision makers in military manpower have operated since World War II. It re-emphasizes the book's dedication to re-establishing a lost equilibrium between military and structure and domestic goals.

Canby himself may have provided the best characterization of his work in an off-hand and ingenuous remark on the Harvard faculty seminar! "In recent years several groups and authors have come forth with menus of domestic goals related to military manpower procurement. The most famous has been the Marshall Commission; the most comprehensive, the Harvard faculty seminar on selective service." The same can be said of Canby's book. It is certainly the most comprehensive work on the subject to date.

Gary L. Wamsley

University of Kansas

For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941. By Charles Chatfield. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971. Pp. 447, $11.95.)

For many years accounts of interwar pacifism have been one-sided and polemical. According to analyses offered during the Cold War period, such doctrines as universal disarmament and mandatory neutrality merely proved that pacifists were intellectually incapable of confronting the facts of international life after 1918. Even treatments of American churches rejoice in the triumph of "political realism" and the consequent waning of a "utopian" anti-war stance. It was the philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr, not that of A. J. Muste, that was celebrated by both "action-intellectuals" and historians.

Only as a result of the Vietnam trauma have historians taken a more dispassionate look. Now, for the first time, scholars are beginning to look carefully at how pacifists themselves perceived the events of the 1920s and 1930s. The author is eminently qualified to make this reexamination. He has written several seminal articles, serves as an editor of the Garland Library of War and Peace, and recently was president of the Conference on Peace Research in History. Now, in his first book, he offers an unmatched account of the interwar peace crusade.

Chatfield begins by showing how World War I transformed a broadly based peace movement, radicalizing the pacifist wing and making it far more alert to issues of civil liberties, imperialism, commercial competition, and war profits. Forced to challenge the Progressive doctrine of inevitable progress, pacifists—as early as 1918—started to ask whether some forms of conflict might be necessary for reform. In some cases, they saw war resistance itself as a means of social change.

In his second part, the author traces the history of the new activist peace organizations (such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the National Council for the Prevention of War) emerging from the Great War. Chatfield shows the interlocking directorate of these peace societies, as well as prominent pacifist activity in fostering trade unionism, the rights of blacks, civil liberties, and democratic socialism.

Chatfield then turns to the ideology of pacifism, revealing how quickly such war opponents adopted "revisionist" and "devil theory" interpretations of World War I. During the interwar period, pacifists continually sought total disarmament, debated class war, wrestled with Gandhian doctrines of nonviolence, and affirmed that military struggle resulted from unequal distribution of world markets and resources.

In the last part, the author indicates how pacifists worked with isolationist Congressmen in fostering the Neutrality Acts and the Ludlow Amendment. Only in 1939, with the advent of World War II, did pacifists abandon broad coalitions and concentrate upon reenforcing their own constituencies. Henceforth, and during the Second World War, pacifism was forced to look inward.

Skillfully combining intellectual and institutional history, *For Peace and Justice* may well go down as a classic. The portraits of peace leaders are deftly drawn, and political and ideological trends are handled with skill. Although Chatfield writes with appreciation of the pacifist movement, he always preserves his detachment and treats Niebuhr as appreciatively as Muste and peace lobbyist Frederick J. Libby. Seldom have the manuscripts at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, oral history projects, and unpublished dissertations been used to such advantage. The extensive bibliographical essay is definitive.

The book does contain some flaws. Occasional spelling mistakes are irritating, factual errors even more so. On p. 321, for example, there are three misstatements concerning the founding of the America First Committee. (In all fairness, it should be noted that the paperback edition, published by Beacon in 1973, corrects many of these mistakes). The organization is not always clear, often jumping from event to ideology without sufficient transition. Chatfield usually refrains from appraising varied pacifist positions, although he is one of the historians best qualified to comment and evaluate them.

In sum, however, *For Peace and Justice* will be consulted frequently—and deservedly—for years to come.

JUSTUS D. DOENECKE
New College, University of South Florida

Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks. By Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman. (New York: Seminar Press, 1972. Pp. xiv, 224. $9.95.)

Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States. Edited by Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger. (New York: Seminar Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 572. $18.50.)

Both of these volumes constitute contributions to the understanding of American race relations. And both are overpriced productions of the same publisher in the series of "Quantitative Studies in Social Relations" edited by Peter Rossi.

Beyond these similarities, however, these two books could not be more different. The first by Crain and Weisman is a free-wheeling, imaginative analysis of survey data in the empirical sociological tradition. The second is a restrained review of comparative black-white research of the late 1960s in the stodgy tradition of the *Psychological Bulletin.*

Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement reports an extensive analysis of a 1966 survey of black Americans conducted by the National Opinion Research Center for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. The Commission was interested in determining the effects of attending desegregated versus segregated schools. Hence, N.O.R.C. sampled 1,651 black men and women, aged 21 to 45, residing in 25 northern metropolitan areas. Middle-class black districts in the smaller metropolitan areas were oversampled so as to insure a sufficient number of alumni of interracial schools. The interview contained almost 500 questions and required an average of two hours. Many of the questions were utilized in another N.O.R.C. national survey that contained 1,326 white respondents; these data provide comparisons with those from the black respondents.

Crain and Weisman organize their analysis around the testing of a central theorem derived from both Abram Kardiner and Martin Luther King, Jr.: *Discrimination leads to psychological disability, which in turn prevents achievement.* Ideologically popular in the 1950s and early 1960s, and out of favor now, this theorem is relentlessly pursued in a lively, if sometimes exasperating, manner.

In general, the Kardiner-King theorem is supported by these cross-sectional and retrospective data; but the multivariate complexity of the issue also becomes clear. Consider several of the far-from-obvious findings: For the southern-born, what their parents told them about race appears to be more important for later achievement than whether they grew up in a broken home. For the northern-born, whether they attended interracial elementary schools appears to be more important (for achievement) than whether they grew up in a so-called "culturally deprived" home.

The original focus of the study on the effects of interracial schools also illustrates the complexity of this domain. The principal results are that interracial education is related to a greater sense of security combined with some inhibition of aggression. These personality differences seem to explain why the black products of desegregated schools are much better educated, earn somewhat more money, and report being "happier." But the consistency of the racial experience in schools is also important. Elementary school desegregation does not relate to personality differences for those first raised in the South. And those associations with desegregated education that relate to interaction with whites (such as job information) are strongest at the high-school level.

The wide-ranging analysis touches on many thorny issues that have been subjected to considerable speculation. Coming from a broken home, for example, is related to lowered income for men and less educational attainment for women. Men from one-parent homes are more violently aggressive, feel less "happy," and possess less "internal control." These factors in turn relate to the respondent's own marital history. But Crain and Weisman also demonstrate that "homes broken by death are at least as damaging as those broken by separation" (p. 121).

Region of birth is another interesting variable. Black southern migrants possess lower self-esteem. But blacks born in northern ghettos seem to react to segregation by externalizing rather than internalizing their feelings and go "about in an unhappy rage" (p. xi). These personality distinctions then relate to achievement differences. And southern migrant men earn more money despite receiving less formal education.

Crain and Weisman close with an essay on the policy implications of their findings. They argue that housing desegregation has brighter prospects for being attained than school desegregation does. They even go so far as to call housing segregation "a house of cards," which, if it begins to collapse, "will fall of its own weight" (p. 187). Consequently, the authors recommend initiating desegregation efforts with new, expensive housing in the outer suburbs, followed by desegregating areas progressively closer in from these suburbs until the black housing need is met. Low-income white and black housing should be desegregated last.

This volume, then, provides some fascinating data, penetrating analyses, and thoughtful ideas. Its chief strength lies in its willingness to tackle explosive issues and reach currently unfashionable conclusions. "The new militancy," for example, is described as not "a prescription for change" but "merely a conservative defense of the attitudinal status quo . . ." (p. 152).

The book, however, could have benefited from considerable editing. The writing is often too casual to be persuasive. And those who insist on precision will be constantly annoyed by the many loose attributions of cause and the general neglect of the relevant race-relations literature. These same criticisms could be leveled against Crain's 1969 volume on *The Politics of School Desegregation.* Yet Crain conducts the studies and writes the books that the field needs. The irritating weaknesses of his style should not detract from the fact that these works are important contributions.

While Crain breaks new ground, Miller and Dreger have made careers of organizing comparative racial research from a psychological perspective. In 1960, they published a 42-page review of the field in the *Psychological Bulletin.* In 1968, they wrote a whole monograph supplement of the *Bulletin* that updated their review through 1965. Now this tome, published in 1973, covers the comparative literature from 1966 into 1970. As the field has rapidly expanded, the reviews have become increasingly lengthy, and this one has chapters by 19 authors.

The coverage is guided by a psychological view of what is important. While there are separate chapters on racial experimenter effects, language abilities, intellectual functioning, temperment, self-concept, social perceptions, and mental health, race and political behavior is relegated to one 25-page chapter. Among the 19 writers, 12 are in southern institutions, 11 are psychologists and psychiatrists, and only one is a political scientist.

The chapters are uneven and overlap considerably in places, as is typical of such contributed works. (Only one of the chapters, a behavior-genetic analysis by Jerry Hirsch, is a reprint.) Two of the nonpsychological chapters offer unusually effective and succinct summaries—Robert Malina's on biological substrata and Leonard Savitz's on black crime. Surprisingly, a number of seminal works from the 1966–1970 period go unmentioned in the relevant chapters (e.g., the 1967 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools,* in the chapter on the effects of desegregation).

There is little attempt to draw the diverse chapters together, and there are no summary or policy implications chapters. One interesting theme emerges, though, and divides the writers: Is there a separate black American culture with its own codes and speech? Joan

Baratz enthusiastically argues, "Yes," in writing on language; Jacquelyne Jackson answers, "No," in writing on family organization. Both could be correct if the ideological implications underlying the issue were defused.

The political chapter by James Clark reviews black political socialization and conventional political behavior. Clark also summarizes the research on unconventional political behavior, especially riot participation and its correlates. He then looks at racial reactions to violence, confidence in government, and black militancy. From his review, Clark derives a four-cell table of black orientations based on political efficacy and trust in the political system.

Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States provides, then, an extensive overview of race research of the late 1960s. While it often reads like the *Encyclopedia Britannica,* the volume represents a useful initial place to check on the racial research literature.

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW
Harvard University

Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South. By Chandler Davidson. (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 301. $11.95.)

This volume is a valuable, but disappointing, addition to a growing literature on black politics in the South. Davidson provides an excellent case study of racial politics in Houston in the 1960s. The disappointment arises from the less than convincing treatment given broad questions about the adequacy of the political process in providing socioeconomic justice for blacks and what strategy will best promote realization of this justice.

Houston is the largest, most rapidly growing city in the South and the same adjectives apply to Houston's black community. Since World War II the black population in Harris County, which includes Houston, has increased from 100,000 to nearly 450,000. During this period, the local black population has moved from virtual political impotency to playing a pivotal role in local politics.

The strength of Professor Davidson's study is his careful analysis of the social, organizational and electoral environment of Houston blacks in the midst of this transition. For example, the depressing impact on effective black participation of electoral contrivances like poll taxes, annual registration which closed for the year in January, at-large elections with a place system, and the unit rule in political party meetings are detailed. Davidson stresses the disparities in income, education, housing, and occupations that persisted in Houston after blacks entered the local political process. He concludes, "There does not seem to be any clearcut connection between the political pressures exerted by Negro interest groups, Negro politicians, and the Negro electorate on the one hand, and progress in obtaining benefits on the other" (p. 138). Even if blacks expand their gains at the ballot box, Professor Davidson questions whether this alone will make much difference in realizing a "just society" in which Negroes receive a "just share" of social and economic rewards. That realization, the author contends, will come only when blacks are able to exercise influence over the economic structure that distributes such unequal rewards to the racial populations.

Given this pessimistic assessment of existing black electoral prospects, how is racial justice to be secured? Davidson dismisses the alternatives of violent revolution and black separatism, urging instead the creation of "a biracial coalition . . . with economic goals radical enough to mobilize large sectors of the less affluent of both races" (p. 220). The author considers and rejects criticisms of this coalitional strategy, arguing that the class interests of blacks and have-not whites provide a suitable base to build a new political majority. Evidence supporting the plausibility of this progressive coalition is gleaned from a study of 20 Houston elections during the 1960s wherein it appears that low-income whites were more likely to vote for black-supported candidates than were middle- or upper-income whites. Some data from New Orleans and Atlanta were also included, but the tendency of low-income whites to back the same candidates as did blacks was less pronounced. Davidson attributes this difference to the non-economic focus of elections in these cities as opposed to Houston. That being the case, he says the lesson for southern progressives is to define political issues in economic rather than social status terms so that "the ordinary southern white voter is effectively cross-pressured by appeals to his economic needs" (p. 219).

There are several problems with this argument about the ineffectiveness of current black electoral action and the likelihood that a new progressive coalition could remedy this situation. In the first place, Davidson's case study focuses on a narrow time slice—basically the mid 1960s—in the middle of a transitional era in Houston politics. The consequences of this narrow focus become evident when one notes that almost all the electoral devices that Davidson describes as being used to reduce black political strength are no longer operative. In Houston and most other southern cities, it is much easier today for potential black electoral strength to be converted into effective political power than was the case in the 1960s. In Houston, New Orleans, and Atlanta, where blacks have been instrumental in electing mayors, this new political clout is reflected in substantive rewards like jobs at city hall. Urban blacks in the South have not yet gained a proportionate share of the rewards distributed through local political processes, but recent achievements have been significant.

The hazards of generalizing from a limited data base are evidenced by an examination of recent Houston elections. In the hard-fought mayoral contests of 1969, 1971 and 1973, for example, the candidates that were overwhelmingly backed by blacks drew their lowest support from low-income whites—a pattern at variance with what Davidson found earlier. Such results, coupled with similar patterns in contests like the Atlanta mayoral election in 1973, suggest to me the great difficulties confronting those seeking to create a stable electoral coalition of blacks and low-income whites.

Davidson might argue that the "real" issues of southern politics are class questions that cut across racial lines, but there is little empirical evidence that low-income whites in southern cities perceive issues in this fashion. Their perception of reality is more often one of conflict with blacks over housing and educational or job opportunities for they think it is their homes, their schools, their jobs that are threatened by the growing urban black populations. Without question, some interests shared by blacks and low-income whites lead them to support the same candidates on occasion (as in national contests where broad economic issues like employment policies are salient), but there remain persistent conflicts between low-income whites and blacks that continue to be reflected in other electoral contests. Current attempts to build permanent electoral coalitions in the South will almost certainly flounder on these conflicts.

In summary, Davidson has produced a first-rate case study of racial politics in Houston. In my opinion, however, he has understated the results and the meaning of black electoral participation and exaggerated the prospects for a stable, class based, coalition capable of substantially redistributing socioeconomic resources through the political process.

RICHARD MURRAY

University of Houston

Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties. By Vine Deloria, Jr. (New York: Delta, 1974. Pp. xv, 263. $2.95.)

The States and Their Indian Citizens. By Theodore W. Taylor. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1972. Pp. xxi, 307. $2.25.)

"Sometimes Indians are 'the hardest goddamned people on earth to help.' " (Taylor, p. 127.)

There is a crisis in Indian affairs, going far deeper than such recent "media events" as the "Trail of Broken Treaties" caravan to Washington, D.C. in 1972 and the confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973. Deloria contends that this crisis is the inevitable result of flaws in American democratic theory and practice which deny to tribal peoples the political and cultural autonomy that treaty law supposedly guarantees to them. Collective, tribal interests are suppressed in favor of a concept of arbitrary, individual interest. Indians are thus forced to create a forum in which the tribe qua tribe can compel the attention of the American political system.

Deloria, a lawyer, argues that this need not be the case. Indian tribes are, or should be under treaty law, semi-autonomous and self-determining communities. Indian political rights as "nations" (tribes), he argues, were never extinguished through the treaty process, in spite of the fact that treaties often required signatory tribes to acknowledge the political sovereignty of the United States (p. 129). Federal court decisions emphasize that such stipulations " 'in no way divested the plaintiff tribe of its sovereign power to enter into treaties with the United States on equal terms. . . .' " (p. 138). This is the basis for "contract sovereignty" as guaranteed, defined, and delineated in treaty law. For Deloria it is the basis for a new federal relationship with the tribes.

The usual claim of "pragmatists" in Indian policy today is that it is too late to redress the grievances of the past. Indians are too few, too politically and economically impotent, too little endowed with the capacity for self-improvement. Deloria chooses to counter these arguments with a comparative study of the political, economic, and educational profiles of various independent and semi-independent states recognized internationally. The Navajo reservation is larger than a number of United Nations member states, including Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, Lebanon, etc. And, although Indian population figures are small, particularly on a tribe-by-tribe basis, they still compare with those of the smaller UN members, such as Qatar, the Maldives, Tonga, etc. (pp. 166, 170).

The argument, of course, is that "contract sovereignty" is akin to "protectorate" status, which has "a long history of acceptance in international diplomatic practice, even though at times the states in question have had difficulty maintaining their independence" (p. 168). Such recognition would "clarify the status of Indian tribes and eliminate the inconsistencies that are presently found in the federal relationship with Indians" (p. 159). Deloria ends the book by outlining steps to accomplish this reworking of the federal principle, based on negotiation between the tribes and the federal government.

"The idealism in this idea," Deloria acknowledges, "is obvious" (Deloria, p. 260). So perhaps are some of the flaws. Legal arguments about Indian sovereignty are controversial; the international parallels shakey. The mysteries of independence and dependence often seem to defy rational analysis. Most serious is the absence of a thorough-going discussion of the dynamics of an American politics which would permit so drastic a re-structuring of political reality on behalf of Indians. Deloria raises far more questions than he answers. But they are provocative questions, reaching beyond the Indian case.

It is, of course, possible to deal with the Indian issue in a narrow sense, stressing unique legal and historical status in comparison with other minorities and political interests in the US. By drawing example and inspiration from a wider arena, however, Deloria draws attention to a universal problem of community rights. Particularly in democratic societies, the issue lies in the tension between the institutionalization of individual rights and the persistence of a demand for community rights. Two responses are possible here: first, to foreclose the issue by insisting on the inevitability of the disintegration of community interests in favor of individual ones; or, secondly, to broaden the issue by raising anew the classic questions of democratic theory about the roles of individuals and groups in democratic society. Taylor, to whom we now turn, chooses the former strategy.

The States and Their Indian Citizens is a response to the concept of the "new federalism," with its stress on the de-centralization of Federal authority to the States. This is a very different kind of "federalism" from that which Deloria proposes, and its consequences are dramatic for the Indian population, for whom federal ties symbolize their unique legal and historical status. Taylor is neither theoretical nor speculative, and his work does not lend itself to the same type of discussion as Deloria's work. It is, in fact, largely descriptive, giving information on the status and activities of Indian communities on a state-by-state basis. Particularly useful are the questionnaires submitted to 50 state governments and to some 245 chairmen of federally recognized Indian groups, and the compilation of their responses (cf., Taylor, Appendices L and M). The absence of explicit theory, however, only underlines that which is implicit.

Taylor's book suffers from a number of serious problems, not least of which is the author's largely uncritical reflection of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' attitude toward Indian policy, which in turn represents a predisposition in American society to assume the inevitable disappearance of communal interests. It is only in light of this assumption that Taylor can defend the argument that government-sponsored policies of enforced acculturation were ultimately in the best interests of the Indians, and that "permissive acculturation" was simply impossible in the absence of a "conducive environment" (p. 15). This is far too critical an issue to be glossed over so casually. Why and how in "pluralistic" American society did there come to be no alternatives? Why wasn't the environment conducive?

A major shortcoming of this book is its failure to examine the tensions among the states, the federal government, and the various Indian tribes. This is crucial. Indians have traditionally viewed the attempts to extend state jurisdiction into "Indian country" (such as Public Law 280 and House Concurrent Resolution 108) as a threat to their special legal status, and have resisted strongly. To ignore this context is to miss the significance of the whole question of the state role in Indian affairs.

Another problem is the author's unwillingness to take seriously the legal—and perhaps also moral—claims of Indian tribes on American society. While disparaging the claims of "professional" Indians to legal redress (p. 125), he urges them on to pursue individual "self-sufficiency." Are there not, in Taylor's sense, "professional" Southerners, corporate businessmen, labor leaders, etc.? Are their claims invalidated? And why the unquestioned primacy of individualism over collective interests and rights?

Taylor is not unsympathetic to the Indian case, but is rather often insensitive to its legal and theoretical ramifications, especially in the area of individual versus collective rights and the problem of the tyranny of the majority.

This brings up the second possible response to the issues Deloria raises, the theoretical one. Federalism is essentially an administrative concept, referring to relations among governmental units. Rights, on the other hand, are pre-eminently vested in the individual in Anglo-American democratic theory. The Indian tribe falls between these two stools. Under the present system, the recognition of the tribe as a political entity must grow out of one of two statuses: first, as an assimilated, solely governmental unit (cf., the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934); secondly, as the mere aggregate of individual interests of citizens who happen to be Indians (cf., the Indian Bill of Rights of 1968). The tribe-qua-tribe disappears in both these contexts, for it is more than a unidimensional political unit and certainly more than the mere aggregate of individual interests.

The issue here is ultimately the status of the community, the collective rather than aggregated individual interest, in democratic societies where competitive individual interest has been the foundation of policy. The "discovery" of the individual as the basis of all political and social authority was one of the crowning achievements of early modern political theory in Europe. The consequent rejection of absolutist collective authority, whether vested in church or state, was inevitable.

It is important to note two things, however. First, the pre-eminence of communal responsibilities and interests over individual rights does not necessarily lead to tyranny, particularly within a tribal, rather than state political structure. Secondly, the persistence of group loyalties, broadly conceived, undermines the traditional assumption of classical democratic theory that groups acting as expressions of individual interest function only where the direct expression of those interests is curtailed. Clearly re-examination of the role in democratic society, not merely of tribal groups, but of "groups" as a general category, is needed.

In avoiding clear-cut statements about the political status of communities and of groups based on race, religion, ethnicity, class or whatever, democratic theorists have tended to imply that competitive individual self-interest in the economic—and political—marketplace is the only basis for democratic societies. Self-interest is assumed to underlie any and all "group" memberships, its shifting nature precluding permanent groups and alliances in the "open" society. This is clearly a serious underestimation at best of the ways in which community and group membership may channel and direct the expression of individual interest. It also fails to allow for the enforced permanence of racial, ethnic, and religious groups bound together by discrimination, where individuality may not be recognized. More important, however, is the failure to explore the nature of the community, the collective interest group, more thoroughly.

The discussion of the tribe is really an exploration of broader dimensions of the idea of the group. The tribal community is more than a unidimensional religious, political or social status. Rather, it encompasses all of these and more. Not merely a mechanical aggregate of its parts—built of political or religious or social allegiances alone—the tribal community is more than the sum, irreducible. It is, in a way, the arbiter of what the individual can be and thus of what his interests are, rather than vice versa. On this idea of collective interest democratic theory is largely silent.

The issue of possible reconciliation of these two concepts of vested rights, individual and collective, stands as a challenge to contemporary political theory. American policy has, in the Indian case, traditionally chosen to resolve through abolition of the Indian system the ambiguities of the issue. Deloria has suggested that one alternative to this is to look to the international arena for solution to a dilemma which is not unique to this society. Taylor chooses to reflect the argument that the special status and claims of the Indian communities are merely historical anomaly, and that the substitution of state for federal jurisdiction merely confirms the trends assumed in democratic theory.

In these positions both the "Indianist" and the theorist have fuel for argument. The tribal community as a living institution, rather than an anthropological artifact, is little known to political scientists. Exploring various aspects of tribalism may prove very fruitful to social science and to all those concerned with the fate of democratic societies.

FRANCES SVENSSON
University of Michigan

Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. By Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1973. Pp. xxxi, 713. $15.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.)

Labyrinths of Democracy, the master report of a comparative study of eighty-two city councils in the San Francisco Bay region, is a very important book. Yet it is a book whose importance is not likely to be quickly understood.

First of all, it was consciously written as a group-level study. This meant that the authors had to be aware at all times of whether they were aggregating individual properties, whether they were making statements about the integral properties of the groups themselves, or whether they were relating the groups to the still more inclusive contexts in which they were situated. Further, since *Labyrinths* stands almost alone as a group-level analysis, the authors were forced to devise many operational indicators—for example, a stratification index, an index of interaction, a measure of role differentiation, and so on—for the concepts they used. This pioneering effort should lead to other group level studies. Yet it has been more than two decades since Herbert Simon reminded us that "complexity in any body of phenomena has generally led to the construction of specialized theories, each dealing with the phenomena at a particular level," and if we are just beginning systematic theorizing at the group level, one cannot be very optimistic about how rapidly our colleagues will pick up this lead.

Second, this study is very tightly integrated. No review can do more than suggest the richness contained in the 700+ pages, 30 chapters, and some 226 figures and tables, but concepts are linked together in chapters, chapters are linked together in sections, and the sections are linked together in the "adaptations, linkages, representations, and policies" sequence of the subtitle. In the section showing how the group adapts to its environment, for instance, five forms of social relations, opinion leadership, cosponsorship, opposition potential, friendship, and expertise, are related to each other, to stratification, and to the external and internal complexity of the council. In the following chapter, six governing practices, general exchange, limited exchange, bargaining, compromise, coalition formation, and ministration, are similarly analyzed and then related to the forms of social relations. In succeeding chapters, there are equally detailed accounts of social climate, patterns of interaction, and role orientation. All of this leads up to three decision structures, unipolar, bipolar, and nonpolar, which are in turn related to three models called conflict, permissiveness, and fragmentation. The flavor of this tight analysis may be suggested by almost any summary quotation, as this from p. 206:

> The effect of *stratification* (on decision structure) is ambiguous. In the larger cities, high *stratification* makes for *conflict* and *constraint* in the *decisional structure,* while in the small cities it makes for *harmony* and *permissiveness. Social climate* has a more consistent effect. In both large and small cities, an *antagonistic climate* makes for *conflict* and *fragmentation* but favors *constraint.* The *political governing style* is conducive to *fragmentation, conflict,* and *constraint* in the large but not in the small cities. *Politicized interaction* makes for *conflict* and, to a lesser extent, *constraint* in the larger cities but for *fragmentation* and *conflict* in the smaller cities. *Role differentiation* favors *harmony* and *permissiveness* and, to a very limited extent, *integration* in the larger cities but makes for *fragmentation, permissiveness,* and *conflict* in the smaller cities. (Emphasis added.)

Each of the words I have emphasized in this quotation are concepts to which Professors Eulau and Prewitt have given specific denotations and for which they have devised measures. (Moreover, this section is followed by others dealing in turn with council ties to the electorate and interest groups, with the quality of representation, and the resulting public policies.) This is a most impressive analysis, but it is not the type of reading for one's nightstand nor the light phrasing that enlivens conversations.

Finally, *Labyrinths* cuts across the specializations into which political science is divided. Since it presents a view of how community policy is formulated, it could be seen as a contribution to urban politics. Since it is concerned with questions of linkage and representation, it certainly fits into legislative politics. Since it carefully compares processes across governmental units, it has something to say to comparative politics. Since it is an example of how theorizing is an integral part of the research process, it should be consulted by theorists. Yet I suspect that *Labyrinths* will be seen ultimately as illuminating that oldest subject matter, governance. And on this, it is well to close with the authors' words (p. 611): "Even if it were possible to identify all the relevant variables, and even if our tools of inquiry were perfect, democratic governance would [still] prove elusive as a topic of investigation. The more we know and the more reliably we know it, the more complex will democratic governance appear to be."

JOHN H. KESSEL

The Ohio State University

From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865. By Louis S. Gerteis. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. Pp. 255. $11.50.)

One experience unique to black Americans has been a basic change in their place in the body politic. White Americans rebelled in 1775 to preserve ancient liberties as Englishmen. Red Americans still battle to maintain tribal autonomies. Black Americans ceased to be chattels during the Civil War and since then have been trying to better themselves from a fundamentally changed legal position in the society.

Louis Gerteis, in an important book, examines with discernment the federal government's role in an early stage of that development, the transition from contraband to freedman. In doing so, he calls into question just how basic the change of emancipation was. This process took place under the chaotic conditions of civil war during which: "The decisions made . . . shaped postwar policies toward the freedman and in large measure precluded the possibility of radical social reconstruction in the South" (p. 7).

The northern army proved more zealous than the southern in exerting its power to enforce law and order upon unfamiliar Negroes. (The Confederates, by and large, depended on their women-folk and the slaves, themselves, to maintain stability while concentrating on the unsuccessful fight against Yankee invaders.) Union soldiers herded black refugees into displaced persons' camps where they were forced to work in field gangs growing crops in the camps. Other blacks were required to contract to work for carpetbagger planters in the Mississippi Valley or local planters in the occupied sections of Louisiana. The contracts provided that rations be supplied and wages paid. Often the required wages were omitted, and the army aided the planters by enforcing the work provisions of the contracts. Gerteis contends that the union officers "had no theories about plantation operations which differed from those held by [southern] planters" (p. 94).

Gerteis does not think the stage of transition from contraband to freedman held any promise of basic social change for those who had recently been slaves. They were still held captive in a plantation system. He dismisses the Port Royal experiment on the sea islands, where former slaves became independent farmers, as an irrelevant exception; and he insists that the black communal farming experiment at Davis Bend, Mississippi—despite a profit of $159,200 in 1865—pointed to no useful future because it was so closely controlled by army officers committed to the gang labor methods of the plantations system. Professor Gerteis is a careful scholar, and it cannot be denied that his sober reappraisal of the period corrects some excessively optimistic views held a short time ago by historians eager to see in Reconstruction bright signals for total success in the Civil Rights Movement. Nevertheless, in dismissing some of the more hopeful experiments in building a better life for the freedmen which carried over into Reconstruction, he does not see that an experiment can have value despite limited immediate success. Even hopes that are dashed are important.

Gerteis discounts the usefulness of northern allies and omits local white southerners (scalawags) who accepted the changed place of black southerners. And, by focusing on federal policy, he sells the freedmen themselves a bit short. He fails to recognize, for example, the dominant reason why army officer Thomas Conway, who had been a defender of the labor camps, became, as a Freedmen's Bureau official, an advocate of the distribution of lands to black farmers: It was pressure put on him by black constituents. The Southern freedmen came out of slavery with generations of experience of dealing with the plantation system and planters. They knew what they did not want—work in a field gang—and what they did—an independent farm. Gerteis shows us that obstacles to the achievement of independence were raised everywhere, and yet the freedmen were not merely victims. They struggled; and the struggles, remembered by later generations, made the transition from contraband to freedman an important time. Since then, in just over one hundred years, black Americans have made gains within a hostile society at a rate that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of once-enslaved peoples.

WILLIAM S. MCFEELY
Mount Holyoke College

Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. By Richard Hellman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 500. $25.00.)

Regulation by independent administrative agency has come under increasing attack by political scientists, economists, lawyers and practitioners. At the same time, greater attention is being directed toward possible avenues for changing the basis for government involvement in the public utility industries. It is particularly appropriate, therefore, that Richard Hellman's study should appear at this time.

Professor Hellman argues that there are three principal options for industry organization and social control in the public utility field. These are (1) publicly-owned monopoly, (2) privately-owned monopoly operating under government regulation, and (3) government competition. Hellman believes that government competition is clearly the outstanding choice if one wants to promote the public interest. He notes that "government competition may . . . be defined in terms of two criteria: First, as a new displacement, threatened or actual, of an existing utility company; and second, as any threatened lowering of rates" (p. 48).

According to Hellman, the most important contribution of government competition lies in the area of dynamic pricing and promotion of service which, in turn, enhances the public welfare by assuring that more service will be available at lower rates. He argues that such an objective cannot be adequately achieved by recourse to publicly owned monopolies or to regulated private monopolies. Traditional regulation is viewed as static and passive, and incapable of motivating acceptable corporate behavior. Interestingly, Hellman welcomes "competitive interaction" between both private and publicly owned electric utilities, so that the motivation for superior performance may come from either a public or a privately owned utility seeking to outperform the other.

Hellman seeks to place the development of government competition in the electric utility industry in historical perspective, and elements of his argument are supported by history. For example, TVA provides an excellent illustration of successful government participation in the electric power field. On balance, if one accepts most of Hellman's arguments regarding the past benefits of government competition, three major questions still remain to be analyzed. Unfortunately, they receive little or no attention from Hellman, but they must be considered an integral part of any proposal that government competition be adopted as a substitute for commission regulation in the future.

First, the process of introducing competition or rivalry into the public utility field can give rise to unique problems of price discrimination and cross-subsidization. Unless the threat of potential competition is prevalent in all markets served by an established utility, the firm will tend to employ earnings from monopoly markets to facilitate underpricing or limit-entry pricing in potentially competitive markets. This practice will be facilitated by the high proportion of overhead costs which characterize these industries. Experience has shown that both private and public enterprises (e.g., the Bell System and the U. S. Postal Service) will employ such pricing strategies when confronted by selective competitive pressures. The results will have an adverse effect on the improved performance which Hellman seeks.

Second, experience indicates that competition in the public utility industries is not necessarily self-reinforcing. In part, public enterprises appear to lose their zest to compete over time (as demonstrated by Hellman's discussion of the New York Power Authority after 1950). But this diminution of competitive vigor also stems from the fact that both private and public firms, once established in their respective spheres of influence, may simply choose to coexist rather than incur the risk associated with continued competition.

Third, according to Hellman, competition leads to progressively lower prices and aggressive promotional practices. At present many environmentalists discourage the use of electricity and promote conservation. Neither public nor privately owned utilities have been inclined to innovate in this area of rate design, and it would be valuable to have Hellman's assessment of the contribution of competition under such circumstances.

Despite the claims made for government competition in electricity, there still appears to be a major role for some form of regulation or social control by an appropriate government agency. The need to establish pricing guidelines, the need to maintain industry flexibility, and the need to recognize national priorities all point to such involvement. Professor Hellman has demonstrated that the process of regulatory reform must not overlook the contribution that could be made by government enterprises operating in a competitive fashion as a constraint on corporate power and as an inducement to superior performance.

HARRY M. TREBING
Michigan State University

The Politics of Electoral College Reform. By Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. Pp. 222. $2.95, paper.)

The recent presidential election makes timely this concise but thorough examination of the perennial issue of the electoral college and what, if anything, should be done about it. Professors Longley and Braun conclude that nothing less than direct popular voting for president will satisfy their specified criteria of democracy, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the winner, and invigoration of politics through the two-party system.

After a foreword by Senator Birch Bayh, whose electoral reform efforts are applauded elsewhere in the book, Longley and Braun review the origins and history of the electoral college. They give special attention to 1960, when the closeness of the race threatened to produce an electoral vote at odds with the popular vote, and 1968, when it seemed quite possible that the Wallace third party campaign would result in neither major party candidate's receiving an initial electoral vote majority and would therefore bring on a season of bargaining either among the electors or in the House of Representatives. The mischievous possibilities of slates of unpledged electors, such as appeared in 1960, and "faithless electors," who appeared in both 1960 and 1968, are pointed out, plus the usual "what might have been" analyses of changes in the outcomes that would have resulted from slight popular vote shifts in certain states.

In a somewhat mechanistic way, the authors review the features of the various reform possibilities: the automatic plan (elimination of the electors with the state electoral votes registered directly), the proportional plan (split of each state's electoral votes according to its popular votes), the district plan (separate choice of electors in each congressional district), direct and nationally pooled popular voting, and several hybrids. A separate chapter argues in detail for direct national popular voting, with a provision for run-off between the two top candidates if neither gets over 40 per cent of the total vote. The run-off feature is felt to be necessary in order to produce a winner with a recognized mandate.

In their historical material and general approach, Longley and Braun follow the pathway marked out several years ago by Neil Peirce in *The People's President*. Their arguments for the direct vote are buttressed by tables, largely derived from the work of John F. Banzhaf III, showing deviations in the respective states from the per state average of voting power of citizen voters under the electoral college and the various reform plans. These calculations are supplemented by special work for this study by John H. Yunker showing state deviations from the national average voting power per citizen voter. These data illustrate the advantaged position of large-state voters produced under the present system of casting each state's electoral votes as a unit, which of course would not be changed under the automatic plan. They also show the advantages that would go to small-state voters under the district or proportional plans. There are further analyses of the effects of the present and various reform systems on regions, urban, suburban, and rural residents, and foreign stock, black, and blue-collar voters.

In arguing for the direct popular vote, the authors note and dispose of the principal arguments that have been used against it. The idea that the states, as such, have a significant stake in presidential voting is brushed aside. It is pointed out that direct voting would insulate against election fraud and maladministration by eliminating the temptation to try to swing large blocs of electoral votes by tinkering with a few returns in closely contested big states. Competition would be enhanced by the incentive for all parties to get out their maximum vote in all states. Finally, and most crucially, the authors reject the argument that the direct vote may undermine the two-party system by attracting a multiplicity of candidates. They point out that it would take a remarkably strong third-party candidacy—much stronger than Wallace's in 1968, for example—plus a very close contest between the major party candidates to force a run-off. They have faith that the 40 per cent plurality and the indivisible nature of the presidency itself will protect us against a proliferation of minor parties.

The book's most original contribution is a detailed narrative and analysis of the strong, but ultimately unsuccessful, drive for electoral college reform in the 91st Congress. In 1969, with the memory of the Wallace threat still fresh, a resolution for a constitutional amendment providing for the direct popular vote passed the House of Representatives. On the Senate side, however, it took a year and a half of maneuvering—complicated by the Haynsworth and Carswell nomination fights which swirled around the same committee—for the reformers led by Senator Bayh to beat off the other plans and get a direct vote resolution to the floor. By now it was late in 1970, and a classic filibuster ensued. Southern Democrats with conservative Republican support held out successfully through a month's debate and two attempts at cloture. If a two-thirds vote for cloture could not be mustered, it was doubtful that the two-thirds necessary to pass a constitutional amendment could be secured either.

In its strong advocacy of the direct vote, this book differs from the recent comparable study for the Brookings Institution by the late Wallace Sayre and Judith Parris, who traversed much of the same ground and concluded that the uncertain hazards of change outweighed the visible advantages. Pay your money and take your choice.

LAURIN L. HENRY
University of Virginia

The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964. By Neil R. McMillen. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971. Pp. 397. $10.95.)

This book is a history of the southern White Citizens' Councils and of the efforts of the Councils and related groups to resist racial integration during, essentially, the decade immediately following the *Brown* decision of 1954. In considerable detail, Professor McMillen describes the Councils' origin and their expansion throughout the South, and he notes the varying degrees of influence they attained in their attempt to resist desegregation. His description of Council activities emphasizes that diversity characterized the movement in general, even within states. He attributes this diversity to the cultural heterogeneity increasingly characteristic of the southern region. The author concludes that ethnological factors primarily influenced the pattern of white southern resistance to desegregation, but he suggests that other factors were also important in shaping the racial attitudes of particular southern communities. He finds that the quality of state and local political leadership "profoundly affected" popular responses to desegregation. As the Councils' inability to prevent the advance of integration became apparent, the movement began to decline—a trend that began not long after the Little Rock incident. By 1961, he concludes, "It had all but disappeared in the peripheral states, and in the Deep South, where its power and prestige had always been greatest, the movement was demoralized and in disarray" (p. 362). Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the organization focused its attention mainly on the private school movement.

The author devotes two chapters to the content of Council thought. At the outset, he notes that the Council movement failed to develop "a systematic intellectual framework in which to operate" (p. 159). Council attitudes varied from region to region in the same manner as the movement's growth and influence, and because of this "intra-organization heterogeneity" were often contradictory and incongruous. Nevertheless, McMillen finds that there were some general beliefs with which the entire movement could agree. Fundamentally, he says, Council ideology was founded on the notions of racial segregation and white supremacy. Council doctrine thus reflected a basically racist point of view. White Citizens' Councils are frequently linked with other ultra conservative groups, and McMillen finds many similarities between Council ideology and that of other right-wing organizations. He sees the Councils' overriding concern with race, however, as a distinguishing characteristic of Council ideology. Indeed, "Council thought was essentially monistic. Racial difference was the ultimate reality before which all other issues paled in significance" (p. 204). McMillen also sees the Councils' official policy of following "strictly legal" methods of defiance as a feature that distinguished them from the more extremist of the southern resistance groups. He concludes, in fact, that "whatever may have been the theoretical relationship between the explosive atmosphere [the Council organization] so often created and the actual outbreak of violence, there is no tangible evidence which suggests that it engaged in, or even overtly encouraged, criminal acts" (p. 360). In a chapter on "the politics of racial integrity," McMillen describes the Councils' efforts to gain political power and points up their characteristically varying roles in the political life of southern states. He also describes the Councils' excursions into national politics, where their activity mainly took the form of efforts to influence the outcome of presidential elections through involvement in independent elector and third-party movements.

As the book's title indicates, McMillen has not attempted a history of the organized southern resistance movement in its entirety. He has focused his study on the activities of the Citizens' Councils, and his efforts have produced a carefully drawn, comprehensive history of the Council movement. Much has been written about the Citizens' Councils, and their more prominent characteristics are well known. McMillen's contribution lies in his approach to his subject: he supplies the detailed information that is necessarily lacking in less complete treatments of the Councils. The book is written in a forthright, lively style; it is well documented and includes a bibliographical essay. As McMillen makes clear, the Citizens' Councils, although always a minority, exerted a strong influence for a time on the racial policies of southern states, especially those in the Deep South. His history of the Councils should be of interest to those desiring information about this facet of race relations in the recent South.

James D. Thomas

The University of Alabama

The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees. By Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky. (New York: Basic Books, 1973. Pp. 172. $8.95.)

Time has not been kind to PPB, the planning-programming-budgeting system promulgated for the United States Government by President Johnson on August 25, 1965. A decade later, few signs remain of the innovation that once stirred the world of budgeting. The formal structures of PPB were quietly dismantled some years ago, and now even the term provokes disdain.

While PPB still was alive, Professors Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky set out to study its operation in two federal agencies—the National Park Service and the Forest Service. (They also took a limited look at the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.) The bulk of their investigations were conducted during 1969, at a time that PPB already was moribund in some agencies but before its formal termination in 1971. The authors made no attempt to bring their story up to date, so that when it was published late in 1973, the situation already was different from that described in their book.

Nienaber and Wildavsky have produced four sets of essays, only loosely connected to one another: (1) Why organizations can't evaluate, (2) how traditional budgeting is done, (3) how PPB wasn't done, and (4) paying for recreation. These themes are prefaced by a brief discussion of the criteria used to appraise the application of PPB in the study agencies. The authors acknowledge that since there are no "accepted criteria" for gauging success or failure and no way of specifying "proper outcomes," they therefore are impelled to examine the "processes through which the decisions leading to these outcomes are made" (p. x). The book thus suffers from the affliction attending most discussions of PPB. The authors' own perspectives and preferences take command. What should be a straightforward empirical account of budget practices in several federal agencies turns instead into still another polemic contra reform. As a consequence, PPB remains almost as unstudied today as it was a decade ago.

This nonempirical cast appears in the first essay, "Evaluation as an Organization Problem," an insightful and lively consideration of why self-evaluating organizations rarely exist. This essay comes at the start of the book; it is not at all informed by the discussion of budget practices in later chapters. Yet it is the most valuable part of the book (though it has also appeared in substantially the same form as an article in the *Public Administration Review*), for it explains why organizations both covet and fail to do much self evaluation. The basic message of Nienaber/Wildavsky "is that evaluation and organization are to some extent contradictory terms" (p. 3), a thesis which is forcefully presented by portraying the probable fate of "evaluative man" in an organization. As an outsider, the evaluator always is at risk of losing either his independence or his influence. He cannot have it both ways: serving his organization loyally and yet steering it away from its traditional course. The organization wants commitment; evaluative man gives it skepticism. The evaluator puts deeds and goals to the stern test of public good; the organization relates instead to clienteles and self interests. The organization strives for stability, evaluation impels it to change.

Despite these intractable difficulties, Nienaber and Wildavsky value the evaluative ethic. Like the ancients, they too seek to join knowledge and power. They suggest that the political role of evaluation be recognized and that politics and evaluation "be joined together so that each becomes part of the other" (p. 35).

The authors next turn to traditional line-item budget practices in the National Park Service and Forest Service. They concentrate on the preparation of estimates by field units, with attention to the forms used for the submission of requests. But they fail to penetrate to the bowels of the study organizations, to examine how the budget is put together piece by piece, or how conflicts and pressures are handled in the field or in Washington. The authors view agency budgeting primarily as a matter of maintaining existing facilities, though they also refer to the inevitable tensions between maintenance and expansion strategies.

Throughout the discussion, Nienaber and Wildavsky take it for granted that the agencies were operating under extremely tight budgets, with no money for new programs, and perhaps not even enough to properly maintain existing facilities. These budget realities seem to have colored the entire budget preparation process, driving out planning and analysis. It is unfortunate that some 100 pages after these constraints were reported, the authors challenge them in a back-of-the-book footnote, pointing to the high growth rates experienced by the two agencies.

The third section of the book consists of two chapters on program budgeting. The authors confess that it is "exceedingly difficult to appraise the PPB system in terms of its utility or its decision-making value" (p. 89). Nevertheless, they offer a tentative conclusion which is much more favorable to PPB than is usually found in Wildavsky's writings: traditional budgeting is most appropriate for routine activities such as maintenance; PPB-type processes might be most appropriate for planning and development purposes. They also acknowledge that "an important function of the PPB system thus is, in practice, its ability to generate data that support agency or departmental goals and objectives."

Having tendered this favorable statement, the authors in the next chapter return to a more conventional view of PPB, focusing on the program structure used in the Department of Agriculture and on difficulties of integrating PPB with the routines of traditional budgeting. Nienaber and Wildavsky conclude this discussion with an erroneous statement: "Students of administrative irony may note that PPBS was abolished in the context of a circular that dealt largely with simplification of paper work" (p. 142). PPB suffered many indignities, but its demise was announced in a memorandum dealing with agency budget submissions for the next fiscal year.

The final portions of the book are wholly divorced from the preceding sections. Nienaber and Wildavsky assess who should pay for recreation benefits and how the recreation programs of the federal government should be financed. They carefully balance environmental and developmental interests and offer some sensible suggestions for increasing the federal investment in recreation facilities.

The book is better in its parts than in the whole. Not closely linked together, the parts should be of interest to persons studying evaluation, budgeting, or recreation.

Allen Schick

Congressional Research Service

Cable Television U.S.A. By Martin H. Seiden. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 272. $16.50.)

The Invisible Resource. By Harvey J. Levin. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 432. $12.00.)

These two books are both rewarding and frustrating reading for students of public policy toward broadcasting. They are rewarding because they provide careful, detailed descriptions of the regulatory policies of the F.C.C., one in the limited field of cable television regulation, the other in the whole area of spectrum allocation as it affects various radio and television uses as well as more specialized uses. They are frustrating because they are studies of the policies themselves and the consequences which flow from the policies, with little or no attention given to the procsses by which these policies are shaped. But each makes substantial criticisms of the F.C.C.'s policies as they stand, criticisms which if accepted would entail a fairly comprehensive alteration in the policies of the Commission.

Seiden's book, an outgrowth of his dissertation at Columbia University, reviews the regulation of cable television through the 1972 revised rules. It contains a wealth of data not available elsewhere on cable television penetration and its regulation. It also presents a very useful review of the various court cases which have shaped both the authority of the F.C.C. and the policies it has pursued. For these strengths alone the book is a very welcome addition to the literature.

The central argument of the book is that the F.C.C. has seriously hampered the growth of the cable television industry by the erection of formidable regulatory barriers to the economic viability of cable television firms. These barriers, Seiden argues, reflect the fears of the most powerful broadcasting interests, most notably networks, stations, and station groups, fears about the likely inroads a thriving cable industry might make into their own profitability. Seiden minimizes the bases for such fears. He further points out that these same interests have themselves made sizable investments in the fledgling cable industry, an industry which is bound to remain financially dwarfed by the networks and stations, even if released from regulatory bondage.

Because the advent of a "wired nation" would result in a greater variety and flexibility of broadcast services, Seiden bemoans the "mind-boggling complexity" of F.C.C. cable rules. He suggests that such regulation as is necessary could better be done by local governments which in his view are better placed to adopt rules suited to their needs.

The F.C.C. is also the bogeyman of Levin's study of the allocation of spectrum space to all broadcast uses, though the implications of Levin's study, if accepted, are far more profound. An economist, Levin has examined the interplay between competition and regulation in spectrum allocation. He advocates the introduction of a modified free market for spectrum space. Because the F.C.C. through license grants and through the arbitrary reservation of certain portions of the spectrum for particular uses—AM, FM, and land-mobile radio; VHF, UHF, and educational television

—has prevented the maximum utilization of scarce and valuable spectrum space, the marginal value of the broadcast-and-common-carrier spectrum to next-best users has risen steadily, he argues.

He points out that the licensing-allocation function of the Commission confers sizable franchise value without at all guaranteeing diversification of program choices, healthy competition and the technological innovations that would result, and maximum local services, goals to which the F.C.C. has given consistent lip service.

Despite the convincing case each author makes for his criticisms of F.C.C. policies, neither gives attention to the processes by which these policies have been made. Therefore, each has written a traditional study of public policy by comparing governmental outputs against some putative rational model—a model which ignores the dilemmas of public policy makers enmeshed in a power system that constrains their choices.

Nonetheless, each author has assembled very useful data for students of public policy, and each book will stand for some time as the authoritative treatment of its specialized subject.

Frank Wolf

Drew University

History of U.S. Political Parties. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Vol. I: 1789–1860, From Factions to Parties. Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers in association with R. R. Bowker Co., 1973. Pp. 3544. $135.00 for the set.)

This massive and costly collection of essays and documents about American politics was written and edited by historians for historians. Political scientists will be able, with some effort, to pick some tasty raisins here and there from the veritable ocean of cereal, and the packaging may make the goodies a bit easier to find than by the usual rummaging through libraries' card catalogues and stacks. But scholars interested in parties *as institutions* will find the collection of little utility.

Schlesinger's package is mislabeled. It is called "History of U.S. Political Parties," but its contents touch only one segment of that vast subject. Its materials are concerned with *national* politics only, and its 3544 pages contain hardly a word on state and local politics and parties. Moreover, even at the national level it deals only with *presidential* politics: there is almost nothing on the history of the parties in Congress or in the national committees. Even the powerful Congressional Caucus of the period 1796–1824 is barely mentioned.

In addition, the presidential parties are conceptualized, discussed, and documented strictly as arenas for conflict among individuals and factions seeking nominations and control of platforms, never as actual or potential performers of electoral and governing functions. Hence the essays on the various parties and historical periods concentrate mainly on the rise and fall of contenders for nominations and add an occasional bit about platform struggles. The documentary materials following each essay include letters and speeches of party leaders, resolutions by state legislatures, party manifestoes and platforms, newspaper reports and editorials, magazine articles, and some of the proceedings of national conventions. One looks in vain for such materials on the *institutional* development of parties as the calls for and rules governing the national conventions, the resolutions establishing the first national committees in 1848 and 1854, debates over the unit rule, two-thirds rule, and bonus votes, and texts of the early presidential primary laws. Indeed, the only such materials in the entire collection are the 1971 reports of the McGovern-Fraser and O'Hara commissions.

Accordingly, the reader who wants to know what many people prominent in presidential politics from the 1790s to now have said about issues and about each other will find this collection useful. But the reader who wants to know how American national parties have become what they are today will still have to depend on the documentary materials in libraries and on the analyses of Ostrogorski, Ford, Schattschneider, Hofstadter, Key, Epstein, and others whose names and ideas are absent from these particular eleven inches of Professor Schlesinger's extensive personal shelf.

Austin Ranney

American Enterprise Institute

Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia. By David G. Temple. (Charlottesville, Va.: Published for the Institute of Government by The University Press of Virginia, 1972. Pp. xv, 225. $12.00.)

During the two decades following World War II the most frequently proposed solution for the metropolitan problem was the consolidation or merger of small, fragmented governments into a single, viable, area-wide unit. Although widely suggested, only in Virginia did this proposal enjoy any degree of success. There, four mergers or consolidations were achieved between 1957 and 1963; one represented the merger of two cities, and three involved city-county consolidation. This study examines the events associated with these four mergers.

Professor Temple focuses on the various steps and stages in the process of merging these units of local government. Within this framework, he examines the conditions and events which motivated the consolidation movements and the environmental context at the time, describes what took place at each of the political and legal stages of the procedure, and indicates the major changes that occurred in the local governmental structures and procedures following consolidation. His data sources were the relevant legal documents, official and unofficial documents of the former governments and study groups, newspaper accounts, and interviews of available significant actors in each of the cases.

Why were these mergers successful? Temple concludes that the two cities were combined because of a fear that political control in one would soon be in the hands of blacks and that such an outcome would be detrimental to certain interests in both cities. In three instances of city-county consolidation, the immediate concern was impending annexation of urban county areas by an adjacent city. Under the Virginia practice of city-county separation, annexation removes the area and its residents and improvements from county jurisdiction and makes them a part of the annexing city. Behind these immediate reasons, however, was the desire of certain interests to maintain as much of the political status quo as possible. Under a consolidated city government these interests could no longer be annexed by an "enemy" city and would have a continued opportunity to pursue and influence desired goals in the new, if enlarged, unit of government.

Temple views these mergers as basically political actions, but clearly the political interests of oligarchies dominated. The movements for merger were initiated by a self-selected few, the bargaining and negotiations over the governmental structures to be included in the new city charter extended only to incumbent office holders, and the securing of the requisite legislative approvals were carried out by and confined to the same self-selected few, usually incumbent, elected officials. Only in the campaigns for the merger referendum were the general citizenry really participants, and even here the leaders followed tried and true political campaign tactics—claims of dire consequences if merger were not successful, and paternalistic assurances that the leaders had the best interests of the area at heart. This strategy worked, for each referendum was approved by a substantial margin.

Temple presents an interesting case study of a rather unusual happening in American local government. His major interest is in the events associated with each step of the merger procedure, and the study is a good general tour through the difficulties encountered at each of the stages from initiation to termination. As he notes, however, a particular combination of time, events, conditions, and effective leadership made these mergers somewhat unique—a conclusion reinforced by the subsequent failure of five other attempts at city-county consolidation in Virginia. Temple's study preceded these failures, but a comparison might lead to a clearer understanding of the critical variables involved in local government mergers.

CHESTER W. BAIN
University of South Carolina

Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis. By Hanes Walton, Jr. (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972. Pp. 246. $7.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

This book apparently has two major purposes. It is designed to "explore black politics north and south from the colonial period to the present day" and "to set forth some theoretical insights and generalization about black political maneuvering and manifestations in this country" (pp. xvi–xvii). While the latter task is not fulfilled, the book has merit in that it does carry out the former goal.

In the book's first chapter, Professor Walton correctly charges that studies of black politics have had two major deficiencies. First, they have examined black electoral behavior to the exclusion of other forms of political activity. Second, the studies have concentrated upon the numerous differences between the electoral behavior of northern or southern blacks, giving little attention to the similarities. To correct these deficiencies, Walton offers a new conceptual framework to guide research in the area.

His framework consists of: (1) four stages which are distinguished by different levels of black political activity, (2) events, such as the 1965 Civil Rights Bill, which move blacks across the states, and (3) the decision-making process which determines the content of the events. The framework essentially posits that blacks can exhibit four levels of political activity and that the actual level blacks in a particular locality achieve is a function of the type of events produced by the local political environment.

As the author desires, the framework forces researchers to view black electoral behavior as only one facet of black political behavior and to give attention to the commonalities between the political experiences of blacks. The framework presents at least as many problems as it adequately addresses, however. For example, when Walton distinguishes between his stages, he treats levels of black political activity as absolutes. This procedure seems analytically naive. Blacks are a particular racial subgroup in the American political arena affected by the same pressures—though perhaps by some additional ones—toward participation or passivity as other subgroups. Thus to make a valid assessment of black political activity levels, we should consider these levels relative to those of other subgroups. Furthermore, Walton offers the readers little insight about the events in the larger political arena which could cause changes in black political activity levels.

Most of the merit of this work lies in the book's succeeding eleven chapters in which Walton presents a wealth of information about the nature of black participation in American politics from the colonial era to the present. He describes the roles blacks have played in electoral politics, machine politics, party politics, pressure-group politics, presidential politics, public office, and as citizens of urban centers. Although the narrative is uneven and sometimes confusing in these chapters, much of the information has never before been provided in book form.

The book is additionally useful to the scholar in this area because of its extensive bibliography citing literature on black politics, conveniently listed according to subject matter.

Carolyn Sue Williams

Xavier University

The Politics of Progress. By Raymond E. Wolfinger. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Pp. 416. $10.95.)

Long-awaited by readers of Robert A. Dahl's *Who Governs?,* Raymond Wolfinger's dissertation research now finally published under the same title promised in a Dahl footnote but substantially revised in light of controversies sparked by the earlier, seminal work, is must reading for those who remain concerned about power and democracy in urban, industrial societies, if only because these data help place Dahl's own analysis in a more complete empirical context. Indeed, the subsequent pluralist/neo-elitist debate, by clarifying and narrowing the issues, has made the subject matter of Wolfinger's study all the more central.

For one thing, the study focuses on the one issue area which all sides have conceded was critically important to New Haven's future: the redevelopment of the city's central business district. Second, within the urban renewal policy arena, Dahl's own, highly abbreviated discussion leaves open the possibility of conflicting interpretations not easily resolved without adducing further information. We are now fortunate to have available nearly two hundred pages of detailed information on Mayor Richard Lee and his urban renewal program (as compared to less than fifty in Dahl's study) to assist the reader in drawing his own conclusions. Third, in the course of providing details on policy formation, Professor Wolfinger tells us a good deal, if not quite enough, about whose homes and businesses were condemned for redevelopment, the specific uses to which the redevelopment tracts were put, and various relocation practices. In short, any instructor who still finds (as I do) that Dahl's study of New Haven is a valuable introduction to urban politics owes it to his class discussions to peruse this volume with care.

Wolfinger himself denies that his study is "part of the 'community power' genre," though he admits that "it does contain a good deal of evidence relevant to propositions that have been developed in that literature" (p. 9). Instead he states that the volume is designed to serve two other purposes: (1) "to explain how important innovative policies were conceived and executed in New Haven" and (2) "to use findings about New Haven to test and revise prevailing theories about local politics" (p. 1). In pursuit of the second purpose, Wolfinger discusses in two splendid chapters the continuing significance of ethnic and machine politics. Indeed, Wolfinger departs significantly from Dahl in his much greater appreciation of the significance of the machine-style character of New Haven's Democratic organization. He demonstrates quite convincingly that machine politicians are quite indifferent to policy questions as long as their control over patronage is not disturbed, that popular mayors can use their prestige and control over material incentives to centralize power, but also that activist, modernizing urban programs can at times jeopardize the interests of (and therefore mayoral relationships to) traditional party organizations. Wolfinger's discussion of these subjects is focused, intelligent, and nicely documented.

As valuable as are many of the discussions on these and other worthy topics, the heart of the study revolves around Wolfinger's attempt to "explain how important innovative policies were conceived and executed in New Haven" (p. 1). Successful pursuit of this objective requires that it be directly connected to his second purpose of testing theories about local politics; only if an explanation is theoretically grounded can it be generalized beyond the particulars of Mayor Lee's New Haven regime. In this regard, Wolfinger's central argument is that "in New Haven the mayor played the leading role in policy formation. . . . More than anything else, urban renewal policy resulted from his ambitions, not those of private groups" (p. 12). Although in an important respect discussed below, Wolfinger's contention is certainly correct, this explanation, by itself, is not theoretically satisfying. As Wolfinger himself points out in his closing chapter, heroic leadership appears only infrequently and erratically on the local political scene. What then is there about these circumstances which can be generalized to urban politics as a whole? What are the conditions that permitted Lee's leadership in New Haven's redevelopment and not elsewhere?

The answers to these questions implicit in Wolfinger's analysis suggest the direction that pluralist theory has taken in the decade since *Who Governs?* For Dahl, it was critical to show that power was widely shared among the various social, ethnic and racial groups in the city. Wolfinger makes no effort to identify socially diverse sources of influence on policy formation; on the contrary, only a small number of businessmen and developers are taken into the confidence of Mayor Lee and his top administrative staff. But Wolfinger does not conclude from these findings that a ruling elite has come to power; he emphasizes instead the fortuitous nature of many of the events that he describes. The redevelopment of the central business district was begun because a Gamble store happened to fold; it gained key support because the National Bank needed a larger, more modern structure; determined opposition came from a jeweler whose new store had to be demolished; and it finally succeeded because Yale University fortunately funded a developer unable to raise cash elsewhere. Given the multiplicity of forces that accidentally shaped even important policies, no ruling elite can be detected.

Along with this emphasis on complexity, one finds a tendency to disaggregate and decompose all units of analysis to the level of the individual. In Dahl's analysis, political and social groups help form the context for political action; Wolfinger, sharply distinguishing himself from group theorists, disaggregates much further, finding it difficult even to speak of the interests of central-business-district businessmen. In commenting on an important issue in the pluralist/neo-elitist debate, for example, Wolfinger notes that developer Stevens influenced policy but lost money, while Malley's department-store executives had little influence over project design but in the end made money on redevelopment. By disaggregating to the individual, Wolfinger tries to show that manipulators of power need not coincide with its beneficiaries.

Such an interpretation has its appeal, especially when the details are described with as much vigor and felicity as in this study. The difficulty is the atheoretical quality of such an enterprise. As Andrew MacFarland has observed, if pluralism simply means multiple causality, reciprocal influences, and continually changing processes, then its contribution to political theory has sharp limits. Analysis tends to degenerate into description, and the facts that must be included in a coherent account grow almost endlessly. As with post-Wagnerian romantic music, the ambiguity, modification, and subtleties of nuance are so manifold, the score is so thick, as it were, that the demand for a new simplifying structure grows irresistible.

Given his individualist orientation, it is somewhat surprising that Wolfinger does not borrow more extensively from the political economy literature in his analysis of the problems of collective action in New Haven. Had he done so, he might have interpreted Mayor Lee less as a Superstar who cajoled and compelled others to follow his lead and more as a brilliant political entrepreneur who enticed others to give to a common cause. Much of the case that redevelopment was *not* a businessman's plot rests on the grounds that Lee had to make extraordinary efforts to induce individual businessmen to contribute to his urban renewal drive. But as Olson and other economists have demonstrated, a policy can be in the collective interest of businessmen and still lack the support of individual businessmen, all of whom may wish to "free ride" on the efforts of others. Recently, Frolich et al. have noted that leaders can provide collective goods by convincing individuals that their efforts will be matched by others. From this perspective, Lee seems to have been a very successful leader who helped central-district businessmen achieve a collective outcome of benefit to most of them. It takes nothing away from Mayor Lee's skills as a political entrepreneur to note that he chose to put his energies to the service of such a cause rather than, say, behind a massive low-income housing program for New Haven's *poor.* To make such an observation, however, requires that one find categories other than the "individuals" analytically appropriate.

In its details, the study, even for post-Watergate readers, is ruthlessly honest about the "warts" of the American political system; Mayor Lee had good political reasons for objecting to its publication as long as he remained in office. As with the special prosecutor's office, however, the book has mired itself in facts at the cost of understanding the significance of the events under investigation.

PAUL E. PETERSON
The University of Chicago

Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946. By Benedict R. O'G. Anderson. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. xv, 494. $15.00.)

It is not easy to do justice to a book of such excellence as this in a short review. Professor Anderson has given us a superb piece of historical reconstruction of the first ten months of Indonesia's "revolution," or struggle for independence, in 1945–46, sketching out the various social and political forces at work with a sharpness of perception that will probably never be bettered by a foreigner. At the same time, he has forced us to look at Indonesian politics from a new and highly revealing angle, challenging many of the assumptions that have previously been made about the political processes at work there.

His major contribution has been to revise what might be called "the Sjahrir version" of the Indonesian revolution by rehabilitating the reputation of Sutan Sjahrir's great rival, Tan Malakka, showing the significance of his role and actions against a strikingly different backdrop. Most previous writers have followed G. McT. Kahin's pioneering account of those events, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952) in which the political parties, with Sjahrir's Socialist Party bulking much larger among them than its later history seems to warrant, were seen as emanations of a great upsurge of mass political consciousness, their ideological doctrines reflecting the views of the major groupings within Indonesian society. Anderson shows us in devastating detail that the parties were in fact "little more than clusters of small personal cliques . . . None . . . had as yet any organized base among the masses, even in the urban areas" (p. 230). The party politics of Indonesia's first year of struggle for independence could virtually be depicted, he says, in terms of the maneuvering of five key cliques, none notably stronger than the others, against a background of debate over the merits of conducting the struggle by strategy of *diplomasi* (negotiations — seeking to exert pressure on the Dutch through the British and Americans) or *perdjuangan,* armed conflict. But more important, he argues, were the rise of the army, of the many irregular *"strijdorganisaties"* and of the *pemuda* (youth) movement with its distinctive *"pemuda* consciousness" moulded by the social upheaval accompanying the collapses of Dutch authority.

One of Anderson's central arguments and assumptions is that if Tan Malakka and the advocates of *perdjuangan* had prevailed in their internal struggle for power with the Sjahrir-Sukarno group of exponents of *diplomasi,* the course of Indonesian history would have been radically different. Because the latter policy was directed towards gaining international support and recognition it was incompatible with a radical social program. "From this came the deepening malaise of the post-independence years, and later tragedies" (p. 407). In a significant aside (p. 408), Anderson suggests that if Sukarno had thrown his weight behind Tan Malakka and the strategy of *perdjuangan,* Indonesian history might have followed a quite different course, perhaps more comparable with that taken under Ho Chi Minh's leadership by the Viet Minh. This is an intriguing and important hypothesis, but not, I think, a fully persuasive one.

Anderson's whole approach to the events of this period rests, in fact, on the assumption that a more militantly revolutionary strategy such as the DRV's would have worked—i.e., it would have been successful in mobilizing the masses against Dutch colonial rule and would have proved victorious sooner or later in forcing the Dutch to abandon their hold there, even if it took a much longer and more bloody struggle to achieve it, as in Vietnam. This hypothesis undoubtedly deserves consideration, for it has perhaps been brushed aside too quickly by previous writers. Conceivably Tan Malakka's strategy would have been just as successful — and it might have been better for the country's sociopolitical health in the long run. It is interesting to note that General Nasution, whose ideological presuppositions are very different from Anderson's, shares the view that Indonesia's leaders made a serious mistake in not pressing the resort to armed struggle and seizing weapons by force from the Japanese immediately after they surrendered. He may be right. Possibly such a course of action would have deterred the British from reoccupying Java and Sumatra and thus forestalled the Dutch come-back in 1946–47, which would have entailed a very different course of events. But I doubt it. Because the strategic and political situation in Java in 1945–46 was so very different from that in Vietnam, it would have been highly improbable that a campaign based solely on armed struggle and a spurning of negotiations with the Dutch and British could have been maintained for long. (Even Ho Chi Minh felt he had to negotiate with the French in 1946, before he was driven to conclude that war was unavoidable.) If Tan Malakka and Sukarno could have worked together along the lines advocated by the former, they would have found themselves forced by circumstances into much the same sort of hot-and-cold mixture of *perdjuangan* and *diplomasi,* requiring compromises with the Dutch, that the Sukarno-Hatta-Sjahrir governments pursued, with ultimate success in 1949. Moreover, if we assume that a guerrilla conflict might have held the colonial forces at bay into the 1950s, as in Vietnam, we are thrust into a realm of speculation about what attitude the USA would have taken after the outbreak of the Korea War towards a left-wing national liberation movement in Indonesia. If instead of opposing the Dutch, the U.S. had then supported them, as it did the French, would the Indonesians have won their independence? It is hard to imagine. I suspect they were lucky to get it when they did, for their success in exploiting international pressures on the Dutch in 1948–49 would not have been nearly so easy to achieve after 1950. That is not the end of the argument, of course. And inconclusive though the debate will remain, Anderson has put us in his debt by challenging us to reconsider so much of the conventional wisdom about that fascinating piece of history.

J. A. C. Mackie
Monash University, Australia

Israel and The Palestinians. Edited by Shlomo Avineri. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971. Pp. 168. $10.00.)

Crushed between the anvil of Jewish nationalism and the hammer of Pan-Arabism, the proud people of Palestine have an unhappy lot, and their problem can hardly be ignored by any book which purports to be a comprehensive study of the fast-moving events in the Middle East. Remarkably, this collection of essays, written after the bloody Jordanian Civil War in 1971, contains not one independent essay on either the PLO, its leader Arafat, or its radical splinter groups which are the most dynamic and powerful Palestinian political and military structures. Thus, even though it was written between 1969 and 1971 this book is already obsolete.

Among its redeeming qualities, however, is that it was written mostly by Israelis and that several of them, like Moshe Dayan, former defense minister, and two retired generals and Arabists, Harkabi and Peled, have addressed themselves to the Palestinian problem. In fact, most of the essays are translations from articles in the Israeli papers, especially *Maariv,* where the debate over Palestine and the Palestinians began as soon as the ceasefire was signed on June 10, 1967. The selections in the book are but a few taken from a multitude of articles written by Israelis of all persuasions, occupations, and roles about the future of Palestine and the Palestinians. In fact, one could speak of Israeli Palestinian ideology as a literature which seriously competes with the Palestinian studies curriculum in Beirut (connected with The American University) as the center of Palestinian activism, and of their scribological and ideological writings. The major thesis of the Israeli Palestinian ideology is put forth by both Professors Avineri and Shamir. Avineri discusses Israel's reluctant but "inconvenient realization that the Palestinian Arabs are a political force that, whatever its ultimate military weakness and the terroristic nature of much of its activity, has to be taken seriously" (p. 14), and that not since 1948 has there been a public discussion in Israel about the Palestinians comparable to what is now going on (p. 15). The essays demonstrate that public leaders like Moshe Dayan are sensitive to the issue. Arie Eliav, for example, the former secretary general of the Israeli Labor Party also called for accepting the claim of the Palestinians for a political identity of their own.

But the issue being debated is no longer whether there is a Palestinian consciousness or a Palestinian political identity. The critical issue now is who should rule the Palestinians: the Hashemites, the "moderates" (those who accept a West Bank-Gaza solution), the notables, the clients of Israeli administration, or the maximalists led by the PLO and Arafat and their radical splinter groups. Of the authors, only Professor (retired general) Yehoshafat Harkabi addresses this question. Harkabi argues that it is neither the moderates nor the notables who determine political and regime orientations for the Palestinians. Rather, he says, their rejection of Israel is a deeply felt ideological one. Harkabi writes, "In the presence of the Palestinians' intention to annihilate us we cannot promise ourselves to become soft, and at times cannot even assume a humanistic stance, and this is a self-contradiction" (p. 6). Harkabi's antagonist, Professor Shamir, former head of Shiloah Middle Eastern Center at the University of Tel-Aviv, calls Harkabi's thesis on Arab intransigence a myth. Shamir argues that in the post-Six-Day-War period, new Arab approaches emerged, as the Arabs saw that trying to destroy Israel was futile. He says the Arabs hoped to put an end to the struggle by utilizing the opportunities created after the war, salvaging Palestinian society by improving Palestinian living conditions and "obtaining a reasonable minimum of national goals" (p. 25). Thus Shamir challenges Harkabi saying that "by concentrating only on the literature published in the Arab states, he [Harkabi] diverts attention away from the no less significant development among the West Bank Palestinians and ignores what could have become the cornerstone of a promising new Israeli approach to the problem of peace" (p. 29).

The PLO and the Arab states answered Shamir at the Rabat Conference that met in November 1974. There the PLO, not the West Bank Palestinians, was recognized as the political group speaking for the Palestinians. Shamir's pipe dream of a West Bank-Israeli sponsored Palestinian state had few voices supporting it in 1971 and none in 1975. Thus the debate became futile and the issue obsolete.

The PLO, although it represents less than 25 per cent of a population of 2.3 million is the Palestinians' most powerful political and military group. With the help of the "Arab Rejection Front" those who wanted no part of Kissinger's mediation, Syria, Algeria and Libya, set the tone in Rabat for recognizing the Palestinian entity. They made a case for the establishment of a secular "democratic" Arab Palestine. It would be an Arafat state dominated by Suni Arabs and made up of Palestine, Israel, and ultimately Jordan.

Unfortunately, Harkabi's thesis turned out to be correct. His vindication was not due to foresight but to the Arab mood in the period after the 1973 war. As yet no Israeli intellectual has found the proper formula for the Palestinians, nor would Avineri and Shamir accept the Arafat solution. The PLO not only does not recognize Israel but its term "secular democratic state" is a euphemism for the annihilation of Israel. No Israeli cabinet, however reasonable, can accept an Arafat-dominated Palestine. Nor will the Hashemite Kingdom accept Arafat and the PLO's independent state unless imposed by their Arab brethren. Since Israel has no intention of bringing about its own destruction and the PLO has not abandoned its grandiose plan for the United Suni Arab-dominated Palestine, the tragic plight of the Palestinians is no closer to solution than it was in 1948. The PLO, not Israel, must change its formula. Otherwise, the Palestinians, a proud, politically conscious people, will remain stateless. An all-or-nothing formula is no cornerstone for new Israel-Palestinian relations.

AMOS PERLMUTTER
The American University

Peasant Society in Koṅku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India. By Brenda E. F. Beck. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972. Pp. xx, 334. $16.50.)

It is perhaps unusual that a book which has little to do with politics specifically should be reviewed in the *APSR*, but then this is a remarkable book. It is a masterly job of social science detective work and an exemplary form of anthropological inquiry. The task Professor Beck sets for herself is to examine the interrelationship of the social and territorial organization of various castes in the Koṅku region of South India, an area corresponding roughly to modern Coimbatore District of Tamil Nadu. Following the residents' own conception of local social structure, Beck analyzes the social organization of Koṅku in terms of five nesting, territorial units; the region as a whole, the subregion, the village revenue unit, the hamlet, and the individual household. What emerges is a clear picture of a bifurcated prestige structure characterized by rivalry between groups basing their claims on the control of territory and of the local labor force (those castes traditionally identified as of the "right," a term of dichotomous distinction with no value implications as such) and those which base their claims on the acquisition of material wealth, self-acclaimed ritual superiority, and, more recently, education (those of the "left").

At each level of social organization, the two blocs are distinguished by differences in customs and traditions, but at the lower levels of the caste hierarchy, these differences decline as a result of the commanding influence of the land-owning dominant caste of the right division, the Gounders (transliterated as KavuNTars), over the economically dependent lower castes of the left division. Beck argues that "the ability to control agricultural production is the key factor in understanding KavuNTar dominance, and their exclusive power position is the key to the development of the extensive social oppositions observed" (p. 268). She concludes that "only where landed, political power and ritual purity — the two major routes to status in Hindu India — remain largely separate, can a right-left division . . . be expected to develop fully. In the classical Indian worldview, material wealth by itself is inadequate as a third, parallel route to prestige. Unless it is combined with one or both of the other status criteria, it cannot contribute to social superiority over more than the lowest-ranking groups. Thus people who possess material wealth but who have been traditionally excluded from land ownership tend to develop an interest in ritual purity in order to offset the inferior power of their riches" (p. 267).

The system of transliteration employed is cumbersome and often requires real effort to recognize what might otherwise be a familiar Tamil name. Perhaps the best example is that of the dominant caste of the Koṅku region. Usually written as "Gounder," it is here transliterated KavuNTar, without identifying the term with the more ordinary usage. Moreover, the index includes Tamil names only in this scheme of transliteration — rendering it difficult to use. Nadar becomes NāTār; Siva (the god), Civā; Chola (the kingdom), Cōra; etc. But this is a minor irritant in an otherwise superb study.

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR.
University of Texas at Austin

Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. By Ralph Braibanti. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966) Pp. xxiii, 569. Price not listed.)

Ralph Braibanti's major work concerning the study of the Pakistani bureaucracy was completed in 1965 and published in 1966. It is unfortunate that it has taken more than ten years for a review of its contents to appear in the pages of this journal because *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan* is one of the more noteworthy displays of scholarly writing on Pakistan. Indeed, it stands among the finer volumes produced by American South Asianists. As the title implies, this is more than a general narrative and analysis of administrative development in Pakistan. Professor Braibanti is a meticulous scholar with an extraordinary interest in detail. He has succeeded in putting together a reference book which is must reading for anyone doing research in Pakistan's administrative history, organization, function, and developmental problems. The author has carefully included in this elaborate bibliographic essay virtually all the significant and many of the obscure works bearing on the subject up to the time of the book's publication. It is to be hoped that Professor Braibanti will consider the possibility of doing a second volume on the subject so that the material released during the period 1965–1976 can be brought to the attention of academic and government researchers the world over. Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan government has instituted sweeping administrative reforms and the changing bureaucratic system could use Braibanti's perceptive examination.

This book is divided into six substantive chapters with a seventh reserved for the author's general observations. It also includes a lengthy set of appendices which is somewhat rare today, in this era of high-cost printing. There are also a number of tables scattered throughout the book which are especially helpful in grouping some of the basic parameters of Pakistan's administrative government. Braibanti traces the historic development of the bureaucratic apparatus in Pakistan, but he is more concerned with identifying, classifying, and evaluating the public records published during 1947–1965. It is the author's contention that the study of government and political processes in Pakistan must lead to an examination of the bureaucratic system and its operations. Braibanti was among the few Americans of the period to view Pakistan as an *administrative state* in which politicians or "popular" representatives were actually subordinate to the higher career bureaucrats. The author served as an advisor to Pakistan's Civil Service Academy, the elite training institution for probationers entering the privileged services before 1973. Moreover, his tour of duty began in the midst of a period of martial law which was to last forty-four months. He was also on the scene to witness the re-emergence of the political parties and ultimately the drafting and promulgation of the Ayubian constitution of 1962.

In spite of all the references to a democratic political system it was clear to Professor Braibanti that the bureaucracy would be more not less prominent in the new presidential system detailed by the 1962 constitution. The system of rural and local government known as basic democracies was reinforced by this constitution, and here too the bureaucracy was given a preeminent role. On the one hand, Professor Braibanti is impressed with the efficiency as well as ability of Pakistan's bureaucratic elite. He certainly sees its role as vital in the maturation of the country's economic and political institutions. On the other hand, he is convinced that sophisticated political processes come with time, experience, education and overall human and environmental change. Professor Braibanti suggests it is for these reasons that Pakistanis were resigned to the fact of bureaucratic dominance in the country's earlier stages of growth. And it is this general condition which permitted the bureaucrats to perpetuate their self-serving superiority myth. But Braibanti is also quick to comment on the instability of bureaucracy during periods of increasing popular awareness. One cannot fault the author for not predicting the tragedy that was to befall Pakistan in 1971, but a careful reading of the chapters on the history and organization of the bureaucracy, local government, and administrative reform, carry hints of the disaster that eventually overwhelmed the country.

Professor Braibanti's fascination with legal systems and particularly the one that the Pakistanis inherited from their British overseers is obvious throughout the book. Chapter Five, which concentrates on legal research, reveals inextricable linkages between the legal and bureaucratic systems. Professor Braibanti helps us to understand why in Pakistan the legal system protected the bureaucrats and seldom the politicians or parliamentarians. Nevertheless, the author is strengthened in his belief that the bureaucracy's power is constrained by statutes, legal custom, and tradition. In general, the administrators were expected to assist the country in its democratic quest. One can only speculate about the author's impressions concerning events after 1965 — especially the concerted attack on the higher bureaucracy in the later stage of the Ayub decade, throughout the Yayha Khan interregnum, and finally up to the time Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced that the country would no longer tolerate a privileged, elite class of bureaucrats and ordered their dissolution. The amalgamation of the services, the disbanding of the long dominant Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the virtual politicization of the administrators have their antecedents, and the sources are to be found in this volume.

As noted at the outset, this is not just another narrative on the Pakistan condition. Professor Braibanti's book is unique because it represents a thorough examination of available research materials on the subject of bureaucracy in Pakistan. As such it will always be an important instrument for students of Pakistan's government.

LAWRENCE ZIRING
Western Michigan University

Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922. By Patrick Buckland. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972. Pp. 363. $16.25.)

Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922. By Patrick Buckland. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973. Pp. 207. $11.50.)

It is said that the events of centuries ago are still fresh memories in Northern Ireland. Perhaps there, more than anywhere, the past still lives in the present. But is it a real or an imaginary past? Until recently it was largely an imaginary past. In fact, in both northern and southern Ireland particular versions of Irish history have been used as weapons in intercommunal conflict. History as ideology is always a dangerous thing because it perverts the culture and deters serious scholars, who fear to tamper with popular myths. But in recent years Irish history has been undergoing a major revision. Robert Kee's *The Green Flag* (New York: Delacorte, 1972), for example, is a model of sensitive revisionism, and one should also mention two courageous books by ministers in the present (December 1975) Irish government, *States of Ireland* by Conor Cruise O'Brien (New York: Pantheon, 1972) and *Towards a New Ireland* by Garrett FitzGerald (London: C. Knight, 1972). One important reason for the new revisionism has been the latest phase in the continuing tragedy of sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland beginning in 1968. So divisive, and apparently insoluble, has this conflict become that serious attempts are being made to clear away the historical shibboleths of both Protestants and Catholics to determine if there exist clues in the past which will help Ireland out of its despair. Emerging from this review is a more balanced account of Ireland during the years of English conquest and occupation, together with a challenge to the romantic revolutionary tradition and the cult of the gunman. There is also a willingness to question the value of the 1916 Easter Rising and the War of Independence. More important, however, for our purpose, is a growing understanding among the Catholic, nationalist Irish in the Irish Republic that there exists, in Northern Ireland, a Protestant Irish nation, or at the very least a subculture, which can no more be coerced into a Dublin parliament today than it could in 1914.

Patrick Buckland is not a revisionist in the sense of one who consciously seeks to reinterpret the past with a view to illuminating the present. Only toward the end of Volume Two does he seriously consider the importance of the past for the present. These two volumes are for the most part descriptive rather than interpretive, but they do present valuable information which can only confirm the revisionist view of the Irish Protestants. Indeed, Buckland writes about not one but two Irish Protestant communities. The first, the Southern Unionists, represented the Ascendancy—Anglo-Irish landlords, elitists, Anglicans, paternalists, a genuine upper class. Because they were scattered throughout the south and represented a small minority overall, their vulnerability obstructed an Irish settlement prior to 1917. But they were the first to realize that home rule was inevitable. They came to fear desertion by both the British government and the Ulster Unionists and therefore moved, in 1917, to protect their property and their status in an Irish parliament. Most of Volume One deals with this *rapprochement,* beginning with the Irish Convention of 1917–1918. They failed, ultimately, and were extinguished as a political force in southern Ireland.

In the north, however, the Protestant majority had a very different character. It represented every social class, from the Belfast laborer to the landed aristocracy. Indeed, the support of the urban working class helps to explain the tradition of sectarian violence, street battles and shipyard brawls, associated with the northern Unionists. Furthermore, the northern Protestants contained a majority of conservative Presbyterians, descendants of the so-called Scotch-Irish, and the historical memories of the whole of Ulster included the Battle of the Boyne and the defeat of the Catholic James II. As Catholic nationalism prospered in the nineteenth century Ulster Unionists did not seek accommodation but retreated into a siege mentality. They were determined to protect their religion, property, status and the union with Britain by resort to civil war, if necessary. This was no idle boast, as Buckland makes clear, although many nationalists still refuse to believe the Unionists meant war. Unionism represented much more than Orange bigotry. If Volume One explains, in part, at least, why a united Ireland was impossible before 1914, Volume Two makes absolutely clear why it has been impossible ever since. What Protestant resistance in the north finally earned was not the maintenance of the union but the creation of a new, six-county, Northern Ireland where the pattern of sectarian hostility was institutionalized as Protestant supremacy. Furthermore, if ever there was any hope of Catholics and Protestants making a new start in the new state, it was surely destroyed by the inauspicious early years which were set amidst the civil war in the south. It was during those years that the Protestant government of Northern Ireland, feeling itself besieged by Catholic, revolutionary nationalism, introduced the despotic Special Powers Act and the infamous "B Specials." Not until Britain belatedly took Northern Ireland under direct rule fifty years later were the Protestants to surrender those powers.

The story of these two Protestant communities is extremely important, but Buckland at times reduced it to a rather parochial and even pedestrian level. This may be because he writes from the Protestant perspective, and his most original contribution is in his use of Protestant papers and documents. The views of the Irish nationalists and the British government are deliberately neglected. He does not pretend to present the Irish Question as a whole. A political scientist seeking explanations in history for a contemporary dilemma will find these books incomplete. Furthermore, Buckland might well have shortened his study by cutting some of the detail on the internecine conflicts of the Southern Unionists and combining the two volumes into one. However, these are reliable sources. They do present the perspectives of the two unionist communities in Ireland in a manner which is well researched and generally well documented. They are, therefore, important for those who believe, with this reviewer, that any solution to the Irish problem must begin with a clear understanding of the critically important evolution of Protestant Unionism in the years from 1885 to 1922.

ALAN J. WARD

College of William and Mary

A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965. By Shahid Javed Burki. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 101. $6.00.)

Ten years after the data were collected, and six years after publication, Shahid Javed Burki's slim booklet *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965* remains a beacon in modern Chinese studies for two reasons. First, it is one of the best collections on rural China at one point in time, 1965. It does not contain extensive data; but it stands out as a small oasis in the desert of ignorance about rural China in the 1960s. Second, Burki's book demonstrates that it is possible to collect significant information in China in the context of a guided tour. It should be examined by scholars who plan to travel to China, to assist in developing a research methodology.

Mr. Burki was a member of a three-man delegation from Pakistan which traveled in China in Summer 1965 for a six-week study of communes. The delegates interviewed officials in Peking, but these reports are not particularly helpful, because it is often difficult to know the precise material included. For example, does Table 1, Use of Mechanized Equipment in Chinese Agriculture, 1957–1964 (p. 5) include mechanical equipment used for irrigation? Although Burki implies it does, other figures suggest that mechanical pumping equipment alone has more horsepower available than the aggregate shown in this table.

The strength of Burki's booklet is the systematic collection from thirteen communes of micro-data on technical transformation, collective income and expenses, wages, etc. Virtually no other source has as much information on the private plots, which Burki discovers provide 10 to 30 per cent of family income on roughly 5 to 10 per cent of the cultivated land. Burki might have pointed out that the high productivity of the private sector does not indicate inefficiency of collective farming; land used for vegetables and animal raising always produces much higher cash income per unit area than land used for grains. The importance of the private sector to family income is, however, vividly demonstrated. In general Burki shows China's agriculture to be gradually modernizing.

One wishes Burki had "massaged" his data a bit more and looked for more relations between education and research, technical transformation, and income growth. While the sample is too small for any conclusive statistical analysis, more hypotheses could have been generated on the sources of agricultural growth.

Scholars traveling to China may wish to borrow Burki's methodology. It consists of having a narrow focus, but probing deeply. If Burki's group visited the Great Wall, the museums, schools and factories, such visits were kept to a minimum. At the communes, they asked questions in a vocabulary and in categories which were well understood by the cadres. They systematically collected information on the same questions at many communes, so we can begin to specify the diversity of experiences in China and perhaps see the vague outline of the distribution of various experiences. If other visitors to China have the opportunity to do this sort of focused, systematic analysis, our understanding of China can continue to grow.

BENEDICT STAVIS

Cornell University

The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise. By Derek Channon. (Boston, Mass.: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1973. Pp. xvii, 257. $12.00.)

This is a revised version of the author's prize-winning dissertation submitted to the Harvard Business School in 1970–71. It is one part (thus far, the only published part) of a coordinated research project directed by Bruce Scott to study the evolution of industrial enterprise in five countries: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Professor Channon, following Alfred Chandler, suggests that there is a natural evolution of the *strategy* and *structure* of industrial enterprises: in strategy, from the production of a single item to a diversified, multiproduct output; and in structure, from a functional management to a multidivisional structure. Corporations naturally evolve from the classic single-product, entrepreneurial type to the more complex multiproduct, multidivision managerial organization characteristic of mid-twentieth century capitalism. Within the multiproduct stage, there is a similar evolution: other products are introduced, but one is dominant; then the firm produces a number of related products; finally, it begins to produce a range of unrelated products, and frees itself from a dependence upon any particular raw material, technology, or market. Thus, structure and strategy evolve toward the modern conglomerate model.

To test this framework, Channon examined the production strategies and internal structural development of the one hundred largest industrial enterprises in Britain during the twenty-year period from 1950 to 1970. This is the meat of the book, and the detailed chapters on the groups of firms which Channon studied — the "undiversified enterprises," the "technological diversifiers," and the "acquisitive diversifiers," — make rewarding reading for anyone interested in the modern British economy.

But while the book provides a very useful view of the recent development of British industrial enterprises, it also raises a number of serious questions, particularly for the student of politics. First is the way the author deals with the concept of development. He includes a neat but very brief overview of the "British industrial environment" in which he reviews changes in the pattern of supply and demand, the growth of competition, and the impact of technological change in this period. But Channon makes no effort systematically to relate these changes in the environment of industry to the changes taking place within enterprises. (Indeed, he fails to explore the most interesting relationship upon which he touches several times: the differential impact of competition on different industries.) Instead, the author seems to see the process in almost nineteenth-century terms as "the natural process of corporate evolution," an autonomous and "inevitable" (his term) process which requires no further explanation.

Because of this starting-point, Channon devotes little attention to those factors which might have initiated, influenced or limited the process of change. In particular, he minimizes the role of government. Except for anti-monopoly legislation, the impact of public policy is ignored or treated cursorily. Yet, while government "planners" have found how difficult it is to exert influence on individual firms, it is still hard to believe that neither successive governments' macroeconomic policies (twenty years of "Stop-Go") nor the detailed intervention in industry which became increasingly frequent during this period affected patterns of industrial development and change.

Channon makes no bones about his belief that the free operation of the large multinational conglomerate is central to the health of the modern economy. Government's role should be limited to preparing the way for these organizations, and then repairing the damage that they do: "Government should address its policies toward smoothing this process [of corporate evolution] and relieving the social problems it creates rather than attempting to hold back the inevitable" (p. 244).

The author argues that there is a natural and inevitable process of corporate evolution toward the American conglomerate model, and he identifies Britain's national economic goals with the achievement of this objective. The "American model of industrial society" is not the only possible choice, but it is the one Britain has chosen: "An alternative model of industrial society, such as the Japanese, also seems to work well, but Britain has chosen to use the American model" (p. 245). Channon's data, however, while revealing increasing product diversification among these large firms, do not indicate that Britain is in fact moving in this direction. What he describes is a range of types, not a pattern of development. As he points out, the largest and most important British firms are among those which have not diversified beyond a dominant product (largely because of government control), and this has not changed significantly in recent years. Those firms, the "acquisitive diversifiers," which have moved closest to the conglomerate model have done so out of market weakness, and they have not been particularly successful.

The nature of the conglomerate is to be guided by available markets rather than by products; it aims to realize maximum profits by selling whatever can be sold to whomever will pay for it. This market orientation cuts across deeply held values in British society, not only in industry but in the British political culture as well, where both Tories and socialists reject the notion of the "acquisitive society" (though, to be sure, not necessarily "Liberal-Conservatives" of the Joseph-Thatcher variety). At the same time, in Britain (as in the United States) there is increasing popular concern with the dangers of a "consumer society." It is not clear that Britain has chosen the "American model" of industrial society (even if this accurately fits the United States, which is questionable). The future pattern of industrial organization remains an open question, and one in which governments will be increasingly involved. Channon's book is an extraordinarily useful examination of British industry, but its major premise needs to be re-examined.

STEPHEN BLANK

The Conference Board

Workers' Self-Management in Algeria. By Ian Clegg. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Pp. 249. $2.95.)

Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie. By Gérard Duprat. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973. Pp. 486. 98F.)

If, as the late Joseph Levenson suggested (*Confucian China and Its Modern Fate,* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965] III, p. 124), the Chinese Marxists made their revolution "against the world to join the world, against their past to keep it theirs, but past," western Marxism has never adequately coped with the rise of ethnic and national as opposed to class identities. Ian Clegg's work is no exception. His analysis is clear, excellently written, and honest—a model textbook for students of North Africa or comparative revolution. But the interpretation must be criticized. What Clegg sees as fundamental — class conflict in independent Algeria — can better be viewed as the efforts of some Algerians and their foreign advisors to establish a framework of political discourse for a fragmented elite. More than in most newly independent countries, public efforts to define Algerian identity were phrased in Marxist rhetoric, but the superstructure of ideology and legislation did not reflect underlying class interests. Rather the search for an ideology to guide the revolution reflected the need of very disparate segments of the elite for some consensus on national purpose that might legitimate their new statuses.

Until 1965, when Boumedienne removed Ben Bella from office, *autogestion,* or workers' self-management, was the regime's principal legitimating myth. Clegg rightly points out that practice had considerably diverged from theory even before Boumedienne's coup and consequently that the coup "was not a counter-revolution in a classic sense," but it does not follow that "the coup was part of a class struggle that was already under way" (p. 134). Clegg argues that the workers who in 1962 and 1963 took over the estates and businesses of departed settlers engaged in an "action of seizing the means of production" which "can, objectively, only be described as a class action" (p. 109). He admits that in most cases the workers' motives were hardly revolutionary, but still the awkward conclusion is that "they were driven by material necessity to give actuality to their objective situation as the negation of capitalism" (p. 172). Clegg is making the behavioralist assumption that the meaning of an action can be neatly (and undialectically) separated from the intent of its author.

The other protagonist in Clegg's class struggle is the new middle class which emerged in Algeria's new state bureaucracy. It is upwardly mobile, but its life style and control of the means of production define it economically as a class. "This dual formulation of an elitist life-style and objective relation to the means of production and political power has close parallels with the class characteristics of the Russian bureaucracy" (p. 115). But Clegg's formulation requires this class to pull itself up by its bootstraps and create its means of production. He admits that it existed only in "embryonic" form under Ben Bella (when Algeria was living in administrative chaos precipitated by an unusually abrupt transfer of power from the French), yet he wishes to ascribe the eclipse and defeat of *autogestion* to the machinations of this class. Curiously, he and virtually everybody else who has tried to analyze Algeria's class structure have overlooked indigenous landowners. These are dismissed as anti-Western, "not a coherent political force," and only tenuously related to Algerian politics (p. 111), yet their presence is considerably less metaphorical and metaphysical than that of the administrative bourgeoisie. In the modern sector, 8500 Algerians each owned more than 100 hectares, and their family ties with top officials were known to many Algerians if not to Marxist publicists. Considerably more astute and revolutionary than the proponents of Algerian *autogestion,* Boumedienne saw where the real danger to his revolutionary design lay. He quietly consolidated control over his administrative infrastructure, and then in 1972 launched an agrarian reform to break the economic basis of any alliance between landowners and segments of the bureaucracy. Hypnotized by his vision of class struggle, Clegg missed a real political one.

If, moreover, the state is by definition counter-revolutionary, so also are its economic plans — investment in capital-intensive heavy industry that Algerian planners hope will be the armature of a thriving industrial society. Consistent with his vision, Clegg argues, in fact, that industrialization is "economic lunacy" (p. 188), except in the cases of big countries like the Soviet Union or China. So, too, comprehensive trade blocs "in competition with neo-imperialism" are ruled out as impracticable. Presumably Clegg would also consider impracticable, if not reactionary, Boumedienne's leadership in OPEC and his efforts to effect a fundamental transformation of terms of trade in favor of the third world. But then, on Clegg's view little can be expected of the third world other than to serve occasionally, as with Algerian self-management, as a laboratory for recycling outworn nineteenth-century ideas.

Duprat's work covers much the same ground as Clegg's, from the emergence of *autogestion* in 1962 to its reorganization under the supervision of state directors in 1969. Duprat's analysis is also informed by a rich understanding of Marxism and other political theories, notably those of Rousseau and Proudhon. But here the similarities end. Whereas the pieces of Clegg's narrative cohere in a theoretical design which may be criticized, Duprat's theories illuminate the pieces as in a kaleidoscope which rejects any simple design. If his work thus comes considerably closer to Algerian realities, it remains as difficult as these realities for the reader to apprehend. I confess to having read it twice during a period of more than a year without being able to decipher any overall thrust, and I tentatively infer the fault to lie with the writer rather than the reader. Turgidly written, poorly edited, and without an index, this thesis for the Faculty of Letters, Nanterre, nevertheless deserves a favorable review on two counts.

First as a study of ideology which tries not to be ideological, it deciphers Algerian utterances, clarifies code words, and sympathetically analyzes logical contradictions and the political or factional tensions underlying them. It does not reduce ideas to social classes or class struggle but rather seeks to understand how perceptions of class, influenced by ideological developments outside Algeria, could provide specific political references for people attempting to construct political space out of the legacy of revolution. Unlike Clegg, who reduces the Algerian revolution to verbal hassles over *autogestion,* Duprat accepts the fact that Algeria experienced a revolution between 1954 and 1962. He also argues (against the oversimplified view that the FLN did not have "an ideology") that a "revolutionary project" emerged implicitly from the years of struggle and was articulated in a variety of suggestive if inconsistent declarations by diverse groups within the FLN. One available symbol, first mentioned in a trade union declaration in 1961, was *autogestion.* Its establishment as a myth, its life history, and finally its death were significant mainly as phases in Algerians' searches for public meanings. If *"l'autogestion arrive à sa maturité sans atteindre l'âge de raison"* (p. 443), the death of the myth also closed one gap within Algeria's revolutionary experience between theory and practice.

Second, the work is exceptionally rich in political detail, relating what was happening on the self-managed estates with intra-elite politics in Algiers. Duprat gathered invaluable written materials from a trade-unionist active in Ain-Temouchent, an *arrondissement* west of Oran. He was also able personally to interview many of the workers who tried to manage farms in the area. Some of their attitudes and motivations make fascinating reading. Their ambivalence toward the state — resentment against external interference coupled with expectations of outside assistance — is good evidence for Duprat's contention that *autogestion* itself stimulated a countervailing bureaucracy. Unfortunately his data are neither quantified nor elaborated in an extended case study of *autogestion* in Ain-Temouchent. The book, then, unlike Clegg's is probably for Algerianists only.

CLEMENT HENRY MOORE
The University of Michigan

Comparative Political Socialization. Edited by Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970. Pp. 135. $3.95.)

The slender volume of five studies is a useful addition to the field of comparative political socialization. Each is based wholly or in part on sample surveys. Joseph Adelson, whose work with adolescents also includes projective techniques, chose not to report on these results, which is regrettable. All their studies make a serious effort to set the inquiry into a larger theoretical context. The success of this effort is, however, at times severely restricted by the very method of the sample survey or by the type of survey with which the authors had to content themselves. This is noticeable in the piece by Kenneth Prewitt, George Von Der Muhl, and David Court, which offers extremely sophisticated thoughts on the not-always-defensible way in which political socialization scholars have treated certain independent variables, such as age. The very design of their own study, however, does not permit them the type of inquiry they advocate (a fact of which they are fully aware), so that instead they had to choose "the strategy which approximates the ideal socialization study" (p. 78). None of the five studies concentrate on very young children, but instead concentrate on adolescents or adults, whose political orientations presumably have more direct political import.

Of the five articles, two are cross-national. Jack Dennis and Donald McCrone report on the development of party identification in western democracies. Judith Gallatin and Joseph Adelson report on the development of political thought in three nations. A comparison of the two studies clearly illustrates the differences in approach between the psychologist and the political scientist. The Gallatin and Adelson piece essentially is a learning study that asks when and how the young person begins to apply formal operations (to use Piaget's terms) to political thinking. Dennis and McCrone instead study the strength of party attachment, the transmission from parent to child, and variations therein across nations, as well as the possible explanations for such variations. Their focus — even if only indirectly — is the political system; Gallatin and Adelson's is the individual.

One of the most interesting findings in the latter piece is that formal operations in political thought seem to develop much later than they do in other intellectual endeavors. The authors conclude that "in all likelihood, this apparent lag in political thinking is a function of the child's narrower social perspective" (p. 111). Another explanation, however, suggests itself. Could it be that home and school ignore the task of "engaging" young people politically? If 15-year-olds can be taught formal operations in algebra and moral thought, one may be permitted to wonder if the same could not be done for politics. The differences in responses among children of different nationalities parallel, as the authors point out, those observed for adults in Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture*. Whether they or Almond and Verba should make these generalizations without understanding what some of the practices mean in different national settings is another question. It is a question one could direct to each of the volume's sections.

Dennis and McClure document that party identification is strongest in the U.S. and U.K., and least strong in France. Rather than look for familial differences, one might trace strength to the stability and small number of parties. Thus I feel certain that pre-World War II German adolescents would have greatly paralleled those of postwar France, not because of any intrinsically similar family patterns but because of the similarity in voter volatility. Where parents vote Communist one year and then desert that party in the next election, young people are not apt to develop stable party identifications regardless of the reticence or openness of family political discussion.

Intra-nation comparisons are made in the essays by Akira Kubota and Robert Ward; by Daniel Goldrich; and by Prewitt et. al. Kubota and Ward imaginatively test the assertion of discontinuities in Japanese politics as expressed in stability of party identification. Their conclusions offer a corrective to the frequently asserted charge of the sharp generational break in postwar Japan. Their study offers ample illustrations of the difficulties encountered in cross-national comparisons. They observe that "don't know" responses are considerably higher in Japan than in the U.S. and suggest that this might be indicative of greater political instability. An alternative explanation is feasible. Maybe genuine not knowing is of the same magnitude in both countries, but American youngsters may be more likely to volunteer an opinion even when they lack knowledge. Again, we can only caution that few conclusions should be drawn from cross-national data unless we are certain of the cultural equivalence of the concepts used and the responses received.

Prewitt and associates performed a most ingenuous analysis of the impact of the school environment on attitude development and/or change (religious orientations in this case) among adolescents enrolled in Tanzanian religious and government schools. This is one of the few field studies that actually controls for differences in school environment, although others have talked about the importance of schooling. Some of the tables lend themselves to different interpretations from those given by the authors, but the significance of the piece lies in the attempt to provide a contextual analysis.

Therein also lies the importance of the Goldrich piece on the *poblador* of Latin America.

He relates actual political experiences (encountered in the attempt to secure housing) to political attitudes, something political scientists have promised to do for years but have seldom done. Goldrich's piece also has the distinction of being the only one in the volume on adult political socialization — another sadly neglected area.

The selections have all the virtues and drawbacks of the whole field of political socialization research. None deals with the *process* of socialization; none is longitudinal; national histories are not as integral a part of the designs as they should be. All, however, show considerably more theoretical concern and sophistication than was the case 10 years ago. All are carefully executed and will add significantly to the slowly growing volume of comparative socialization research.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL

Rutgers University

British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations. By Ronald Dore. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 432. $11.75.)

Modernization has been considered a process that began in England and Western Europe and then spread, or is still spreading, to the rest of the world. The convergence theory holds that this process will gradually bring all societies into conformity.

Dubious of all grand theories, Ronald Dore, the well-known English Japan specialist and sociologist, has reviewed this hypothesis in the light of a detailed study of industrial relations in two highly industrialized societies. His findings will be shocking to some. He finds that Japanese workers have undergone a "social democratic revolution" (p. 115), whereas British workers have not. The result is that the British workers — class conscious and suspicious of employers — are organized horizontally by trades and are thus buffeted by the labor market from one enterprise to another on the basis of work opportunities and pay, having gained their present "rights" only incrementally in a dogged battle that still goes on with management and at times goes against them. By contrast, the Japanese workers experienced a sudden revolutionary breakthrough in the first few years of the American Occupation that among other things gave them "maximum hours, minimum holidays, overtime provisions, etc., which were more generous than in any other capitalist country" (p. 116). And even when the Occupation embarked on its anti-Communist "reverse course," rescinding a number of the rights previously given (and still not entirely recovered), Japanese industry had totally accepted the union as a legitimate bargaining agent in wages and protection of persons with rights to full facilities within the factory. Japanese industry had also accepted "the abolition of all but monetary distinctions between the formerly separate 'statuses' of staff and manual workers" (p. 119). One of the many consequences of the lack of this "social democratic" revolution for British industry is that the continuing class hostility prevents the realization of that full cooperation between management and workers that is seen in Japanese factories. Enjoying "tenure" and a pay system based substantially on seniority, Japanese workers are organized in "enterprise unions" in which they feel an allegiance to the company and work hard for the corporate prosperity. They are thus "organization-oriented" rather than "market-oriented." Seeing this as a world trend, Dore asks if Britain is catching up to Japan (Chapter 13).

Answering affirmatively, he ends up by supporting a convergence theory after all, but one differing from most others in three respects. (1) He recognizes that the desire for social equality comes to modify the linearly increasing technological complexity that would otherwise create hierarchy. (2) He finds that terms and conditions of employment, therefore, tend to be less influenced by the labor market than by what the functions within the enterprise call for. (For example, the Japanese worker, confident of not losing his job, is much more amendable than the British to being moved around to different tasks within the larger enterprise.) And (3) he argues that the later developing societies can jump ahead of the earlier developers in various ways (which the Japanese have done in education, personnel management, etc., as well as in achieving closer, and in that sense, more egalitarian, personal relations).

Still, Dore does not contend that the need for handling complex technology and organization and the need to achieve status equality necessarily impose identical institutional solutions on all advanced industrial economies (p. 419). In short, the world of the future will not be monotonously uniform for three reasons: (1) the pre-industrial histories of various nations continue to pattern them differently; (2) so do their peculiarities of geography, population, etc.; and (3) how and when they industrialized makes a great difference.

Despite the prospects of continued future diversity, Dore's hypothesis is that the main trend of industrialism in the world is toward the organization man rather than toward the man who values individualism and "freedom." The "rationality" involved works better in large-scale enterprise (than in small business), fed by an educational system based on the "merit" of success in examinations. One can discern unmistakably the face of Max Weber behind Dore's approach here, but that is hardly comforting to people who hold dear the values of individual liberty.

The methodology used in this study is almost faultless ("apples" truly being compared with "apples"), the historical scholarship impressive, and the writing superb (a real pleasure to read). Nevertheless, on the basis of recent trends in Japanese society, I have the optimistic feeling that Japanese society has already begun to undergo a series of profound social changes that may well undermine the almost idealized (but frightening) image of the hard-working, submissive, and group-oriented Japanese labor force, described by Dore. This can already be seen in the widespread reaction in Japan to the headlong dash toward economic growth at the expense of the environment and of the quality of life, taking the form of citizens' movements, individualism, and nonconformity. But these are changes only beginning to affect the society whose industrial relations are meticulously analyzed here. Indeed this study has much to offer the political comparativist of both developing and industrialized countries, as well as those interested in political sociology and economy, and it once again demonstrates how important is the in-depth, truly comparative and integrated, study, still so rare, of which this is a remarkable example.

George O. Totten
University of Southern California

Arabs and Berbers. From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. Edited by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 448. $15.00.)

Arabs and Berbers, a work published in 1972 by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud with eighteen collaborators, stimulates a dualistic and contradictory interpretation. To a certain extent, it provides a representative sampling of various studies devoted to the traditionally antithetical problem of Arab and Berber societies. Seen thus, the book is indeed a logical outcome of this question. At the same time, however, it opens a new chapter in the study of political anthropology of the Maghreb, for it challenges that very issue. Even in the introduction by E. Gellner, the well known division between two populations considered ethnically irreducible is presented as the outcome of an entire network of artifices, if not of a deliberate mystification. Furthermore, a reading of the various contributions admirably reflects this ambivalence: continued prevalence of the theory of Arab-Berber (pseudo)-opposition as well as criticism and ultimate dismissal of the same theory. In other words, the authors of *Arabs and Berbers* prove that the myth is still alive even as they denounce it.

"Divide the adversary" is an old formula in war or political strategy. The "discovery" of a Berber minority and recognition of its importance (or rather fabrication of it for political manipulation) date back to French colonization, to colonial ethnologists, and to the theoreticians and politicians of colonialism; more specifically, they spring from Algeria at the end of the last century. The "Kabyle myth" of the years 1840–1870 represented a primary attempt, but at the time, the endeavor consisted of a search for the "good savage" and those native pillars of colonization who were capable of helping the French cultivate the land if not run the country. By 1890–1900, there was no longer any question of an attempted political and economic recuperation of the "Kabyle" minority. The triumphant colonial system sought to confirm its supremacy. To that end, it pitted two groups against one another by emphasizing their differences. In the extreme, we fall into wittingly opposed stereotypes: the lazy Arab, a thief and ever-potential traitor; the industrious Berber, upright and loyal. For it was imperative to valorize the numerically inferior of the two groups. Whence special legislation; Kabyle representation within the "Délégations financières," that assembly of mere façade; Berber cultural politics; schools . . . and so on.

Berberism is thus, first and foremost, a political construct and the Berber-Arab antinomy an instrument of domination. What currently obfuscates comprehension of the issue is the work of the social sciences which propagated the theory and then categorized the mentalities and modes of behavior. When officially invited to prove the scientific grounds for such a compartimentalization into two races, the colonial ethnologists hardly strove to seek proof of the assertion. To cite but one example, in 1910 E. Doutté and E.-F. Gautier exploited in behalf of the "Gouvernement général" of Algiers the findings of an *Enquête sur la dispersion de la langue berbère,* a study which proved the progressive recession of Berber in response to the extension of Arabic. Intended to facilitate the reinforcement of pro-Berber politics, the study justified *a posteriori,* a choice already made, rather than preparing that choice.

A reading of the major authors, Hanoteau and Letourneux, Masqueray — from whom Durkheim borrowed the concept of segmentarity so widely diffused by Ernest Gellner — confirms the growing interest in studying the Berbers in Algeria. And we find the traces of such an attitude immediately following the occupation in Morocco. Augustin Bernard has left us a "mission in Morocco" (in the form of a report to the Governor General of Algeria) which merely reproduces on Moroccan soil the ethnics divisions elaborated with regard to the neighboring country. Edmund Burke III demonstrates admirably (pp. 175–199) the influence of Hanoteau and Letourneux which extended as far as Lyautey's entourage, and can be recognized in the drafting of the *dahir* of September 1914. It is regrettable, however, that no author sought to pinpoint the true sources of berberism within the ethnic literature of Algeria. Moreover, the same criticism can be leveled against the work as a whole, for it is decidedly slanted toward Morocco, whereas Algeria is the subject of only four of the twenty-three studies which compose the collection.

But this French "invention" could not help influencing not only the scholars and politicians but also those most directly concerned, namely, the Berber-speakers themselves who were constantly reminded how much their life styles, rules and laws, religious policies, economy, culture and organization differed from those of the Arabs. Thus the image presented to them by the Europeans brought about alterations within the very society that had been observed. The colonized group underwent an unconscious internalization of those values that had been filtered through the colonial analysis. And, in part, this is one of the basic themes of the work: how an academic myth altered the very society which it purported to explain.

The first part, therefore, examines the "traditional base." The real issue, it would seem, is not to rediscover the tribe (and, "tribe *and* nation in North Africa" would be a more fitting substitute than "from tribe to nation . . .") but rather to understand the connotations of the word "tribe" in the Morocco of 1918, 1945, and finally in 1970. In this vein, it is interesting to compare Mrs. Vinogradov's paper on a *Taraf* Berber tribe before the protectorate with David Seddon's observations on the ethnic populations of Northeastern Morocco from 1870 to 1970. It seems that the word tribe has become a mere appelation, an administrative term with no real sociological base. The true dissimilarities then, are not to be found between Arabs and Berbers, but between groups factions, and clans. The determining factors are the relations of various groups with the central power, the inequalities of wealth, and the intensity of bonds of friendship or enmity.

Several contributions in the second part carry us further along in the same direction. Louis-Jean Duclos points out that first and foremost, the national unity of Morocco, even before colonization, transcended ethnic divisions. This unity, moreover, continued to develop despite the French government's policy of favoring Berber elements. For example, Abdeslam Ben Kaddour has shown that Berbers occupied key posts more because the French had placed them there than because of any alleged Berber superiority. With the advent of the nationalist movement, ethnic rivalries created or inflamed by the colonialists diminished. And above and beyond considerations of independence, nothing indicates that the resurgence of certain particularisms is due exclusively to ethnic motives. It is certainly not shown, for example, in Octave Marais' analysis of the political evolution of independent (post-colonial) Morocco, nor in William B. Quandt's study on the Berber minority within the political elite of Algeria; moreover Jeanne Favret's article which opens the third part, "Ethnicity and Social Change," establishes that the agitation in Kabylie and in Aurès after 1962 is a manifestation of supernationalism, of ultra-integrationism rather than of a policy of separatism.

The final section of the book is devoted to the *"coup manqué"* of Skirat, to use the term of John Waterbury; the concluding statements are made by Charles Micaud. As already stated, the major portion of the work vacillates between the desire to maintain the Arab-Berber dichotomy as a means of investigating the past and present, and the temptation to demystify that very dichotomy, once and for all. Ernest Gellner states in the introduction that he purposely allowed each contributor to express him/herself as he/she saw fit. The same ambiguity marks the recent work by Montagne: *The Berbers, Their Social and Political Organization* (translated and introduced by D. Seddon; Preface by E. Gellner [London: Frank Cass, 1973]), as well as the reprinting of Anthony Wilkins's 1900 study: *Among the Berbers of Algeria.* Are Berber studies being renewed in the United States and in England? Are they concerned with refurbishing those concepts initially forged by colonial anthropologists? Or is there an attempt to rethink berberism by trying to understand who designed it and for what purpose? In the meantime, all of these studies point to one fact: that contemporary studies teach us less about the Berbers of North Africa than about France and her political entanglements, about a France ensnared by a myth that she herself created.

JEAN-CLAUDE VATIN

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Aix-en-Provence, France

Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem. By Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh. (Calcutta: Oceania Publishing House, 1972. Pp. 235. $8.00.)

The policy adopted toward the independence of India was a forerunner of the liberal attitude taken toward the winding-up of the British Empire after 1945. As early as 1917, the Montague Declaration had recommended the establishment of partially responsible government in India. The years between 1929 and 1934 saw the evolution of a new policy, which culminated in the Government of India Act of 1935. While the Viceroy was still to exercise exclusive control in some areas, the Act set up a Federation in India with strong provincial rights and an increased measure of responsible government at the center.

Throughout the 1929–1934 period, the Conservative leader Baldwin lent his support to a greater measure of independence for India. Many in his party, however, were outraged at what they saw as "surrender" to the militant nationalists led by Gandhi, and went all out to reverse Baldwin's position. These intraparty dissensions form the focus of this work by Professor Ghosh, who now teaches at the University of New South Wales. His major purpose is to use the India question to throw light on the distribution of power in the Conservative party through an analysis of its decision-making processes.

Ghosh contends that previous accounts of the distribution of power in the Conservative party, notably that of R. T. Mackenzie in *British Political Parties,* have been too concerned with the structural sources of power, giving a misleading picture of the role of the leader. Instead, Ghosh contends that "power in the Conservative party is dispersed" (p. 15) and that "in spite of his formal power, Baldwin could not decisively influence the Conservatives' decision" (p. 5). The bulk of the book is dedicated to showing the limits put on Baldwin's power by the dissent of his followers.

The author succeeds quite admirably in demonstrating a number of areas in which Baldwin was forced to modify his position under pressure from party colleagues. For instance, backbench pressure caused him to modify his support for the Dominion Status Declaration of 1929. Similar pressure forced him to support the cautious posture of the Conservative delegation to the Round Table Conferences of 1931–1932. Third, the expressed fears of the leaders of the National Union and the regionally powerful Manchester Chamber of Commerce resulted in stronger safeguards for British trade in the 1935 India Act than the 1933 White Paper had advocated.

While it does show the limits on Baldwin's power, however, the book is less useful in providing a general theory of power in the Conservative party relevant to the student of contemporary British politics. It lacks both a rigorous theoretical framework, and a statement of conclusions linking the author's contentions directly to his evidence.

A particularly crucial omission is any attempt to place this study within the context of the post-1867 Conservative party. For instance, the reader begins this book with the notion that the 1922 Committee is perhaps the crucial constituency whose support a Tory leader must maintain, while the National Union is, according to Ostrogorski and Mackenzie, a mere "handmaid" to the party in Parliament. One is therefore perturbed that, although the 1922 Committee is relegated to a very indirect treatment, the National Union's deliberations receive extended attention.

Furthermore, I wonder whether India was an appropriate issue to use in the search for greater understanding of the distribution of power in the Conservative party. Party revolts on Suez, Rhodesia, and the Common Market suggest that Tory dissension and overt rebellion are most acute on questions of empire or national sovereignty, a category clearly encompassing India. In addition, one should hesitate to draw general conclusions about Conservative leadership from the experience of Baldwin. Despite his long tenure in the office, he was in some ways the least successful and most vulnerable leader of his party in the period between Balfour and Heath.

A final drawback is that the book has been very poorly indexed and proofread.

These weaknesses, however, should not detract from the strengths of the book. Ghosh has provided an interesting description of the pattern of dissent on the question of India policy and its role in causing Baldwin to modify his position. He has also provided a suggestive counter to those modern studies of political power which stress its accretion and concentration rather than its limits and diffusion.

GEOFFREY LAMBERT
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg

Red Square at Noon. By Natalia Gorbanevskaya. Introduction by Harrison E. Salisbury. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Pp. 288. $7.95.)

On August 25, 1968, as Ms. Gorbanevskaya reports in this careful account, seven Soviet citizens peacefully demonstrated in Red Square in protest against the Soviet-organized military intervention which began the massive process of repression and intimidation that was to put an end to the effort of the Communist government of Czechoslovakia, led by Alexander Dubcek, to "revive socialism" in that country. The expression "to revive socialism" is taken from the appeal "to the Communist Parties of the whole world," issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Extraordinary 14th Congress, on August 22, 1968 and reprinted in this volume (pp. 22–24). The governments of the five Warsaw Pact states involved in the intervention (the USSR, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland — Rumania did not participate) of course presented their action as one undertaken in defense of the "achievements of socialism" in Czechoslovakia.

Thus, two very different interpretations of socialism, and also of democracy, clashed. On the one side was an essentially Stalinist, and — if the term democracy has more than demagogic value — obviously reactionary conception. It postulates that an infallible and omnipotent party apparatus must impose its will on the membership of the ruling party and on the "masses" of the USSR and other "socialist" polities. This pattern of rule is viewed by the Kremlin as the proper application of "Leninist" principles. Opposed to this was the approach of the Dubcek forces in Czechoslovakia and of the Democratic Movement in the USSR (some of its participants were Communists, some were not), who believed that to pretend that socialism could exist without democracy was to make a mockery of the very idea of socialism. These anti-Stalinist, democratic reformers were prepared to run great risks in defense of their convictions.

Of the seven Soviet citizens who defied their government by organizing a sit-down demonstration at the historic Execution Ground, near the Kremlin, five (Larisa Bogoraz, Konstantin Babitski, Vadim Delone, Vladimir Dremlyuga, and Pavel Litvinov) were tried on charges of maliciously slandering the Soviet state and social system (under Article 190/1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) and of grossly violating public order (Article 190/3 of the same code).

As became clear from statements of the prosecution, and also of the judge (who echoed the prosecution, and severely obstructed the defense) at the trial in October, 1968, the first charge was based on the prosecution's interpretation of banners carried by the demonstrators, which urged withdrawal of the occupation forces and otherwise criticized the intervention. The second charge was supported by witnesses clearly assigned by the Soviet authorities to this task; other witnesses, who supported the defendants' arguments, and those of defense attorneys (four of the accused had attorneys; Bogoraz conducted her own defense) that no disturbance of traffic or public order had occurred, were not permitted to testify. Despite the flimsiness of the government's case, the five persons who were tried received severe sentences of detention in forced labor camps or exile.

The other two participants in the demonstration were declared insane, and spent time in "special psychiatric hospitals" under security police (KGB) auspices. One of these, Victor Feinberg, who had four of his upper front teeth knocked out by plainclothes operatives during the demonstration, was recently permitted to leave the USSR. The other, the poetess Gorbanevskaya, the compiler of this book, had, at the time of the writing of this review, been released from confinement, but had been refused permission to leave the USSR.

Gorbanevskaya's careful and apparently full record is useful and interesting in a number of connections. For one thing, like other remarkable accounts of Soviet political trials of the 1960s, such as Alexander Ginzburg's record of the Sinyavski-Daniel affair, or Pavel Litvinov's compilation on the trial of Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov, *Red Square at Noon* sheds light both on the progress made since the death of Stalin in reducing the inhumanity of the Soviet judicial process and on the vast distance still to be covered before anything like the "rule of law" can be said to have come into existence in the USSR.

Even more important, perhaps, than what documents such as this tell us about contemporary justice in the USSR and related matters, is what they indicate about political change in the future. Of course, the efforts of people like Bogoraz, Litvinov, Academician Andrei Sakharov, and others to promote "democratization" in the USSR have failed. However, the facts that the effort could be made at all, that it was made, and that even in the highly sensitive field of foreign policy, some Soviet citizens dared to protest, are significant. Perhaps at some future date such efforts will be more successful than they were in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

But if the Red Square demonstrators established a precedent that may inspire future reformers who, one hopes, will be more fortunate than their predecessors, their fate is also a warning. Not only was the Soviet regime able to crush them with ease, but — and this is discouraging — there is every reason to believe that the Soviet "masses" were at best indifferent to the libertarian message of the Litvinovs, the Grigorenkos, and the Sakharovs, and at worst downright hostile.

It could of course be argued that the organizers of the demonstration were foolhardy to challenge the Kremlin on such a sensitive issue as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in view of the taboo in Soviet political culture against such open defiance of policies not only decided upon but, in this case, already implemented. However, Anatoli Yakobson, a leader of the Democratic Movement, in a letter included in this volume, effectively countered criticism of this nature when, noting that since the Sinyavski-Daniel trial no arbitrary act of the authorities had passed without public protest, he added, "That has the makings of a precious tradition, a start to people releasing themselves . . . from humiliating fear and participation in evil" (p. 285). But, of course, one can agonize over whether history will mourn the activists of the Soviet Democratic Movement as martyrs or celebrate them as prophets. In the meantime careful study of the words and deeds of the Soviet democratizers, and of the Kremlin's response thereto, is indispensable to understanding contemporary Soviet domestic policy, which in turn shapes and constrains Moscow's foreign policy.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

Yale University

The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970. By Werner G. Hahn. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Pp. vii, 311. $12.50.)

Focusing upon the policy debates between 1960–70, Werner Hahn presents a chronology of the agricultural issues that affected the political careers of Soviet leaders. Professor Hahn's approach is "to identify individual leaders' positions on issues through careful study and comparison of their statements through the years, to identify the role of these leaders and their viewpoints in disputes and decisions, and to compare personnel shifts and career patterns with policy changes and political disputes" (p. xii).

Although the book contains an extremely useful collection of data, it lacks an explicit theoretical perspective and is particularly weak on analysis. No attempt is made to relate the vast amount of information to the broader context of Soviet political behavior nor to the current theoretical discussions among Soviet specialists. Hahn has evidence, for example, to challenge some of the assumptions of interest group theorists. His data demonstrate that power struggles and policy debates occur among individuals rather than groups. A model of patron-client relationships would be the most applicable to his study, since he refers continually to the purging or promotion of a leader's protégés at lower levels of the party and government hierarchies.

Hahn's book is divided into two parts. Part One begins with the 1959 harvest disaster in Kazakhstan and the demotion of Khrushchev's supporters, N. I. Belyayev and A. I. Kirichenko. It recounts that by the beginning of 1961, Khrushchev managed a comeback and installed a new team (T. D. Lysenko, K. G. Pysin, G. I. Voronov) to implement his agricultural programs; the team soon split, with Voronov and Pysin becoming the dominant forces. Despite the chapter headings, Hahn de-emphasizes Khrushchev's personal leadership and pays particular attention to the careers of Voronov and Lysenko between 1962–65. He tells us that the 1962 party re-organization initially put Voronov in a powerful position regarding agriculture (in March) and then contributed to his decline (in November). After the 1963 Virgin Land drought, Voronov began to oppose Khrushchev and to support the alternative views of A. I. Berayev and Sh. Sh. Khayrullin. Voronov also continued his opposition to Lysenko (who still had Khrushchev's support). Lysenko's own position had been weakening at least since March 1962 and reached its nadir in early 1965. Hahn concludes this section with the fall of Khrushchev and the reversal of his policies.

Part Two describes the conflict between Voronov and Polyanskiy (1965–70) in terms of the former's support for organizational reforms that would reduce costs of production and increase agricultural efficiency, and the latter's preference for investing more resources in agriculture. They differed also on the issue of more direct state control over kolkhozes (Voronov) versus an elective administrative system for kolkhozes (Polyanskiy). Hahn considers D. S. Polyanskiy the chief spokesman for the agriculture lobby, which suffered a setback when Brezhnev supported the transfer of funds to consumer goods in March 1967. This was later reversed, however, when Brezhnev joined Polyanskiy to increase the resources for agriculture after the meat crisis of 1969. Voronov fought this policy and implemented his own programs in the RSFSR, which contributed to his final defeat after the Brezhnev-Polyanskiy position prevailed at the 24th Party Congress.

Hahn claims that the second part of his book shifts its emphasis from debates over agricultural organization and the techniques to be used in agricultural production (1960–65) to debates over priorities between agriculture and industry (1965–70). He attributes this to the (relative) lack of public discussions of agricultural techniques after 1965, but admits that differences may have persisted within the political leadership. This seems to be an artificial distinction, since the competition between industry and agriculture is clearly visible in the earlier period (e.g., pp. 102–116), and the disagreements over agricultural policies are prevalent throughout the rest of the book. Hahn shows how the amount of resources invested in agriculture vis-à-vis industry depended indirectly on the agricultural output of the previous year, i.e., greater investments usually followed droughts or meat shortages. But it is difficult to assess these expenditures outside the context of the nonagricultural demands being made at the same time.

What conclusions can be drawn from the substantive material presented in Hahn's book? In terms of political behavior, we see a continual hustling among secondary leaders to improve their own status in the Kremlin hierarchy and to have their policies prevail. Hahn's study demonstrates again that Soviet political conflict is not limited to a narrow circle of Politburo leaders; policy debates on agriculture involve many individuals, including leaders of territorial party organizations and agricultural scientists.

One also receives the impression of perpetual movement and uncertainty among the top leaders. Difficulties in Soviet agriculture seem to stem, in part, from the inability of the leadership to implement a given policy for any length of time. Due to the differences of opinion among the secondary leaders and the inability of the primary leader to impose his policies upon them, there is a continual shifting of programs as the political situations of individuals change. To a certain extent, this is a circular relationship because agricultural problems themselves are a factor in the realignment of political positions. Nevertheless, the personal career interests of individuals, their reluctance to compromise viewpoints, and the lack of long-term programs have clearly contributed to the failures of Soviet agricultural policies.

Most of Hahn's presentation is based upon inferences from the Soviet press. Although generally adequate, there is not enough documentation for some of the speculative judgments and assertions regarding "purges" and other changes in personnel. Nevertheless, Hahn has provided a useful source of data on the relationships between agricultural disputes and individual political positions in the Soviet Union between 1960–70. His extensive reportage is followed by several appendices, including the membership of the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR and the Heads of Central Committee Sections for the RSFSR, which are valuable reference materials for students of Soviet politics.

LINDA L. LUBRANO
American University

Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy. By D. A. Hamer. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. 368. $16.25.)

This is a book on internal party tactics. It is a close-grained, meticulous piece of scholarship of the type traditional in British historiography, and, within the canons of that genre, it is excellent. How did the party organism function? How was it supervised, directed, kept alive? From extensive research in private papers and other documentary materials, Hamer sees a party afflicted with an inability to stick together once it won elections. To this internal dilemma, as Professor Hamer believes, the party leaders bent their most determined thoughts, and not to the realization of a great vision of what the British nation should become. Men like Joseph Chamberlain argued for the broad front tactic, pursuing social reform across a wide spectrum and thus attracting wide support. Gladstone, ever the man of passion and great causes, sought the unifying element instead in campaigns against single evils: Disraeli's imperialism, or the national refusal to satisfy Ireland's demand for Home Rule. By this means, he hoped to bury the fissiparous inclinations of the "sections" that made up the party — the temperance enthusiasts, Welsh Methodists, land reformers, and the like. Conviction did not lie behind these party tactics, only a concern for holding the party together.

As Hamer sees the matter, then, a party is to be understood in basically structuralist terms. That is, it does things for reasons arising out of its inner organizational needs, not because it is drawn onward by some motivating social vision which it wishes to bring into reality. This is a venerable viewpoint, and it is here argued with great skill and scholarly eclat. Indeed, the author is summary in his dismissal of the work of other scholars — especially, so it seems to happen, that of American scholars. The result, however, is a book in which the terms of reference have a dated air. A revolution in scholarship has occurred in the past fifteen years, with regard to the way in which we understand and undertake to explain party behavior, and it is regrettable that Hamer has not availed himself of this work. Political scientists like V. O. Key, Jr. and Walter Dean Burnham in this country have elaborated the concepts of the critical election and voting cycles, which would have greatly aided Hamer's analysis. Hamer mentions approvingly, but seems unable to make use of, the work of the brilliant Cambridge historian John Vincent, who has uncovered the roots of party life in networks of social groupings in the country at large, and party motivations in a sense of dramatic encounter with bitterly disliked social influences ranged behind the opposition party. G. R. Searle, another Cambridge-trained British scholar, has written an important book whose concepts would have greatly illuminated the problems Hamer was working on: *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971). Robert Wiebe, in this country, has written a similar work: *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York, Hill and Wang, 1967). Of course, Lee Benson and Samuel Hays have led the emergence of the "new political history," with its close exploration of ethnocultural influences. All of this has given us quite a new framework for conducting research into party history. Books written without benefit of these new vantage points are no longer very convincing.

Thus, where Hamer dismisses the "sections" (ethnocultural groupings) as unfortunate irritants, the new scholarship would find them of the essence of party thought and action. To treat such influences as simply a matter for party tactics is to ignore whole territories of thought and feeling. In doing so, Professor Hamer has lost sight of that vision of the British nation that gave British Liberalism its true momentum and character.

ROBERT KELLEY
University of California, Santa Barbara

Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Edited by Claire Holt. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 348. $15.00.)

All of these essays seek to delineate what Clifford Geertz, in his afterword to the volume, describes as the "politics of meaning" which lies behind and subtly but profoundly influences the countless acts, conflicts, and passions of the overt political arena. In a country as diverse and eclectic as Indonesia, as he stresses, such an enterprise is a daunting one, especially since there exists no accepted methodology for engaging in the enterprise and all too little in the way of comparable studies in other cultures.

The authors adopt a variety of approaches, according to their interests and dispositions. In their analyses of Javanese millenarianism and Indonesian legal culture, Sartono Kartodirdjo and Daniel Lev call upon Western sociological theory to capture and dissect their phenomena. William Liddle examines primordialism as it expresses itself in and through party politics in North Sumatra by more explicitly political science techniques. Benedict Anderson and Taufik Abdullah, by contrast, seek to penetrate long-established cultural norms impinging on political ideas in order to explicate the ways in which those ideas manifest themselves in systems and movements of contemporary significance.

Anderson in a brilliant piece of cultural analysis teases out the Javanese idea of power from artistic and literary sources, while Abdullah traces the manner in which Minangkabau religious leaders sought to come to terms with change within their own universe of ideas.

The electicism of the methodologies represented therefore fits well with the electicism of the general subject of discussion, and there appears to be little value in weighing one against another in view of the richness of the insights gained from them all into a wide range of political activity relevant not only to the Indonesianist but also to the many other scholars concerned in different milieus with similar topics or the "politics of meaning" generally.

Geertz sees these essays as important in shedding light upon the continued inability of the Indonesians to reconcile their diversity with the imperatives of a nation state as they conceive it. This is certainly one way of viewing their contribution. Anderson and Kartodirdjo, for example, both show that the ethos of the dominant groups in Indonesia has taken scant account of divergent currents of radicalism that run deep among the Javanese. The Islamic reformers discussed by Abdullah, and the lawyers struggling for a place in social life have fared no better, and both to varying degrees constitute actual or potential sources of disaffection for any centralized regime in Indonesia. Yet, as Geertz himself points out (p. 323), "most of the larger nations of Europe grew out of a cultural heterogeneity hardly less marked," so wherein lies the crucial difference in their political histories? Surely not in the mere refusal to come to terms with diversity, as Geertz suggests, since these same European states displayed a similar reluctance (and some, such as Austria-Hungary, paid dearly for it; others may yet do so).

A good deal of the answer, I suspect, lies in the exogenous pressures which Indonesia and other ex-colonial countries have faced in confronting all their problems, including that of defining and managing the nation state itself. This is no new insight, least of all to Geertz himself, but we need to be reminded of it when we throw up our arms in the air at the seemingly irrational ways in which Indonesian leaders try to manipulate their sociocultural environment.

The great merit of these essays is to bring home to us how strong and deep-rooted the cultural patterns of Indonesia remain, and how they intrude into the most "modern" sectors of political life. They add substantial weight to the arguments of those who emphasize that the means to lasting and beneficial change in the new states lies not in an all-out war against tradition, but through a complex and selective adaptation of it. It cannot be said that Western policy makers, or the present Indonesian leaders who defer to their advice, have taken heed. Herein lies the grounds for the pessimism that infuses Geertz's conclusion; herein lies the unstated but pervasive lesson to be learned from a reading of these essays as a whole.

REX MORTIMER
University of Papua New Guinea

Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon. By Robert N. Kearney. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 195. $10.00.)

The purpose of this book is to describe and categorize the political action and associations of trade unions in Sri Lanka (Ceylon). While the main focus of the study is on the interaction between labor organizations and political parties, the author also analyzes the functioning of Ceylonese trade unions in their capacity as bargaining agents for the organized labor force in Sri Lanka. Dealing primarily with post-1960 developments, the author refers on occasion to the background of earlier events.

Professor Kearney's study brings certain characteristics of Ceylonese trade unions into relief. There is first the prodigious growth in the number and membership of trade unions in Sri Lanka since 1947 when that country obtained independence. In 1948 the total membership of unions which submitted an annual report to the Commissioner of Labor was 158,178. Twenty years later, the reported membership of Ceylonese trade unions had grown to nearly one and a half million, approximately 10 per cent of the island's population. Two other characteristics of Ceylonese trade unions, however, have conspired to weaken the political potential of what on the surface has been an impressive record of growth. Most important is the fragmentation of the Ceylonese labor movement. In 1967, for example, 75 per cent of the 1,239 unions which filed an annual report had less than 250 members and of these only a fourth had a membership exceeding 50. This fragmentation, despite the organization of many of these unions into larger federations, has made it difficult for the working class in

Sri Lanka to act as an effective political bloc. Intense rivalry between labor organizations and among their leaders is another characteristic of Ceylonese trade unions. At every level of organization — the trade union, the federation, and the political party to which many trade unions are attached — both personal and political rivalry inhibits cooperative action.

These characteristics of Ceylonese trade unions, as well as the fact that Sri Lanka remains a predominantly agricultural country in which the majority of the gainfully employed are not unionized, could lead one to underestimate the political significance of trade unions in Sri Lanka. On the contrary, they are critically important for at least two reasons, according to Professor Kearney. In the first place, trade unions have organized workers in vital sectors of Sri Lanka's highly vulnerable economy. The tea estates, on which Sri Lanka depends heavily for foreign exchange, are dominated by powerful communalist trade unions of Indian Tamil workers. Public service personnel and workers in the port facilities have each been organized into unions whose leadership has been marked by competence and sophistication. Strikes by these unions can paralyze Sri Lanka's economy, and governments have had, on occasion, to invoke emergency measures. Furthermore, Ceylonese trade unions are highly politicized. Strikes have been used as a weapon with which to threaten or undermine governments, and governing parties have sought to form alignments with leaders of labor organizations in order, for one thing, to avoid politically-motivated strikes. This is especially true of the large number of unions which are affiliated with parties in Sri Lanka.

The degree to which trade unions are politically committed to parties forms the basis of Professor Kearney's typology of Ceylonese labor organizations. One type consists of party-sponsored trade unions. Established through the initiative of parties and maintaining close organizational links to the sponsor, this type of union is directly manipulated for political reasons. Organized into large federations, party-sponsored unions enroll, according to Kearney, from one fourth to one third of all organized employees in Sri Lanka. Party-oriented unions form a second type, differing from the first in that a party "cannot always depend on automatic acquiescence in the course of action it proposes" (p. 97). Originating independently of party initiative, this type of union is brought into an association with a party by the assumption of leadership in the union by party members. The third type of union described by Kearney is the politically uncommitted labor organization. It is distinguished by the fact that it avoids "the kind of close partisan association and predictable political behaviour which is typical of party-oriented unions" (p. 120).

Conceptually, Kearney's classification is a useful ordering device which may be applicable in the study of trade unions in the intensely political environments of developing states. I say this despite the analytical and empirical flaws that mar the author's otherwise well-conceived scheme. Kearney's classification of Ceylonese labor organizations falls short, partly because empirical support for his types is inadequate and partly because subjects are bent to fit the mold. Typologies of party-oriented and politically uncommitted unions, for example, are drawn from profiles of a few unions, readily accessible to the researcher, which the author describes in order to substantiate and illustrate the type. The reader is left unconvinced of the representative character of these unions, especially since the names, number, and membership of the labor organizations included in these types are not given. More serious is the fact that profiles of some unions used to exemplify types are distorted. The Ceylon Mercantile Union, which Kearney categorizes as party-oriented, was founded under the aegis of a party. While it is true that its leadership was assumed later by members of another party, the union has taken great pains to insure an identity separate from that of the party to which its leaders belong and to retain a nonpartisan posture regarding political questions.

A tendentious argumentation is also employed in regard to the unions whose profiles are drawn to illustrate politically uncommitted unions. Indian Tamil unions, which Kearney argues are typical of this category, are avowedly political entities, quasi-party in origin and behavior, and they have been consistently committed to the communalist and other interests of the community they represent. They function as much like parties as like unions.

Others of Kearney's examples are more relevant, and there is some basis for his categorization of Ceylonese trade unions. Had the whole of his scheme been more carefully considered and researched, his work would have been more theoretically useful.

Calvin A. Woodward
University of New Brunswick, Canada

The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971. By Lorenzo Kent Kimball. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1972. Pp. ix, 246. $7.95.)

This is a survey of Iraqi politics. Following an initial section on power and nationalism, purportedly the central concepts, Professor Kimball proceeds to an essentially chronological account, emphasizing the period since the 1958 Revolution.

This is not a totally bad book. Most of the factual mistakes — like giving Syria as an example of a country in which a multiparty system has been "relatively successful" (p. 34) or saying that Iraq was the first independent Arab state (p. 57) — are peripheral to the author's main concern. With condensation and minor revisions, it might be turned into a readable popular account. The author usually writes relatively well.

But the book was apparently intended to be something more. According to the blurb on the jacket (perhaps not written by the author of the book), it is "an original contribution," and its heavy documentation gives it the form, but hardly the substance, of serious scholarship.

The account is generally superficial. To cite one example, analysis of the dynamics of the post-1968 regime is largely limited to standard biographical information on President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, described as "the acknowledged leader of the coup and the Government" (p. 144). Such a figure as Siddam Husayn al-Takriti — who, rather than President al-Bakr, has often been regarded as the most powerful person in the regime — is not even mentioned.

The book is padded with digressions into subjects that are only indirectly relevant, such as the Lebanese crisis of 1958 (pp. 88–89) and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (pp. 127–128). Long-winded official statements provide poor substitutes for analysis, and the appendices (pp. 185–239) are unnecessarily extensive.

Furthermore, the research is not thorough. Minimal references are made to Iraqi sources. Unwise use of sources is sometimes made; for example, an unconfirmed generalization, pejoratively worded, is made about the late President Abdul Salem Aref (p. 92), citing *Near East Report,* a hostile, partisan newsletter. Carelessness is shown in matters like using a book published in 1960 as a source for figures on oil production in 1962 (p. 67).

The analysis of power and nationalism — particularly the former — is generally well done (though unoriginal), but is essentially tacked on, with little application throughout the book. The author's claim (p. viii) that this is a study of the conflict between pan-Arabism and local nationalism — "using the struggle for power in Iraq as the prime example" — does not bear scrutiny. The occasional attempts to relate these concepts to Iraqi politics seem forced and artificial. Thus, at the end of his historical survey, the author reaches the pedestrian conclusion that "the struggle for power in Iraq began early in the history of the Islamic Empire" (p. 59).

Insofar as Kimball deals with conflicting concepts of nationalism, he consistently depreciates pan-Arabism. Whether or not one shares his feelings, the author fails to make a convincing case. One might reasonably conclude that state interests prevail over commitment to pan-Arabism, but to say, as Kimball does (p. 118), that Arab nationalism "does not play a significant role in the struggle for power" is to go dangerously far. Arab nationalism is also equated far too simplistically with Islamic sentiment. At one point, the book lists "being a Muslim" as a basic ingredient of the Arab identity (p. 76), ignoring the existence of non-Muslim Arabs, some of whom have been leading Arab nationalists.

In conclusion, this book is of virtually no value to specialists on Middle Eastern politics, although the general discussion of power will interest some political scientists. Both political scientists and general readers may find it a convenient short introduction to Iraq, but its value in this regard is marred by serious deficiencies.

GLENN PERRY

Indiana State University

The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States. By Enver M. Koury. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1970. Pp. 308. $11.00.)

Koury's book deals with five "revolutionary-progressive" states: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Prior to World War II, some of these states (e.g., Algeria) were dominated directly by the colonial power, others (e.g., Egypt), indirectly through a local elite and a net of treaties and agreements. All of them are developing nations and thus share with other developing countries the problems of scarcity and the challenges of development. Unlike other developing nations, however, these states, after the ascendancy to power of revolutionary leaders, are undergoing rapid changes involving the transformation of their societies into a social order compatible with the objectives of their respective revolutions — industrialization and modernization. In order to achieve these objectives quickly, the revolutionary leaders have sought to "bypass the evolutionary process of change by short-cut solutions" (p. 14). Single parties, in the form of mass movements, have been formed to serve both as a social base of the revolution and as its agent of change and of political expression within the state. They have attained popularity and support mainly through promises to bridge the "is ought to be" gap in their societies.

In his analysis, Professor Koury uses Rex O. Hopper's four-stage model of the revolutionary process. The first stage is characterized by uncoordinated mass discontent and unrest. The conditions which give rise to this state stem both from the gap between aspirations and reality and from the recognition that the traditional systems will not be able to bridge this gap. In the second stage, discontent and unrest are transformed into organized forces; the intellectuals ("the great men of knowledge") assume an important role in the affairs of their respective countries and thus set the stage for the "men of revolutionary action" to initiate their activities. In this stage, the existing order is discredited. The third stage is typified by conflicts between traditional elites ("conservative" and "liberal") and new elites ("radical"). This conflict is expressed in uprisings and counter-uprisings in which the radical elites take over and dictatorial rule is established. The last stage is characterized by actions aimed at legalizing and stabilizing the revolutionary government through the recruitment of mass support and the establishment of single mass parties. In this stage, the men of revolutionary organization "exploit what the great men of knowledge first conceived and the men of revolutionary action then instituted" (p. 189), in order to organize the revolutionary mass movements with the aid of such tools as "mass psychology, propaganda, communication media, slogans and ideas" (p. 192).

Although the book represents a useful addition to the better literature on the contemporary Middle East, a few reservations are in order: The author rightly observes that the Arab revolutionary leaders "share and embody the frustrations and hopes of their followers" (p. 138). The explanation of these frustrations is, it seems to me, incomplete if it is limited to the social and economic planes, important as these are, to the neglect of the political. The humiliation suffered by the Arab countries in the Arab-Israel war of 1948 has left its mark on later developments in these countries. It is no accident that the initial coups d'état took place after the 1948 war and that their leaders (e.g., Zaim and Shishaky of Syria, Nasser of Egypt, and Qassem and Aref of Iraq) fought on Israeli fronts. The experience of these defeated army officers in the field revealed the impotency of their traditional societies in the face of a progressive and modern one. Consequently, these disillusioned officers posed a challenge to the established authority in their respective countries, which set the revolutionary process in motion.

In a study of this nature, extending over the broad geographic area from Algeria in the west to Iraq in the east, with all its cultural differences, generalizations are necessary in order to point out the general patterns. But some of the author's generalizations are not applicable in equal measure to all the Arab revolutionary-progressive states (for example, in the section on the struggle for power, Iraq is not discussed, nor is Syria, except for the period of its union with Egypt); other generalizations can be applied not only to those states but also to non-revolutionary Arab states (as in the section on the men of revolutionary organization). In the process of reviving national consciousness, leaders quite often refer to past national glories, whether those from the "distant past" or the "immediate past," in which the nation takes pride. This is true of all nations, especially those at a certain level of national development; it is certainly true of the Arab states whether or not they are included in the revolutionary category, e.g., Jordan.

In addition, the doubts raised by the author regarding the continuity of the single-party regime upon the death of the leader (pp. 258–9) have proved unjustified, at least in the case of Egypt. After Nasser's death, the powers of office were constitutionally transferred to Sadat. And finally, a clearer definition of such terms as "totalitarian government" (which is often confused with authoritarian government), "natural group," "functional group," etc., would have been beneficial.

Despite these shortcomings, the book's important contribution to the understanding of the contemporary Middle East will be appreciated by students of that area.

SUBHI ABU-GOSH
The Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem

Economic Development and the Reponse of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis. By William M. Lafferty. (Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, 1971. Pp. 360. NK 48.00.)

It is unfortunate that political scientists have tended to ignore the Scandinavian countries. Although they rank low in power and population, and are scarcely exotic, they do offer congenial testing conditions for cross-national comparisons. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are rich in data almost to a fault, similar enough to make comparison inviting, yet sufficiently different to make it interesting.

One of the most prominent exceptions to this neglect of Scandinavia is the literature dealing with the relationship between industrialization and the rise of the strong labor movements typical of all three countries. The classical statement of that relationship has been expressed in what Lafferty refers to as the Bull-Galenson hypothesis, formulated originally in 1922 by the Norwegian historian Edvard Bull, Sr., and paralleled by the later work of Walter Galenson. To paraphrase the hypothesis: the tempo, timing and intensity of a country's industrialization has been the most important factor in conditioning the character of its labor movement. The more sudden and rapid the industrialization, the more radical the labor response was likely to be, which explains why the Norwegian Labor Party was more radical than its counterparts in Denmark and Sweden.

While a number of other scholars, notably Lipset and Kornhauser, have incorporated the hypothesis in their work, it has never been subjected to any genuinely systematic empirical investigation. It is this task that Lafferty sets out to accomplish.

It is practically impossible to do justice to the scope and depth of his methodological apparatus in any brief account. He has drawn on a wide variety of American and Scandinavian thinkers: Mancur Olson, Lipset, Asbjørn Bjørnset, W. W. Rostow, Rokkan, Gösta Carlsson, and Ulf Torgersen, to mention but a few.

Lafferty's model is, in his own words, a "multi-level, ecologically-based data structure" (p. 22). It begins by developing, on the total-system level, a macrodynamic analysis of labor's response to industrialization (recast in the language of economic development) in the three countries, ranging from "highly abstractive comparison of total-system indicators to comparison of politico-historical context" (p. 24). There follows a contextual analysis of both individuals and group structures (the Labor Party and trade unions) within Norway. His third project, not yet completed, will involve an ecological-base analysis of labor's electoral response.

The study is unusually careful, methodical and sophisticated. It exemplifies as well as any comparable effort in recent years the enormous complexity that is inevitably involved when one attempts to subject a classical historical-descriptive hypothesis to systematic empirical treatment.

But it would be unfair to suggest that the book will appeal only to aficionados of methodological arcana, or that its findings are necessarily bound to the confines of Scandinavia. Although the conclusions are not drawn boldly, and while the general hypothesis seems to be confirmed, much evidence in the book suggests that factors other than economic development may have been every bit as influential in shaping the character of the working-class movement. Much of the analysis points instead to the importance of national-historical factors, e.g., the fact that Liberal-Labor cooperation was closer and more durable in Sweden and Denmark than it was in Norway. The presence of event-specific variables, such as the independence issue in Norway, clearly were important during the early period of the socialist movement. Structural considerations — e.g., the presence or absence of proportional representation, or the decentralized nature of Norwegian social structures in general — provide yet another variable of some potency. Finally, one can even move a half-step in the direction of the "great man" theory, for there were pronounced variations in the kind of leadership that emerged in the nascent socialist parties (e.g., Martin Tranmael in Norway, and the contrasting figure of Hjalmar Branting in Sweden).

The data generally confirm traditional views on the sequence of industrialization — first Denmark, then Sweden, and last of all, Norway. It does, however, cast some doubt on the assumption that the Norwegian experience was the most intense. There is furthermore considerable evidence that the putative Norwegian "radicalism" which earlier scholars had inferred from very limited evidence, may have been not much more than intraparty rhetoric.

After having followed an imposing series of intricate arguments in the book, the average reader could be left with a feeling of incompleteness, partly because this volume does not purport to be more than a segment of the total project. But the sense of incompleteness may also be in some measure a product of the research strategy itself. The author spins such a fine and complicated methodological web that the conclusions tend to get lost in it. The findings are certainly substantial enough to merit greater delineation than they receive.

The study is skewed toward Norway, perhaps unavoidably since the Norwegian Labor Party is the deviant case, but the result is that the sections on Sweden and Denmark are not as detailed as they might have been. The book does not, for example, mention the highly important popular movements in Sweden at the turn of the century. An account of these would have added considerably to the discussion of the legitimation thresholds through which the various socialist movements passed (pp. 129–131).

But, minor flaws notwithstanding, the book will perform a real service for students of comparative politics if it does no more than expose the complexity of reality. Its major value is not that it generates new and seductive theories but that it demonstrates in a thoroughly professional way the marvelously subtle convolutions inherent in any systematic data-based examination of economic and political development.

Joseph B. Board

Union College

Slums Are for People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development. By Aprodicio A. Laquian. (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press, 1971. Pp. 245. $9.00.)

Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project. By Colette Pétonnet. Trans. by Rita Smidt. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. 293. $11.50.)

Pétonnet and Laquian explore two different communities of the poor — different types in far different parts of the world, using different research techniques. Pétonnet writes a vivid, thorough description and analysis of an urban housing project in France, based on a classical ethnographic experience. Laquian reports the impact of a community development action research experiment in the Philippines, drawing generalizations from a survey of an important squatter community in Manila. Dr. Pétonnet, an anthropologist associated with the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research) in Paris, worked as a solitary urban ethnographer. Dr. Laquian, who was deputy director of the Local Government Center in the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, organized a team of more than two dozen researchers and community workers seconded from seven different agencies. In both cases, the research was carried out in 1966.

Both communities are new and both are labeled "transitional," which means that they live in the interstices of those public intentions, rationales, and fantasies called urban plans, shaped — in different ways — by the Great Hiatus between official starts and finishes, which holds the real meaning of urban space in our time.

The families of La Halle, waiting for years to get into the HLM moderate-rent public housing, dwelt precariously as "occupants," inferior to tenants because they lacked the protection of leases, remaining vulnerable to eviction for nonpayment of fees or for "misbehavior." They responded passively to their public fate as a stigmatized population stored in a sanitary container on the edge of the city by withdrawing into a social life of warm camaraderie within the project and into a personal life of extreme liberty, impatient of any restraint.

In Manila, however, fugitives from calamities of the village responded aggressively to the Great Hiatus of the metropolis. After the Tondo Foreshore was raised from the sea, and while government and business interests crept toward shaping the area for port facilities, the migrants who settled Barrio Magsaysay seized the gift of dawdles and wrangles at the top to rush, squat, and organize on government property, and to begin their struggle for title — a patient, intelligent, legal and political campaign to make secure their precarious tenure on ambiguous land.

In La Halle, one is struck by the extreme lack of political interests, the total absence of political organization, and the alienation from routine political processes. For any ordinary problem, whether it involved school, courts, or housing needs, the residents avoided intermediaries and insisted on going to the top — to the head of a ministry or even to the President of the Republic. They wrote long letters full of trust and hope to the chief of state. Questioning ten residents about this practice, the author learned that every one of them had written directly to General de Gaulle. It worked. After years of waiting, a letter to the General brought results in a matter of days.

In Barrio Magsaysay, one is impressed by the energy of political life, the extent of participation, the solidarity, and the sense of community power. The people worked through lobbies and pressure groups, stalked politicians, used every means the system offered, and managed to get some results. "The political strength of the squatters, arising from their unity and organization, had given them the legal right to stay where they were" (p. 74).

Feared as an explosive menace, more than 600,000 squatters lived in Manila at the time of the research, more than a third of the metropolitan population. Laquian argues that the virtues of the barrios outweigh their dangers. The research discloses that despite their deprivation of physical amenities, the residents felt comfortable socially, and 70 per cent of the people interviewed declared they were unwilling to move out of Barrio Magsaysay. The emotional warmth and security, mutual aid, and social controls in the communities not only help the migrant survive city life, but even transform him from a peasant to an urban man. Slums and squatter communities are shock absorbers, transitional way stations, halfway houses to modernity, and should be cultivated rather than demolished, says Laquian. Besides, since their demolition is impossible without immense trauma to the rest of society, the only solution is to rationalize slums, not to eliminate them. The author concludes with a plan for slum communities designed by the government and organized through community development programs. He moves from the experiment in Manila to offer some generalizations about "induced social change" in the developing nations.

Not everyone will share Laquian's faith in planning, his interest in changing motivations, or his scheme for engineering modal personalities. Some of his own information indicates that the admirable vitality in the barrio depends on a spontaneity that would scarcely survive governmental rationalization. He also suggests that community development programs harmonize the need of the community to develop its resources and the urge of the government to control the squatter settlements. Not everyone will swallow that claim. The book is warmed by the author's humane concern for the squatters, and it contains useful material that demolishes some stereotypes about barrio life. Most of it, however, reports quantitative data drawn from the survey, coming alive only in a few pages that describe real people and events, hinting at the dynamics of the community. Otherwise, the picture is static and dim. One wishes for observations of the barrio equal to Pétonnet's view of the project.

Pétonnet's study describes how heterogeneous people dumped under the same scorn—"We in La Halle"—hearing outsiders claim "those people are savages," create a warm community with common values, struggle with privations, experience space and time in a special way, go through stages of the life cycle, raise and endure their children, complain of loneliness, fight and fear each other, yet dwell together in considerable harmony. Europeans, Arabs, and Jews from North Africa, as well as people from metropolitan France and other parts of Europe grow more like each other and lose some of their ethnic differences. Moslems and Jews live side by side without hostility. It is an important book on milieux for the poor, because, believe it or not, no one else has published a thorough ethnography of a housing project. It rectifies stereotypes about project life and even leads one to speculate that some day public housing may be revealed as a great involuntary experiment with diversity. As W. F. Whyte recognizes in his Foreword to the translated edition, Pétonnet's work carries the inspiration for a new program of research—the comparative ethnography of social problems.

E. V. WALTER

University of Manchester, England

The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France. By Georges Lefebvre. Translated by Joan White. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973. Pp. 234, $7.95.)

The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792. By Alison Patrick. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Pp. 407. $15.00.)

Georges Lefebvre's *La Grande Peur de 1789* is now available in English for the first time since it was published more than forty years ago, in 1932. It is high time that Lefebvre's book became accessible to students and scholars who do not read French, so that they may become acquainted at first hand with this subtle and sometimes elusive classic by one of the greatest historians of the French Revolution.

Fear, panic, and rumors were widespread in France during the summer of 1789. Poverty, unemployment, and famine created general unrest. In certain sections of the country there were large-scale peasant revolts against the seignorial régime. Peasants feared for the safety of their crops as the harvest approached, and the vagrants who roamed the countryside, seeking work and begging for food, were often taken for brigands. Town and country feared and suspected each other as riots occurring in one kind of place were blamed on machinations by the other.

But Lefebvre distinguishes between the generalized fear of brigands and the epidemic of local panics that appeared in revolutionary France and the characteristic phenomena which, in his view, constituted the Great Fear. This consisted of five or six currents of rumor and panic, which Lefebvre isolates and traces in great detail. They occurred almost simultaneously, between July 20 and August 6, 1789, and were distinctive in both their substance and in the speed with which they spread.

According to Lefebvre, the substance of the Great Fear seems to have differed from that of other panics in two ways. One was a heightened consciousness of danger. There had always been fear of vagrants, but the security measures taken by cities and towns in 1789 led the people in the countryside to believe that more vagrants than ever had scattered across the countryside. Vagrants had often been confused with brigands, and there had always been fear of brigands, in the sense that "the appearance of the brigands was possible and much dreaded." But during the Great Fear, people were convinced that the brigands were there; "they were there in the flesh, they could be both seen and heard" (p. 137). The other essential element of the Great Fear noted by Lefebvre is more fundamental. The vagrants-turned-brigands, whose presence was felt as real, were not ordinary brigands. They were somehow linked in the minds of the fearful with an aristocrats' plot against the Third Estate. Just as it was believed, quite correctly, that there was collusion between the aristocracy and foreign powers, encouraged by the *émigrés*, it was widely believed that the aristocrats had turned a kind of army of vagrants out into the countryside to injure the peasants and destroy their homes and crops. The Great Fear was not fear of brigands; it was fear of counter-revolution.

The other distinguishing characteristic of the Great Fear cited by Lefebvre was its movement. There were numerous localized panics in France, but the Great Fear traveled. In fact, Lefebvre tells us that it traveled at a speed of about four kilometers an hour (during the day). Each of the currents of the Great Fear appeared at a particular place on a given date and traveled elsewhere, along routes which Lefebvre charts in detail, carried sometimes by ordinary people, but more often by people of standing or the authorities themselves, who increased the panic by dutifully taking fanciful rumors seriously lest they themselves be accused of collusion with the plotting aristocrats. Fresh panics were set off en route, sometimes when peasants marching to the rescue were themselves taken for brigands. In one of the most fascinating historical accounts ever written, Lefebvre traces in detail the routes of the currents of fear, with the result that we learn, among other things, that a panic which started in Ruffec (in what is now Charente) on July 28 reached Lourdes, near the Spanish frontier, on August 6; that the Ruffec fear (which moved east and north, as well as south) met the Maine fear (which began somewhere west of Chartres) at the town of Loches (southeast of Tours); and that more currents of fear flowed into Millau (in what is now the Aveyron) than any other town.

The striking originality of this work, as George Rudé points out in his introduction, is that "rumor, panic and fear . . . are presented as a new and significant dimension in the historical process" (p. xiii). Perhaps paradoxically for a work with such a central theme, it is its passion for detail on a relatively narrow range of matters — the itineraries of the currents of fear — that most impresses. The linkages between the fear itself and other historical processes are less clearly presented. We can accept the proposition that the Great Fear both reflected and increased peasant opposition to the aristocracy, but other related questions go unanswered. We do not learn, for example, why the Great Fear appeared where it did but not elsewhere, why the Great Fear followed a peasant uprising only in the Mâconnais, but not in other areas of popular revolt, or why revolt followed the Great Fear only in the Dauphiné but not elsewhere.

The translation by Joan White is generally faithful, but there are some lapses. On p. 153 the word "often" in the original appears as "most often," with results that are somewhat puzzling in the light of later remarks, and on p. 155 the text does not include what Lefebvre himself said in the original version, that he assumed that the Great Fear was spontaneous and not deliberately contrived.

Alison Patrick's *The Men of the First Republic* is a carefully researched and detailed analysis of the composition and behavior of the French National Convention, which was elected in the fall of 1792 just after the downfall of the monarchy. The author, an Australian scholar, proceeds first by assigning the Deputies to three main political groups, the well-known Gironde, Mountain, and Plain, each of which she further divides into three subgroups.

Then, on the basis of the four roll-call votes taken during the trial of Louis XVI in January, 1793, and the two roll-call votes on the impeachment of Marat in April and the reinstatement of the Commission of Twelve in May, both of which could be expected to reveal deep political conflicts, Patrick examines the extent to which the groups previously established displayed consistent patterns of behavior. Later chapters examine the extent to which there appears to have been consistency between the political outlook of the departmental assemblies which elected the members of the Convention in September 1792 and that of the Deputies whom they elected, and the prior political experience, the age, and the occupational backgrounds of the Deputies.

Patrick produces a number of findings of considerable importance to ongoing debates about the character of political conflict during the period of the Convention and the distribution of attitudes among various political, social and economic groups. She finds, for example, that the Montagnard element in the Convention was quite large and received considerable support from the Plain, that the core of Montagnard strength came from the Deputies who had previously sat in the Legislative Assembly, that the Convention contained a consistently right-wing group, which Patrick classifies as a subgroup of the Plain, and that there is little evidence to support the notion that differing political attitudes at the time were related to differences in wealth or social status among the Deputies. The book contains a valuable account of the elections of 1792, and the author's painstaking research generally provides a wealth of information related to the Convention beyond those aspects mentioned briefly here.

The author, however, appears to be unfamiliar with methods of scaling or of index construction which could have been employed to great advantage in her analysis of the roll-call votes taken in the Convention. Data such as those presented in Table 5, which relates overall voting at the trial of Louis XVI to the initial classification of the Deputies into groups and subgroups, and in Table 23, which relates the overall voting to the prior political experience of the Deputies, could have been presented more economically if Patrick had given index scores to the Deputies and reported the appropriate means and standard deviations. Such scores could also have been employed to analyze the political behavior of the various age and occupational and other subgroups with which the author is concerned.

In his introduction to Lefebvre's *The Great Fear of 1789,* George Rudé suggests that the study of such phenomena as fear and panic requires that the traditional methods of history be enriched with statistical methods and computer analysis. The same may be said of the historical study of legislative behavior. But if Patrick has not done all that she might by way of analysis, she has supplied in meticulously detailed appendices such data as the complete list of Deputies, their ages and occupations, their votes on the six crucial roll-calls, and the groups and subgroups to which she assigned them. Moreover, this wealth of data, which others may reanalyze, is appended to a fine work of historical scholarship which enlightens us greatly about the Convention's place in revolutionary France.

ROY PIERCE

University of Michigan

Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971. A. Lerumo. (London: Inkululeko Publications. 1971. Pp. 216. £1.25.)

Race and class are a volatile combination. The South African Communist Party since its founding in 1921 has struggled with little success to reconcile conflicting loyalties. This semi-official party history, by a veteran African journalist and party militant, was first published in the London journal, *African Communist.* It is a remarkably candid account accompanied by a useful collection of documents.

Lerumo's party history begins with a strained Marxian analysis of South African history, finding the pre-European societies in a state of primitive communism, and holding British imperialism and monopoly capitalism at least as responsible as Afrikaaner nationalism for subsequent oppression. Candor emerges with a frank denunciation of the Party's attempt in the 1920s to win white working-class support by implicitly endorsing anti-African demands such as racial job reservation. Checked by the Eighth Communist International in 1928, which ordered the Party to support an independent native republic, the Party suffered a disastrous period of extreme sectarianism, bureaucracy and loss of support. During the Depression according to Lerumo it spurned poor whites, many of whom turned to extreme right-wing Afrikaaner nationalism.

This Party history skips over the nightmarish 1939–1941 period. Always supine before Moscow, the South African Party switched overnight from a denunciation of World War II to enthusiastic support of South African entry after the German invasion of the USSR. Its all-out support for the war won it new adherents and a modest measure of popularity, somewhat exaggerated by Lerumo. The dénouement came swiftly, however, as the newly elected Nationalist government pushed through the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, outlawing the Party and swooping up hundreds of supporters.

The author cogently describes the Party's futile response to the governments' onslaught on its existence. The Central Committee, totally unprepared for underground activity, agreed to voluntarily dissolve the Party. Since then a new underground Party has emerged in South Africa with a legal wing in exile in London. Formally committed to armed revolutionary struggle and allied with the African National Congress (a body which the Party had fought for years as representing only the African bourgeoisie), the illegal party has yet to make much of a mark. It seems, however, judging from this book, to have arrived at a coherent, plausible explanation of its past and a new set of Marxian beliefs for the future.

Lerumo has succeeded in making the best possible case for the South African Communist Party by acknowledging its past errors and its limited role. His partisan account makes useful reading for students of South African politics, providing the documents and inside analyses on which a more balanced view of the Party can be based.

AARON SEGAL

Cornell University

Political Participation in Modern Indonesia. Edited by R. William Liddle. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973. Pp. 206. $7.50, paper.)

The five essays and the introduction contained in *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia* examine widely varied subjects but break new ground in our understanding of Indonesian politics—which is refreshing given the near-stagnation that Indonesian political studies appeared to have suffered in recent years.

From 1949 to 1962 a bloody rebellion took place in West Java, the homeland of the Sundanese, a people about whom little has yet appeared in scholarly print. This was a major rebellion whose purpose was to establish an Islamic state. From 1957 through 1961, *each year* approximately 1,000 Dar'ul Islam fighters were killed; 9,000 houses destroyed; while the Government side lost approximately 300 soldiers and 1,200 civilians.

Karl Jackson and Johannes Moeliono in their "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java" examine 19 villages that had followed very different courses: to fight for the DI, to resist it, and to swing back and forth between the two sides. Three villages, one from each group, are subject to intensive scrutiny.

"During the data analysis stage of the research, variables other than traditional authority were tested and found wanting. Systematic differences correlating positively with the political behavior of the villages were not found for variables such as religious values, income, education, mass-media exposure, and density of national symbolism. . . . The traditional linkages binding leader with followers within villages and the bonds that spread outward from the village leaders to the supravillage world were found to be the most powerful determinants of each village's political participation." (pp. 14–15)

To quote from the findings of the village that fought actively and at considerable cost for the DI: "The story of how this village became involved in the rebellion is similar to the sketches of decision making for the progovernment and the swing village. Although the results are very different, the elements constituting the process are the same. The set of long-term, highly personal linkages between advisor-advisee, teacher-pupil, and superior-subordinate are vested with traditional authority allowing the bapak (father) in each dyad to mobilize the anak buah (literally, children) for action by activating a personal loyalty bond" (p. 48). Within the essay is an excellent study of what is traditional authority within the Sundanese village.

Donald Emmerson's "Bureaucratic Alienation in Indonesia: The Director General's Dilemma" is an analysis of 1,859 answers to a competition in a 1968 issue of "Selecta," Indonesia's most popular weekly. The journal posed a problem for its readers: three candidates are proposed to the director general of a state organization. The position to be filled is an important one, and all three candidates are fully qualified, although in different ways, to fill the position. The public was asked: "Who in your view should be chosen to be installed as the leader of the corporation. . . . And what is your reason?"

The respondents most probably came from the intermediate strata of politically aware and socially mobilized Indonesians, but not from the elite or lower classes. The findings are complex, and the degree of alienation from and critical view of the bureaucracy is analyzed according to many variables. Emmerson notes in his conclusion that the bureaucracy has redundant personnel, is ubiquitously corrupt, has a poverty-ridden reward structure, is ineffective in performance, and faces monumental tasks. "Bureaucratic alienation under such circumstances is rational. . . . It is based on reality. The problem for Indonesians is not how to adapt to that reality but how to change it" (p. 106).

Masjumi, the modernist Islamic political party, was banned by Sukarno in 1960. In February 1968 the new military regime refused to permit its reorganization, but did tolerate the formation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). Allan Samson, in "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," examines one of the basic causes of Parmusi's ineffectiveness. Parmusi, as Masjumi before it, contained three main religious factions, whose religious and political outlook he explores in depth: the fundamentalists, the reformists, and the accommodationists. Much research is still required on so-called Indonesian Islamic Modernism, and Samson does note of the reformists that their refusal to subject the basic doctrine of the Koran and Hadith to critical analysis "invites the question of just how modern Islamic modernism really is" (p. 130).

The Suharto regime intervened heavily to ensure accommodationist leadership for Parmusi — that is, in favor of those whose political philosophy is more pragmatic and indeed approaching secular thought, and who sought cooperation with non-Islamic organizations. This intervention necessarily led to the withdrawal of fundamentalist and reformist support, and the winning of a mere 5.4 per cent of the total vote in the 1971 general elections compared with Masjumi's 20.9 per cent in 1955. The government has subsequently forced Parmusi to fuse into a larger Moslem party.

Eliseo Rocamora's "Political Participation and the Party System: The PNI Example" lays to rest the traditionally held view of the PNI as the conservative party of civil servants and opportunist businessmen. He provides a careful study of the changing nature of the party from its founding in 1946 to October 1965. His greatest contribution concerns the PNI during the period of Guided Democracy, 1959–1965. The PNI not only expanded, but altered its character in a genuinely radical direction. The student, youth, and labor organizations grew rapidly, gained entry to the party's central leadership, and brought with them a radical ideology and organizational drive competing with those of the Communist Party. The younger leaders were from lower social strata and, increasingly, from the Outer Islands. But the PNI-left was, of course, politically eliminated by the subsequent military regime.

William Liddle provides both a brief Introduction and an essay on "Modernizing Indonesian Politics." In the Introduction he points to how little is known about politically important factors in Indonesia. *Within* Java these include the military, the bureaucracy, the extent and intensity of *aliran* loyalties, and the influence of traditional culture on decision-making processes and policy implementation; they include just about everything *outside* Java.

"Modernizing Indonesian Politics" is a study of the ideology and political thinking and maneuverings of the organizationally fragmented, secular, modernizing intellectuals in the period 1967–1969. Liddle argues that their utopia, a "modern" society, owed much to the egalitarian, industrialized, welfarist community envisioned by Sutan Sjahrir, although they jettisoned much of his Marxist content. Eager to rid Indonesia of its "backward" traditional society and culture, these intellectuals searched for formulae to ensure the victory of "modernists" in the upcoming national elections. Many tied themselves to the military regime and to the military-created GOLKAR which proceeded to sweep the farcical elections of 1971.

In Liddle's view, the secular modernists are as far out of touch with the realities of Indonesia as was the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) in the 1950's. They are urban, from higher social strata, and westernized. They are ignorant and suspicious (also fearful?) of the peasantry. Moreover, their mentors in the officer corps give no indication of sharing the same utopian dream.

In sum, *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia* opens to our understanding diverse but important aspects of recent Indonesian political history. And most of its authors do so in a way clearly sympathetic to the fate of the great mass of Indonesians who are poor and whose own voices have been largely silenced by military dictatorship.

DONALD HINDLEY

Brandeis University

China: Management of a Revolutionary Society. Edited by John M. H. Lindbeck. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971. Pp. 391. Index. $12.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

It is unusual to find a symposium volume in which the papers are of uniformly high quality, and which are still timely after five years of political typhoons. The nine immortals who contributed to this volume met in the summer of 1969 for a conference on Government in China, and their contributions were edited by the late John Lindbeck, who also wrote an introduction outlining the rationale of the book: to exemplify work by scholars as involved in the revolution in political science as they are with the Chinese revolution, and to merit attention for their use of "political science concepts, methods and data" (p. xi) as well as for their analysis of China. In a codicil, Gabriel Almond suggests that hitherto various hypotheses and theories of political development, for example, have not been thoroughly applied to China. "The principal reason for this failure grows out of the isolation of Chinese studies, and the slow penetration of notions such as these into the study of Chinese politics" (p. 382). He sees this study moving toward theoretical and methodological sophistication by the "importation" (p. 377) of conceptual tools, etc. from other branches of political, social, and behavioral science.

I can imagine some equally ethnocentric retorts, reminding us of the famous London newsboy's placard "fog in Channel — Continent isolated." Lindbeck puts it the other way: "Political science has now begun to accommodate the Chinese experience" (p. xi). A totally detached observer might see the fascination of this book as arising from its nature as a report by one set of "sorcerers" on the attempts of another set to redefine and justify their role. The first set has been defined by Benjamin Schwartz (more kindly than by Stan Andreski) as "a large assortment of CIA operatives, Pentagon strategists, professional Communist experts, games-theoreticians, political scientists and others" who seek to impose their ("Western") models and conceptual schemes on the infinitely varied flow of events; the other set is of course the elite of the PRC and especially Mao and his colleagues, who have been struggling for 25 years to keep their "politics in command" — with the techniques they learned during the 25 years before, and in another world.

Under the rubric "Authority and the Masses," Lucian Pye and Chalmers Johnson introduce some of the dilemmas of participation and authority which are exemplified in the case studies by Peter Schran on control and "self-reliance" in economic management, by Victor Li on the two models of a legal system, and by Donald Munro on the two-line struggle in Education. Michel Oksenberg reveals the nuts and bolts of top-level policy making under Mao, 1949–68; Frederick Teiwes marshals a mass of statistical data to clarify provincial politics and the key issue of central vs local power, which recurs throughout the book. He shows that in the provinces and in public, local leaders are the arm of the Center — but in Peking they may become spokesmen of their constituency (p. 137). Donald Klein dissects a representative bureaucratic organism, the Foreign Affairs *Hsi-t'ung,* and Ellis Joffe describes the restructuring of the Army under Lin Piao which prepared its intervention in the politics of the Cultural Revolution and the instructive events of Fall 1971. His narrative illustrates the continuing relevance of Pye's observation (p. 14) that in spite of its ideological dressing, the traditional Chinese system was ultimately dependent on military power; and this, as Ping-ti Ho points out, has largely determined its authoritarian character. While the purely military or professional viewpoint treats ideological dressing (political work) as "guaranteeing the fulfillment of concrete jobs," the generalist medicine men naturally argue that politics must guarantee their leadership — Party leadership — over the Army and "exercise the commanding and leading function" (p. 373).

Relating traditional forms of social participation to conditions preceding the victory of the Communists and their initial success in mass mobilization, Pye notes that the behavior of Chinese groups does not fit Western theories of mass politics; they did not make demands on, or compete to influence, the formal structure of government. Their members were subjects, not citizens. Johnson recalls Weberian and other theories of authority and traces the Mao regime's shifts in justifying its power: as leader of national liberation, as a development dictatorship, and by an ideology of personal authority — the Mao cult. One should now add the revival of Legalism. What emerges from Pye and Johnson is the slipperiness of our Latin words applied to Chinese ambiguities: participation slides easily into involvement and involuntary commitment, as described by Mu Fu-sheng and Bao Juo-wang. Authority need not depend so much on a "belief system" which legitimizes, as on a justifying emergency ("there's a war on!") or politics of resource reallocation (I'm in charge to see you all get your watery soup). K'ang Yu-wei put it succinctly in 1902: The suffering from universal autocratic rule will be less than the suffering from war and chaos caused by the existence of "boundaries" between States, families and so on. Like the refugees in the *Romance of the*

Three Kingdoms" and the People in Mao's essay on the correct handling of contradictions, our cultural ancestors too welcomed a Caesar and what Richard Falk calls the "Imperial solution" to a time of chaos. But robbing Peter to feed Paul also requires force, even if you call it building socialism (Oksenberg, p. 113). The role of arbiter between resource-hungry bureaucracies and social groups may justify a policy of divide and rule, but it also creates a tension between the ruler's image as Protector of the Poor and his job as top bureaucrat. K'ang, again, disarmingly illustrates the dilemma when he suggests that his cadres, though enjoying suitable emoluments, will all live and look like everyone else, "to show complete equality." (Ta T'ung Shu, tr. L. G. Thompson, Allen & Unwin, London 1958, p. 220.)

The related problems of "self-reliance" and "egalitarianism" vs. centralized control and élitism are so clearly illustrated in Li on Law, Schran on Management and Munro on Education that the ambiguities in these concepts also appear; reliance on the masses, *tzu-li keng-sheng* and decentralization slide into the attitude noted by Lord Macartney in the eighteenth century — that any technical problem can be solved by "putting more coolies on it" — and egalitarianism slides into the suppression of what J.-J. Rousseau called "partial societies," intermediate between the sole embodiment of the general will and the marching millions. This is why, as Pye notes, use of "mass movements" and group life to achieve wealth and power for the state may have institutionalized them as an alternative to, rather than powerhouse of, development — and led to privatisation rather than participation in the normal meaning. If Confucius wanted gentlemen but got players, perhaps Mao wanted little generals, and got massive choreography. In practice, the physical limitations on control and planning of the economy led to handling of routine mainly by lower levels and planning of expansion by higher levels; the difficulties of imposing a Soviet-style external model of law led to handling of routine, minor deviancy informally and prophylactically by group pressure — the internal model. The conflicting requirements of selecting trained manpower for industry and defence of the borders *and* cementing the worker-peasant alliance on the home front by limiting social polarization led to ambiguous formulas for education, such as the combination of work and study, interpreted as cover for a two-stream elitist system by the "'Liu Shao-ch'i revisionists" and as a ladder for the underprivileged by the motley forces of the Cultural Revolution. As Munro pertinently argues, in the struggle between these two lines there was a good deal of sense on both sides. The ultimate dilemma is that the blend of initiative and discipline into which Mao tries to harmonize the irreconcilables is characteristic of an army; and the contradictions which the official media now blame on the persistence of the bourgeois State apparatus and of the collectively-owned rural sector, wage differentials, etc. cannot be resolved until the elimination of the dangers arising from the existence of other States; notably the USSR.

Ian W.A.C. Adie
The University of New South Wales

National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. Edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya. (New York: The Free Press, 1971. Pp. 307. $7.50, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970. Edited by Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab. (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1972. Pp. 350. $8.95, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

The comparative study of revolution is a tricky business. "Revolution" can be ethnic, national, transnational, international, and can be defined in terms of various thresholds of violence and change. The possibility of even more imprecision is introduced in the subfield, "national liberation." Does the term refer to the removal of foreign occupation troops, the psychological uplifting of a people? Or is it a signal, a code word, for something entirely different, the establishment of a preferred type of ideological rule in the interests of certain powers, regardless of the form of the struggle that ensued for the achievement of power by a given group? All these questions must be posed in considering the present volumes inasmuch as the term is used for everything from "personal" liberation (if within the United States) to the struggle of one faction, incredibly, in a *civil* war.

Miller and Aya's study is a useful, if odd, combination of analytical attempts to disentangle some of the confusions existing in thought about the "revolutionary situation," and one-sided or polemical attacks on, primarily, the United States. Manfred Halpern tries to understand "incoherence" in the modern world, and sees clearly that the various types of revolutions are neither primarily plots emanating from "international communism" nor necessarily the result of unmitigated Western perfidy. The Guevaras on one side and the Rostows on the other, he argues, "have become mere tacticians, separating violence from political transformation except in the realm of myth" (p. 18). The neglected revolution — of modernization — "is not a peculiar burden carried temporarily by the underdeveloped, but rather history's first common, world-wide revolution," where most of the breaking of traditional connections is "unintended and uncontrolled" (p. 19).

In contrast, consider C. L. R. James's fascinating account of what he terms the revolution in the Gold Coast. "The people of the Gold Coast could count on no direct support from anywhere" (p. 102), he writes, as if a century of anticolonial agitation in Britain, the active work of Clement Attlee's Labour government, the continuing struggle of such people as Fenner Brockway (as he then was), and organizations like the Fabian Society, were for naught. James asserts that, were Ghana to break into civil war, "British imperialism — disguising itself in the mantle of the United Nations — will go in again to protect British life and British property" (p. 104). Such theses must be established to prove his central assertion, that it was the "people," in some inchoate but pertinent sense of the term, who had "liberated" the Gold Coast, not the British, and certainly not the educated elite of the colony. C. L. R. James is in fact one of the last of the "old pan-Africanists," the group that gathered around George Padmore in London, organized the 1945 pan-African conference in Manchester, and championed Kwame Nkrumah. Read as a primary source, for understanding of that particular group, this essay is invaluable to the political scientist; but it is not social science.

Some of the essays combine analysis and polemics, for example, Mr. Eqbal Ahmad's insightful essay on revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency. Mr. Ahmad scores a number of points on the counter-revolutionaries of the 1960s, but is so one-sided as to lack credibility. When he states that it is "probably impossible for counterinsurgency experts to perceive the truth, for doing so entails admitting a revolution's legitimacy and their own side's lack of it" (p. 184), he is noting that his mind is closed to the many instances where insurgencies lacked wide popular support, as was the case in the Philippines (on which he gets his facts wrong in any case (p. 148).

Quotes out of context, where an unlikely purpose is served, also occur. Mr. Ahmad is convinced that "Western liberalism has been concerned essentially with procedural freedoms while neglecting substantive ones." Sir Robert Thompson, thus, "has a fundamentally bureaucratic view of the problem" of insurgencies, a conclusion derived from Sir Robert's assertion that the bias of his quoted book, " 'is heavily weighted on the administrative and other aspects of an insurgency' " (p. 176), as if administrative capacity is not central to the establishment of equity and fairness in governance.

If in this first volume some of the writers are distressed at America's alleged inability to perceive the realities of popular revolutions, in the other volume, that of Hodges and Shanab, no such concern is evinced, since such an ability is not expected. "National liberation" does not mean, in the popular sense, the unshackling of a people: it is rather a codeword for a movement whose *ends* (if not whose immediate interests) coincide with those of one or the other international Communist power. "National liberation" is no longer, for example, the "democratic struggle against the survivals of feudalism" as it was prior to 1917. From that date a second wave began, under "the influence of the October Revolution," and it was directed against "not only foreign imperialist domination, but also native oligarchies." Likewise, nationalism in the Third World "has thus increasingly merged with communism . . . it is now part of the main antagonism of our times — the struggle between capitalism and socialism" (p. 29). We learn that "virtually the entire world is up in arms against U.S. efforts to dominate the world economically and politically, if not always militarily. . . . If the past half-century is any indication of the future, then we may expect the continued mushrooming of national liberation fronts and a steady contraction of capitalist influence in the Third World" (p. 7). The changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s by Communist parties are more indicative of what the authors mean by liberation (p. 29) than what might otherwise be taken to be a classic instance, the expulsion of Nazi troops in 1945. Thus the "liberators" of Thailand are the Communist guerrilla movements which have operated actively in the kingdom's extremities since 1965 (without however having attracted a popular base).

The kind of double-think that such a frame of mind necessitates produces many euphemisms. King Hussain's devastating success against the Palestine guerrillas in 1971 is a situation in which the government "tried to restrict the activities of the guerrillas" (p. 102). That which is permitted in the unedited contributions by "revolutionary leaders" is often equally interesting. We learn from the president of the People's Republic of the Congo that "regionalism and tribalism appear in Black Africa with colonialism. Before that they did not exist" (p. 203).

"National liberation" also encompasses the struggles of the "blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and American Indians" (p. 8). Puerto Ricans, indeed, rank fifth, in numbers, of the world's "subject peoples" (p. 317), after the Quebecois, and the Portuguese, South Africans, and American blacks. Apparently the persecuted minorities in numerous Third- (or Fourth-) World states (what are left of the Hutu in Burundi, for example) do not count; nor apparently, do whole nations whose independence was lost (for example the Baltic and Turkic Central Asian states) or whole peoples, among whom the anticolonial revolution has yet to be permitted to develop (despite Lenin's promise, before and after his assumption of power, to grant the right of "secession" to them).

If the first volume suffers from being a mixture of the naive and analytical, the second suffers, from a scholarly point of view, from a lack of analytical organization. Schematically the book is organized geographically, around regions, with sections combining interviews with favorite guerrilla leaders, selections from classic studies, and exhortations by hopeful leaders eager to proclaim the established government a fraud. But the book's editors are not attempting to make a contribution to the comparative study of revolution. They are trying to foster a particular kind of revolution. Beneath the sheep's clothing of what appears to be a serious study of an important topic, is something about which it might be appropriate to cry wolf. What Morris Janowitz said of guerrilla warfare in its relation to the examination of international relations applies here, namely that "the consequences of guerrilla warfare are a study area in which the assertions of ideologists and advocates serve as substitutes for effective analysis of realities and limitations" (Morris Janowitz, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy in International Relations," *World Politics,* XXVI [July 1974], 478).

W. Scott Thompson
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. By Clement Henry Moore. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1970. Pp. 360. $4.95, paper.)

This fine study was published long ago, but has stood the test of time very well and still today deserves a review, however long overdue. Although it forms a part of the well-known Little, Brown series of texts in comparative politics, it is far more than a textbook: it is an admirable theoretical essay and a generally very successful application of the modern tradition of structural-functional analysis to the study of the North African states. It will probably be of greatest use to readers who already know a good deal about North African history and society and to those who already are familiar with the standard literature of the past two decades on comparative political change.

Much of Moore's concern is to establish a genuinely comparative frame of analysis, something surprisingly rare among scholars in the comparative field. He seeks to show how the differing historical circumstances of the three countries—notably, their various "colonial dialectics" with France—have left each of them with its own pattern of institutional capacities for response to social challenges. Thus, while the fundamentals of ecology, social structure, and culture are quite homogeneous in North Africa, the politics of the three states are each highly distinctive.

Professor Moore, in his own independent way, is very much an heir to the tradition of modern comparative theory established by the likes of Easton, Almond, Deutsch, and Huntington, in his preoccupation with the differentiation and interplay of inputs and outputs and in his efforts to gauge the mechanisms of stability in each political system. His membership in this tradition leads him naturally to share in its main virtues and problems. In North Africa, where each of the regimes has now lasted a very long time by contemporary world standards and, moreover, seems acutely conscious of the requisites of survival, it is instructive to learn in some detail from Moore how the art of survival is practiced in each instance and what the general rules of policy are that it imposes on each ruler. Bourguiba in Tunisia, for instance, with his strong Destourian Socialist Party and commitment to modernization, was pretty much impelled during the first dozen years of independence to keep seeking opportunities to expand his regime's impact on the wider population, while King Hassan of Morocco has sought to keep it to a minimum and Boumedienne in Algeria has been highly selective.

It is likewise useful to follow Moore's tracing of the varying capabilities of the three governments in the "extractive," "regulatory," "distributive," and "symbolic" realms (e.g., respectively, tax-collections, reform, social services, propaganda), and the relationship of their performances to the measure of support to be had from their narrow or extended "stability groups" and "core combinations" (terms which he has borrowed from Ilchman and Uphoff). With the aid of such concepts, plus an encyclopedic store of information, Moore is able to explain in systematic fashion how King Hassan's search for widespread but scattered, and competitive, elements of support in the society (his "stability group," i.e., all those whose more or less passive support provides the basis of his legitimacy) has meant that his "core combination" of active collaborators is less close-knit and reliable than those of Boumedienne and Bourguiba. Boumedienne cultivates an extended stability group so little, and relies on the support of a homogeneous inner circle so heavily, that he is all the more free to make unfettered rational choices in economic policy, such as the heavy priority given to industrialization at the expense of agriculture, employment, and consumption. Thus Algeria is by no means the mobilization regime it is cracked up to be.

On the other hand, perhaps Moore's preoccupation with mechanisms of equilibrium, however much it may be shared by the North African political actors themselves, gives us a picture that is a little too narrow and a little too tidy. Is the process of self-maintenance necessarily the most significant thing worth exploring in the political systems of North Africa? And how do we gear our understanding of these countries to such important but unpredictable events as a senile president's clinging to office in Tunisia, the windfall for national budgets of oil and phosphate price rises, or the spectacularly futile attempts of conservative Moroccan army officers to eliminate their conservative king?

MALCOLM H. KERR
University of California, Los Angeles

Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective. By Lloyd D. Musolf. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972. Pp. 172. $10.00.)

How do governments make use of the various possible relationships between government and private enterprise for economic and consequently social and political development? This constitutes an important problem area, and the author breaks new ground in surveying it. In between purely public and private enterprises a significant variety exists of combinations of industrial relationships relevant for economic development planning. The concept "mixed enterprise" is reserved for domestic, intersectoral firms whose ownership is shared between the public and private sector. It is thus distinguished from multinational and even joint enterprises in which the sharing of ownership may be absent.

Professor Musolf usefully points out that economic development involves a choice about the public/private-sector mix, and his survey of strategies in nine countries can provide itself a measure of economic development philosophies. Furthermore, in exploring the impact of mixed enterprise on economic development, he examines the relationship between mixed enterprises and a number of important political questions such as: Can an influence equilibrium between the public and private partners be maintained once established? (He thinks not.) Will the government sector dominate the private sector in less-developed countries? (He thinks so.) And, what happens to mixed enterprises over time in the development process? (He thinks they probably decline.) In order to address these issues the author surveys the basic relationships between government and the economy—why and how is government interested in economic planning and commercial ventures? How is public enterprise related to national development?

The author's general survey of government enterprises is an important contribution, and the author well describes the current varieties of relationships between public enterprises and economic development planning. The remainder of the volume is devoted to surveys of mixed enterprise strategies in a number of countries. We learn, for example, that non-ideological economic development goals dominated the history of mixed enterprise. Mixed enterprise emerged inductively from failures and weaknesses in private enterprise. The Japanese, especially, were successful in forming enterprises and transferring them to the private sector. The Pakistanis have not been as successful in a similar effort, and India, for ideological reasons, has not allowed private participation in government-initiated enterprises even when such participation has been urged. Israel, Taiwan, and Mexico have been more "successful" at using mixed enterprise in their national economic planning, while mixed enterprise has not been used much in the United States until very recently.

The main problem with the volume is the absence of a structuring principle, a set of theoretical criteria for choosing the countries selected for the survey. At a minimum, to test the impact of public and mixed enterprise on national development, it would be useful to select countries at similar levels of "development," both with and without mixed enterprise. Essentially, the volume is descriptive and introductory. My central quarrel is with the author's treatment of development. Surely, the author could have gone beyond vaguely equating industry and finance with modernization. And exactly what kinds of basic questions can we address through learning about the public/private sector? The author alludes to the success of the "Japanese pattern" of beginning enterprises and then transferring them to the private sector. But unless the author controls for a host of exogenous dimensions, e.g., the degree of political institutionalization, the rate and sequence of change in the Japanese case, what do we learn?

Despite these reservations I believe that the author has provided a service by addressing an important set of issues in a development context.

ROGER W. BENJAMIN
University of Minnesota

Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process. By Clark D. Neher. (DeKalb, Ill.: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 1972. Pp. 63. $3.00 paper.)

The budgetary processes of local government institutions in Thailand have received little attention to date, and this brief monograph represents a useful attempt to fill a gap in an important aspect of Thai government and politics. Based on his research in Chiang Mai province of northern Thailand, Professor Neher presents conclusions on the overall structure of local government organizations and then illustrates the process of budgetary allocation for local development projects through case studies in two communes (*tambon*) of two different districts of this province.

The monograph contains a review of the formal structure of local administration. Neher concentrates on techniques by which the commune council (*sapha tambon*) allocated revenues made available to it through local land taxes. Failure to mention the various roles of the Village and Tambon Development Committees sponsored (and supported financially) by the Community Development Department is surprising; these committees also allocate financial resources (from the CD budget) for local development projects, and often have an over-lapping membership with the commune council.

Greater difficulties arise from Professor Neher's emphasis on the "local government budget." The impact of the budgetary process on the residents of rural Thailand is determined far more by decisions on how to allocate central government revenues within any particular province or district than by decisions of the commune council on allocation of the relatively minuscule amount of money at their disposal during the period under study. Analysis of budgetary politics needs to include the vastly larger amount of construction project activity under way through the various agencies, and budgets, of the central government: roads, wells, irrigation facilities, all the rest. A detailed focus on allocation of 11,700 baht (about $585) for one year by the council in one commune fails to supply the necessary perspective.

Nevertheless, Neher's descriptions of the council meetings in which project priorities for the coming year are determined provides useful insights into rural Thai politics: the relative roles of the District Officer, local politicos, and ordinary villagers; the degree of lobbying and particularistic interest-group pressures; the extent of information available to participants; villager expectations for certain kinds of responses and results when dealing with officials of the central government. As political participation increases in rural Thailand, which has happened in many areas since overthrow of the nation's military rulers in October 1973, these issues gain in relevance to the broader study of Thai politics.

Professor Neher's study of rural budgetary procedures and the role of commune councils became more important as a result of allocation decisions made in the spring of 1975 by the newly elected civilian coalition government headed by M. R. Kukrit Pramoj. In order to gain additional support in the House of Representatives and accelerate political decentralization, the new Prime Minister announced a special fund of $125 million (2.5 billion baht) to be made available for rural development projects—$25,000 (500,000 baht) for each *tambon*. These monies are being allocated by commune councils such as those studied by Neher; neither the District Officer nor others in the central government's bureaucracy can override the decisions of this local government institution. This is infinitely more money than these rural leaders have ever before had available on which to exercise their budgetary and political priorities; and the sum was increased to 3.5 billion baht in the 1976 national budget. This monograph, by providing insights into how these institutions allocated some 10,000 baht per year, gives us a better basis for understanding the problems and potential in allocating fifty times this amount under Kukrit's innovative and controversial new effort.

DAVID MORELL

Princeton University

Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933. By Donald L. Niewyk. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 254. $8.95.)

The extent to which anti-Semitism permeated various segments of German society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has proved to be an extremely complex question and may be impossible to answer definitely. The increasing intensity with which anti-Semitic policies were pursued by the National Socialist regime after 1933, culminating in the murder of at least five million European Jews, left the understandable but unproved impression that all Germans either hated Jews or at best were indifferent to their past persecutions and contemporary suffering. It is this larger problem that has motivated Donald Niewyk to address himself to the more manageable task of describing the "attitudes and actions" of German Social Democrats toward Jews and anti-Semitism during the years of the Weimar Republic. If the implications of this study hold up, then a very substantial segment of German society was free of anti-Semitic prejudices.

Two themes are central to Niewyk's work. The first is that the Social Democratic party consistently and vigorously opposed Judeophobia and promoted friendly relations with the Jewish community. Although he does present evidence of a few anti-Semitic statements by socialists, Niewyk concludes emphatically that "the marginal infiltration of anti-Jewish opinions among individual Social Democrats remained almost unmeasurable" (p. 210). This point is made repeatedly as Niewyk documents how Social Democrats responded to anti-Semitic propaganda and other attacks on Jews. The second theme is more interpretive. While Social Democrats rejected anti-Semitism, Niewyk argues that they underestimated its seriousness and significance. They failed to understand that anti-Semites did in fact hate Jews as Jews. The Social Democratic misunderstanding rested on an erroneous explanation — the "plot theory" — that maintained that Jews were "merely convenient scapegoats" and that the actual goal of anti-Semites was to destroy the Weimar Republic and the Social Democratic Party. Although a few Social Democrats leaned toward other theories, for example, psychological interpretations of Judeophobia, the "plot theory" was never dropped, and, the author concludes, it blinded socialists from seeing the genuine danger in anti-Semitism.

The central points have been made judiciously, but some aspects of the book are not entirely satisfying. As Niewyk himself admits, his evidence is not adequate to demonstrate that rank-and-file Social Democrats fully and always agreed with the party's denunciations and explanations of anti-Semitism. On this issue, the limits of Niewyk's narrow documentary approach are evident. He is too inclined to treat anti-Semitism chiefly in terms of doctrinal and policy statements and does too little to approach it as a multifaceted phenomenon involving a web of emotions that may be felt but not necessarily acted upon. The author hardly touches on the psychological complexities embedded in anti-Semitism. One longs for more analysis that differentiates kinds and levels of Judeophobia. On another matter, greater attention to attitudes found in the Communist party would have created a larger context for evaluating the opinions to which organized labor as a whole was exposed. Finally, since Social Democratic thinking on anti-Semitism and Jews did not change dramatically during the years of the Weimar Republic, there is a dulling sense of repetitiousness as the story proceeds. This sense is compounded by an organizational scheme that is itself repetitious. But Niewyk's study is, within its range, sound and reliable, offering a fine beginning for further exploration and refinements on Social Democratic sentiments on anti-Semitism.

VERNON L. LIDTKE

The Johns Hopkins University

Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. By Robert A. Packenham. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. xxii, 395. $15.00.)

Robert Packenham epigrammatically summarizes as follows the key ideas of American "liberal myopia" as they have been applied to foreign aid and other interventionist policies since World War II: Change and Development Are Easy; All Good Things Go Together; Radicalism and Revolution Are Bad; Distributing Power Is More Important Than Accumulating Power. He then goes on to show us how these principles undergird both the *doctrines* of the practitioners of foreign aid and the social science *theories* pertaining to political development. The author makes a good case that the best framework for understanding doctrines and theories of foreign assistance between 1947 and 1968 (and later?) is provided by writers like Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, David Potter, Carl Degler, and others who have explicated this country's unique experience with the liberal tradition.

The shift of attention from Western Europe to the Third World did involve the astonishing assumption that relatively small economic inputs would produce enormous transformations. Somewhat dizzied by the successes of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, we developed strategies of intervention elsewhere that were based on profoundly unrealistic notions of multiplier effects in economic aid programs. Furthermore, our commitment to such premises and to the assumptions the author describes were so strong, we were unable to interpret rapidly enough when our interventionist policies were doomed and equally unable to adapt when boomerang effects upset our own domestic equilibrium.

Often as not our policies encouraged abroad increases in instability, radicalism and violence. Finding our impulses to build democratic mirror images frustrated, we tended to support any regime, however conservative or reactionary, that would at least spare us the additional frustration and fear produced by political instability and radical movements. This posture was as true of the Kennedy years as it was of the presidential policies that preceded and followed him. Rhetoric and preachments about democracy aside, the Kennedy administrative practice heavily confirmed that national security, anticommunism, and economic development were much higher-priority goals than the encouragement of democratic regimes. Our model of democracy was itself distressingly parochial, too often overstressing populistic norms, too uncritically wedded to the American liberal idea that checks, balances, decentralization, and other methods of distributing rather than accumulating or concentrating power were desirable.

As an example of this last point, Professor Packenham discusses the so-called Fraser Amendment which was incorporated as Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act. Title IX represented the first time that explicit political goals were written into foreign assistance legislation. Packenham notes the amendment's emphasis on local government and political participation in voluntary associations and in local developmental schemes. Despite his personal experience in Washington, the author seems to have missed two critical aspects of the wording and intention of Title IX. First, the emphasis on local rather than national government and politics was designed to avoid trouble with congressmen (and perhaps national leaders abroad) who would not endorse overt language about our intentions to affect *national* government. It did not in this sense reflect one of the four liberal norms. Second, Title IX itself is a very good example of the influence (for better or worse) of academic theorists on those who make and try to implement public policy. As such its existence runs counter to what the author has to say about the impact of the theorists on the practitioners.

The description of the relationship between these two groups — the officials who make and apply doctrines and the professors who spin and try to sell theories — constitutes the most interesting, troublesome, and provocative aspect of this book. Packenham offers us an intriguing, somewhat contradictory interpretation of the relationship between the social scientists who were interested in political development and the officials who administered foreign aid for two decades. As theorists and as individuals, he says these scholars had little influence; indeed most of them (including the most luminous names in the academic firmament) were not well connected and were largely unknown in Washington (pp. 243–249). Whatever may have been going on in the academy (and Packenham finds astonishingly more intellectual agreement there than was or is the case), theories of political development were more ignored than utilized in our foreign policy. Furthermore, he says, "The theories not only *were not* used very much; they also *should not* have been used very much because they had little to offer policymakers and could not have improved policy a great deal even if they had been more widely employed" (p. 254).

I think Packenham is right, not only because (as many of us were saying in the very literature Packenham examines, or examines in part) the conceptual status of the political development literature is a highly parochial Tower of Babel. The so-called theories of political systems and development for the most part are not theories at all. These formulations are made at so great a level of abstraction as to put off any policy maker who, unlike some undergraduates, will quickly see the poverty of high-flown abstractions, cosmic classification schemes, and simplistic platitudes about government that often masquerade as policy advice. It is a pity that Packenham did not pay more attention to the differences among the social scientists whom he has too readily lumped together.

Packenham then says that these same academic elites *did* have an impact on policy makers, not so much as individuals but as representatives of organizations like Rand, Brookings, or the Council on Foreign Relations; as consultants, researchers, and conference organizers associated with a handful of universities headed by Harvard, MIT, and Yale and financed by the leading American foundations. That influence turns out to be, in the author's view, a sheer abdication of the responsibility of the social scientist. Rather than criticize and provide alternatives to leading policy doctrines, the social scientist supports them; rather than challenge what the policy maker does he endows these things with legitimacy. Far from suggesting conspiracy or even strong patterns of cooptation, Packenham notes that when social scientists and government officials see themselves as jointly involved in a common endeavor "the government does not need to coerce or buy off the social scientists in order to inhibit criticism." The liberal tradition blunts conflict by making these elites ideological bedfellows (p. 303).

Packenham goes on from here to weaken his own argument and indeed to erode away the generous and self-critical impulse that underlies the book itself. For example, he says (p. 306) that the social scientist should be neither a critic nor an advocate but should "search for truth." Yet this is part and parcel of the behavioral posture of some scholars that leads, as Packenham himself shows, to advocacy masquerading as scientific truth, and to a neglect and abandonment of the *critical* function which necessarily and always must have an underlying normative base. It seems to me well established in our theory if not in our practice of social science that a critical skepticism toward things as they are in society is essential.

The book's concluding pages are the most revealing. Having lamented the abstracted empiricism and the prescriptive arrogances he finds in the political development literature, the author defines political development as "*the will and capacity to cope with and to generate continuing transformation toward whichever values seem appropriate in the particular context*" (p. 338, italics in original). Appropriate to whom? Not specified. What values? Economic development, personal freedom, and socioeconomic justice. In that order? Well, that depends, because if there is too sharp a conflict with personal freedom, " . . . it might be necessary to accept lower rates of progress in economic development and socio-economic justice." (p. 339).

Which is exactly where many of us started before the intellectual homogeneity Packenham deplores began to break apart. Packenham himself seems to be showing us exactly how thick are the liberal blinders he has explored. He leaves us with the true but nevertheless scarcely reassuring direction that "ultimately, discovering satisfactory new paradigms and ideologies will probably require original research, a penetrating vision, a powerful creative thrust, rigor, logic, with a capacity for integration and synthesis" (p. 358).

Who wants to lead off?

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA

Yale University

Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question. By Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King. (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press [Archon Books] 1971. Pp. 247. $10.00.)

Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 brought with it many revelations of disputes that had been hidden behind the curtain of the proclaimed fraternal solidarity of the socialist regimes and communist parties. One such dispute, perhaps the most bitter, was the historic Macedonian question in modern Marxist dress. It had been a part of the secret history of the guerrilla activity in the Balkans during World War II, the subject of high-level negotiation and of decisions by the Comintern and by Stalin himself, and the central — and insoluble — element in plans for Balkan or South Slav federation debated endlessly by Communist leaders before, during, and after the war. The Macedonian question was used by the Communist powers against Greece at the time of the civil war in that country, but when the break with Tito came, Stalin chose to use it against Yugoslavia, and the Bulgarian leadership was only too glad to play that game. Tito fought back, the conflict over Macedonia came out into the open, and it has been there ever since.

Stephen Palmer is a Foreign Service Officer who served in Belgrade and in Sarajevo in the 1950s, the time when much of the new material on relations among the Communist regimes was being published. The hitherto secret history of the Macedonian question was brought to light in a series of publications of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), notably in volume VII of *Istorijski Arhiv KPJ* and in the records of the first congress of the Communist Party of Macedonia held in 1949. Palmer during a year's leave at Indiana University made full use of this material to write a monograph for Western readers. His manuscript, a well-written study on a subject of both historical and contemporary significance, encountered massive indifference on the part of American commercial and academic publishing houses. Apparently Macedonia was a far-away land of which we knew, and needed to know, nothing. Over a decade later, with Robert R. King of Radio Free Europe as co-author, the book finally made its appearance in 1971. King, a first-rate scholar, has drawn on his own extensive knowledge of nationality questions in southeastern Europe to enlarge the study and bring it through the 1960s. It does not, however, go very deeply into the political battles and press campaigns of those later years, in which the Macedonian question has been a barometer of Yugoslav-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

The heart of the book is still Palmer's original portrayal of the strategy Tito developed to establish the primacy of his partisan movement in the Vardar valley during the war and to keep Macedonia within Yugoslavia thereafter. This book does not give the last word on this subject — new material has now appeared in the recently published memoirs of Vukmanović-Tempo, the executor of Tito's wartime strategy in Macedonia, and in the work of the Yugoslav journalist and historian, Slobodan Nešović, on Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. Nevertheless it tells the story clearly, and with a rare understanding of the complex pattern of Communist politics superimposed on Balkan realities. The authors' long acquaintance with Communist methods and jargon and their understanding of the historical background of the Macedonian question (in so far as it can be comprehensible to anyone) serve them well.

They give full credit to the foresight of Tito and his colleagues in choosing to go all out in support of a "Macedonian nationality," and thus not only to atone for the Great Serb imperialism of Yugoslavia's past but also to undermine the Macedonian-Bulgarian sentiment which had seemed the only alternative. Although the Yugoslavs were not able to extend their Macedonian Republic to include ethnic brothers beyond the old frontiers of the Yugoslav state — and the fear that they would do so confirmed Greece and Bulgaria in their position that no people of Macedonian nationality existed on their side of the border — nevertheless, the creation of the Macedonian Republic as one of the six constituent republics of the federated Yugoslav state was a master stroke. How big a gamble it was, and perhaps still is, appears from the authors' frank conclusion that they do not know whether in fact a Macedonian nationality exists. The Communist leaders of Yugoslavia and of the Macedonian Republic have labored mightily to create that nationality, and their handling of internal and international questions over the past generations has given them the appearance of success.

In the present international configuration, things are likely to remain as they are. But if one considers some of the possibilities — say, a striking Soviet success in disrupting a post-Tito Yugoslavia or bringing it back within the fold, or a Soviet failure to hold Bulgaria as a subservient ally — then the old questions about Macedonia would rise again: conflict among the Balkan states over where the frontiers should be and where the Macedonians belong; or the age-old dream of Balkan federation in which a united Macedonia should have its place.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Council on Foreign Relations, New York

Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico. By Gianfranco Pasquino. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1970. Pp. 304. Lire 4000.)

Militari e Potere in America Latina. By Gianfranco Pasquino. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974. Pp. 288. Lire 5000.)

In the first of these two books Professor Gianfranco Pasquino, of the Universities of Bologna and Florence, summarizes and interprets for the Italian reader the bulk of theoretical American literature on comparative politics. He makes an earnest attempt at integrating the various trends of thought in the "political development school," and spends a good deal of time finding out whether they are value free or not. The first three chapters, dedicated to this theme, are therefore quite ambitious but not very successful in fulfilling their aim. The remaining ones offer detailed and quite useful accounts of the thinking of Samuel Huntington, Gabriel Almond, and David Apter. For the Italian reader not yet prepared to cope with the texts themselves this work can be useful as a general introduction. For those already familiar it can provide a stimulating critique.

In his other book, on the military in Latin America, Pasquino comes to grips with a specific problem, and makes a more original contribution toward understanding it. The focus is theoretical and comparative, centered on four countries: Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. There is a chapter for each of these countries, covering the recent decades of its history. A good description of the facts is given, intertwined with theoretical interpretations and hypotheses of the middle range type. This combination, not very common and not at all easy to achieve, makes the book useful not only for courses on Latin America but also for others of a more general nature. The author's approach seems to be a mixture of the "political development theory" plus a sort of implicit neo-Marxism, reasonable in its exposition but quite radical in some of its conclusions. Secondary sources are used, not very deep in detailed information but solid enough in themselves.

The Argentine chapter is particularly successful in integrating propositional analysis with facts. The rapidity of socioeconomic changes and expansion of political participation are put in the forefront as causes of political decay in that country. Following Germani, Pasquino links the mobilization of internal migrants to the spread of *peronismo.* Pasquino analyzes the social origins of the Armed Forces while indicating that what happens to the military is not only a military problem, or a result of characteristics of that group, but also the outcome of tensions in other parts of society (p. 51).

The professionalization of the armed forces reappears in the various country studies and in the final theoretical summary as a central variable. As they become more technically competent, passing through advanced schools and seminars, the military acquire greater confidence in themselves and in their capacity to perform some of the tasks left undone by other social classes. The "permanent takeover" attitude spreads, as evidenced in Brazil and Peru, however contrasting the ideological orientations of their armed forces. Nor are they simple defenders of the interests of the oligarchy, or of the middle classes. A multitude of factors must be taken into account, making difficult though not impossible a theoretical analysis. The author clearly sees this, but occasionally he oversimplifies, as when, concluding his book, he states that military intervention can only "retard and aggravate sociopolitical problems, making a frontal confrontation with the lower classes almost inevitable" (p. 268).

The Peruvian chapter is to be commended for a clear analysis of the role of SINAMOS (National System to Support Social Mobilization) and the so-called industrial community. Both are seen as utilizing methods of mobilization and mass control, directed against the influence of grass-roots political movements. Of these there are two varieties: the old, established, and rather well-known APRA, and the new, potentially more dangerous radical left. The bitter hostility of the military to APRA is one of the classical enigmas of Peruvian politics. Pasquino reviews the evidence and various interpretations, though he does not seem to me to give appropriate consideration to the continued strength and vitality of the APRA. The fact that the APRA did not organize the rural masses actively enough must be seen not as evidence of its decayed vigor but as a direct result of its preponderance among the urban and plantation workers and lower middle classes. The weight of its union apparatus forced it to look after the demands of its members and supporters, shirking the more hazardous strategy of incorporating vast unorganized masses of Indians and peasants. Interestingly enough, it was Belaundismo in the 'sixties, based on higher social strata than Aprismo, which made inroads among those groups, and now it is among those very groups that the military regime can probably find a more receptive audience.

The Chilean chapter is more policy oriented, concerned with a strategy for the left. The effort is marred by several oversimplifications, as when it is taken for granted that "the whole progressive Latin American sociological school (has shown) the middle classes and other middle strata . . . to be incapable of an autonomous reforming function" (p. 157). The author criticizes the Communist parties of Chile and the rest of the continent for holding opposite views. His main recommendation is to give more importance to the organization of the "marginal" population (p. 158), and to keep in mind that toward the Armed Forces the only appropriate solution is the one adopted by the Bolivian revolution of 1952 and by Fidel Castro: they must be destroyed (p. 154).

In the Brazilian study we see again the marginal population given a central role as constituting a very serious danger to the system. This fact, not always accepted by political analysts, deserves closer attention, as it is certainly a time-bomb on the Brazilian political scene, making an adaptation to a pluralist political system more difficult. On the other hand, Pasquino's view about the unrepresentative nature of the pre-1964 political structure seems exaggerated. The parties of the Vargas complex (Social Democrático and Trabalhista), together with their main opponent, the Uniao Democrática Nacional, are described as though they had been almost on the vanishing point, representing a smaller and smaller section of the electorate, based on statistics which show that the straight party vote was a diminishing percentage of the total (p. 172). This evidence may indicate the oscillation of alliances or the opportunism of leaders, but not the decay of parties. At this writing (several years after the book was finished) the party system of Brazil, however straitjacketed by the military government, has reappeared with rather high spirits and good health.

In an appendix the main theoretical points made in the text are summarized and developed, giving the gist of the author's argument, worth translating to make them available to the English reader.

TORCUATO S. DI TELLA
University of Belgrano, Buenos Aires

Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. By Frederic L. Pryor. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968. Pp. 543. $8.50.)

Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations was commissioned by the Yale Economic Growth Center and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan and published seven years ago. It is a thoroughly researched and copiously documented quantitative study in which Frederic Pryor addressed himself to three objectives: comparing market and centrally planned economies; extending the positive theory of public finance; and refocusing the study of comparative economic systems. Whether or not these laudable, though hardly modest, goals have been achieved, it is a book that deserves more attention than it has received, not least of all from political scientists. Pryor has selected a sample of fourteen nations in the Euro-American world and divided them into two groups of seven, those allocating resources through the market and those through central planning. Included in the former and ranked in descending order of per capita GNP are the USA, West Germany, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia; and in the latter, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, USSR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Using data from 1950 through 1962 for time-series comparisons and in 1956 and 1962 for cross-sectional comparisons, Professor Pryor relies largely on multivariate regression analysis to measure the influence of economic systems and the level of economic development on public consumption expenditures — most importantly for defense, welfare and health, and education, and, secondarily, for administration, internal security, nonmilitary security, and research and development. Whenever possible he analyzes the behavior of these expenditures with respect to substitution relations, centralization, stability, and incidence, the first of these having to do with the extent to which public expenditures become substitutes for private expenditures and the last with their impact on the distribution of income.

Pryor has taken on the statistical problems — inadequate and incomparable data sources; sticky aggregation difficulties; ambiguities in interpreting tests of statistical significance — that inhere in these ambitious intentions for good reasons. Specialists in comparative economic systems traditionally have been less concerned with making systematic comparisons of the performance of different types of economic systems than with the institutional, historical, and ideological circumstances that distinguished capitalist, communist, and fascist economies from one another. Following World War II, however, as the state became increasingly involved in the management of capitalist economies, and as communist economies flirted with market-type reforms in trying to overcome the micro-economic inefficiencies that were plaguing them, it appeared to many observers that these economies were converging. The so-called convergence thesis is no better grounded in systematic quantitative analysis than were the earlier views of the great "isms." Comparative observations like these need the data base that Pryor has set out to build. And he is certainly right in comparing a set of market economies and a set of centrally planned economies to minimize the force of idiosyncratic conditions in particular societies. Moreover, since governments establish and maintain the institutional and legal framework within which resources are allocated, they serve as a most appropriate focus for comparing economic systems.

In a book so thoroughly committed to a quantitative methodology and so carefully researched one expects that its conclusions will neither shatter our perceptions of, nor shock our values about, economic systems. *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* is no *Time on the Cross,* that recent controversial exercise in cliometrics which appears to cast slavery in the ante-bellum American South in a more favorable light than hitherto. We learn that the economic system variable is relatively unimportant in accounting for differences in public consumption expenditures and that ideological, customary, or political factors are becoming less important with the tempering of cold-war dogmatism. The level of economic development "plays a statistically significant role in the cross-section analysis . . . for only internal security, foreign aid, and research and development. For military, welfare, education and health expenditures, on the other hand, this *per capita* income variable has little explanatory power" (p. 287). Again, "For welfare expenditures and, to a lesser extent, health expenditures, there seems to be an upward limit to the public expenditures/GNP ratio, such that those nations with the lowest relative expenditures have the fastest increase in public consumption expenditures" (p. 291).

These all-too-brief examples of Pryor's conclusions are typical of his judicious and restrained approach to this vast comparative enterprise — a consequence, no doubt, of the sobering influence of quantitative data. In fact, he may have been overly cautious. At any rate he felt constrained to stand off from the evidence which supported the convergence thesis. "Indeed, in a great many more important respects the two economic systems are very different and, let me add without proof, are *not* becoming more similar" (p. 310 emphasis in text), a statement which suggests that even the most indefatigable researcher may sometimes feel oppressed by his numbers.

In conclusion, I should note that Pryor has placed most of the statistical data in a series of appendices which account for more than one-third of the book. This helps those readers who would have found the complete quantitative story dense and difficult to penetrate while concentrating the data base of the study for those who are as interested in quantitative methodology as in substantive conclusions. Unfortunately, the publishers have not been as considerate of the reader as Pryor has; there are an unconscionable number of typographical errors which certainly should have been caught by the editors. Finally, it is not clear why Pryor insists on calling all current government expenditures "public consumption." Surely expenditures on education or research and development represent investment rather than consumption.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.

Northwestern University

Industrial Society in Communist China. By Barry M. Richman. (New York: Vintage Books, 1972. Pp. 968. $4.95, paper. Hardbound edition, 1969, $15.00.)

Barry Richman, Professor at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles, went to China rather unexpectedly more than a decade ago and was able to gather detailed statistics on thirty-eight Chinese economic enterprises of all types. At the time, his data were unique and he hurried to publish them in a form that would be understandable to the general reader and yet would contribute to specialist knowledge of Mainland China's management and economic development. These form two of the purposes of the present volume. The author also desired to assess the Chinese experience by referring to his own general model of such processes and by comparison with his previous work on Indian and Soviet management. Finally, the author wanted to publish a volume on contemporary China that would serve as a guide to understanding that country as a whole, not merely its management practices.

After a decade, Richman's data are still invaluable because they fill a gap in the period just before the Cultural Revolution and complement the more extensive statistics compiled by many observers since. More important, the administrative situation and policy direction described in early 1966 is much more analogous to the post-Cultural Revolutionary present than to the intervening years of turbulence. Thus, far from being outdated by the quick march of events in China, this book continues to have relevance for the serious student of the People's Republic. If carefully mined, it contains a wealth of material useful for historical comparison in the author's fields of competence. Finally, the intervening decade has not been unkind to his more extensive analysis of such areas as education, social attitudes, and law in China.

But the original problems of the work, originally published in 1969, persist. One is that the author, like many others writing on China, attempts to do too much within one cover. It is impossible for him to fulfill the ambitious aims listed above without moving onto insecure factual grounds and without enlarging the book to a length that most readers will not wish to tackle. It would possibly have been better if Richman had published his notebook of economic and management data — that, after all, is the enduring legacy of his visit — and refrained from the temptation to discourse, seemingly, on all of China for many different audiences. The author falls short of this objective.

Another problem is the author's ambitious attempt to place an exposition of Chinese management techniques and economic development within the context of a theoretical model. This also required significant expansion of the length and complexity of the discourse. The first hundred pages are thus devoted to the theoretical model and the next four-hundred fifty to the "environmental" factors informing China's economic performance since 1949. Additional material is then introduced to describe the course of China's economic development, including comparisons with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and India. Only in chapters 8–12, comprising the last 250 pages of the volume, do we come, finally, to most of Richman's own findings based on his own observations. The book, thus, is really two volumes with the most important material introduced only in the second. Given this length, the reader is tempted to consult only those sections that are of immediate interest to him, causing the volume to lose its intended unity. Ultimately, it turns into a handbook.

A third problem aggravates the second. This is the author's overblown writing style and his tendency to make too many claims for his own work. The nearly one thousand pages could have been reduced by at least a third, thereby making the new material more accessible to, and easing the burden on, the reader. The reader also tires of Richman's overuse of direct references to himself and his work, especially when coupled with the words "significant" and "first-hand."

For the political scientist, the volume does hold some general attractions. It is a work on political economy — as all worthy works on China must be — and thus breaks down the artificial barriers between the two fields. It wisely views Chinese economic development not merely in the context of post-1949 history but also of pre-1949 Chinese events, of the modernization-development pattern in comparable foreign states, and of generally applicable principles of industrial management. It also treats Chinese industrial development as the rational product of environmental constraints, both physical and sociopolitical. And it stresses the constant contradiction between the Party's ideological imperatives and the demands of managerial, technical, and economic rationality.

It is well that Richman appreciates the many influences on Chinese industry. The fundamental problem of the work, however, is that it draws attention to too many factors of importance. Despite his attempt to embed Chinese industrial development in the framework of comparative management theory and practice, his good sense makes him realize that the operative principles of one field will not explain even part of the story. Lacking one or a few parsimonious and overarching principles or ideas, Richman is driven to trying to include and explain everything, and ends up leaving some of the most important questions unanswered. (One of these is the relationship of industry to agriculture in China; this is still the supreme determinant of economic activity in that country and informs the content of much of Peking politics as well. Richman ignores this issue almost entirely.) If the author had been slightly less ambitious, he would have been less tempted to introduce so much extraneous information that, in the end, makes it impossible for the reader to decide what is the central aspect of the topic. By moving outside his area of expertise, moreover, Richman is constrained to advance many questionable assertions and to generalize on the basis of quite incomplete data. Lastly, Richman did not attempt, in this edition, to take account of the implications of the Cultural Revolution for the period of the early 1960s, at the end of which his visit occurred. Many of the events he observed in the deceptive calm of mid-1966 were the very causes of the disorders that followed almost immediately upon his departure from China.

Nonetheless, much of the volume remains of worth and, thanks to a reasonably detailed index, latter-day readers can look up facts and comparisons, many of which are not to be found elsewhere. For this reason alone, the book belongs on the shelf of serious scholars of China, comparative politics, and economic development.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON
University of Washington

The Sword And The Scepter: The Problem Of Militarism In Germany. Volume 3: **The Tragedy Of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg As War Chancellor (1914–1917).** Volume 4: **The Reign of German Militarism And The Disaster Of 1918.** By Gerhard Ritter. (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1972 and 1973. Pp. vii, 611 and viii, 496. $18.00 each.)

The late Gerhard Ritter was always more interested in writing about individuals than about the impersonal forces that influence the historical process, and this was never more evident than in his great work on German militarism. The first volume of this comprehensive study of the endemic conflict between civilian and military authority concentrated upon Bismarck's successful struggle against Chief of Staff Moltke for the control of policy during the wars of 1866 and 1870; and the bulk of the second was devoted to an analysis of the theories of Schlieffen and Tirpitz and a description of the corrosive effects that their authority had upon German statecraft before 1914. The third and fourth volumes, now available in the excellent translation of Heinz Norden, are in the same mode, the former being dominated by the melancholy figure of Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who finally lost the battle for civilian supremacy that Bismarck had fought so robustly, the latter by Ludendorff, who, in his bland arrogance, proved that all of Bismarck's fears of military encroachment upon the sphere of national policy were justified.

In recent years, the policy of Bethmann Hollweg has been a subject of lively debate among historians, and Fritz Fischer *(Griff nach der Weltmacht,* 1961) and his followers have sought to prove that, far from being an opponent of the grandiose schemes of the soldiers, Bethmann was as much an expansionist as they. This thesis Ritter rejects, and his third volume raises serious questions about Fischer's use of documents and his tendency to generalize from inadequate data. His own view — and it is supported by the recent publication of the diaries of Bethmann's secretary, Kurt Riezler — is that Bethmann always regarded the ambitions of the soldiers as unrealistic and their intrusions into the sphere of policy determination as dangerous, but that he never possessed the cheerful self-confidence and combativeness of Bismarck and hence was ineffective in maintaining his position. In Ritter's view, he was too much the intellectual, lacking a "wholly secure instinct for power," and was too conscientious to stand up to the willful unconditionality of people like Ludendorff. Moreover, even if his temperament had been less scrupulous, he was handicapped by the fact that, in wartime, popular opinion is (at least this was true during the first World War, and not only of Germany) apt to support the soldiers in any difference with politicians.

Nevertheless, Bethmann was not a weakling, and he fought more doughtily for civilian control than might have been expected—far more so (although Ritter does not make this point) than the English Prime Minister Asquith did. If in the crisis of 1914 he was overborne by the technical arguments of the soldiers and swept into a war from which he expected the worst, he steadily resisted Chief of Staff Falkenhayn's attempts to intervene in political matters, won a signal victory over Tirpitz and the admirals in 1915 in the matter of submarine warfare, and fought stubbornly for three years to prevent a self-defeating definition of German war aims by the military and the greedy economic interests. Indeed, as Ritter points out, it was his determination to keep the door open for a negotiated peace that led him to make his worst mistake, which was to urge the Emperor to replace Falkenhayn with the team of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the hope that the popularity of the latter would give him the necessary backing to pursue moderate and negotiable war aims. In reality, the new High Command made a compromise peace impossible by being much more demanding than their predecessor had been.

Once the scales had fallen from his eyes, the Chancellor did what he could to remedy his error, and the most interesting chapters of Ritter's third volume describe his desperate attempts to extricate himself from a war which he knew could no longer be won by military means alone. His efforts were resisted by the men he had elevated to power, whose ambitions in Poland defeated any hope for a separate peace with Russia, whose insistence on retaining Belgium made negotiation with the West impossible, and whose demand for unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States into the war. But, as Ritter makes clear, Bethmann's defeat would not have come if the soldiers had not always enjoyed public support, and if they had not found allies among civilian politicians, whose real interests might have been supposed to lie in supporting the Chancellor. It is ironic and tragic that men like the Centrist politician Matthias Erzberger and the future chancellor in the Weimar period, Gustav Stresemann, should have played key role in denying Bethmann parliamentary support in July 1917, and thus assuring his fall.

Erzberger — always much more naive than his biographer Klaus Epstein was willing to admit—may have hoped that Bethmann would be succeeded by someone (preferably Bülow) who would be more capable of controlling the soldiers. If so, he was sadly mistaken; and Ritter's fourth volume shows the full consequences of this faulty judgment. In the post-Bethmann period, all authority was in Ludendorff's hands. It is true that on one occasion Chancellor Hertling attempted to delineate in writing the appropriate limits of military authority in political matters, but he lost heart before the ink was dry on the paper, and no one tried again. It was Ludendorff who forbade new initiatives in the direction of negotiated peace; it was Ludendorff who insisted against all reason that military victory was inevitable and demanded the dismissal of those officials, like Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann, who had doubts; and it was Ludendorff who, as late as

October 1918, long after the failure of his much-touted spring offensive, went on dreaming of German Rivieras in the Crimea and German bridges from the Caucasus to India. Ritter is surely correct in suggesting a similarity between Ludendorff in 1918 and Hitler in 1944–1945, both lost in their delusions, and both incapable of restraint because there was no one around them with the courage to face up to them and refuse their demands.

Ritter had hoped to conclude his work with two essays dealing with the forms that the problem of militarism assumed after 1918: one on the Weimar years, the second on the Third Reich, a period in which, by a curious reversal, it was the soldiers who sought to restrain the blind militarism of the civilian leaders. He died in 1967 before he could complete this epilogue. This is regrettable, but in no way diminishes the stature of this magisterial study.

Gordon A. Craig

Stanford University

The Right Wing In France From 1815 to de Gaulle. By René Rémond. (Philadelphia, Penn.: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2nd ed. 1969. Pp. 465. $10.00.)

This second American edition of Professor Rémond's elegant, erudite, and influential work (the first appeared in 1966) is a translation of the revised French third edition. It brings the account up to 1967, with a postface on the Events of 1968 which contributes little either to the previous analysis of the French Right, or to an understanding of the Events of May, witnessed by the author at close hand at Nanterre. But the final chapter, thoroughly revised to carry the study from 1940 through 1967, is full of interest. The author's shrewd remarks on the Republican Independents and their affinity with the Orleanist tradition have since been confirmed by the election of 1974 in which Giscard d'Estaing captured the conservative majority from the Gaullists and thus made himself president of France.

The author modestly suggests in his preface that "here and there" he has used the insights of the social sciences. In fact, the book remains a classic example, in the best French tradition, of the traditional study of the evolution of ideas, climates of opinion, and movements. Readers ought not, therefore, to look for much political science or political sociology. What they will find, in abundance, are shrewd *aperçus,* psychological insights, and historical analogies, based on wide reading, substantial research, broad sympathies and profound understanding. These qualities are displayed to good effect in the analyses of Orleanism; of the evolution of one branch of legitimism into a sort of "national Catholicism" under the stress of colonial wars and the challenge of communism; and of Bonapartism and its various nationalist and antidemocratic successors from Boulangism to the leagues of the 1930s, and later to a fraction of the OAS. Professor Rémond suggests that Gaullism finally succeeded in reuniting the democratic strain in Bonapartism, present in it since the Revolution, with the nationalist current which had submerged it from Boulangism onwards. Gaullism thus revived the Bonapartist tradition by bringing it back to its popular origins, restoring the alliance of democracy and nationalism.

In short, this is a sophisticated work of scholarship, designed to stimulate and provoke as well as to inform; it is directed to those already conversant with French history and traditions, not to beginning students. The latter will be puzzled by the author's allusive style, compounded by an inelegant translation, whose sentence structure and phraseology constantly remind one of French constructions. Non-French readers will be further confused not only by careless proofreading but by (for example) "Incomparable Chamber," "immitigably," and "interposed persons." The translator has also succumbed to the bad French habit of misspelling proper names, e.g. "Moseley" (spelled correctly in the French text). Finally, Professor Laux confuses, in an explanatory footnote, the constitutional limits on the legislative omnicompetence of the Assembly with the Gaullist conceit of a presidential "reserved sector," revealed by Chaban Delmas in 1959 to a Gaullist party conference.

In short, this classic essay is still well worth reading, preferably in French, but also in this adequate though imperfect translation.

D. B. Goldey

Lincoln College, Oxford

Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience. By Elie Adib Salem. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Pp. 174. $7.95.

No Arab country has maintained a parliament, free enterprise, respect for a large number of different religious communities, and relative prosperity for as long as Lebanon. After three decades, is it valid to summarize this Lebanese experience as modernization without revolution?

Elie A. Salem, professor at the American

University of Beirut, educated in the United States and with an insider's knowledge as well of Lebanese politics, offers us an interpretation much more complex, subtle, and skeptical than the book's title implies. Salem defines modernization comprehensively as adapting, transforming and replacing traditional institutions. His honest and sensitive scholarship compels him, however, to focus on the reasons why Lebanon could not move beyond limited adaptations. He thus helps to explain, though this was not his intention, the limits upon change that led to the current civil war.

Salem analyzes Lebanese politics until now as "a mix of tradition and modernity, feudal vestiges and capitalism, [religious] confessionalism and secularism, democracy and plutocracy, rugged individualism and narrow communalism" (p. 52). To govern such a society with a government said to be based upon "conciliation and consensus" (p. 4) raises serious questions: Who decides on agendas and whose agreement is required; indeed, What are the limits of agreement? The leaders of the seventeen religious communities—usually the descendants of established and rich families—govern through cliques and clubs where they bargain with the remainder of a similar elite already successful in business, army, and church or thanks to their connections with foreign embassies. The poor—much more often Muslims than Christians—have little to bargain with in such a system, and hence receive the least. The intellectuals, dependent on the same system of preferment, are allowed to speak as a Greek chorus. Their hesitations and exhortations, worries and predictions turned out to be correct, but they were not allowed to alter the established laws of change.

Among the small groups which are in charge of political brokerage, parliament is only one of the leading clubs, and not the most powerful. No one, except at times the President, is moved to act as broker for the public interest; no one—not even he—speaks for a national constituency. Naturally, the Lebanese bureaucracy, as Salem shows in an especially vivid and effective chapter, knows for whom it is supposed to be working. Now it serves as a "bottleneck" to modernization, because of overcentralization, outmoded procedures, lack of technical skill and equipment, religious loyalties and job quotas, nepotism, bribery and laxity of performance. But any "modernization" of the bureaucracy itself which would "disregard professional, personal, familial, and factional considerations would be extremely difficult" (p. 105).

Salem's judgment on the future of the bureaucracy applies to the future of Lebanon's political system: "Lebanon's communal society has established a political formula that can both accommodate change and introduce moderate reforms, provided they do not seriously shake the foundations of the political power structure" (p. 138). This formula reflects "the constraints of confessionalism, factionalism, and personalism" (p. 38). Indeed, "jockeying for power, balancing the distribution of power among many players," and making sure that the game itself can continue—all these make "heavy claims on the time of the players and leave inadequate time or room for modernization politics" (p. 73). No wonder development planning, which Salem analyzes in particular detail, moves "cautiously, hesitantly, haphazardly, and inconsistently" (pp. 73-74).

One does not have to transform or replace anything in order to go as far as Lebanon has gone. If tradition has already taught a people the advantages of bargaining and brokerage among the already powerful, they may also be well prepared to make economic and political deals in the modern age—as long as all essential values remain convertible. People must not come to want fundamentally new kinds of relationships. The talented must continue to prefer the laming but cosy security of existing solidarity groups to the trials of fostering creativity. The poor, exploited, and excluded must not turn their very condition into an issue. Adapting is an age-old skill that has become the least effective mode for meeting the problems of the modern age. What is required instead is the capacity to overcome the cleavages and rigidities that arise in every society still trying to preserve its inherited pattern of relationships. That capacity also requires the persistent creation and nourishing of fundamentally new relationships. If this kind of transformation is the new and permanent revolution of the modern age, then it must be said that modernization has barely begun in Lebanon. People who seek to avoid this kind of revolution tend to bring upon themselves other, more old-fashioned kinds of revolution.

MANFRED HALPERN

Princeton University

Elites in the People's Republic of China. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972. Pp. 669. $15.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

The study of Chinese Communist politics has progressed from an examination of institutions and policy statements, through an analysis of leadership, ideology and elite solidarity, to a concern with the nature, causes and consequences of elite and social cleavage. This volume gained impetus from the Cultural Revolution's demonstration that the Chinese leadership and polity were highly fragmented and that these divisions provided the basis for social mobilization and coalition building.

This edited volume is composed of articles by fourteen scholars; each treats a different level or segment of the Chinese polity. Consequently, this endeavor has the coherence problems common to many edited volumes. The absence of thematic continuity, however, is particularly serious when analyzing elites. It is difficult to imagine what meaningful definition of elites could have been employed to lump together articles about the Central Committee, provincial level leaders, minorities officials, cadres in Shanghai and Canton, professors at Peking University, and a single student. Even more inexplicably, there is no significant analysis of the Politburo, the Military Affairs Commission, or the Standing Committee of the State Council. In addition, because the book covers such diverse facets of the society and polity, the reader is left with the impossible task of figuring out how, if at all, these various levels and strata interact. Despite these difficulties, however, several of the individual articles are good and employ techniques of leadership and policy analysis that will be examined below.

Elite analyses have been based on a rainbow of assumptions about which variables are most closely linked to elite behavior. Some analysts assert that elite behavior is best predicted by aggregate attribute data, others believe that organizational affiliation is primary, while still others believe the perceptions of elite members are the crucial variables. This book gives voice to all three perspectives.

Waller (in his article about the Kiangsi Soviet's Central Executive Council and the Eighth Central Committee) and Scalapino (in his article comparing the composition of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees) *seem* to assume that aggregate socioeconomic, geographic, educational, and career characteristics are linked to elite political behavior. Two points must be made: First of all, as Waller candidly noted, attribute data are highly fragmentary, thereby reducing the confidence that can be placed in subsequent conclusions. Key data on socioeconomic background, education, occupation, and foreign exposure are all spotty. Don Klein makes this point in his excellent paper analyzing the resources available to the scholar attempting to undertake a study of the Chinese elite. Even more fundamentally, Scalapino offers the reader no guidance in predicting elite behavior from the aggregate attribute data he provides. In the absence of some theoretical or empirical assertion about the relationship between elite attributes and elite behavior, one wonders toward what end all these data were collected? On what basis were certain variables deemed "important" and others unimportant?

The second genre of elite analysis represented in this volume views individual elite members as parts of specific organizations. "The Organization," in turn, is alleged to determine, or shape, the elite member's interests, objectives, and perceptions. The Whitson piece adopts this perspective: ". . . decisions and viewpoints within any government are structured by groups of organizations, members of which develop special interests and career investments in the survival and power of those organizations" (p. 381). This mode of analysis, though promising, has shortcomings. For one thing, members of the elite usually have several organizational affiliations, leaving the analyst to decide which ties are most closely linked to an individual's policy behavior. For instance, are the actions of a military garrison commander best explained by his ties to the Communist party, the field army to which he belongs, the military region in which he is situated, the local garrison where he lives, or the service with which he is identified? It is plausible that different policy issues would tap different organizational loyalties. Theodore Lowi's work is suggestive in this regard. William Parish has pinpointed a further difficulty which is that many of the phenomena Whitson believes indicative of purposive organizational behavior (e.g., patterns of personnel assignment) are better explained by assuming random behavior (*China Quarterly,* 56, 1973, 667-699).

Finally, one must be extraordinarily careful in ascribing "interests" to any organization. Halperin and Kanter prudently note (in *Readings in American Foreign Policy*) that organizational interests are very hard to define without a high degree of certainty about the context in which an organization's leaders view an issue. This suggests that organizational perspectives would benefit by more precise perceptual data and the use of intensive case study material.

The volume's final genre of elite analysis might be broadly termed the "perceptual school" (related to the work of George, Holsti, and Leites). From this perspective one asks, how did the specific individuals or "groups" perceive the problems and devise strategies to solve them? Richard Baum's study of lower and middle-level rural "party power holders" *(Tang-ch'üan P'ai)* is excellent, and displays sensitivity to the fact that many possible motivations may produce any given action (p. 542). Baum charts the succession of strategies these cadres employed to protect themselves, their organizations, and their policies during the Cultural Revolution. Chang's essay analyzes the political strategies used by China's provincial leaders during the Cultural Revolution. Montaperto's essay, while *NOT* dealing with an elite by any stretch of the imagination, provides intensive motivational data on one Cultural Revolution era student.

The major difficulty with the perceptual approach, as with notions of organizational interest, is the great uncertainty about "real" elite perceptions and the linkages such perceptions have to policy behavior. Also, one must be careful not to infer motivations without sufficient data. For instance, Chang asserts that ". . . toward the end of May, the provincial leaders' feelings of uncertainty and anxiety gave way to those of apprehension. . . . They knew too well from the experiences of past campaigns that they could be adversely affected by actual or potential 'guilt by association' " (pp. 504–505). I *intuitively* subscribe to this line of argument but must note the absence of data demonstrating that provincial leaders *did* perceive things this way. Data were only gathered to show that leaders *should* have felt that way.

In this extensive volume, we see political scientists dealing with China begin to utilize an increasingly broad range of research strategies, drawing upon the socialization, organizational, and perceptual literatures. All the individual studies take as their starting point the assumption that elite and social solidarity are not givens. White's study of leadership in Shanghai (along with the pieces by Baum and Chang) moves beyond that and attempts to explore the interaction between elite and social cleavages.

Evaluating the book as a whole, one notes two overriding difficulties: First, the concept of elite is never spelled out and, as a consequence, each author employs his own definition of the term. Also, it is never clear what range of political and social events the concept of elite is useful in explaining. Second, to assume that a given category of persons (by reason of hierarchical position) constitutes an elite is to obscure a major point of contention: "Who" makes policy, and are the actors most salient to one policy area equally important across the entire spectrum of issues? Much of what we know about organizations and bureaucratic politics (e.g., from Allison, Etzioni, Holsti, and Selznick) suggests that formal position in the hierarchy is, at best, a very imperfect guide to lines of actual policy-making authority and importance.

What, then, is a next step to take in building upon the advances which this volume represents? The field might now move from the narrow analysis of leadership to the analysis of policy formulation in specific policy areas. With this orientation, one can utilize aggregate attribute data, organizational perspectives, and the perceptual literature without eliminating the possibility of finding a policy-making system in which lower participants play a vital role. Also, such a policy orientation will make it easier to clarify the relationships between leadership and organizations at different levels in the system.

DAVID M. LAMPTON

Ohio State University

Comparative Political Corruption. By James C. Scott. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972. Pp. x, 166. $7.95, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

Although part of a series intended for "the undergraduate student of comparative politics," this intelligent, generally accurate, and thought-provoking little book was obviously meant for Professor Scott's professional colleagues as well. Indeed, since Arnold Heidenheimer's excellent analysis and reader *Political Corruption* (1970) lamentably has been withdrawn from circulation by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Scott's book is the only comparative study of political corruption currently in print. It reflects the increased interest in political corruption during the late '60s and early '70s among political scientists and especially students of less developed areas. Professor Scott's own research on corruption (published in various journals), as well as new information and thought, is incorporated in the book.

Comparative Political Corruption falls into three parts. The first part defines political corruption and argues that the phenomenon should be investigated as a special case of political influence. The second and third parts are respectively comparative analyses of administrative and electoral corruption. Definition of the field is an important problem for students of corruption since it influences not only what they are studying but their perspective on the subject. Scott, following J. S. Nye, defines corruption as "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public office (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (p. 4). Most students of the subject would agree that corruption involves violation of the norms of a political regime. More controversial is Scott's decision to limit corruption to violations resulting from material inducements. He is certainly in good company in adopting this restricted view, since "corruption" for centuries has frequently been associated with bribery, and since such authorities as Heidenheimer and Nye continue in the tradition. Other traditions, however, include other types of influence besides wealth and status. Thus, the British Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 considered as types of electoral corruption not only bribery and treating but also "personation" (a type of fraud) and "undue influence," which involved the use of "force, violence and restraint."

It is important to distinguish various methods of corruption for purposes of political analysis, since one can often substitute for another and since particular methods may be associated empirically with types of regimes or stages of political development. I would argue that political corruption as a field for research is too narrowly defined if limited to one cause of the violation of regime norms; namely, particularistic material incentives. Scott, by distinguishing between corruption on the one hand and fraud and intimidation on the other, finds that the Nkrumah regime in Ghana ceases to be of relevance to the study of corruption after 1960 when material inducements became less important in maintaining Nkrumah's rule and fraud and intimidation became dominant. Surely those who supported the formal norms of the Ghanian regime were just as outraged when Nkrumah and his colleagues violated them by fraud as when they violated them by bribery. In eliminating fraud and intimidation from his concept of violence, Scott may underestimate the degree of corruption in modern political systems where there does appear to be a marked decline in bribery and similar practices. If Watergate is any guide, fraud and intimidation may well be the dominant forms of corruption in modern societies.

Scott devotes the bulk of his book to comparative analyses of administrative corruption based mainly on case studies of early seventeenth-century England and contemporary Thailand, and of electoral corruption based mainly on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England and contemporary Ghana and India. Corruption of and by bureaucrats, he observes, is the distinctive pattern of corruption in autocratic regimes in which electoral competition is of little or no significance. When victory in electoral competition becomes necessary to remain in office and yet the electorate fails to be motivated by ideological and policy inducements, then electoral corruption is likely to be found. Scott's examination lays special stress on the use of electoral corruption by political machines, the discussion of which alone is more than worth the price of the book.

Scott occasionally overstrains his comparisons of pre-twentieth-century English and contemporary Afro-Asian corruption, although he is clearly correct in his general position that European regimes of the past were in certain significant respects, including corruption, similar to many of those in Africa and Asia today. Inevitably he is more familiar with some of his cases than others. Many historians would, for example, find his suggestion that ideological and policy considerations were relatively unimportant in Jacobean England misleading to say the least. Moreover, by assuming that during that period he is dealing with what he calls "proto-corruption" (not illegal and thus, in his view, not corrupt), Scott is making an historical error, since bribery of officials has been illegal in England since medieval times. He also fails to indicate the way in which corruption as perceived by anti-court elites—the so-called Country party—undermined the legitimacy of the Stuart regime. Corruption, because it can occur only when formal regime norms supported by some parts of society are violated, will inevitably lead to some degree of disaffection toward the norm violators. When the disaffected are politically powerful and have other reasons as well for opposing those perceived as corrupt, the latter can find themselves in serious trouble. Their actions are viewed not only as wrong but also as illegitimate while the actions of their opponents, whatever other their actual motives, gain in legitimacy.

WILLIAM B. GWYN

Tulane University

Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study. By A. H. Somjee. (New Delhi: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1971. Pp. xxvii, 189. Rs 25.00.)

Confronted by earlier failures, governments in many less-developed countries are seeking to redefine strategies of rural development. They have been joined in this effort by numerous international agencies, i.e., The World Bank

(IBRD), the FAO, and the ILO. In this reassessment, the role of structural-institutional factors has received increasing attention. Therefore one turns to Somjee's study of institutional change in rural India with considerable interest. India's attempts at planned institutional and social-structural change span almost three decades, and have been the object of a substantial amount of research.

What Professor Somjee has given us is a case study of the impact of the introduction of a local village panchayat (council), elected by universal adult suffrage, upon the traditional social and political systems of a village in the State of Gujarat, near the city of Baroda. He has conducted research in this village on a number of occasions since 1959. The historical perspective which accrues from these earlier studies adds an important dimension to this work. Six of the seven chapters are concerned with politics at the local village level. A seventh chapter assesses the impact upon village politics of the General Elections of 1967.

His work confirms numerous earlier findings. One consequence of adult suffrage has been a redefinition of the criteria for leadership. Status, as determined by land ownership, wealth, and high caste membership continues to be perceived as a requisite for leadership. To it has now been added skill in bargaining, and the ability to mobilize a significant number of followers as a basis for entry into the coalition-making process which invariably follows local elections. The study also confirms the role of ascriptively defined groups, rather than individuals, as the essential building blocks of rural political alliances. Within this context, the need to secure majority support has led to the bridging of social divisions within the rural polity, resulting in intricate alliances of caste groups from all levels of the status hierarchy. In the process, some leverage has accrued to lower-caste groups, but not very much. Finally the study also confirms earlier findings of the rapid generational shift in leadership, following the introduction of local self-government. In the village under study, a bifurcation of leadership roles has taken place in which members of the older generations continue to exercise social leadership, whereas political leadership has shifted to the hands of the younger generation.

In his analysis of the failure of the village panchayat to become an effective representative institution within the village, Somjee has made a useful contribution at a descriptive level. He identifies two patterns of behavior within the village as having undermined the effectiveness of the panchayat. The first of these he characterizes as "the direct approach," by which he means the tendency of villagers to bypass the panchayat as an institution for local conflict resolution and decision making, and to approach district level administrators and political leaders directly, seeking their intervention in local problems. This practice, a continuation of traditional pre-independence patterns of behavior throughout India, was condoned, and even encouraged, by officials at higher levels of authority. They used these opportunities to build their own support. The net effect was to remove from the panchayat issues upon which it could have taken decisions, and hence established its effectiveness. The author characterizes the second pattern of behavior which undermined the panchayat as "the mass approach," an essentially populist stance, encouraged by a Gandhian worker who came to the village, and sought to bring about total community involvement in local affairs. The net effect of the mass approach was to blur the role the panchayat as a representative institution for the village. Finally, Somjee describes the ways in which higher authorities frustrated attempts by the panchayat to raise financial resources. These actions on the part of the authorities would seem to indicate that they were not seriously committed to making the panchayats effective instruments of local self-government.

While not ostensibly a part of his analytic framework, two other factors of considerable importance for students of rural development and institution building are discussed by Somjee. The first of these is the opening up for villagers, particularly the landless, of employment opportunities in the nearby city, Baroda, completely outside the control of the village economy. The second factor is the marked increase in opportunity for both primary and secondary education in the village. Both of these changes facilitated challenges to social and political structures which critically influenced the entire system of distribution of power within the village. This, in turn, reinforced the overall impact of majority rule in the elective process. Ironically, while the institution of the panchayat was ineffective, the net consequence of its introduction was to significantly alter power relationships within the village.

I was disappointed in this study for several reasons. Analyses of village politics have been undertaken for several decades in rural India, yet there is little evidence here that any significant methodological advances to systematic assessment have been made. Basically what was utilized in collecting data for the first six chapters of the study was the anthropological participant observer technique. All of the predictable limitations upon generalizations which arise out of a case study so defined are present. The final chapter discusses the impact of the General Election of 1967 on village politics. We are told that a systematic sample was drawn based upon the village voting list and a survey conducted. The presentation of data leaves much to be desired. In almost all instances only raw data are presented, with no percentages and few cross tabulations. Furthermore, since Somjee makes no attempt to assess the statistical significance of findings, the reader cannot evaluate his argument that national politics has had a "destructuring impact" upon the village.

The empirical findings of this study seem to support the view that planned, structural-institutional intervention is able to bring about significant changes in political behavior. Unfortunately this book does not make a contribution to the development of theory in this regard.

Ralph H. Retzlaff

The Agricultural Development Council, Inc., Singapore

Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes. 2nd edition. Introduction and Analysis by Harold J. Berman. Trans. by Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966, 1972. Pp. 399. $12.00.)

It is a pleasure to welcome the second edition of this fine volume. In its basic format the book remains unchanged. As before, it contains a good literal translation of three pieces of Soviet legislation—the RSFSR Criminal Code, the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Law on Court Organization of the RSFSR—*and* a long (125 pp.) introductory essay by Professor Berman, which treats such topics as the history of the codes and of changes in them and the role of the procuracy and of the legal profession in Soviet criminal law and procedure. The decision to prepare a new edition of this book just six years after the first one was prompted by the large number of changes made in Soviet criminal legislation during the interim, so many as to render the original translation obsolete.

Readers familiar with the first edition will also discover that the excellent introductory essay by Professor Berman now includes a new section on the criminal codes and criminal procedure codes of the other republics (written by Mr. William Butler), a more detailed discussion of the problems of translating Russian legal language (largely to answer critics of the first edition), and an extended chapter five "Changes in the 1960 RSFSR Codes, 1961–1971," (written with the collaboration of Mr. Butler). It is this chapter on recent changes in Soviet criminal and criminal procedure legislation which has particular interest for political scientists since it provides both an overview of trends in Soviet criminal policy of recent years and a useful analysis of the relevance of Soviet criminal legislation for the control of political dissidence.

In assessing trends in Soviet criminal policy during the 1960s, Professor Berman claims that despite some changes in the direction of leniency or of rationality, the general tendency was for penalties to be made harsher (p. 71). Without doubt this interpretation stands as a correct description of the decade of the 1960s as a whole; yet, in my view, it leaves a somewhat inaccurate impression of the direction of Soviet criminal policy during the second half of the 1960s and by implication in the early 1970s as well. The bulk of the changes in Soviet criminal law during the 1960s which increased the severity of punishment came in the first half of the decade, and, as Professor Berman indicates, constituted a reaction to the extreme leniency of some provisions included in the new code of 1960. This reaction, however, was short-lived, and the "law and order" mood of the early 1960s gave way in the later half of the decade to an *eclectic* criminal policy. Some of the measures introduced in these years resulted in harsher sanctions, others in milder ones; most shared the common aim of reducing and preventing crimes with whatever tactics seemed most likely to succeed in the light of current scholarship and practical experience.

Professor Berman's treatment of the legal control of dissent in the 1960s begins with an analysis of the changes in the criminal law prompted by the prosecutors' difficulties at the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial—changes which "now make it possible to catch almost any strong expression of political dissent" within the ambit of one or another provision of the criminal code" (p. 83). The discussion then proceeds to the procedural aspects of "political trials," a matter of considerable importance for the conflict between regime and dissenters. "The underlying dilemma," writes Berman, "is that the Soviet political authority seeks to legitimate its struggle against dissent by reliance upon the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, while the dissenters invoke the same codes to legitimate their opposition" (p. 89). Thus, Professor Berman puts in a nutshell the importance of Soviet criminal law and procedure for an understanding of dissent and its control in the USSR.

In its presentation as well as in its substance this book is a model of its kind. There is a comprehensive index (prepared by Malcom Hinden), as well as a glossary of Russian legal terminology, and appendices useful to the specialist.

PETER H. SOLOMON, JR.

University of Toronto

Angola. By Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier. (New York: Praeger, 1971. Pp. 296. $11.00.)

Most literature covering the anticolonial insurgencies that felled Portugal's *ancien regime* is lopsidedly Afro-centric. It slights the European dimension of wars which were ultimately "lost" in Portugal itself. The volume under review represents an important exception. Its first, longest (155 pp.), and most valuable section constitutes an excellent summary of European-African interaction during some five centuries of Portuguese presence. In it Professor Douglas L. Wheeler, a careful, thorough researcher, has drafted a clear and concise history drawing upon the full range of primary sources available before the coup of 1974.

Neglectful of neither the precolonial history of Angola nor the complex motives and patterns of Portuguese penetration, Wheeler presents a judicious, well-balanced overview. As background reading to the political drama of contemporary Angola these first six chapters are unexcelled. They reflect the patient labor of an historian who has dug deep in the archives, then organized and analyzed his data with dispassion. Especially insightful are Wheeler's appraisal of the role of Angolan *assimilados* (pp. 93–98) and his assessment of race relations (pp. 106–08, 111–115) in colonial society. His chapter on "Angola and the Republic, 1910–1926," suggests interesting historic parallels at a time when Portugal's Second Republic, 1974–?, no less troubled and fragile than the first, is trying to extricate itself from the wreckage of collapsed empire. Wheeler concludes his historical synthesis with a survey of Angola under Antonio Salazar's *Estado Novo* that focuses on the genesis of the impending clash between Portuguese and African nationalism.

The collision that ensued led, after thirteen years of insurgency, to the death of Portugal's Eurafrican illusions. René Pélissier, a French writer who has specialized in the military history of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking Africa, describes this collision of the 1960s in three chapters (pp. 159–239) that contrast sharply with those that precede. With a confident, often acid, pen he chronicles and judges, relying largely on inadequately acknowledged secondary sources and interviews with Portuguese military and government officials in Angola. The result is a provocative, sometimes insightful, but error-plagued and tendentious analysis of the first ten years of the Angolan war.

After noting quite properly that "any study of Angolan problems must be an exercise in scepticism" given the unreliability of documents, informants and reportage, Pélissier throws caution to the winds. His assertions and speculations are often plausible and intriguing but left unsupported by evidence: e.g., the notion that Lucio Lara (not Agostinho Neto) "is now perhaps the most active and important MPLA leader" (pp. 164–5); that the Congolese *Parti de la Solidarité Africaine* (PSA) was somehow implicated in Angolan affairs (pp. 167 and 174); that the American Committee on Africa helped to strengthen UPA "contacts with the Baptist Church" (p. 169); that "not only Angolans but a sizable number of troublemakers from the Léopoldville population" invaded northern Angola in March 1961 (p. 181); or that in spite of the war there was overall "a decided improvement in Angolan race relations" (p. 235). An uncritical acceptance of official Portuguese versions of events is the distorting variable. Pélissier relates as unquestioned fact reports of drugged insurgents massacring whites, *mestiços,* and ethnic rivals and derides nationalist leadership as unworthy and incompetent. The uprising of 1961 was "a caricature of a successful nationalist revolt" (p. 177). And occasionally, Pélissier's facts are clearly wrong. Rather than seeking to "rejoin" the MPLA (which he claims never to have belonged to) in 1964–65, the Ovimbundu leader, Jonas Savimbi, refused to join on terms offered and chose instead to form his own movement (p 224).

If one accepts Pélissier's work on its own terms, however, as a pungent, personally engaged critique of an African insurgency, its value is quickly apparent. His stress on ethnic disunity, leadership shortcomings, and strategic errors may be Gallic but is also insightful. For example, he writes tellingly of the UPA insurgency in northern Angola:

> It began with a massacre, and continued with a more skillful form of guerrilla warfare. The UPA enjoyed the support of the Bakongo masses but it had forced them to abandon their means of livelihood and, instead of

> making hundreds of thousands of combatants of them it only created refugees. More serious, the flight of the Bakongo into the bush, though giving it short-term support, deprived it of the indispensable complicity of a settled population, essential to a long struggle (p. 187).

Pélissier outlines timid administrative reforms such as the new labor code that followed the outbreak of hostilities in 1961, credits the nationalists with hastening their advent but at great human cost, and reflects on the irony of "a war which slowly exhausts Portugal" but infuses the purchasing power of 50,000 European soldiers, new settlers and foreign investment in mineral extraction, and thus "develops Angola" (p. 199). And in the light of subsequent events, Pélissier's assessment of the Portuguese military was prescient: he found "a lack of enthusiasm among some Portuguese officers" who, viewing victory as problematic, did not "go to the limit of their human and material resources" and suffered from bad morale (p. 230).

The volume ends with a short wrap-up chapter by Douglas Wheeler in which he underscores the economic development in Angola during the war years, argues that of all European colonizers the Portuguese "have maintained the friendliest and least race-conscious relations with black Africans" (and the French?) and concludes that nationalist divisions made the possibility of Angolan independence during the next decade "rather remote" (p. 250). Indeed, had nationalist insurgents in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique not been much more effective than their Angolan counterparts, had it all depended upon Angolan nationalists, such an assessment might have proved right on target. With sobering foresight, Wheeler conjectures that "if Angola were given independence tomorrow, the resulting loss of life might well make the Congo crisis of 1960–64 pale in comparison."

A series of well-designed maps, a useful, select bibliography, separate indices for names and subjects, and a table of Angolan organizations with their common abbreviations add to the usefulness of a volume of uneven but lasting merit.

JOHN MARCUM

University of California, Santa Cruz

Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 365. $3.95, paper.)

How successfully can social scientists predict the future? Of what value is the conference mode for doing so? Is it possible to compile a sensible volume based on the contributions of a diverse group of scholars? Insofar as domestic and international seminars appear to have become the hallmark of our time, and increasing numbers of books based on papers contributed to such meetings are being published, it is reassuring that, even though *Economics and World Order* was written before the Limits to Growth thesis and the energy crisis had burst upon us as the preoccupations of our generation, it is worthy of attention.

This volume, which deals with the wide range of issues implied by a futuristic look at the preferred world economic order in the years 1990–2000 and the paths by which an optimal society might be attained, had its origins in the World Order Models Project of the World Law Fund. By combining papers presented at a 1969 meeting in Northfield, Massachusetts, with a number of invited contributions and an introduction by Jagdish Bhagwati, who edited the papers, the volume seeks to be comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and consciousness-raising. To fill this tall order, of course, would have been a monumental task. What is surprising, therefore, is not that the book falls short of its objectives, but that it comes so close to fulfilling them.

In the lead article Bhagwati establishes parameters and makes clear that the primary economic value toward which the preferred world order should aim is better welfare for the world's poor people (a strong point of the volume is its emphasis on people rather than nations); he also asserts that international and intranational income disparities are near the center of the issue. Bhagwati's introduction mixes conventional and unconventional wisdom in dealing with issues such as foreign aid, brain drain, science and technology, and it concludes with the questionable propositions that world famine is unlikely and that world population growth will gradually diminish and is no cause for alarm.

Subsequent articles by P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan and Thomas Weisskopf present traditional liberal and New Left perspectives, respectively, on the outlook for the poor. Each contribution, in its own way, has an air of unreality: Rosenstein-Rodan brilliantly and succinctly describes the evolution of economic disparities since 1800 and the steps needed to narrow them in the next several decades, but he leaves the reader without any feeling for whether, or to what extent, the needed steps will be taken; Weisskopf's argument is so heavily laden with assertion and value judgment that it requires an act of faith to agree with his thesis that elites will "ultimately give way to revolutionary movements" (p. 66). Similarly, the two articles contributed by socialist authors, Jozef Pajestka and Lev V. Stepanov, are unlikely to move readers other than those who are already committed. These contributions both suffer badly from (1) the false assumption that only doctrinaire socialism has the capacity to satisfy social values and (2) the authors' felt need to make as many unkind comments about capitalism as possible.

The next four articles provide meaty, if not always balanced, analysis of the role of international institutions. The late Stephen Hymer has written a trenchant attack on the social and economic impact of multinational corporations, unfortunately not paired with another article taking the opposite viewpoint. Both Harry Johnson's analysis of international trade and payments arrangements and Robert Triffin's discussion of how the world monetary system should and may become substantially more internationalized by the year 2000 are workmanlike and comprehensive. These pieces have the particular virtues of first, not being dominated by the theme of how the situation of poor countries can be aided irrespective of other goals and, second, taking a serious view of how growing international interdependence has led to—and may continue to lead to—a better world order. Jan Tinbergen has written a faintly optimistic essay and, in dealing with the "development decade" concept and various global development strategies, he seeks to broaden the perspective in which the issues of development are considered.

The last third of the book, which deals with the new world order from the perspective of various developing regions, is uneven. It includes articles on Latin America by Osvaldo Sunkel and Carlo Diaz-Alejandro, on Africa by Dharam Ghai and Ali Mazrui, on China by Shigeru Ishikawa, and on India by Pitambar Pant. These regional views are instructive, particularly the analyses of Dias-Alejandro and Mazrui, but they often fail to go beyond a regional perspective. (For example, more is made of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market than is justified by economic theory or prospective economic or political relationships among the countries concerned.) To the extent that the authors of these regional articles are especially prone to wishful thinking, have differing values, and do not clearly define the objectives to be reached by the end of the century or the paths for moving in those directions, these papers illustrate the inevitable problems which dog any effort to deal with futuristic and hard subjects. Similarly, these and earlier articles deal with isms such as capitalism with little feeling for the impurity of the systems as actually practiced. Illustratively, there is no effort anywhere in the book to distinguish differences among non-Communist industrialized countries or to recognize the prevalence of mixed economic systems.

The great strength of this book, aside from its presentation of a stimulating panoply of related ideas, is that it makes a coherent case for rapid social change and suggests the means whereby it may occur. Although Bhagwati and his coauthors could not have foreseen the realignment of world economic power which followed the 1973 Middle East War and could not have known that the Third World political coalition in the United Nations would loom as a potential power as early as 1974, they have addressed their respective subjects at a level which makes these real-world events understandable. The happy explanation for this is that most of the articles are written from more than a narrow economic perspective; they are broadly based in the world of political economy and focus on issues which are so critical that they are bound to remain relevant.

LAWRENCE A. VEIT

Council on Foreign Relations

The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation. By Hedley Bull. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 15. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973. Pp. 50. No price indicated.)

This brief study of the 1972 SALT agreements undertakes first to measure them against the goals of arms control. In considering whether they have reduced the likelihood of war, Hedley Bull does not discuss the common assertion that the very placing of limits on arms has decreased tension and the likelihood of war; he has long criticized the notion that arms races, as such, cause wars. Rather, he concerns himself primarily with how the agreements have affected the possibility of a partial disarming strike by one side. Professor Bull shows very well (p. 13) how the agreements have not enhanced second-strike deterrence; he concludes that limiting the vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles is the most important task of present negotiations. Bull's own suggestions are not, however, very promising. Bull goes on to refute concisely the widespread belief that the Moscow accords enshrine the purely deterrent strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction. Indeed, the SALT accords have, since Bull wrote, probably contributed somewhat to acceptance of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's "counterforce" strategy.

Turning to the political meaning of the Moscow agreements, Bull concludes that "the terms of the interim agreement [on offensive forces] are remarkably one-sided" in favor of the Soviet Union. But critics' fears of the agreements' effects on American attitudes towards her allies are very exaggerated, even if their "general thrust" is correct. Bull mentions only in passing the possibly much more important question of allied attitudes towards the United States.

Bull's presentation of SALT clarifies the issue very impressively. The reader may wonder, however, whether some further motives and results should not have been treated. To take the simplest examples, Bull does not choose to discuss the evident attempt of each side to disarm the other's superiority (Soviet missile payload, American ABM technology). When the Soviets brought up American Forward-Based Systems in Europe and "provocative attacks" by third powers, they may have shown a second intent to sow trouble between a nation and its allies. Another, less fully intentional, result of the SALT negotiations has been an *increase,* rather than a decrease, in many weapons. Formal comparison calls attention to weak areas; new weapons are cultivated as bargaining chips for negotiations and as payoffs to bureaucratic groups for supporting an agreement. Examples are the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, and cruise missiles. These side-effects of SALT may in turn have important consequences for future arms control. Cruise missiles, for instance, may reopen the question of air defense and make limited nuclear strategies more feasible. Both cruise missiles and the B-1 will make U.S. strategic forces more asymmetrical with the Soviet missile force and may tend to increase negotiating complications and uncertainties about the political effects of the strategic balance: it will be harder to guess whether the overall strategic balance or the missile balance is the politically relevant fact. Time has also seen the ambiguities in the SALT terms grow into charges of cheating; this is another of the aspects of SALT which the author surely perceived but chose not to explore, whether for brevity or because of his focus on arms control. But one of the things the student of arms control wants to know is whether arms control agreements are the best way to achieve arms control. This is the question raised by the secondary effects of SALT discussed above. It is a question that Bull does not address. As a consequence, he did not write as interesting a study as he could have written, although it does furnish those interested in arms control or in U.S.-Soviet relations an unusually clear-headed evaluation of the SALT agreements.

CHARLES H. FAIRBANKS, JR.
Yale University

Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations (Volume 4—1973). Edited by Lucius C. Caflisch. (Geneva: The Alumni Association of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1973. Pp. 372. Belgian francs 400.)

This fourth volume in the series *Annals of International Studies* is an ably edited and relatively comprehensive collection of essays on the law of the sea and related problems. Though its publication came too early for its contributors to have taken into account the actual proceedings of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Hydrospace in International Relations* ranks high among books dealing with the problems of ocean space. The fourteen essays, authored by some of the most distinguished scholars in the field, are almost all clearly written and well documented. They are substantial enough to interest the specialist. At the same time, they provide the uninitiated with a broad and systematic overview of the complex issues associated with the law of the sea.

The essays, reflecting the interests and perspectives of a variety of academic disciplines and geographic areas, are divided into three general groups. Under "general topics" are included papers on the interests of the developing countries by Ram P. Anand, on Latin American interests by Ralph Zacklin, and on the interests of the land and shelf-locked states by Vladimir Ibler. Under "special topics" are included two papers on strategic and military problems—demilitarization and denuclearization of the oceans by Edward D. Brown, and Western European interests in the Indian Ocean by Jacques Freymond; two on economic problems—ocean resources and global mineral supplies by Richard L. Gordon, and the importance of nodule mining to the world nickel industry by Herbert D. Drechsler; and five relating specifically to legal problems—coastal state jurisdiction by Leo J. Bouchez, the archipelagos problem by Geoffrey Marston, marine fisheries by Albert W. Koers, oil pollution by Lucius Caflisch, and the General Assembly's "Declaration of Principles" (1970) by Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Under "the future regime of hydrospace" are included two papers—on the creation of an international machinery to manage the seabed by Moritaka Hayashi, and on the law of sea-mining by Louis Henkin. The book also includes an appendix containing a number of useful documents pertaining to sea law.

Much that has transpired at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was anticipated in these papers. The Conference, which was launched as an effort to rewrite the law of the sea, quickly expanded into a confrontation between the rich industrial states and the poor "third world" states over the political and economic reconstruction of the global order. The confrontation has been particularly harsh with respect to the creation of a regime of the deep-seabed and ocean floor (the area lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction of coastal states), where vast quantities of valuable ferromanganese nodules are known to lie. Most of the papers in this volume reflect this rich-poor controversy, testifying to the enormous political (and ideological) handicap under which this Conference has labored.

Anand's paper ("Interests of the Developing Countries and the Developing Law of the Sea") describes sympathetically the grievances and the goals of the developing countries. The grievances are the familiar ones of poverty, the growing "development gap," and the inequitable distribution of world resources, for which the developed countries are held responsible, at least in part. The goals are, first, to secure for the developing states "the largest possible share of the resources of the seabed" (p. 23), by extending the scope of the territorial sea, for example, or by establishing an economic resource zone within which coastal states would exercise more or less exclusive control of both living and non-living resources to a distance of 200 miles from land; and second, to deny whatever is left to the developed states. This last is to be achieved by embodying in the new legal regime of the high seas the principle that the resources of the deep oceans (particularly the mineral resources of the ocean floor) are the "common heritage of mankind," to be exploited for the common good—most especially, for the good of the developing countries. Anand is aware of the contradictions in these goals: claims by developing *coastal* states to mammoth economic resource zones rather substantially diminish the area of sea space remaining for the "common heritage"—or for the developing *landlocked* states. But in remarking that the developing countries "have stood solidly behind this concept" (p. 22) of the common heritage, he may have overstated their unanimity and underestimated the degree to which the concept has been drained of any meaning—to no small extent by the "selfish" actions of the developing countries themselves.

The irony in the dispute between developed and developing states over control of ocean resources is that the only major resource with any chance of becoming the property of all mankind—the ferromanganese nodules—may result in the enrichment of very few. The nodules, which carpet up to 25 per cent of the ocean floor, do contain rich concentrations of many metals, chief among them copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. And there are estimates that US investments in nodule mining alone may exceed $6 billion before the end of the century. But much of the excitement over nodule mining rests on the assumption that terrestrial supplies of these minerals are limited and, in some cases, approaching exhaustion. Gordon's paper ("Ocean Resources and World Mineral Supplies") casts considerable doubt on the "exhaustion" theory, arguing that the "resource pessimists" have simply not proved their case. Ocean miners (and public policy makers), he points out, should not bank on increasing scarcity to raise prices to such levels as are required to compensate for the high costs of deep ocean mining. For if the assumption of mineral scarcity proves unwarranted, so may ocean mining. Essentially the same point is made by Drechsler ("The Significance of Nodule Mining to the World Nickel Industry"). Noting that estimated world reserves of nickel (one of the most valuable components of the nodules) rose from 16 to 75 million tons in the 10-year period 1963–1973—an amount "sufficient for 125 years at the estimated 1970 world production rate of 600,000 tons" (p. 133)—Drechsler concludes that "there is little reason to expect that many nodule mines will be producing nickel before the year 2000" (p. 139).

The supreme irony, of course, is that the global struggle to control these seabed resources has outstripped in intensity virtually every other issue before the Third United Nations Conference. Even if the nodules one day prove of great value, as many believe they will, they are today nowhere mined commercially and their future value remains largely speculative. The law of the sea is stalked today as much by the ocean's unknown future as by its known past.

The book has a number of limitations. Some topics (e.g., economic resources) are treated at considerable length and from several perspectives, while others (e.g., preservation of the marine environment, the straits question, and scientific research) are only barely touched upon. Several papers (e.g., Caflisch, "Some Aspects of Oil Pollution from Merchant Ships") will appeal only to those steeped in the legalisms of marine jurisprudence. Two of the shorter papers are in French, which may authenticate the multinational character of the volume, but at the expense of its full accessibility to American readers. Unavoidably, the swift passage of events in the realm of ocean law has "dated" some of the materials considered. But there are enough outstanding papers in this volume to reward the reader amply. Indeed, this may well be the best general collection of essays on the international problems of the oceans yet published.

ROBERT G. WIRSING
University of South Carolina

The Communist International, 1919–1943. By John Lewis Evans. (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Pageant-Poseidon Ltd., 1973. Pp. 194. $7.95.)

Outline History of the Communist International. By the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971. Pp. 563. $5.00.)

Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy. By Helmut Gruber. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974. Pp. 544. $3.95, paper.)

The Third International or Comintern was indeed a strange historical phenomenon. As conceived by Lenin in 1916, it was designed to replace what he felt was a bankrupted Second International which had betrayed socialism when many of its members and constituent groups supported national ambitions in World War I. Enunciated in Lenin's April Thesis, the concept of a Third International became part of the Russian Bolshevik's revolutionary program in 1917. Revolution and Civil War, however, delayed its founding until March, 1919 when the poorly attended Organizational Congress of the Comintern met in Moscow. Viewed by many western Socialists as something less than desirable, the Third International was from the beginning dominated by Russian leadership. The organization had two integrated objectives. Publicly the Comintern was to plan, promote, and direct the pending world socialist revolution. Its unpublicized objective was to aid the Bolshevik's Civil War effort against the White Armies and foreign interventionists, and thus help to protect the socialist experiment in Soviet Russia. As Helmut Gruber writes: "In one of those strange ironies of history the Comintern was both inspired by and the victim of the Russian Revolution" (p. 509).

Until it was quietly and mercifully dissolved in May, 1943, the Comintern had a long and inglorious record of failures both as a socialist international and after 1925, as an organizational tool of Stalin's foreign policy. Even its limited accomplishments were ephemeral and in the end proved to be ideologically destructive to the dream of a world socialist order.

In recent years considerable interest in the Comintern has been shown by Western historians and political scientists, and a number of excellent analyses and accounts have appeared. For example, one thinks immediately of the work produced by Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch (*Lenin and the Comintern*, Stanford, 1972), and of the documentary collections edited by Jane Degras (*The Communist International 1919–1943: Documents*, London and New York, 1956, 1960, Vol. I: 1919–1922, Vol. II: 1923–1928). It would be nice to be able to report that the three volumes being reviewed here have something to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Comintern and its activities. Unfortunately, that is only the case with one of them.

Evans's *The Communist International, 1919–1943* is a book which really has to be read to be believed because no review could ever do it justice. After the first chapter the reader's reaction is one of shock and wonder as to why anything of this quality should have been published. After the second chapter, one is simply disgusted and appalled thinking of the number of trees sacrificed to produce the paper for this volume. By chapter three, however, the reader can settle down and begin to enjoy this book in a masochistic sort of way. One approaches each new page with satanic anticipation as to how many spelling errors and misprints will be counted (e.g., Li Tao-chao for Li Ta-chao, p. 96; Kugomintang for Kuomintang, p. 93), and what odd commentary will be found next. For example:

> The future fate of the Third International was very closely tied up with domestic events

> in Russia. Lenin asked the Zimmerwald Union, to which the Left tenuously adhered, to help bring pressure on the socialist groups in Russia to withdraw their support from the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks led the Zimmerwald Left, and they were to lead all Russia. There was just no end to their achievements; a new international would make them rulers of the whole world, and it was inconceivable that it could fail. After November, 1917, the term Zimmerwald Left was dropped and Bolshevik took its place (pp. 21–22).

> The international Bolshevik movement did not go out of existence on May 15, 1943. It stayed alive and is alive today. However, the aspect of world Bolshevism that was called the Comintern ceased to exist after 1943 (p. 176).

Although promoted as an overall history of the Third International, the book in its own mysterious way deals primarily with Comintern activities in Germany, France, China, and Spain. Even in the best books the Spanish and Chinese Civil War situations are recognized as highly complex. Here they are treated in such a disjointed manner that the complexity becomes chaotic.

Unless the reader possesses a fair knowledge of international communist activities he will find this book nearly incomprehensible. One reason is that the work is so poorly organized. Paragraphs often seem to be inserted at random, with no relevance to what came before or to what follows. Biographical sketches, which belong in footnotes, are interpolated into the text effectively ruining whatever continuity the section attempted to maintain. According to the publisher, the book is a revision of the author's M.A. thesis. One can only charitably assume that it is a thesis sadly mutilated by scissors and paste, and then further disfigured by editorial incompetence. If the thesis contained any new material or original analysis, it was certainly lost before the work found its way into print. According to the bibliography, the book is based almost entirely on secondary sources, and even these are too often handled in a rather cavalier fashion. In his conclusion the author writes: "In the history of the Third International from 1915–1943, three periods of its activities have been distinguished, *although not always clearly*" (p. 176). To that one can only add, Amen!

The *Outline History of the Communist International* is mistitled "A Detailed and Exhausting History . . ." would be more appropriate. Here the reader will find more minutiae on the Comintern than he or she ever wanted to know: all presented in an agonizingly pedantic style. It is a typically Soviet historical study, produced by a committee of eight authors headed by A. I. Sobolev, with an obvious ideological bias.

Every phase of Comintern development and all personages involved are portrayed as dictated by the correct Party line as of 1971, the date of publication. This is the Comintern's history as seen in the Brezhnev-Kosygin period of interpretation. Here one finds the wise, all-knowing Lenin skillfully establishing a theoretical and organizational structure for world revolutionary leadership. There is the pragmatic, but slightly overbearing Stalin dexterously formulating and implementing Comintern policies and activities. Then, of course, there is the muddle-headed, diabolical Trotsky subverting the Comintern with his mistaken permanent revolution theories and insatiable political ambition. In this study the Comintern's problems seldom, if ever, originate in Moscow but arise from ineffective implementation in the field because of local Communists' inexperience, ignorance, or corrupting nationalistic attitudes.

The western reader will regard the volume's interpretations and analyses of events with incredulity. One example will suffice. In 1943 the fact that the Comintern was arbitrarily abolished by Stalin because it had become an embarrassment to the Soviet Union's war-time alliance with the capitalist West is not mentioned. Instead the *Outline History* tells us that the Comintern was abolished only after long deliberation among party representatives from around the world who finally voted *unanimously* for dissolution because "under the conditions of the war the existence of the Communist International was used by the reactionaries to slander the Soviet Union and the communist parties of the different countries" (p. 512).

The final chapter of the *Outline History,* entitled "Traditions of the Comintern and the Present-Day Communist Movement," lays great stress on the heritage of the organization in creating international solidarity among the world proletariat and the downtrodden masses, and on its legacy for a bright future of world communism under the guidance and leadership of the USSR. Then, near the end, the authors inform us that

> a heavy blow to the unity of the world communist movement has been dealt by the Mao Tse-tung group, which has sunk to anti-Leninist positions and is pursuing a Left-

> ist adventurist policy of great-power chauvinism in the international arena and the world communist movement.
>
> The opportunist degeneration of Mao Tse-tung and his group is a logical evolution and consummation of their erroneous political and theoretical views which the Comintern had once combated (p. 558).

So much for the heritage of communist international solidarity and for the Comintern's legacy to the modern world!

After Evans and the *Outline History* one turns with relief to Gruber's *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern*. Although making no really new contribution to historical knowledge, this volume does provide a good coverage of the 1924–1929 period. It is the second volume in Gruber's projected trilogy on the fate of international communism from World War I to 1939. The first volume, *International Communism in the Era of Lenin,* appeared in 1967 and received generally favorable criticism. We now await volume three on *International Communism in the Shadow of Fascism.*

The basic theme of this book is obvious from the title. The years 1924 to 1929 witnessed the complete bolshevization of the Comintern. The organization was turned away from its international objectives, becoming merely an additional vehicle to further the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. The Comintern was indeed forced by Stalin to align its activities with his doctrine of "Socialism in One Country"—a transformation closely associated with Stalin's own triumphant rise to totalitarian power within the Soviet political structure. Although Stalin must bear primary responsibility for the Comintern's character in the second half of the 1920s, Professor Gruber emphasizes that Stalin was working from a contradictory theoretical base for the Third International established by Lenin in the early 1920s.

> The Comintern's move toward a more hierarchical structure was in part a continuation of precedents established by Lenin who, in an attempt to avoid the lack of focus and indiscipline of the Second International, sought to transfer the rigid organization of his bolshevik party to the Third International. The bolshevik leaders of the Comintern chose to build on these precedents in part because all of Leninist practice had already been mystified and given the force of law by those struggling for the succession (pp. 506–507).

Trotsky too must share the responsibility for the bolshevization of the Comintern. His much publicized opposition to Stalin's foreign policy and Comintern activities came after the bolshevization process had become irrevocable, and only when the organization was displaying an ineptitude which could no longer be ignored.

This volume is divided into two parts. The first deals with the bolshevization process and the second with "the Comintern and Colonial Peoples." The two parts are each divided into three sections. For example, part two covers the theoretical ambiguity of the Comintern's approach to the colonial empires in Africa and Asia, and then moves on to investigate in depth China as the "Waterloo of Comintern colonial policy: prologue and dénouement."

Gruber's comments on China in the 1920s are perceptive and interesting. Stalin's Comintern policy for China displayed a wide ranging incompetence that is almost uncanny. If a wrong option was available, it was selected. If a false reading and analysis of the situation could be made, it was done. If bad and misleading counsel to the Communist Party of China was conceived in Moscow, it was always given. When the ailing fortunes of the CCP finally reached rock bottom after 1927, it was the Soviets' view that the "inept leadership" of the Chinese party had to accept the blame. The Comintern/Stalin policy could never have been wrong. It is little wonder that Mao Tse-tung developed a healthy suspicion in the 1920s that Moscow might not be the fountainhead of all wisdom; that Stalin's aid and advice was determined first and foremost by Soviet national interests; and that the welfare and success of foreign communist parties was a low priority in the Kremlin. The bitter seeds of the Sino-Soviet dispute had been deeply planted.

Each section of the Gruber book is introduced by a clear, carefully constructed historical essay followed by a selection of documents chosen to illustrate the basic tenets set forth in the essay. The sections end with a brief selection of "further readings." The volume also contains a helpful selected general bibliography and a very competent and useful index. This work can be recommended without hesitation as a sound introductory text on international communism in the 1920s. It should prove useful as collateral reading in courses on the history of Soviet foreign policy.

Readers may recall that during the 1920s western reaction to the Comintern was one of apprehension and concern: "The Great Red Scare." Looked at historically, an amused response might have been more appropriate. Nevertheless, the Comintern was an interesting experiment and a fascinating institution. The three volumes reviewed above have a certain fascination of their own in demonstrating how an historical occurrence can be discussed and evaluated from different ideological positions, and from divergent bases of intellectual preparation.

JOHN W. STRONG

Carleton University, Ottawa

Regionale Verflechtung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme. By the Forschungsinstitutes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, e.V. Bonn, Band 33. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973. Pp. 311, DM 34.00.)

One of the remarkable phenomena that attended the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) has been the resurgence of interest in international politics and economics. Long before the *Wirtschaftswunder* started to take effect, associations and societies concerned with international affairs, foreign policy, and related matters mushroomed in Germany. Some of these attained national repute. The *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,* in particular, became internationally renowned. Indeed, its right arm, the Research Institute has become an outstanding source of reference in the study of international politics.

The book under review, the Institute's latest accomplishment, consists of twelve essays produced by a variety of authors. The collective enterprise was initiated by Waldemar Besson, well-known for his expertise in and publications on the Federal Republic's foreign policy. The untimely death of Besson, a few years ago, did not cause the ambitious project to founder. By then workshops had been established in which a number of highly qualified political scientists and political executives were to participate. Although care was taken to blend the theoretical and practical approaches, the executive group (generally those who face the day-to-day problems resulting from the BRD's involvement in regional organizations) contributed disproportionally to the undertaking. The list of executives participating in the workshops included names well-known to the German public such as Katherina Focke, Ellinor von Puttkamer, and Per Fischer. Their contributions, however, have in a sense remained invisible because the task of formulating the results of the workshops was often left to lesser luminaries. Also, one cannot help thinking that the executive group should have been balanced by the inclusion of scholars who through their writings made clearly visible imprints on the discipline. One wonders why Heinrich End and Uwe Nerlich were not included in either panels or papers. Even more curious is the omission of Dr. Helga Haftendorn, who was associated with the Research Institute for several years, and who has recently established herself as a foremost authority in the field through her monumental book *Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik zwischen Sicherheitsbefriedigung und Friedenssicherung.*

The mix of "officials, politicians and theoreticians" (as Reinhard Lohrmann classifies the contributors in a brief foreword) has naturally affected approach and performance. Diversity and unevenness invariably attend collective intellectual endeavors, but in this instance the problem might have been overcome to some extent had a general editor been made responsible for structuring and disciplining the *Schriften.* Since no one appears to have assumed that role, the essays vary widely in theme, tenor and treatment. Thus Erwin Häckel's essay that immediately follows the Foreword is highly theoretical, attempting to arrive at a conceptualization of regional alignment (the latter term, rather than *entanglement* would seem preferable, at least in this context, as a translation of *Verflechtung*). One may not always agree with Häckel. The assumption, e.g., that regional organizations may be viewed as useful and necessary vehicles in the development of world unity has been thoroughly eroded by recent experiences, and is certainly no longer as prevalent as its *auctor intellectualis* (Etzioni) maintained at the time (p. 31).

However that may be, Häckel represents Academe *in optima forma.* The essay on the European Communities and the Federal Republic of Germany which appears to concentrate on the *Verflechtung* (in this instance to be translated as *integration*) of the national and the community policies, conveys the view of an official, and perhaps also the official view. The author, Dr. Ulrich Everling, at the time of writing a top official of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Finance, bases his arguments by and large on German source material, some of it included in articles which he himself contributed to scholarly journals.

The *Schriften* thus explore the position and the commitments of the *Bundesrepublik* in their regional context. They by and large address themselves to the assets and liabilities resulting from NATO- and EEC-membership, the intricacies of the *Bundesrepublik*'s position and its relation to its partners. The American reader in particular will be intrigued by the

German perception of the organizational politics of defense. Then again, he may be struck by the fact that no mention at all is made of the important policy differences between the USA and the BRD, particularly during the Kennedy administration when the relationship between Germany and its allies had virtually reached its nadir. The philosophy behind burden sharing (the *Leitmotiv* during the Nixon years) is also analyzed from the German perspective (in Wilfried Hofmann's essay, pp. 143–65).

Finally, one has to bear in mind that although a timely analysis of the *Bundesrepublik*'s involvement in regional organization must be applauded, its usefulness may be limited in terms of time. Perhaps one should not exaggerate the built-in obsolescence of contemporary assessments; but the new Europe changes fast, and any analysis of any aspect of its structure may appear dated within a few years. To mention but one example: most of the preparatory work of the *Schriften* had been conducted before the Europe of Six changed into a Europe of Nine. What relevance, one must ask, do the problems of the former set have to those of the latter?

In sum, the present volume is destined to remain relatively obscure in the United States. As things stand, it appears unlikely that German and American scholarship will experience a *Verflechtung* that would make the book required reading in graduate course work on this side of the Atlantic. Its contents will not make waves, its sources (unfortunately, the volume lacks an index as well as a bibliography) are not likely to be cited in future papers or brandished at future conventions. This is unfortunate because a book that has been the fruit of so much specialist effort deserves a better fate.

Henri J. Warmenhoven
Virginia Commonwealth University

Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. By Louis Henkin. (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, 1972. Pp. 553. $11.50.)

In *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* Louis Henkin seeks to fill a void of long standing. He maintains that while there have been distinguished studies of presidential or congressional power in foreign affairs, they permit "only peripheral vision . . . of the rest of the scene" (p. ix). Quincy Wright gave a broad overview in his work, but new considerations have arisen in the half-century since it appeared. Failure to fill the void stems from the notion that constitutional law counts for little in foreign affairs, the fact the Court has said little in the area, etc. In his mind the effects are costly, for although the role of politics in foreign affairs is ample, the politics itself is often shaped by the Constitution.

Mr. Henkin argues that the "abiding uncertainties" turn on the distribution of political powers between President and Congress "singly and together, in conflict and cooperation" (p. 10). Other areas also generate constitutional questions: international organizations, the role of the states and courts, individual rights. Let us say a word on his discussion of these lesser areas of controversy before we turn to his analysis of the greater.

America's participation in international organizations has posed no significant difficulties in Mr. Henkin's view. Obligations fall on the American government, not individual citizens. The government is under no *constitutional* obligation to honor any treaty. Should future participation impinge directly on individuals within the United States new constitutional issues, without precedent, would arise.

Mr. Henkin holds that judicial review, which has had a small role on questions of states rights or Separation, and a more substantial one on individual rights, "has flourished as the courts have staunchly upheld the supremacy of treaties and of acts of Congress or of the President over inconsistent state action" (p. 210). He gives a lucid exposition of the *Sabbatino* case, with its implication for Act of State doctrine and determination of international law for the states.

He feels that federalism showed its limitations in foreign affairs long before it "began to be a wasting asset in American life generally" (p. 228). Problems arise, for example over the distinction between the Treaty denied the State and the Agreement or Compact, with Congress's consent, allowed it. Mr. Henkin's main theme is the limitations of state power, as under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, and the additional restraints implied in *Zschernig* v. *Miller*. He believes, nevertheless, in the "abiding relevance of federalism" derivative in part from constitutional, in larger part from political, considerations.

In the final area of lesser controversy, the author stresses that Mr. Justice Sutherland exempted foreign affairs "from the rigors of limitations on delegation inherent in the separation of powers" in *Curtiss-Wright*, but affirmed the applicability of other constitutional limitations. Their vitality is evident in cases which turn on individual rights, e.g., the bearing of due process on the right to travel abroad or of "just compensation" on more generous leeway for the Court of Claims in instances of "taking for public use."

The major areas of controversy with which Mr. Henkin is concerned stem from the fact that in domestic affairs the constitutional consequences of Separation are more or less agreed; in foreign affairs they are determined by no "natural" division. "As they have evolved, the foreign relations powers appear not so much 'separated' as fissured, along jagged lines indifferent to classical categories of government" (p. 32).

The most jagged of these lines is that between the "President's conduct of foreign relations, including the use of force for foreign policy purposes, and the power of Congress to declare for war" (p. 100). However, as a "matter of constitutional doctrine" the President "begins to exceed his authority only if he wilfully and recklessly moves the nation toward war, and a responsible President, loyal to his constitutional oath, should stop, or seek the authorization of Congress" (p. 100). Happily "that constitutional issue is becoming hypothetical for it is increasingly difficult to make an authentic case that the President has taken the country into war without Congressional authorization in advance or ratification soon after" (100–101).

Under Mr. Henkin's analysis it is less the constitutional issue that is likely to become hypothetical than the ability of Congress to make effective its constitutional responsibilities. Once any considerable number of Americans is engaged in military action through presidential initiative, Congress may find itself faced with a Hobson's choice if it seeks to exercise its check by reduction of appropriations or through disengagement. The attempted exercise of constitutional responsibilities in the former instance risks imposition of unbearable burdens on America's fighting forces; in the latter it is undermined by the inability of a state to terminate conflict through its sole initiative.

"A President can insist that the 'line' between war and foreign policy by means short of war is the constitutional imperative delimiting his domain from that of Congress," Mr. Henkin asserts. But this hardly resolves the dilemma. Is the President true to his oath when he draws that line as broadly as he deems necessary, barring explicit withdrawal of congressional support, or is he under obligation to draw it strictly, through the changing phases of its exercise, in the absence of specific congressional authorization? Here Mr. Henkin's clarity in formulation of the issue is not matched by clarity in its resolution.

In his conclusion the author rightly discounts proposals that seek remedies through drastic amendments or the denial of power, and puts his emphasis on more effective legislative-executive *modus vivendi et operandi* and the more balanced exercise of power.

Mr. Henkin's book makes a notable contribution to the task of building a new national consensus in foreign affairs, as much by its tone as by its terms. Its hallmark is concern to weigh competing claims with scrupulous care. In lucidity, comprehensiveness, and thoroughness, it offers rich resources to us all.

WHITTLE JOHNSTON

University of Virginia

The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History. By Ray Jones. (New York: Humanities Press, 1971. Pp. 224. $11.00.)

This is a contribution to the history of the British civil service. The main themes addressed are the division of labor within the Foreign Office between intellectual and mechanical work; the devolution of work from the under-secretary to the junior clerks; and the regulation of admission to the service by competitive but limited examinations. The changing responsibilities and status of the posts within the hierarchy are chartered and explained, including the decline of the Chief Clerk and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. The importance of having been Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary in connection with rising to the position of Permanent Under-Secretary is incidentally brought out, as is the hold of the Private Secretary on appointments and consequently on the character of the Office. There is a useful appendix and, in chapter 2, some tables, providing biographical information about Clerks recruited between 1824 and 1906. All the relevant material has been used, some of it for the first time, and the bibliography is particularly well presented.

The picture that emerges is of a rather inbred institution with a distinct sense of identity, highly conscious of the differences between it and other departments and determined to maintain them; of a body of men making from time to time adjustments to their working routine which kept the Office always slightly behind the times. In this perspective, reduced in many respects to its proper proportions, the Foreign Office is revealed as concerned less with *la* *haute politique* than with administering itself, and as engaged in a rearguard action lasting fifty years to withstand the leveling influence of a Treasury determined that the F.O. Establishment should cost the country as little as possible and consistently refusing to countenance increases in personnel simply because the volume of business was otherwise unmanageable. The impression given is that the Foreign Office was there, like the cavalry in war, to give tone to what would otherwise be an unseemly brawl.

The author is not concerned with the impact on foreign policy of the developments he describes. He assumes too much when he says (p. 143) that foreign policy was formulated within the administrative arrangements he has investigated. It is doubtful whether this was the case even after the Reforms which took effect from 1 January 1906 and for which Lord Lansdowne and the "old guard" of Sanderson and Villiers here get the credit they deserve. As it is, no symbolic value is attached to the fact that the Cabinet ceased to meet in a room in the Foreign Office late in 1856. Nevertheless, this is a valuable work of reference, to be placed alongside the Foreign Office Lists. Many historians will have reason to be grateful to Dr. Jones for his work in this field.

Keith Wilson

University of Leeds, England

The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present. By Morton A. Kaplan. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1973. Pp. 94. $3.00, paper.)

The first half of the book deals with the origins and early developments of NATO. On the whole, this part is a well balanced, level-headed analysis of American and Soviet postwar policies with an emphasis on the French-German dichotomy and its impact on US relations to Europe.

One would also agree with Professor Kaplan in his assessment of NATO's problems in the 'seventies. While the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact (WTO) allies keep increasing their military capabilities in an apparent preparation for a blitz-like, hard and sudden strike against the West, the NATO countries stick to their old-time strategy of a defence based on gradual mobilization and a slow conventional build-up.

There is also logic reasoning in his proposition that if the countries in the West are unable to respond quickly and effectively to a blitz-strike from the East, they should look for ways to slow down the delay and thus gain time to mobilize.

Doubts and objections start cropping up, however, when Professor Kaplan proceeds to discuss the practical measures which he recommends to implement his dissuasion strategy. Partly to avoid a Soviet first strike on nuclear sites, partly to convince the East Europeans that NATO would not hit back at the US and its national territories, Kaplan feels that the United States should withdraw its 250 Pershing missiles for tactical nuclear delivery from Central Europe. He also feels that the quick reaction aircraft (QRA) designed for nuclear strikes, should be withdrawn. As a compensation he suggests "a more credible linkage" of the Polaris/Poseidon nuclear forces and a further development of USA's quick-transfer capability.

First, given the present Soviet military deployment in Eastern Europe, one wonders how the Warsaw Pact allies could feel assured that a NATO response would hit Soviet forces only, with no damage to their own territories. Moreover, although the WTOs might prefer to sit on the sidelines in a NATO-USSR confrontation, it seems very unlikely that the Soviet Union would allow them to do so. So far from growing looser, the Soviet grip on its Eastern European allies has become harder and firmer since the Czech crisis in 1968, partly through a de facto acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine, partly as a result of increasing Western weakness and growing Soviet strength.

Second, while the suggested withdrawals probably would leave the WTOs undissuaded, their effect on US's West European allies might be quite serious. The rationale for NATO—as they see it — is to provide a credible US support to the defence of Western Europe. Their long-standing worries about a substantial reduction of US troops in Europe have been further augmented by such detente measures as SALT I, which made many of them question the long-term validity of America's strategic deterrence. Should the local nuclear deterrence also be weakened by a withdrawal of major means for tactical nuclear delivery, the West Europeans might see it as another indication of a gradual US "thinning out" process in Western Europe.

One traces in this book a perception of Europe, which though widely shared, may not reflect the situation. The West Europeans may comply with American withdrawal policies such as those suggested by Dr. Kaplan, but the long-term psychological effect on their evaluation of the US as a European mainstay may prove more important than the short-term gains from limited withdrawal arrangements. In this, as in many other respects, his book provides a useful illustration.

NILS ØRVIK

Queen's University, Ontario

Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution. By John T. McAlister, Jr. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971. Pp. 365. $2.95, paper.)

This work adds to John T. McAlister's consistently provocative analyses of the political underpinnings of the two Indochina wars. His previous penetrating studies provide essential background to the development of conflict in Indochina, including research on the complex non-Vietnamese highland ethnic group struggle permitting the Viet Minh to develop a small military capability and leading to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In the present work, McAlister has written the foremost statement in English on the significance that World War II, and especially the Japanese role during and immediately following that war, had upon later events in Indochina. Excellent scholarship utilizing documents previously exploited by only a handful of scholars results in a search in depth for typically underrated influences. Sources include the rarely mined Service Historique de l'Armie (French Army Archives), limited publication editions of Suretè General studies and of World War II British and American foreign offices, materials of the prominent French scholar on Indochina, Paul Mus, and a wealth of relatively fugitive French sources.

Although revolution is the theme and the presentation is succinct, the history Professor McAlister has written is also comprehensive. He considers such important influences on the origin of revolution as the historical background of precolonial Vietnam, the colonial experience, the impact of the World War II Vichy and Japanese interregnum, and the British and Chinese occupation period. Of considerable interest are his treatments of vastly complicated internal Chinese politics as they affected the Viet Minh; the role of various Vietnamese political parties, sects, and personalities who fought both the French and the Viet Minh in the mid-1940s; and the sociological, economic and military situation in Vietnam on the brink of the First Indochina War. McAlister also analyzes the incidence of the August revolution, compares the revolution in both the North and South after the Japanese surrender, and unravels the intricacies of internal French politics during the period. The complexity of Vietnamese history is amply documented by the facts McAlister provides on Japanese assistance to the Viet Minh, including weapons, weapons production, and cadre training, as well as their aiding and building southern anti-Viet Minh military and paramilitary forces. This aspect of the presentation is an invaluable guide to the innumerable interconnections among political groups in Vietnam which so greatly influenced the Indochina wars.

McAlister includes discussion of numerous significant events including the Japanese coup de force, the allied victory over Japan without invasion of the Indochinese mainland, the decision permitting Great Britain and China to occupy along prescribed territorial lines, the death of President Roosevelt, the rape of the economy of the North by the Chinese and decisions of Chinese warlords permitting the Viet Minh to survive, and China's policy of accepting concessions from the French.

Yet having described numerous influential events beyond control of the Viet Minh, McAlister presents conclusive evidence that successful revolution is not the result of chance. Utilizing his mass of data, he analyzes the Viet Minh's genius for organization, its superiority over competing indigenous political groups, its ability to compromise with the French even at the risk of internal dissension, and its tenacity in the long period of rebuilding in the highlands.

Although the history in *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* stops with the beginning of the First Indochina War, the seeds of all later fruits of success, failure, and ultimate triumph for the Viet Minh are here. While undoubtedly nothing can be considered inevitable in predicting the course of a revolution, the characteristics McAlister ascribes to the Viet Minh greatly explain its long-range success as a revolutionary force.

CHARLES A. JOINER

Temple University

Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict. Edited by James A. Rahl. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970. Pp. 476. $32.50.)

This is Volume 4 of the European Common Market Antitrust Project of the Special Committee on the European Common Market of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Breck P. McAllister, Chairman). The first three volumes covered business regulation in the original six common-market nations; this one explores the interface between the antitrust laws of the Communities and of the United States. Nobody with a sense of history can be indifferent to the parallels between the two systems. In the United States, after the Civil War, markets expanded as trade barriers were lowered by the railroads, and so also after 1957 in Western Europe as manmade barriers came down. In each case, competition became more intense, and inefficient firms were hard hit as hitherto protected enclaves were invaded. One result was the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. When the European Communities were established, the connection between the wider ambit of trade and the maintaining of competition was obvious, and the Treaties wrote it into their organic law. Thereby, they assumed the same problem of jurisdiction over corporations affiliated to or dependent on sovereign states outside their own boundaries.

The foreign impact of American antitrust is an old story which has attracted able scholars into a difficult area: "For a field which has witnessed so much litigation, this one unfortunately has been relatively unenlightened by expositions in the formal opinions themselves . . . " (xii).

The book first sketches the history of the Communities and the general objectives of securing the benefits of free trade. (It is sad to reflect how ready were all members in late 1973 to dishonor the article providing for unimpeded movement of goods, when they prevented oil shipments to the Netherlands.) The conflict between economic planning and competition proved to be less difficult than the extent to which the Community law was supreme and could therefore override national law where it was more or less restrictive. There follows, logically enough, a very useful summary of the abiding issue—antitrust laws, Violation may result from acts no matter where committed, but must those acts be a direct restraint on United States trade and commerce, or does any substantial restraint, however indirect, suffice? Either way, one needs an economic analysis to see whether any effect exists. The authors are curiously noncommital about the ruling on Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (92F Supp. 947 [D. Mass. 1950]) which, in effect, says that investment to manufacture abroad rather than at home would be a restraint, illegal if done as part of any kind of combination. The treatment of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Communities is of course more conjectural, since the record is so much shorter.

The extraterritorial procedure and enforcement are examined in considerable detail. The well known Dyestuffs case was, at the time of writing, still on appeal to the European Court of Justice, which has subsequently affirmed (2 CCH Common Market Reporter Paragraph 8169 [1972]). The ECJ, in addition to moving toward the American stress on patterns of conduct implying conspiracy, seemed to me to hedge or limit the sweep of the Commission decision which "constitutes assertion of personal jurisdiction over alien firms on grounds which appear to be as broad as, if not broader than, those relied upon under American law" (137). In effect, the ECJ found that the parent firms outside the Common Market were really there through their subsidiaries, so that the problem was unreal anyway. I suspect that the authors of this work would be less than satisfied with the ECJ decision. In any case, the detailed survey of conflict in chapter 4, although impossible to summarize, well repays a reading. Restraint of competition by government enterprises, in theory subject to the antitrust laws, in practice an object of official and public solicitude, is a sleeping giant. The most celebrated conflict over antitrust jurisdiction, however, has involved neither the Common Market nor government enterprises but the Swiss jeweled watch industry, in combination with the American. The Swiss government opposed the Department of Justice in the American courts with unprecedented vigor and lack of restraint. They lost on liability but probably succeeded in moderating the relief. Efforts at international consultation, notification, and more rarely actual cooperation, are few and not impressive, yet the need is so apparent that the attempt will stumble on.

The book is an impressive treatment of a difficult and almost unbearably complex subject; the authors manage to be exhaustive in their treatment without losing the thread of logic. Twenty years hence, much of the content will be outmoded, yet it will have been replaced only interstitially, like an animal body renewing itself.

M. A. ADELMAN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Politics of Central Asia. By Ram Rahul. (New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1973. Pp. 183. $9.00.)

This is a survey of penetration of Central Asia (the area defined in broad traditional terms) by the great powers, with China, Russia, Britain, and India as the main actors. The title is thus a misnomer since the book does not really deal with the politics of local states. Written by an Indian scholar, it offers new insights, but it is disappointing because it is more descriptive than analytical and is based almost exclusively on secondary Western sources. Two appendices list agreements between the People's Republic of China (App. I), the Soviet Union (App. II), and the border states.

The main part of the book is devoted to a blow-by-blow account of treaties and agreements marking boundary settlements. Described segment by geographic segment, the history of each piece of boundary is carried through from earliest entries to the present. Rulers, agents of foreign powers, topographic landmarks, and place names pass in front of the reader in a somewhat confusing kaleidoscope; there are no maps to help. Leaders of Central Asia's two great religions, Buddhism and Islam, are singled out for special treatment in two chapters. In an interesting account, *lamas* and *mullahs* are seen as defenders of local interests, but frequently also as instruments of foreign penetration; in modern times they serve the aims of cultural and peace diplomacy of the two powers now dividing the region: the Soviet Union and China.

From the Indian vantage point, the author offers a special perception of the relative role played by the two powers. In their contest for primacy in Central Asia, the Soviet Union is seen as the stabilizing influence and a benign power. China is the aggressor, its efforts to extend influence in contiguous regions being seen as a prelude to disaster: "China is not only claiming territories in Soviet Central Asia, . . . but also trying to secure the secession of the Soviet Central Asian republics . . . thereby destroying . . . the very basis of the Soviet Union — a union of peoples of many races and creeds. . . . Not only has China now crossed the man-made Great Wall . . . but it has also essayed the great walls erected by nature itself — the Altai, Himalaya and other mountain ranges. . . . Its conflict with the [Soviet Union] has . . . profound implications for all mankind. [It] . . . may result in a great cataclysm" (pp. 130–131).

Notwithstanding the past imperialism of the Tsars, the Soviet Union is not regarded as an imperialist power. Since 1917 it has "finally turned its back on imperialism" (p. 97), a statement which flies in the face of obvious evidence. The author himself cannot sustain the logic of his argument in the discussion of the Soviet policy towards southwestern neighbors. He is sympathetic to the Soviet Union's ambitions to extend influence into Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, "the area of its aspirations" (p. 91), but states that Russia's general policy in that area "has always been to attach and/or draw them to itself," the goal pursued now by diplomatic rather than military means (p. 89). He feels that the three countries no longer fear Russia (p. 14), but acknowledges nevertheless, that the Turks still "passionately believe that the Soviet Union is bent . . . on either annexation or domination" (p. 92). The section on Iran, incidentally, totally omits the 1945–46 Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran, the narrative moving directly from 1927 to 1945 (p. 84). Available evidence also makes doubtful some other assertions, such as that the Soviet Central Asian republics enjoyed full autonomy in the nineteen twenties (p. 14), or that the formation of an "independent People's Government of Mongolia" and its pro-Soviet orientation, have been a matter of entirely free choice (p. 13).

In the assessment of the role of China, the author's concern, naturally enough, centers on the threat to India's security. He feels that the PRC pursues the old concept of the "Central Kingdom" which comprehends no other relationship with the border states than that of "suzerain-vassal" (p. 39), that it feels it "has the moral right to claim any territory that had at any time been the part of its empire (p. 15), and that "China's present more-than-mere border confrontation with India [is] to get India to acquiesce to China's power complex in Asia" (p. 39). In this light India's policy to extend protectorate over Himalayan border states (an extension of the old British policy), is seen as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.

The book does not offer new factual information or analytical insights, but it can be assumed that its obvious pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese bias is shared by a number of Professor Rahul's fellow academics (he heads Central Asian studies at the University of New Delhi) and Indian intellectuals. For this reason it is of interest to an American reader.

TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE
Carleton University, Ottawa

The Analysis of International Politics. Edited by James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East. (New York: Free Press, 1972. Pp. 397. $12.95.)

To honor Harold and Margaret Sprout, the editors have assembled eighteen essays by as many authors. They suggest that these essays bear in a variety of ways on major themes in the work of the Sprouts—the linkages between domestic and foreign policies and politics, the changing nature of the international system, the role of science and technology in international affairs, the contribution of comparative foreign policy studies, the role of ecological factors, and the making of military policy.

The papers by and large do not primarily seek to test or criticize the work of the Sprouts. The papers can usefully be viewed as a collection of snapshots of the state of international relations studies and the state of mind of some leading scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They reflect the earlier divisions and issues in the field, early signs of work which has since been developed substantially, and attempts to come to grips with the issues raised by the Vietnam War and the domestic protest it engendered. Many of the authors reveal rather candidly their own continuing search for a general intellectual and philosophical posture toward the study of international politics.

Before turning to some general impressions suggested by these snapshots, it is important to note that at least four of the essays provide significant substantive contributions in their own right. Richard Falk treats the relationships between the superpowers and proximate zones they dominate to suggest structurally different ways of thinking about international relations. Dina Zinnes systematically uses quantitative studies to test for relationships among the external environment, perceptions on the part of decision makers, and foreign policy actions. Chadwick Alger draws on multiple methods to measure and elucidate the effects of public debate, negotiation between and among regional groups, and delegate interaction on the progress of the U.N. General Assembly toward consensus. Maurice East exploits aggregate data for the 1948–64 time period to clarify on a systemic basis the relationships between discrepant economic positions and prestige among nations and the incidence of internatioal violence.

What general impressions do the papers leave? First, they suggest in many cases a recognition of the inadequacy of radical simplifications. Charles McClelland notes and welcomes a shift away from an ungrounded, umbrella theory in a systems metaphor. J. David Singer rejects assertions of a lack of cross-over in the work of those styled as theorists and others styled as empiricists. He also challenges assertions that analysts of international politics must choose between the pursuit of normative concerns and of formal science. Morton Kaplan argues rather elegantly that both those who would treat international politics as deterministic and those who would treat it as random deprive man of the freedom to act purposefully to affect international outcomes. While he disposes of the argument that the degree of predictability of international politics is the negative of the degree of freedom, he does not promote the conception of foreign policy as "one of decisions based on simple rules to control a deterministic world" (p. 103). Instead he suggests that international politics and policy must be thought of as a very complex matter in which numerous semiautonomous actors strive to achieve some sort of regulation based on a combination of freedom and constraint. Charles Hermann contends that the analysis of foreign policy cannot appropriately be seen as equivalent to the analysis of capabilities. And Klaus Knorr usefully complicates the notion of capabilities by pointing out the fallacies of pretending that capabilities are certain, are mensurable in the absence of some stipulated objectives and contingencies, and are solely confined to military attributes. Attempts to simplify the set of attributes of nations fare no worse than attempts to simplify the set of actors in international politics. Oran Young makes a strong case for the importance of actors other than the nation-state and argues that failure to consider these other participants distorts analysis.

One is struck by the sense of openness and re-assessment these themes convey. But one is also struck by how much they reveal (1) a continued pre-occupation with chronic intellectual issues that are inherently unresolvable and (2) a lack of consensus on the basic elements with which the analysis of international politics ought to deal.

This lack of consensus seems to be compounded by a lack of useful operationalizing of the basic concepts thrown about in the literature of international relations. For example, James Rosenau asserts that experts do not know how to conceptualize the notion of "environment," and Charles Hermann comments on the difficulty analysts have in thinking clearly about what they mean by foreign policy. Burton Sapin calls attention to an inability to define the elements of foreign policy performance. The conceptual foundations seem particularly weak when one seeks starting points for efforts to evaluate and design international policies and political institutions and national foreign policies and foreign policy institutions.

The reflections of several authors on attempts to move directly to empirical studies in order to facilitate resolution of conceptual difficulties are discouraging. Ernst Haas makes the point quite clearly that numerous empirical studies on the sources of internal conflict yield only a hodgepodge of results. Dina Zinnes finds that a largely different set of studies on the relationships between domestic and international attributes and between perceptions and actions yield only mixed results in the absence of systematically introduced alternative conditions.

Complicating the field of international politics, recognizing the needs for refining basic concepts, and calling for more multidimensional conceptual frameworks to guide empirical work amount to asserting that analysts of international politics need to make much more demanding choices in the formulation of their questions and priorities.

Do the papers suggest what some of those choices and priorities should be? Bruce Russett in his call for macroscopic analysis of the factors that limit political choice and consequence, presents one set of suggestions. He argues that broad social, economic, and technological characteristics of international politics and the participants in it matter more than the microscopic features of politics and decision making. Hermann would disagree. Neither proposes a set of empirical steps to resolve the dispute or, more reasonably, to clarify the information gain, be it for prediction or explanation from differing mixes of the two sorts of analysis.

Finally, the papers are interestingly sparse in their policy implications. Russett does argue that the importance of his "nonpolitical" variables and the gross stabilities they suggest warrant skepticism about interventionist foreign policy and imply that occasions for foreign policy decision are often best met by abstention and delay rather than by assertive actions. Yet he does not deal with dilemmas raised by the presence of other assertive participants in international politics and the need for coordinated abstention. Raymond Tanter claims that forecasting based on causal analysis can be applied to international politics but supports his argument mainly with examples of forecasting activities rather than instances of intellectually soundly based forecasts. While Russett says that even solely inductive forecasts can be helpful, he notes their vulnerability to gross changes in the international system. Sapin admits our inability to determine what difference one rather than another kind of foreign policy machinery makes for foreign policy performance. And while Vincent Davis is critical of McNamara's managerial style with regard to Vietnam, he does not convincingly demonstrate why a different style would have mitigated that disaster.

The analysis of international politics is clearly as rich and diverse as the Sprouts have long contended, and it offers ample opportunity for creative work. Yet there is little indication that the field has evolved a coherent intellectual orientation capable of producing either strong theory or particularly soundly based policy predictions and prescriptions.

DAVIS B. BOBROW
University of Maryland, College Park

International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order. By Henry G. Schermers. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972. Vol. I: Pp. xxiv, 303. DF1. 53.00; Vol. II: Pp. xvii, 487. DF1. 82.00.) 82.00.)

This book is a substantial contribution to an emerging area of study which includes the constitutional and administrative law of public international organizations. Unlike the previous literature in that field it is a comprehensive treatise based on comparative study of many organizations and covering the whole range of normative material on their status, structure, and functioning; earlier work concentrated either upon a single organization or upon comparative study of a single topic. Professor Schermers, the Director of the Europa Institute of the University of Amsterdam and of the postgraduate International Course on European Integration, has previously published in Dutch a comparative study of the specialized agencies affiliated with the United Nations (*De gespecialiseerde organisaties, hun bouw en inrichting*), upon which he has built in this more comprehensive treatise.

The range of topics seems adequately to cover "institutional" law, but there will certainly be disagreement about the adequacy of the treatment of some topics. The legal status, and the privileges and immunities, of international civil servants, as well as the vexing issues of their sometimes conflicting national and international loyalties, may well deserve examination in greater depth. Volume I begins with a classification of international organizations and properly excludes from further consideration the private organizations (i.e., nongovernmental organizations and international companies). It then examines the character and conditions of membership in public international organizations; and the organization, functions, and powers of their governing organs both representative and professional, considered from the standpoint of policy-making, control, and judicial functions. Volume II begins with a detailed analysis of the decision-making process in international agencies, including the methods of voting and the rules for entry into force of decisions. It then proceeds to financing and budget making. Finally it examines the legal order of the organizations as determined by their constitutional instruments and general international law, and the consequent internal and external status of agency regulations. One chapter presents the limitations of the international legal personality such organizations are considered to possess. There is a full treatment of the interpretation of basic instruments and of the resolution of disputes about their interpretation, followed by examination of the means available for enforcement of the rules of international agencies through supervision, sanctions against member states and individuals, or use of the legal machinery of member states. Possibilities of increased coordination of agencies are discussed, and their external relations examined primarily in the context of the basic framework of treaty relationships which supports them.

Professor Schermers's basic assumption is that a body of international common law relating to the status, structure, and functioning of public international agencies is emerging from the common elements in their constitutional interpretation and practice, and that this common law can be formulated on the basis of a comparative study of that practice. He has performed a very great amount of spadework in bringing together the necessary materials, inserting into the text in fine print hundreds of examples drawn from the practice of organizations which illustrate the points under discussion, with footnote references to the documentation. He has also provided in Volume I a useful 18-page bibliography of works discussing these organizations. As a systematically organized repository of source materials for the comparative study of international organizations, the work will be invaluable to teachers and students whatever they may think of its success as an exposition of a body of international common law.

Professor Schermers has not very explicitly examined the theoretical basis of this common law. It would seem that since the competencies of public international organizations are determined by the basic treaties which serve as their constitutional instruments, any common law of such organizations must arise from the explicit authorization or with the tacit consent of the member states and may become general or particular international law as those organizations enjoy comprehensive or only limited state membership. The materials show that when questions arise on which the constitutions are silent, interpretation has filled the gaps by resort to general principles of law and borrowings from the practice of other organizations; hence there is evidently an assumption that the member states assent to the use of such sources in developing institutional law.

Although Schermers does not elaborate such a theoretical framework, he assumes it, for he provides abundant materials about the relationships of public international agencies among themselves and with their member states. But the picture which emerges from these materials is not a tidy one. As he points out, both the member states and the governing organs of the international organizations interpret the legal status and competencies authorized by basic instruments, with the result that differences of construction occur. There is not as yet much provision for formal resolution of such differences by institutional apparatus. When cooperative attitudes exist (as they generally do in international administrative agencies, where political issues are less sharp than in the multifunctional organizations), informal resolution is often possible. But in the face of sharp differences the position of member-states can be intractable and can force adjustment by the organizations. Since the attitudes of member states are far from uniform, this does not make for a steady growth of common law.

The enforcement of legal rules developed by international organizations, which is discussed at length, is also ultimately dependent in many cases upon the legal agencies of the member states. There is considerable variation, however, in the availability of such national implementation and in the effectiveness with which it is applied. Schermers feels that the organizations do have some limited form of international legal personality with defined competencies, and that they can in spite of the difficulties inherent in the present international system gradually increase their effectiveness. He advocates better coordination of the separate agencies, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations, to avoid overlapping functions, to engage in joint planning and reporting, and to exchange staff personnel. Such coordinated agencies might move toward the development of an international civil service and become more effective instruments for dealing with multi-faceted international problems such as development.

In the organization of his book Professor Schermers has increased his difficulties by casting his net very widely, for he throws together extremely disparate types of organization. Could not one provide a more coherent view of the common law of single-function international administrative agencies, which have a good deal in common in their organization and procedures, than appears when they are bundled together with the complex structures and problems of the United Nations and the European Community? The financial problem of United Nations peacekeeping seems to belong to a different order of things than the financing of such administrative agencies. The practice of the International Court of Justice has little relevance to that of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, still less to that of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. At times the comprehensiveness of the treatise results in a stringing together of descriptions of unrelated agencies which obstructs the central purpose—i.e., to extract common elements of structure and procedure.

It is also true that the author rather frequently, when confronted with no very clear evidence of a generally accepted rule or practice, offers his personal opinion about what the practice ought to be. These opinions are certainly welcome as the considered view of a close student of international organization, and they invariably reflect Professor Schermer's desire to contribute to the effectiveness of the organizations. But they seem at times to be conclusions more appropriate in the comparative study of international organizations than in the adumbration of rules of customary international institutional law. They tend to reinforce a feeling that the materials collected do indeed reveal some common principles and practices, but only in a rudimentary stage of development, with considerable lacunae, and with not a few instances of frustration in the face of political forces still working at cross purposes.

These limitations would probably be freely admitted by Professor Schermers, and they do not detract from the solid contribution made by his painstaking work. It is to be hoped that he may find time and inclination to continue to expand his materials in successive editions to keep pace with what is likely to be an expanding field of institutional practice.

Professor Schermers' work is carefully organized, thoroughly documented, and written in a direct, clear style. It is not free from some minor solecisms of diction and grammar resulting from his writing in a foreign tongue, but none appears to obscure the meaning.

CHARLES H. MCLAUGHLIN
University of Minnesota

The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics. By Franz Schurmann. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974. Pp. 593. $15.00.)

The Logic of World Power is the most exciting and significant study of world politics to appear in recent years. Franz Schurmann, well known for his China studies and for his leading role in the antiwar movement, brings a diverse background effectively to bear in this volume. Schurmann accords a shaping centrality to the Vietnam experience but does not dwell on the policy aspects of the war except to illuminate structural features of American foreign policy and of world politics more generally considered.

Oddly enough, the idiosyncratic quality of the book does not detract from its significance. Schurmann's study provides a comprehensive and original account of how Vietnam policy flowed naturally from the evolving global role of the United States in the period since World War II. It also concentrates upon the interactions among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, the links between domestic politics and foreign policy especially as illuminated by organization theory and bureaucratic politics, and the causative impact of economic factors and forces upon the interplay of states. In his handling of each of these themes, Schurmann makes sensitive use of his mixture of personal and academic concerns, producing a book that undoubtedly arose as a personal effort to make sense of America's place in the world after the Vietnam debacle. Impressively, Schurmann's feeling for generalization and gift for conceptual clarity transmute his personal quest into a work of lasting scholarly stature.

The book is divided into three principal sections: "Arcana of Empire," an account of the main drift of American foreign policy after World War II up to Vietnam; "Russia, China, and America," an exploration of the shift from amity to enmity in Sino-Soviet relations in the context of a shared, but diverse, adversary relationship to the United States; "Vietnam," an explanation of ideological and bureaucratic motivation underlying the American involvement, followed by a heavy stress on the political conduct of the war as portrayed in the Pentagon Papers, and culminating in Schurmann's assessment of how the U.S. failure in Vietnam will affect world politics and America's global role in the years ahead. Each section provides a comprehensive interpretation of the issues from an original point of view; each is a separate *tour de force* that is not only brilliant but persuasive as well.

Briefly, Schurmann believes that the United States in the period after World War II moved to assume the mantle of empire that had fallen from a weakened Great Britain. According to Schurmann, the American urge to establish an imperial world order originated with Franklin Roosevelt's vision of a peaceful world system extending the Soviet-American wartime alliance into the postwar world under the aegis of the United Nations. Roosevelt's death in 1944 prevented such a vision from ever being tested; Truman's ascendancy to the presidency coincided with both Soviet anxiety about America's nuclear monopoly and Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe, thereby producing a new nexus of Great Power conflict. For Schurmann the Truman Doctrine of 1947 embodied the idea of containment in an active, authoritative form, and simultaneously gave birth to an imperial mission of global scope based on maximum control over developments throughout the entire non-Communist world, with the rationale of opposition to Soviet expansion serving partly as pretext, partly as explanation.

From Truman the imperial torch was passed to John F. Kennedy, whose presidency injected a new element of idealism into American foreign policy. In Schurmann's words: "President John F. Kennedy came to power with a grand design to do what Roosevelt had dreamed of: spread a Pax Americana over the entire world which would guarantee security from war, stability for all, and development for the poor. Kennedy's progressivism and his imperialism were inseparable" (p. 419). The dualism of the Kennedy years was typified by two of its most characteristic innovations—the Peace Corps and the Green Berets. American imperial energy was dissipated in Vietnam, where the quest for control was frustrated by revolutionary nationalism and the idealism was tarnished beyond recognition by the practical imperatives of military necessity in a deteriorating situation. Schurmann is not shrill, however, and he appreciates the extent to which the American idealistic impulse was both genuine and appreciated, even in Vietnam. Indeed, it is this realization that makes Schurmann's thesis especially valuable, because he is able to illuminate the way in which the imperial motivation, when effectively challenged by revolutionary nationalism, ineluctably if unwittingly produces barbarous behavior that entails waging indiscriminate and cruel warfare against civilian society.

Schurmann's argument is subtle and multifaceted, but part of the originality of his interpretation is to assign principal responsibility for the imperial outlook to centrist, liberal Democrats rather than to right-wing conservative Republicans. Schurmann also shows that America's imperial posture flowed from a set of internationalist economic concerns connected more closely with the restoration of a world market system than with the narrower goal of American business expansion *per se*. That is, American foreign business activity was encouraged, but at the longer-term expense of the national economy itself, a process suggestive of the earlier overseas flight of British capital. In the end, Schurmann seems ambivalent about the future, believing on the one side that Vietnam crushed the imperialist impulse, and on the other that it may yet reemerge in the form of a new idealistic quest, this time perhaps under the banner of "interdependence."

Beyond this line of substantive interpretation, Schurmann makes a central distinction between ideological politics and interest politics. In this regard the imperial mandate emanated from a broadly based popular consensus that arose initially from the desire of most Americans for a peaceful and decent world, and then was sustained—until the Vietnam failure and détente—by a more negative but essentially similar conviction that American power must be spread broadly to preclude Communist aggression. Within the parameters set by this ideological consensus, foreign policy is shaped by the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and reflects the complex bargaining outcomes of contending governmental and nongovernmental interest groups Schurmann is at his best when he describes the bureaucratic processes through which a government—any government—often finds itself taking contradictory steps in order to neutralize contending coalitions of interest groups. Such a process is familiar to students of the defense budget and arms control, but

Schurmann's achievement is to demonstrate its relevance to *all phases* of the foreign policies of *all governments*. With great feeling for cultural and ideological texture, Schurmann demonstrates that whether one is talking about the policies of China, the Soviet Union, or the United States one is talking about a shared process of intragovernmental conflict resolution carried on in deliberate isolation from public understanding. One is left with the feeling that perhaps the business of government is too shoddy to bring out into the open, even in a country such as contemporary China which Schurmann admires for a variety of well-specified reasons.

As a consequence, Schurmann's book certainly confirms a cynical view of state power, although the policy implications of such a view are nowhere considered in the book. It could be, although Schurmann is nowhere explicit, that the only path to humane governance is by deconcentrating and decentralizing political power, especially in the large states, and by reconstructing local and intermediate institutions.

Of course, one cannot do justice to Schurmann's achievement in a short review. It would be easy to dissent from Schurmann's judgment at this or that point. He often makes controversial assertions without sufficient care or documentation (e.g., that the United States committed genocide in Vietnam or that the atomic bomb was the essential structuring feature in the post–World War II period). Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of Schurmann's line of interpretation is persuasive, and his analysis is always instructive. Whether one agrees or disagrees, one cannot fail to learn. Let me put my evaluation in more professional terms: The next time a graduate student asks which three books in international relations to read for minimal literacy, I will now be able to say in a tone of assurance that one of them must be *The Logic of World Power*. For the other two, there are numerous candidates!

RICHARD A. FALK
Princeton University

The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy. By Robert W. Tucker. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 156. $7.50, cloth; $2.75, paper.)

When a mainstream political science international relations specialist writes a book endorsing, even if somewhat reluctantly and patronizingly, the radical revisionism of the 1960s, the event may be of some note in intellectual history, apart from the intrinsic merits of the endorsement. When five years later another mainstreamer is asked to review the endorsement for this journal, a further stage in assimilationism may have been reached. I imagine this is two steps forward—though arguably, in the meantime, author Robert Tucker may have taken one step backward elsewhere in waving an American big stick about Arab oil (*Commentary*, January 1975, pp. 21–31). Meanwhile also a burgeoning political economy literature about American foreign policy (Thomas Paterson, Theodore Moran, Steven Rosen, James Kurth, and several others, plus additional contributions by stalwarts Gabriel Kolko, Harry Magdoff, and Richard Barnet) leaves Tucker's examples of radical revisionism questionably representative. Nonetheless, Tucker's own points seem still sufficiently pertinent to warrant concentrating a review of limited length on them rather than on their relation to the subsequent evolution of ideas.

Tucker's central point, approached again and again from various directions, is succinctly stated near the end:

> The radical critique has forced us to acknowledge the extent to which an obsessive self-interest has been central in American foreign policy. . . . In its insistence that American diplomacy has been driven throughout by self-interest, the lesson radical criticism conveys is that America has behaved very much as other great powers have behaved, and that if there is a quality unique to American diplomacy it consists in the greater than usual disparity between ideals professed and behavior. This lesson may not have been the intention of radical critics—certainly this was not their primary intention—but its corrective value is not diminished for that reason (p. 148).

Their "primary intention," which Tucker is at pains to reject, is to demonstrate varieties of economic determinism and thus to magnify the repulsiveness of America's selfishness and promote resistance to it by contrasting it (explicitly or implicitly) with the altruism she would supposedly show if her capitalism were replaced by thoroughgoing socialism.

Tucker mistrusts such socialism; and against the economic determinism of those whom he groups, with some conscious procrusteanism, as radicals (principally William A. Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Harry Magdoff), Tucker accords his own primacy to the balance of power. Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau reverberate throughout Tucker's critique:

> Radical criticism will not confront the eternal and insoluble problems inordinate power creates, just as it will not acknowledge that men possessed of this power are always ready to use it if only in order to rule over others. In the radical weltanschauung there is little, if any, appreciation that dominion is its own reward and that men may sacrifice material interest in order to rule (or, for that matter, to be emulated). There is also little, if any, appreciation that expansion may be rooted in an insecurity that is not simply self-generated (p. 151).

The radicals are right that America behaves selfishly, much more than she imagines; but so do all great powers, capitalist and socialist—a "phenomenon as old as human history," Tucker is fond of repeating, and one most likely to continue, because of age-old defensive pre-emptive aggressiveness and because of common pride and power lust apart from economic gain.

Tucker does not really come to grips with the Marxist problem of the prospects for transforming human personality under socialism; in effect, he dismisses the idea, relying on "human history" and a mildly suspicious interpretation of Soviet experience. Yet the persistence with which he asserts the primacy of security roots over economic roots of action in nearly all periods of international relations and particularly in twentieth-century American foreign policy evinces resolve to preclude the socialist solution while incorporating most of the rest of radical revisionism. Tucker is not content to argue, as I would, that American foreign policy could not have been conducted without *multiple* sources of support: practitioners and influentials whose minds are on security (like Tucker), *and* others whose minds are on profits, *and* others whose minds are on social stability, *and* others whose minds are on bestowing the blessings of Americanization on lesser breeds, and others who . . . etc. It seems to me that the location of leadership vis-à-vis followership (in an analysis at this high level of generality) is no more important than recognizing that leaders are not leaders unless they are somehow attractive to followers. And in my view business interests do at least fit among the sets of followers that are likely to have a long-term contingent veto over American foreign policy whether or not they normally have the initiative in policy making; moreover, fundamental business interests do enjoy some privilege in that American leaders whoever they are have learned an obligation to preserve "the American way of life," which involves mixed economy capitalism. Whose purposes, then, should normally be said to be prevailing becomes a subtle problem of analysis in which it is not clear to me that Tucker bests the radicals he studied. And if socialist consciousness-raising were really somehow able to nullify the prestige of American business, international security-consciousness would indeed remain, but the world would be more changed than Tucker enjoys contemplating.

Another miscue (this time many of the radicals are more to blame) is Tucker's concentration on undercutting the argument that America since 1945 has been aggressively thrusting to achieve a world integrated for capitalism through U.S. hegemony; whereas, it seems to me, the argument most worth considering is that American took over and refurbished the family estate of a world that had already been integrated for capitalism by British and French parents that were now becoming too infirm to guard the family estate themselves. To be sure, there were the British/American and the French/American father/son quarrels that Kolko emphasizes; but Magdoff in effect sees that the family ties were fundamental. From the latter perspective, without having to adopt the Marxist dialectical contradication, Tucker should not find the view that there is now a European and Japanese capitalist "empire by (American) proxy" too "difficult to reconcile with the view that our principal Capitalist allies are also our principal adversaries . . . in the imperialist network" (p. 133).

One might point to other inadvertently slippery encounters in the 1915–65 historical sections that compose much of the book. Yet to overemphasize them would be unfair. Tucker's book is an honest effort to assimilate radical revisionism. It should be welcomed, for it advances the day when contributions of Marxist *analysis* can be freely utilized in research and policy making even by those who firmly continue to oppose Marxist *prescriptions*. Not all American elites will shrink from their own image when they come to see it more clearly along with the image of others worldwide in some neo-Marxist mirror.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

INDEX TO VOLUME LXX

Aberbach, Joel D. and Bert A. Rockman. *Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy*. 456

Abramson, Paul R. *Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974*. 469

Abueva, Jose V. *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography*. Reviewed by A. B. Villanueva. 597

Abu-Gosh, Subhi. Review of Enver M. Koury, *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States*. 1341

Achen, Christopher. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief*. . . . 1231

Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing. Ralph Nader and Donald Ross. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Adamany, David W. *Campaign Finance in America*. Reviewed by John R. Owens. . . 1298

Communication: Crossover Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules. . . 536

Adelman, Irma and Cynthia Taft Morris. *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries*. Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 232

Adelman, M. A. Review of James A. Rahl, ed., *Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict*. 1384

Adie, Ian W. A. C. Review of John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*. 1349

Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar. Review of Paul Alpert, *Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich*. 235

Adorno, Theodor W. *Negative Dialectics*. Reviewed by Gillian Rose. 598

The Adversaries: Politics and the Press. William Rivers. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234

The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U. N. Eras. Michla Pomerance. Reviewed by Edward Gordon. 291

The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World. David Kimche. Reviewed by Frank H. H. King. 1005

After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War. Lisle A. Rose. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560

Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process. Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross. 126

Agor, Weston H. Review of Fidel Castro, *Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes*. 674

Agpalo, Remigio E. *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro*. Reviewed by Aprodicio A. Laquian. 639

Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries. W. A. Douglas Jackson, ed. Reviewed by Roy D. Laird. 658

Agrarian Reform in Latin America. Robert J. Alexander. Reviewed by Peter Ranis. 233

Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War. George C. Herring, Jr. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, 'We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560

Alcock, Norman Z. *The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies*. Reviewed by Louis Kriesberg. 663

The War Disease. Reviewed by William R. Thompson. 599

Alexander, Robert J. *Agrarian Reform in Latin America*. Reviewed by Peter Ranis. 233

Review of Carroll Hawkins, *Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers*. 242

Alexander, Yonah. *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects*. Reviewed by Joel S. Migdal. 664

Alinsky, Saul D. *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. . . . 620

Alker, Hayward R., Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. *Mathematical Approaches to Politics*. Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600

Allardt, Erik. Review of Ann-Katrin Hatje, *Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930– och 1940–talen*. 653

Allende's Chile. Kenneth Medhurst, ed. Reviewed by Michael J. Francis. 249

Allworth, Edward, ed. *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*. Reviewed by G. Jukes. . . . 234

Almond, Gabriel A. Review of Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics.* . . . 1278

Alpert, Paul. *Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich.* Reviewed by Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. . . . 235

Alves, Marcio Moreira. *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* Reviewed by Peter McDonough. . . . 987

The American Condition. Richard N. Goodwin, Reviewed by George Kateb. . . 636

American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964. Stephen R. Weissman. Reviewed by M. Crawford Young. . . . 300

Ameringer, Charles D. Review of Gordon K. Lewis. *The Virginia Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput.* . . . 1007

The Analysis of International Politics. James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds. Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. . . . 1386

Anarchy, State and Utopia. Robert Nozick. Reviewed by Douglas Rae. . . . 1289

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946.* Reviewed by J. A. C. Mackie. . . . 1320

Anderson, Robert W. Review of Brian Irving, ed., *Guyana: A Composite Monograph.* . . . 658

Angola. Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier. Reviewed by John Marcum. . . . 1372

Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4—1973. Lucius C. Caflisch, ed. Reviewed by Robert G. Wirsing. . . . 1375

An, Tai Sung. *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute.* Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. . . . 665

The Anti-Communist Impulse. Michael Parenti. Reviewed by Geoffry S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* . . . 560

APSA Presidential Address, 1975. *"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture.* Austin Ranney. . . . 140

APSA Presidential Address, 1975, Introduction to. Pendleton Herring. . . . 139

Aquarone, Alberto. *Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano.* Reviewed by A. F. K. Organski. . . . 666

Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds. Reviewed by Jean-Claude Vatin. . . . 1332

Archbold, W. A. J. *Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period).* Reviewed by Manindra K. Mohapatra. . . . 640

Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic. Donald P. Whitaker et al. Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. . . . 270

Argyris, Chris. *Behind the Front Page.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* . . . 1234

The Arms Trade with the Third World. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. . . 297

Armstrong, John A. *Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.* . . . 393

Aronson, James. *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV and Radio;* and *The Press and the Cold War.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* . . . 1234

Arrington, Theodore S. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1230

Asbell, Bernard. *The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History.* Reviewed by Paul T. Heffron. . . . 210

Atkinson, David M. Review of J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden;* Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods;* Wendell Glick, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* . . . 1295

Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. . . . 617

Auerbach, Philip Hone. Review of Herman Kahn and Barry Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties.* . . . 205

Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future. Alfred Stepan, ed. Reviewed by Ronald M. Schneider. . . . 997

Avineri, Shlomo. *Comment on Resnick's "Crude Communism and Revolution."* . . 1146

Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Reviewed by Patrick Gardiner. . . . 602

Avineri, Shlomo, ed. *Israel and the Palestinians.* Reviewed by Amos Perlmutter. . 1321

Axline, W. Andrew. Review of Ernest H. Preeg, *Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy.* . . . 292

Aya, Roderick and Norman Miller, eds. *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351

Aydelotte, William O., Allan G. Bogue, and

Robert William Fogel, eds. *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603

Ayer, A. J. *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage.* Reviewed by David Berlinski. 1257

Ayres, Robert L. *Communication: Development and Strategy in Latin America.* ... 550

Baaklini, Abdo I. Review of George M. Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya.* 241

Bach, Stanley. Review of John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* 977

Baehr, Peter R. Review of George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds., *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973.* 283

Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects. Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely. Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 259

Bain, Chester W. Review of David G. Temple, *Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia.* 1316

The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Ronald Grigor Suny. Reviewed by Stanislav Kirschbaum. 971

Baldwin, Elaine. *Differentiation and Cooperation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav.* Reviewed by Khayyam Z. Paltiel. 236

Bamba, Nobuya. *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy.* Reviewed by Hideo Sato. 274

Bank, Richard M. and Steven R. McCarl. *"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited.* 886

Barber, Benjamin R. *The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton.* Reviewed by Jürg Steiner. 198

Barber, James David. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* Reviewed by, Arnold A. Rogow. 1299

Barber, James P. Review of Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II.* 246

South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970. Reviewed by Leonard Thompson. 668

Barghoorn, Frederick C. Review of Natalia Gorbanevskaya, *Red Square at Noon.* .. 1335

Barkan, Joel D. *Comment: Further Reassessment of "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya.* 452

Barker, Bernard, ed. *Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings.* Reviewed by James G. Kellas. 604

Barker, Charles A., ed. *Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs.* Reviewed by Adda B. Bozeman. 669

Barney, William L. *The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860.* Reviewed by LaWanda Cox. 623

Barritt, Denis P. and Charles F. Carter. *The Northern Ireland Problem.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Barros, James, ed. *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future.* Reviewed by Harold K. Jacobson. 275

Beck, Brenda E. F. *Peasant Society in Koṅku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India. Reviewed by* Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 1322

The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century. Beryl Smalley. Reviewed by Ernest L. Fortin. 208

Beck, Lewis White, ed. *Philosophy of War.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Beck, Paul Allen. *Communication: Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse.* 930

Beck, Robert H. Review of Raymond Boudon, *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society.* 605

Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930– och 1940–talen. Ann-Katrin Hatje. Reviewed by Erik Allardt. 653

Behind the Front Page. Chris Argyris. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties. Vine Deloria, Jr. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306

Beichman, Arnold. Review of William R. Corson, *Consequences of Failure.* 214

Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970. Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy. Robert D. Putnam. Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 253

Beloff, Max. Review of Phillip Darby, *British Defense Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968.* 674
Benjamin, Gerald. *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights.* Reviewed by Stephen M. David. 624
Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Lloyd D. Musolf, *Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective.* 1354
Bentham's Political Thought. Bhiku Parekh, ed. Reviewed by Wilfrid Harrison. 963
Bergsten, C. Fred, ed. *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research.* Reviewed by Benjamin J. Cohen. 277
Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. Dieter Mahncke. Reviewed by Wolfgang F. Dexheimer. 663
Berlinski, David. Review of A. J. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage.* 1257
Berman, Bruce J. Review of E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939.* 237
Bernd, Joseph L. and James F. Herndon, eds. *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII.* Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. 202
Bettelheim, Charles. *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor.* Reviewed by D. Gordon White. 641
Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States. Martha Derthick. Reviewed by Thomas R. Dye. 632
Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics. Fred R. Dallmayr. 64
Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. Alonzo L. Hamby. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., ed. *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s.* Reviewed by Lawrence A. Veit. . 1373
Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184
Biddis, Michael D., ed. *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings.* Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
Bienen, Henry. *Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control.* Reviewed by L. Gray Cowan. 642
Binder, Leonard. Review of Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis.* 254
Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South. Chandler Davidson. Reviewed by Richard Murray. 1305
Black, Cyril E. and Richard A. Falk, eds. *The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management* and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment.* Reviewed by G. Schwarzenberger. 670
Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970. Roger B. Canfield. Reviewed by Ralph A. Rossum. 625
The Black Muslims in America. C. Eric Lincoln. Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis. Hanes Walton, Jr. Reviewed by Carolyn Sue Williams. 1317
The Blacks in Canada: A History. Robin Winks. Reviewed by Mildred A. Schwartz. 1004
Blanchard, Robert O., ed. *Congress and the News Media.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Blanco, Hugo. *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru.* N. Allen, trans. Reviewed by Larry L. Pippin. 643
Blank, Stephen. Review of Derek Channon, *The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise.* 1326
Blum, John Morton, ed. *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Board, Joseph B. Review of William M. Lafferty, *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis.* 1343
Bobrow, Davis B. Review of James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics.* 1386
Boggs, George T. and John M. Paxman, eds. *The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance.* Reviewed by Lynn H. Miller. 1011
Bogue, Allan G., William O. Aydelotte, and Robert William Fogel, eds. *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603
Boudon, Raymond. *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects*

in Western Society. Reviewed by Robert H. Beck. 605

Boulding, Kenneth E. Review of Matthew Melko, *52 Peaceful Societies.* 206

Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement. Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease. Reviewed by Peter Kolchin. 224

Bozeman, Adda B. *Review of Charles A.* Barker, ed., *Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs.* 669

Brady, Linda P. Review of Dusan Sidjanski, ed., *Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics.* 264

Braibanti, Ralph. *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.* Reviewed by Lawrence Ziring. 1323

Braun, Alan G. and Lawrence D. Longley. *The Politics of Electoral College Reform.* Reviewed by Laurin L. Henry. 1311

Braun, Nicole Condorelli. *Commissaires et Juges dans les Communautés Européennes.* Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671

The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945. Frank D. McCann, Jr. Reviewed by Thomas E. Skidmore. 1007

Breines, Paul. Review of Robert Havemann, *Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist.* 1271

Breton, Albert. *The Economic Theory of Representative Government.* Reviewed by William A. Niskanen. 605

Brett, E. A. *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939.* Reviewed by Bruce J. Berman. 237

British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968. Phillip Darby. Reviewed by Max Beloff. 674

British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations. Ronald Dore. Reviewed by George O. Totten. 1331

Brody, Richard A. *Communication: Whom Did Wallace Hurt in 1968?* 924

Browning, Frank and Dorothy Forman, eds. *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971.* Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard. 278

Brown, Lee. *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Brown, Robert. *Rules and Laws in Sociology.* Reviewed by Arthur L. Stinchcombe. 199

Brown, Thad A., Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, and Alden S. Raine. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753

Bruce-Briggs, Barry and Herman Kahn. *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties.* Reviewed by Philip Hone Auerbach. 205

Bruneau, Thomas C. Review of Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics.* 992

Buchan, Alastair. Review of George H. Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation.* 1012

Buckland, Patrick. *Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922;* and *Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922.* Reviewed by Alan J. Ward. 1324

Budge, Ian and Cornelius O'Leary. *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees. Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky. Reviewed by Allen Schick. 1313

Buenker, John D. *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform.* Reviewed by Robert E. O'Connor. 212

Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. Kakuei Tanaka. Reviewed by Ardath W. Burks. 267

Bull, Hedley. *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation.* Reviewed by Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. 1374

Bunche, Ralph J. *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR.* Reviewed by Robert E. Martin. 211

Burdette, Franklin L. Review of James MacGregor Burns, *Uncommon Sense.* . . 213

The Bureaucratization of the World. Henry Jacoby. Reviewed by John H. Hallowell. 660

Burki, Shahid Javed. *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965.* Reviewed by Benedict Stavis. 1326

Burks, Ardath W. Review of Kakuei Tanaka, *Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.* 267

Burman, Ian D. *Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention.* Reviewed by William L. Day. 625

Burns, Eveline M. Review of Herbert Harvey Hyman, ed., *The Politics of Health*

Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City. 220

Burns, James MacGregor. *Uncommon Sense.* Reviewed by Franklin L. Burdette. 213

Burtle, James and Sidney E. Rolfe. *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation.* Reviewed by Susan Strange. 1015

Butterworth, Charles E. Review of François Hotman, *Francogallia.* Latin text by Ralph E. Giesey. J. H. M. Salmon, trans. 613

Cable Television U.S.A. Martin H. Seiden. Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315

Caflisch, Lucius C., ed. *Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4—1973.* Reviewed by Robert G. Wirsing. 1375

The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen. Mohamed Heikal. Reviewed by R. H. Dekmejian. 279

Callaghan, James. *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Campaign Finance in America. David W. Adamany. Reviewed by John R. Owens. 1298

Campbell, John C. Review of Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* 1358

Review of William Shawcross, *Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution.* 263

Canby, Steven B. *Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis.* Reviewed by Gary L. Wamsley. 1301

Canfield, Roger B. *Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970.* Reviewed by Ralph A. Rossum. 625

Canon, Bradley C. and S. Sidney Ulmer. *Communication: The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent.* 1215

Carroll, John, compiler. *Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own.* Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285

Carter, Charles F. and Denis P. Barritt. *The Northern Ireland Problem.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Carter, Gwendolen M. and Thomas Karis. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II.* Reviewed by James P. Barber. 246

Carter, Richard B. Review of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland.* Wilmoore Kendall, trans. 1292

Casper, Jonathan D. *The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.* 50

Castberg, Frede. *The European Convention on Human Rights.* Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671

Castro, Fidel. *Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes.* Reviewed by Weston H. Agor. .. 674

Caute, David. *Frantz Fanon.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258

The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia. Kirk R. Petshek. Reviewed by Miriam Ershkowitz. 224

The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971. Lorenzo Kent Kimball. Reviewed by Glenn Perry. 1341

Channon, Derek. *The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise.* Reviewed by Stephen Blank. 1326

Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics. Barry D. Karl. Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond. 1278

Charvet, John. *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* Reviewed by Judith N. Shklar. 606

Chatfield, Charles. *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* Reviewed by Justus D. Doenecke. 1302

Chevalier, Louis. *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.* Reviewed by Louise A. Tilly. 644

China: Management of a Revolutionary Society. John M. H. Lindbeck, ed. Reviewed by Ian W. A. C. Adie. 1349

China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis. Arthur A. Stahnke, ed. Reviewed by Daniel Tretiak. 295

Chiu, Hungdah. *Communication: China and the Taiwan Question.* 551

Christol, Carl Q. Review of Lillian L. Randolph, *Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice.* 1013

Cirino, Robert. *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* ... 1234

The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964. Neil R. McMillen. Reviewed by James D. Thomas. 1313

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice? William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman. Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Civil Disobedience and Democracy. Elliot M. Zashin. Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen.. 1259
Claeys, Paul H. *Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative.* Reviewed by L. Huyse. 645
Clarke, Colin G. Review of Carl Stone, *Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica.* 998
Clarke, James W. Review of F. Chris Garcia, *Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California School.* 218
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy. Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman. 456
Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. Carl Stone. Reviewed by Colin G. Clarke. 998
Clausen, Aage R. *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus.* Reviewed by Michael L. Mezey. 626
Clegg, Ian. *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328
Clinton, Richard L., ed. *Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research.* Reviewed by John G. Grumm. 608
Cobb, Roger, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross. *Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.* 126
Coffin, William Sloane, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman. *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?* Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Coggin, T. Daniel and John E. Hunter. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1226
Cohan, A. S. and R. D. McKinlay. *Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems.* 850
Cohen, Benjamin J. Review of C. Fred Bergsten, ed., *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research.* 277
Cohen, Marshall, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds. *War and Moral Responsibility.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Cohen, Ronald and John Middleton, eds. *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* Reviewed by Michael F. Lofchie. 238
Cohler, Anne M. Review of Thomas L. Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws.* 962
Cohn, Rubin G. *To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform.* Reviewed by Byron W. Daynes. 628
Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. John Newhouse. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. Reviewed by Emmet V. Mittlebeeler. 648
The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy. Norman L. Zucker. Reviewed by Paul Ritterband. 273
Comment: Further Reassessment of "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya. Joel D. Barkan. 452
Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray." Frederick T. Steeper and Robert M. Teeter. 806
Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Interpretations of the 1972 Election. David E. RePass. 814
Comment on Resnick's "Crude Communism and Revolution." Shlomo Avineri. 1146
Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting. Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 779
Commissaires et Juges Dans Les Communautés Européennes. Nicole Condorelli Braun. Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671
Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict. James A. Rahl, ed. Reviewed by M. A. Adelman. 1384
Communication: Cross-over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules. David Adamany. 536
Communication: Funston Reply to Canon and Ulmer. Richard Funston. 1218
Communication: Julius Turner Revisited: Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts. Harvey L. Schantz. 541
Communication: More on Political Violence. Ernest van den Haag. 556
Communication: Multi-Level Analysis in

State Politics. William Lyons and David R. Morgan. 159
Communication: The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics." John Wanat and Phillip W. Roeder. 163
Communications: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
  Fred H. Lawson 932
  Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood 934
Communications: China and the Taiwan Question.
  Hungdah Chiu. 551
  Yung Wei. 552
  Allen S. Whiting. 552
Communications: Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse.
  Paul Allen Beck. 930
  Richard Funston. 932
Communications: Development and Strategy in Latin America.
  Karen L. Remmer. 548
  Robert L. Ayres. 550
Communications: Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.
  Chester Spatt. 1221
  Guillermo Owen. 1223
Communications: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.
  Dennis D. Riley. 929
  Fred W. Grupp, Jr. and Alan A. Richards. 930
Communication: Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States: A Methodological Note. Jesse F. Marquette. 545
Communication: The Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality Hypothesis: A Rejoinder. Richard Child Hill. 154
Communication: Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality. Max Neiman. 149
Communications: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.
  Stephen V. Stephens. 1224
  John E. Hunter and T. Daniel Coggin. . . 1226
  Theodore S. Arrington. 1230
  Christopher Achen. 1231
Communications: The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.
  Kazuhiko Okuda. 174
  N. Patrick Peritore. 178
Communications: Stability of Partisan Attachments.
  James W. Hottois. 552
  Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo. 554
Communication: State Public Policy and Variance Analysis: A Reply to Wanat and Roeder and to Lyons and Morgan. Douglas D. Rose. 166
Communication: The States' Role in Public Policy: A Clarification. Douglas D. Rose. 926
Communication: The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent. Bradley C. Canon and S. Sidney Ulmer. 1215
Communication: What Gordon Tullock Really Said. Gordon Tullock. 924
Communication: Whom Did Wallace Hurt in 1968? Richard A. Brody. 924
Communism in Korea, 2 vols. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. Reviewed by Princeton Lyman. 260
The Communist International, 1919–1943. John Lewis Evans. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Comparative Political Corruption. James C. Scott. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. . . 1368
Comparative Political Socialization. Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings, eds. Reviewed by Roberta S. Sigel. 1329
Comparative Political Violence. Fred R. von der Mehden. Reviewed by Cynthia H. Enloe. 269
Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States. Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds. Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro. Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. 661
Compassion: Toward a Science of Value. William Eckhardt. Reviewed by James Chowning Davies. 611
The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. Charles W. Yost. Reviewed by Earl C. Ravenal. 302
Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Eric A. Nordlinger. Reviewed by Fred R. von der Mehden. 250
Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808. Kenneth R. Maxwell. Reviewed by Donna Guy. 1008
Congressional Quarterly Service. *Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972)* and *Guide to the Congress of the United States.* Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 628
Congressmen's Voting Decisions. John W. Kingdon. Reviewed by Stanley Bach. . . . 977
Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972). Congressional Quarterly Service. Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 628
Congress and the News Media. Robert O. Blanchard, ed. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola

Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China. John W. Dardess. Reviewed by L. Carrington Goodrich. 647
Consequences of Failure. William R. Corson. Reviewed by Arnold Beichman. 214
Cooper, Joseph. *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.* Reviewed by Richard E. Damon. 631
Corson, William R. *Consequences of Failure.* Reviewed by Arnold Beichman. 214
Cowan, L. Gray. Review of Henry Bienen, *Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control.* 642
Cox, LaWanda. Review of William L. Barney, *The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860.* 623
Craig, Gordon A. Review of Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship — Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918.* 1363
Crain, Robert L. and Carol Sachs Weisman. *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Creating the European Community. R. C. Mowat. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold. 288
Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution. William Shawcross. Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 263
Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. Reviewed by Richard L. Sklar. 247
Crowley, F. K. *Modern Australia in Documents.* Reviewed by Murray Clark Havens. 646
Crude Communism and Revolution. David Resnick. 1136
The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States. Leon E. Stover. Reviewed by John K. Fairbank. 266
Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria. David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. Reviewed by Robert Melson. ... 265
Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor. Charles Bettelheim. Reviewed by D. Gordon White. 641
Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Claire Holt, ed. Reviewed by Rex Mortimer. .. 1338
Dallmayr, Fred R. *Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics.* 64
Damon, Richard E. Review of Joseph Cooper, *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.* 631
Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era. Elmo Richardson. Reviewed by Jeanne Nienaber. 983
Darby, Phillip. *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968.* Reviewed by Max Beloff. 674
Dardess, John W. *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China.* Reviewed by L. Carrington Goodrich. 647
Davidson, Chandler. *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South.* Reviewed by Richard Murray. .. 1305
David, Stephen M. Review of Gerald Benjamin, *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights.* ... 624
Davies, James Chowning. Review of William Eckhardt, *Compassion: Toward a Science of Value.* 611
Davis, Harold Eugene. *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction.* Reviewed by Thomas W. Walker. 610
Davis, Vincent, James N. Rosenau and Maurice East, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics.* Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1386
Daynes, Byron W. Review of Rubin G. Cohn, *To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform.* 628
Day, William L. Review of Ian D. Burman, *Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention.* 625
Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV and Radio. James Aronson. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. Benjamin R. Barber. Reviewed by Jürg Steiner. 198
Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem. Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh. Reviewed by Geoffrey Lambert. 1334
Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s. Stanley Hoffmann. Reviewed by Dorothy Pickles. 655
De Grazia, Sebastian. Review of Elliot Jaques, *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice;* Staffan B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class;* Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-

fare, *Work in America,* Prepared under the Auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; and Yves Simon, *Work, Society and Culture.* 1273

Dekmejian, R. H. Review of Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* 279

Deloria, Vine, Jr. *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306

Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study. A. H. Somjee. Reviewed by Ralph H. Retzlaff. 1369

Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism. Allen Yarnell. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Dennis, Jack and M. Kent Jennings, eds. *Comparative Political Socialization.* Reviewed by Roberta S. Sigel. 1329

de Paor, Liam. *Divided Ulster.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Rufus E. Miles, Jr. Reviewed by Harold Seidman. 222

Derthick, Martha. *Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States.* Reviewed by Thomas R. Dye. 632

de Schweinitz, Karl, Jr. Review of Frederic L. Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* 1361

Review of Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries.* 232

Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT. Colin S. Gray. A review essay on Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race;* Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *SALT: Problems and Prospects;* William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's;* John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT;* Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System;* Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.* 1242

Deutsch, Karl W., Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Antoine H. Stoetzel. *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600

Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India. B. C. Muthayya and I. Gnanakannan. Reviewed by Dan Fritz. 988

Dexheimer, Wolfgang F. Review of Dieter Mahncke, *Berlin im geteilten Deutschland.* 663

The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950. Martin Jay. Reviewed by Hans Speier. 1276

Dick, William M. *Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era.* Reviewed by David Kettler. 215

Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav. Elaine Baldwin. Reviewed by Khayyam Z. Paltiel. 236

The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History. William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert William Fogel, eds. Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603

Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks. Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman. Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303

Di Tella, Torcuato S. Review of Gianfranco Pasquino, *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico* and *Militari e Potere in America Latina.* 1359

Divided Ulster. Liam de Paor. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Dobson, Douglas and Douglas St. Angelo. *Communication: Stability of Partisan Attachments.* 554

Doenecke, Justus D. Review of Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* 1302

Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion. Robert Cirino. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Dore, Ronald. *British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations.* Reviewed by George O. Totten. 1331

Dreger, Ralph Mason and Kent S. Miller, eds. *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303

Driver, Edwin D. *World Population Policy: An Annotated Bibliography.* Reviewed by Dorothy M. Stetson. 648

Duby, Georges. *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century.* Reviewed by David Herlihy. 611

Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann. *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Reviewed by Emmet V. Mittlebeeler. 648

Duprat, Gérard. *Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328
Dye, Thomas R. Review of Martha Derthick, *Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States.* 632
Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit. Anton Pelinka. Reviewed by George Schwab. 964

The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century. Georges Duby. Reviewed by David Herlihy. 611
East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72. Dale Roy Herspring. Reviewed by James H. Wolfe. 654
East, Maurice, James N. Rosenau and Vincent Davis, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics.* Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1386
Eckhardt, William. *Compassion: Toward a Science of Value.* Reviewed by James Chowning Davies. 611
Eckstein, Alexander. Review of Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972.* 657
Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy. Ernest H. Preeg. Reviewed by W. Andrew Axline. 292
Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis. William M. Lafferty. Reviewed by Joseph B. Board. 1343
Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 233
Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production. E. G. Liberman. Reviewed by Gregory Grossman. 618
The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930. Richard D. Wolff. Reviewed by Robert L. Tignor. 271
Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed. Reviewed by Lawrence A. Veit. 1373
  Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184
The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Albert Breton. Reviewed by William A. Niskanen. 605
Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society. Raymond Boudon. Reviewed by Robert H. Beck. 605
Edwards, George C. III. *Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power.* 101
Efron, Edith. *The News Twisters.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Einhorn, Eric S. Review of Erik Rasmussen, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. VII/1972.* 255
Eisenstadt, S. N. *Tradition, Change, and Modernity.* Reviewed by Marion J. Levy, Jr. 1261
Eisinger, Peter K. Review of David Sears and John B. McConahay, *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot.* 985
El-Ayouty, Yassin. Review of Abderrahman Robana, *The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States.* 256
Elections and Public Policy. Benjamin Ginsberg. 41
Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933. Walter Struve. Reviewed by Wayne C. Thompson. 1000
Elites in the People's Republic of China. Robert A. Scalapino, ed. Reviewed by David M. Lampton. 1366
Elliott, Robert C. *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre.* Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Emmerson, John K. and Leonard A. Humphreys. *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes.* Reviewed by Richard Storry. 649
The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies. Norman Z. Alcock. Reviewed by Louis Kriesberg. 663
Emy, H. V. Review of Laurie Oakes and David Solomon, *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister.* 991
Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. Don E. Kash, Irvin L. White, and others. Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 282
Engels, Frederick and Karl Marx. *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung."* Reviewed by David-Hillel Ruben. 206
Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class. Steven Marcus. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1283
Enloe, Cynthia H. Review of Fred R. von der Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence.* 269
Epstein, Edward Jay. *News From Nowhere: Television and the News.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Epstein, Leon D. Review of Robert D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy.* 253

Erickson, Richard J. *International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law.* Reviewed by Peter B. Maggs. 675

Ernst, Joseph Albert. *Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution.* Reviewed by Alan Tully. 635

Ershkowitz, Miriam. Review of Kirk R. Petshek, *The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia.* . . 224

Eulau, Heinz and Kenneth Prewitt. *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* Reviewed by John H. Kessel. . . 1308

The European Convention on Human Rights. Frede Castberg. Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671

European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States. Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, eds. Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 284

Evans, John Lewis. *The Communist International, 1919–1943.* Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377

Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration. Volker Rittberger. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld. 1014

Executive Ombudsmen in the United States. Alan J. Wyner, ed. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 230

Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes. Helmut Norpoth. 1156

Ezrahi, Yaron. Review of Jean-Jacques Salomon, *Science and Politics.* 967

The Fabian Society. *Socialism and Affluence,* and *The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals.* Reviewed by Della Nevitt. 1264

The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Sungjoo Han. Reviewed by Han-Kyo Kim. 649

Fainstein, Norman I. and Susan S. Fainstein. *The Future of Community Control.* 905

Fainstein, Susan S. and Norman I. Fainstein. *The Future of Community Control.* 905

Fairbank, John K. Review of Leon E. Stover, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States.* 266

Fairbanks, Charles H., Jr., Review of Hedley Bull, *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation.* 1374

Falk, Richard A. and Cyril E. Black, eds. *The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management* and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment.* Reviewed by G. Schwarzenberger. 670

Falk, Richard A. Review of Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics.* 1390

Fan, K., ed. *Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings.* Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200

Fanon. Peter Geismar. Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258

The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation On History. Bernard Asbell. Reviewed by Paul T. Heffron. 210

Feinstein, Estelle F. *Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893.* Reviewed by Richard E. Welch, Jr. 636

Feld, Werner J. Review of Volker Rittberger, *Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration.* 1014

Ferrell, Robert H. Review of Ruth B. Henig, ed., *The League of Nations.* 678

Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes. Fidel Castro. Reviewed by Weston H. Agor. 674

The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals. The Fabian Society. Reviewed by Della Nevitt. . . . 1264

Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971. A. Lerumo. Reviewed by Aaron Segal. 1347

52 Peaceful Societies. Matthew Melko. Reviewed by Kenneth E. Boulding. 206

Finch, Elizabeth A. *The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA.* Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 279

FitzGerald, Garret. *Towards a New Ireland.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Review of Elizabeth A. Finch, *The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA.* 279

Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918. Annelise Thimme. Reviewed by Lewis Hertzman. 972

Fogel, Robert William, Allan G. Bogue, and William O. Aydelotte, eds. *The Dimensions*

of Quantitative Research in History. Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603
Fokkema, D. W. *Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution.* Reviewed by G. Eric Hansen. 239
Ford, W. Scott. *Interracial Public Housing in Border City.* Reviewed by Leonard S. Rubinowitz. 217
  Review of Nathaniel S. Keith, *Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930.* 220
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. Louis Henkin. Reviewed by Whittle Johnston. 1381
Forman, Dorothy and Frank Browning, eds. *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971.* Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard. 278
Formisano, Ronald P. Review of Stephen E. Patterson, *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts.* 981
For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941. Charles Chatfield. Reviewed by Justus D. Doenecke. 1302
Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. *Regionale Verflechtung Der Bundesrepublik Detuschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme.* Reviewed by Henri J. Warmenhoven. 1380
Fortin, Ernest L. Review of Beryl Smalley, *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century.* 208
Foster, Frank F. Review of Joel Hurstfield, *Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England.* 245
Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics. Sidney R. Waldman. Reviewed by Robert J. Sickels. . . . 975
Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War. John P. Diggins. 492
Francis, Michael J. Review of Kenneth Medhurst, ed., *Allende's Chile.* 249
Francogallia. François Hotman. Latin text by Ralph E. Giesey. J. H. M. Salmon, trans. Reviewed by Charles E. Butterworth. . . . 613
Frankovic, Kathleen A. Review of Dennis P. Sobin, *The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs.* 226
Frantz Fanon. David Caute. Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258
Freedman, Ann and Constance Smith. *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature.* Reviewed by G. David Garson. 970
Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England. Joel Hurstfield. Reviewed by Frank F. Foster. 245
Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* . . . 560
Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause. John Hohenberg. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly. Oliver Woshinsky. Reviewed by William H. Hunt. 271
French, Peter A., ed. *Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* . . 952
The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras). J. S. McClelland, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
Fried, John H. E. *The Great Nuremberg Trial.* A review essay on *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946,* with a new introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg, and *Report of Robert H. Jackson: The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945.* 192
Friedman, Isaiah. *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations.* Reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman. 676
Fried, Robert C. *Party and Policy in West German Cities.* 11
Fritz, Dan. Review of B. C. Muthayya and I. Gananakannan, *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India.* 988
From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure. Tibor Mende. Reviewed by Susan Aurelia Gitelson. 286
From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865. Louis S. Gerteis. Reviewed by William S. McFeely. 1309
From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought. Donald W. Hanson. Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 1268
From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II. Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter. Reviewed by James P. Barber. 246
From Tribe to Nation in Africa. Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds. Reviewed by Michael F. Lofchie. 238

Fuchs, Werner et al., eds. *Lexikon Zur Soziologie.* Reviewed by Gianfranco Poggi. 1265

Functionaries. F. William Howton. Reviewed by Lloyd A. Rowe. 614

Funston, Richard. *Communication: Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse.* 932

Communication: Funston Reply to Canon and Ulmer. 1218

Furniss, Norman. Review of Martin O. Heisler, ed., *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies.* 243

The Future of Community Control. Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein. 905

The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research. C. Fred Bergsten, ed. Reviewed by Benjamin J. Cohen. 277

The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment.* Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds. Reviewed by G. Schwarzenberger. 670

The Future of the International Strategic System. Richard Rosecrance, ed. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspective on SALT.* 1242

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the the Cold War, 1941–1947.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy—A Review Essay.* 560

Gallagher, Matthew P. and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

Gamer, Robert E. Review of Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger, *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* 240

Gann, L. H. and Peter Duignan. *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Reviewed by Emmet V. Mittlebeeler. 648

Garcia, F. Chris. *Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools.* Reviewed by James W. Clarke. 218

Gardiner, Patrick. Review of Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State.* 602

Garson, G. David. Review of Constance Smith and Ann Freedman, *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature.* 970

Geiger, Frances M. and Theodore Geiger. *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* Reviewed by Robert E. Gamer. 240

Geiger, Theodore and Frances M. Geiger. *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* Reviewed by Robert E. Gamer. 240

Geismar, Peter. *Fanon.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258

Gellner, Ernest and Charles Micaud, eds. *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* Reviewed by Jean-Claude Vatin. 1332

Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974. Paul R. Abramson. 469

The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition. Leonard Krieger. Reviewed by James J. Sheehan. 1279

Gerteis, Louis S. *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865.* Reviewed by William S. McFeely. 1309

Ghosh, Sailesh Ghandra. *Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem.* Reviewed by Geoffrey Lambert. 1334

Gilbert, Charles E. Review of Nicholas Rescher, *Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective.* 1291

Gilbert, John H., ed. *The New Era in American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Howard H. Lentner. 677

Gilbert, Robert E. *Television and Presidential Politics.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives:* A review essay on Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada;* Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order: From the 1970's to the 1990's;* and Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.* 184

Ginsberg, Benjamin. *Elections and Public Policy.* 41

Gitelson, Susan Aurelia. Review of Tibor Mende, *From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure.* 286

Glick, Wendell, ed. *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295

Gnanakannan, I. and B. C. Muthayya. *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India.* Reviewed by Dan Fritz. 988

Gobineau: Selected Political Writings. Michael D. Biddis, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284

Godwin, R. Kenneth. Review of A. E. Keir Nash, ed., *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes.* 1288

Godwin, R. Kenneth and W. Bruce Shepard. *Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government.* 1127

Goldey, D. B. Review of René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle.* 1365

Goodrich, L. Carrington. Review of John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China.* 647

Goodwin, Richard N. *The American Condition.* Reviewed by George Kateb. 636

Gorbanevskaya, Natalia. *Red Square at Noon.* Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn. 1335

Gordon, Edward. Review of Michla Pomerance, *The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U. N. Eras.* 291

Gorman, John W., Samuel Popkin, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779

Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes. A. E. Keir Nash, ed. Reviewed by R. Kenneth Godwin. 1288

Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective. Richard Rose. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. Richard Hellman. Reviewed by Harry M. Trebing. 1310

Government and the Media. Ithiel de Sola Pool. A review essay on Chris Argyris, *Behind the Front Page;* James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio* and *The Press and the Cold War;* Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media;* Lee Brown, *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America;* Robert Cirino, *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorshp to Manipulate Public Opinion;* Edith Efron, *The News Twisters;* Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere: Television and the News;* Robert E. Gilbert, *Television and Presidential Politics;* John Hohenberg, *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause;* Joseph Keeley, *The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television;* Richard W. Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press;* John Luskin, *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press;* Lester Markel, *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion;* John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy;* Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell, *Presidential Television;* William Rivers, *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press;* Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials;* William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News And The Real World;* Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents;* Charles W. Whalen, Jr., *Your Right To Know;* George F. Will, ed., *Press, Politics and Popular Government.* 1234

Graber, Doris A. Review of Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology.* 633

A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution. Marcio Moreira Alves. Reviewed by Peter McDonough. 987

Gray, Colin S. *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* A review essay on Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race;* Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *SALT: Problems and Prospects;* William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's;* John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT;* Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System;* Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.* 1242

Review of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade with the Third World;* and Miles D. Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World.* 297

The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France. Georges Lefebvre. Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345

The Great Nuremberg Trial. John H. E. Fried. A review essay on *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946,* with a new Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg, and *Report of Robert H. Jackson: The Interna-*

tional Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. 192
The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation. Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burtle. Reviewed by Susan Strange. 1015
Gregor, A. James. *Interpretations of Fascism.* Reviewed by Stanley G. Payne. 1266
Griffith, Robert and Athan Theoharis, eds. *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy—A Review Essay.* 560
Griffith, Robert. *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Grossman, Gregory. Review of E. G. Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production.* 618
Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative. Paul H. Claeys. Reviewed by L. Huyse. 645
Gruber, Helmut. *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy.* Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Grumm, John G. Review of Richard L. Clinton, ed., *Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research.* 608
Grupp, Fred W., Jr. and Alan R. Richards. *Communication: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.* 930
Guide to the Congress of the United States. Congressional Quarterly Service. Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 628
Guyana: A Composite Monograph. Brian Irving, ed. Reviewed by Robert W. Anderson. 658
Guy, Donna. Review of Kenneth R. Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808.* 1008
Gwyn, William B. Review of Alan J. Wyner, ed., *Executive Ombudsmen in the United States.* 230
  Review of James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption.* 1368

Haas, Ernst B. Review of Frede Castberg, *The European Convention on Human Rights;* and Nicole Condorelli Braun, *Commissaires et Juges dans les Communautés Européennes.* 671
Haddad, George M. *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya.* Reviewed by Abdo I. Baaklini. ... 241
Hahn, Werner G. *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970.* Reviewed by Linda L. Lubrano. 1336
Halle, Louis J. *The Ideological Imagination.* Reviewed by Lawrence A. Scaff. 1267
Haller, Walter. *Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung.* Reviewed by Francis H. Heller. 637
Hallowell, John H. Review of Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World.* 660
Halpern, Manfred. Review of Elie Adib Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience.* 1365
Hamblin, Robert L., R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller. *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change.* Reviewed by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202
Hamby, Alonzo L. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S Truman and American Liberalism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay* 560
Hamer, D. A. *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.* Reviewed by Robert Kelley. 1337
Hansen, G. Eric. Review of D. W. Fokkema, *Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution.* 239
Hanson, Donald W. *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought.* Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 1268
Han, Sungjoo. *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea.* Reviewed by Han-Kyo Kim. 649
Harcourt, G. C. *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital.* Reviewed by Leland B. Yeager. 1270
Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. Review of Brenda E. F. Beck, *Peasant Societies in Koṅku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India.* 1322
Hardin, Russell. *Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition.* 1202
Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933–1955. Vols. I-XIX. Reviewed by Paul F. Power. 651
Harper, Alan D. *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

The Harried Leisure Class. Staffan B. Linder. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273

Harrison, Wilfrid. Review of Bhiku Parekh, ed., *Bentham's Political Thought.* 963

Harris, Rosemary. *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay. Geoffrey S. Smith. Review of John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946;* Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948;* John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947;* Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate;* Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism;* Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism;* Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952;* Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress;* George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War;* Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972;* Robert J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War;* Norman D. Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948;* Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse;* Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War;* James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft;* Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War;* Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965;* Joseph M. Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists;* Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism,* and *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955;* and Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism.* 560

Hart, Jeffrey A. Review of John J. Weltman, *Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy.* 975

Hartmann, Susan M. *Truman and the 80th Congress.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Haskel, Barbara G. Review of Stein Rokkan, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973.* 995

Hassner, Pierre. Review of Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre, *Le nationalisme, facteur belligène.* 203

Hatje, Ann-Katrin. *Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen.* Reviewed by Erik Allardt. 653

Havemann, Robert. *Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist.* Reviewed by Paul Breines. 1271

Havens, Murray Clark. Review of F. K. Crowley, *Modern Australia in Documents.* 646

Hawkins, Carroll. *Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers.* Reviewed by Robert J. Alexander. 242

Hayward, Fred M. *A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana.* 433

Heffron, Paul T. Review of Bernard Asbell, *The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History.* 210

Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Shlomo Avineri. Reviewed by Patrick Gardiner. 602

Heginbotham, Stanley J. Review of Donald P. Whitaker et al., *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic.* 270

Heikal, Mohamed. *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* Reviewed by R. H. Dekmejian. 279

The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime, 1953–1970. Abraham Rothberg, ed. Reviewed by D. Pospielovsky. . . 966

Heisler, Martin O., ed. *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies.* Reviewed by Norman Furniss. 243

Held, Virginia, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds. *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Heller, Francis H. Review of Walter Haller, *Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung.* 637

Hellmann, Donald C. Review of Harald B. Malmgren, ed., *Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests.* 221

Hellman, Richard. *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study.* Reviewed by Harry M. Trebing. 1310

Henderson, William. *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement.* Reviewed by Ralph R. Premdas. 244

Henig, Ruth B., ed. *The League of Nations.* Reviewed by Robert H. Ferrell. 678

Henkin, Louis. *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution.* Reviewed by Whittle Johnston. 1381

Henry, Edward L., ed. *Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City.* Reviewed by Russell D. Murphy. 219

Henry, Laurin L. Review of Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, *The Politics of Electoral College Reform.* 1311

Herlihy, David. Review of Georges Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century.* 611

Herndon, James F. and Joseph L. Bernd, eds. *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII.* Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. .. 202

The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe. Paul Neuburg. Reviewed by Paul Hollander. 989

Herring, George C., Jr. *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Herring, Pendleton. Introduction to APSA Presidential Address, 1975. 139

Herspring, Dale Roy. *East German Civil Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72.* Reviewed by James H. Wolfe. 654

Hertzman, Lewis. Review of Annelise Thimme, *Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918.* 972

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. *Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies.* 1033

Hidén, Mikael. *The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years.* Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 655

The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays. Arthur S. Link. Reviewed by Richard J. Stillman II. 619

Hildebrand, David K., James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal. *Prediction Analysis in Political Research.* 509

Hill, Richard Child. *Communication: The Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality Hypothesis: A Rejoinder.* 154

Hindley, Donald. Review of R. William Liddle, ed., *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia.* 1348

Historians of Modern Europe. Hans A. Schmitt, ed. Reviewed by Robert Woito. 1294

A History of Regulatory Taxation. R. Alton Lee. Reviewed by Clara Penniman. 978

History of U.S. Political Parties, Vol. I: 1789–1860, From Factions to Parties; Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed. Reviewed by Austin Ranney. ... 1316

Hochman, Harold M. Review of Sar H. Levitan, *Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s.* 979

Hodges, Donald C. and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds. *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351

Hoffmann, Stanley. *Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s.* Reviewed by Dorothy Pickles. 655

Hohenberg, John. *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Hollander, Paul. Review of Paul Neuburg, *The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe.* 989

Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition. Russell Hardin. 1202

Holt, Claire, ed. *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* Reviewed by Rex Mortimer. .. 1338

Hotman, François. *Francogallia.* Latin text by Ralph T. Giesey. J. H. M. Salmon, trans. Reviewed by Charles E. Butterworth. 613

Hottois, James W. *Communication: Stability of Partisan Attachments.* 552

A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland. James Callaghan. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

House, Jonathan M. Review of Judith M. Hughes, *To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Preparation in the 1920's.* 245

How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. Aage R. Clausen. Reviewed by Michael L. Mezey. 626

Howe, Christopher. *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972.* Reviewed by Alexander Eckstein. 657

How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action. Si Kahn. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Howton, F. William. *Functionaries.* Reviewed by Lloyd A. Rowe. 614

Hsieh, Alice Langley. Review of Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks. *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* 272

Huber, Joan. Review of Roland Mousnier, *Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present.* Peter Evans, trans. 1009

Hughes, Judith M. *To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's.* Reviewed by Jonathan M. House. 245

Humphreys, Leonard A. and John K. Emmerson. *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes.* Reviewed by Richard Storry. .. 649

Hunter, John E. and T. Daniel Coggin. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1226

Hunter, Robert E., ed. *The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action.* Reviewed by Raymond C. Miller. 679

Hunt, William H. Review of Oliver Woshinsky, *The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly.* 271

Hurstfield, Joel. *Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England.* Reviewed by Frank F. Foster. 245

Huyse, L. Review of Paul H. Claeys, *Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socioéconomiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative.* 645

Hyman, Herbert Harvey, ed. *The Politics of Heath Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City.* Reviewed by Eveline M. Burns. 220

The Ideological Imagination. Louis J. Halle. Reviewed by Lawrence A. Scaff. 1267

The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism. Sterling Stuckey. Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209

Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder. Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller. 832

The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy. John C. Merrill. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Alexander Saxton. Reviewed by Wen H. Kuo. 984

Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai. Peter A. French, ed. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Indonesia After Sukarno. J. M. van der Kroef. Reviewed by Michael Leifer. 1003

Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. 1033

Industrial Society in Communist China. Barry M. Richman. Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 1362

Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre. *Le nationalisme, facteur belligène.* Reviewed by Pierre Hassner...... 203

The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. *Outline History of the Communist International.* Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. David L. Sills, ed. Reviewed by Ralph Ross in *On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* 939

International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order. Henry G. Schermers. Reviewed by Charles H. McLaughlin. 1388

The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America. Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville, eds. Reviewed by E. M. Kassalow. 1001

International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law. Richard J. Erickson. Reviewed by Peter B. Maggs. 675

International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States. James N. Rosenau. Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 1016

An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining. James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine. 1185

Interpretations of Fascism. A. James Gregor. Reviewed by Stanley G. Payne. 1266

Interracial Public Housing in Border City. W. Scott Ford. Reviewed by Leonard S. Rubinowitz. 217

The Invisible Resource. Harvey J. Levin. Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315

Ireland since the Famine. F. S. L. Lyons. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922. Patrick Buckland. Reviewed by Alan J. Ward. 1324

Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922. Patrick Buckland. Reviewed by Alan J. Ward. 1324

Irving, Brian, ed. *Guyana: A Composite Monograph.* Reviewed by Robert W. Anderson. 658

Israel and the Palestinians. Shlomo Avineri, ed. Reviewed by Amos Perlmutter. 1321

Jackman, Robert W. *Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World*. 1078
Jackson, Robert H. *Report on The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945*. Reviewed by John H. E. Fried in *The Great Nuremberg Trial*. ... 192
Jackson, Robert J. Review of Vincent Lemieux, *Le Quotient Politique Vrai*. .. 248
Jackson, W. A. Douglas, ed. *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries*. Reviewed by Roy D. Laird. 658
Jacobsen, R. Brooke, Robert L. Hamblin, and Jerry L. L. Miller. *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change*. Reviewed by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202
Jacobson, Harold K. Review of James Barros, ed., *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future*. 275
Jacoby, Henry. *The Bureaucratization of the World*. Reviewed by John H. Hallowell. 660
Jaher, Frederic C., ed. *The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History*. Reviewed by Suzanne Keller. 615
Jameson, Frederick. *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature*. Reviewed by Paul Piccone. .. 1272
Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy. Nobuya Bamba. Reviewed by Hideo Sato. 274
Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide. James William Morley, ed. Reviewed by Chalmers Johnson. 287
Jaques, Elliot. *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice*. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson. Reviewed by J. A. C. Mackie. 1320
Jay, Martin. *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950*. Reviewed by Hans Speier. 1276
Jenkins, George D. and Kenneth W. Post. *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria*. Reviewed by Robert Melson. 993
Jennings, M. Kent and Jack Dennis, eds. *Comparative Political Socialization*. Reviewed by Roberta S. Sigel. 1329
Jensen, Richard. Review of Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896*. 980
Johnson, Chalmers. Review of James William Morley, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide*. 287
Johnston, Whittle. Review of Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution*. ... 1381
Joiner, Charles A. Review of John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution*. 1384
Jones, Charles O. Review of Don E. Kash, Irvin L. White, and others, *Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations*. 282
Jones, Edward E., David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior*. Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Jones, Ray. *The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History*. Reviewed by Keith Wilson. 1382
Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents. Jeremy Tunstall. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234
Jukes, G. Review of Edward Allworth, ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia*. 234

Kahn, Herman and Barry Bruce-Briggs. *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties*. Reviewed by Philip Hone Auerbach. 205
Kahn, Si. *How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action*. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Kanet, Roger E., ed. *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*. Reviewed by Bernard P. Kiernan. 280
Kanouse, David E., Edward E. Jones, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior*. Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Kaplan, Morton A., ed. *SALT: Problems and Prospects*. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT*. 1242
Kaplan, Morton A. *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present*. Reviewed by Nils Ørvik. 1383
Karis, Thomas and Gwendolen M. Carter. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II*. Reviewed by James P. Barber. 246
Karl, Barry D. *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics*. Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond. 1278
Kash, Don E., Irvin L. White, and others.

Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 282
Kassalow, E. M. Review of Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville, eds., *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America.* 1001
Kateb, George. Review of Richard N. Goodwin, *The American Condition.* 636
Kearney, Robert N. *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon.* Reviewed by Calvin A. Woodward. 1339
Keeley, Joseph. *The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Keeton, George W. and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973.* Reviewed by Peter R. Baehr. 283
Keith, Nathaniel S. *Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930.* Reviewed by W. Scott Ford. 220
Kellas, James G. Review of Bernard Barker, ed., *Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings.* 604
Keller, Suzanne. Review of Frederic C. Jaher, ed., *The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History.* 615
Kelley, Harold H., Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Kelley, Robert. Review of D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.* 1337
Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control. Henry Bienen. Reviewed by L. Gray Cowan. 642
Kerr, Malcolm H. Review of Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* 1353
Kessel, John H. Review of Heinz Euleau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* 1308
Kettler, David. Review of William M. Dick, *Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era;* Carl Reeve, *The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon;* and Sally M. Miller, *Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920.* 215
Khouri, Fred J. Review of Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects.* 259
Kiernan, Bernard P. Review of Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations.* 280
Kilcup, Rodney W. Review of Franco Venturi, *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment;* and Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre.* 973
Kimball, Lorenzo Kent. *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971.* Reviewed by Glenn Perry. 1341
Kimche, David. *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World.* Reviewed by Frank H. H. King. . . 1005
Kim, Han-Kyo. Review of Sungjoo Han, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea.* . . 649
Kingdon, John W. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* Reviewed by Stanley Bach. . . 977
King, Frank H. H. Review of David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World.* 1005
King, Robert R. and Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 1358
Kinnard, Douglas. Review of Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman, eds., *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971.* 278
Kintner, William R. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Kirkendall, Richard S., ed. *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970.* Reviewed by Richard L. Sklar. 247
Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. Review of Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller, *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change.* 202
Kirschbaum, Stanslav. Review of Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* 971
Kirst, Michael W. and Frederick Wirt. *The Political Web of American Schools.* Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 987

Kitamura, Hiroshi. *Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations.* Reviewed by Ichiro Miyake. 1006

Klieman, Aaron S. Review of Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations.* 676

Kolchin, Peter. Review of Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* 224

Kolodziej, Edward A. Review of Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, eds., *European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States.* 284

Koury, Enver M. *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States.* Reviewed by Subhi Abu-Gosh. 1341

Krause, Lawrence B. and Walter S. Salant, eds. *European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States.* Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 284

Krieger, Leonard. *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition.* Reviewed by James J. Sheehan. 1279

Kriesberg, Louis. Review of Norman Z. Alcock, *The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies.* 663

Kuo, Wen H. Review of Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California.* . . 984

Kvavik, Robert B. Review of Mikael Hidén, *The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years.* 655

Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. Louis Chevalier. Reviewed by Louise A. Tilly. 644

Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era. William M. Dick. Reviewed by David Kettler. 215

Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt. Reviewed by John H. Kessel. 1308

Lafferty, William M. *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis.* Reviewed by Joseph B. Board. 1343

Laing, James D., David K. Hildebrand, and Howard Rosenthal. *Prediction Analysis in Political Research.* 509

Laird, Roy D. Review of W. A. Douglas Jackson, ed., *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries.* 658

Lambert, Geoffrey. Review of Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh, *Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem.* 1334

Lampton, David M. Review of Robert A. Scalapino, ed. *Elites in the People's Republic of China.* 1366

Landauer, Carl. Review of Eugene Lunn, *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer.* 1282

Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru. Hugo Blanco. N. Allen, trans. Reviewed by Larry L. Pippin. 643

Lane, Robert E. Review of Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values.* 965

LaPalombara, Joseph. Review of Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* 1356

Laquian, Aprodicio A. Review of Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro.* 639

Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1344

Lasswell, Harold D. Review of Anthony Wilden, *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange.* 976

Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution. James Petras, ed. Reviewed by Kenneth Medhurst. 250

Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction. Harold Eugene Davis. Reviewed by Thomas W. Walker. 610

Lawrence, David G. *Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment.* 80

Lawson, Fred H. *Communication: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 932

The League of Nations. Ruth B. Henig, ed. Reviewed by Robert H. Ferrell. 678

Lee, Chong-Sik and Robert A. Scalapino. *Communism in Korea,* 2 vols. Reviewed by Princeton Lyman. 260

Lee, R. Alton. *A History of Regulatory Taxation.* Reviewed by Clara Penniman. 978

Lee, Richard W., ed. *Politics and the Press.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Lefebvre, Georges. *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France.* Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345

The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television. Joseph Keeley. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Leibman, Morris I. and William Sloane Coffin, Jr. *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hin-*

drance to Justice? Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Leifer, Michael. Review of J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia After Sukarno.* 1003
Lemieux, Vincent. *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans.* Reviewed by Kenneth McRoberts. 1281
Le Quotient Politique Vrai. Reviewed by Robert J. Jackson. 248
Lengle, James I. and Byron Shafer. *Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change.* 25
Lentner, Howard H. Review of John H. Gilbert, ed., *The New Era in American Foreign Policy.* 677
Leonard, David K. Review of Donald Rothchild, *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization.* 258
Lerumo, A. *Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971.* Reviewed by Aaron Segal. 1347
"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. Ernest R. May. Reviewed by Donald E. Nuechterlein. 981
Levine, Charles H. and James L. Perry. *An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining.* 1185
Levin, Harvey J. *The Invisible Resource.* Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315
Levitan, Sar H. *Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s.* Reviewed by Harold M. Hochman. 979
Levitt, Kari. *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada.* Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184
Levy, Marion J., Jr. Review of S. N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change, and Modernity.* 1261
Lewis, Gordon K. *The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput.* Reviewed by Charles D. Ameringer. 1007
Lexikon Zur Soziologie. Werner Fuchs et al., eds. Reviewed by Gianfranco Poggi. 1265
Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. Robert A. Packenham. Reviewed by Joseph LaPalombara. 1356
Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy. D. A. Hamer. Reviewed by Robert Kelley. 1337
Liberman, E. G. *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production.* Reviewed by Gregory Grossman. 618
Liddle, R. William, ed. *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia.* Reviewed by Donald Hindley. 1348
Lidtke, Vernon L. Review of Donald L. Niewyk, *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933.* . . 1356
The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon. Carl Reeve. Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Lincoln, C. Eric. *The Black Muslims in America.* Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
Lindbeck, John M. H., ed. *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society.* Reviewed by Ian W. A. C. Adie. 1349
Linder, Staffan B. *The Harried Leisure Class.* Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Link, Arthur S. *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays.* Reviewed by Richard J. Stillman II. 619
Lippmann, Liberty and the Press. John Luskin. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention. Ian D. Burman. Reviewed by William L. Day. 625
Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case. Lynn T. White III. . . . 479
Lofchie, Michael F. Review of Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* 238
The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics. Franz Schurmann. Reviewed by Richard A. Falk. 1390
London, Kurt L. Review of Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-Asian Relations.* 286
The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Longley, Lawrence D. and Alan G. Braun. *The Politics of Electoral College Reform.* Reviewed by Laurin L. Henry. 1311
Loshak, David. *Pakistan Crisis.* Reviewed by George M. Platt. 660
Lubrano, Linda L. Review of Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970.* 1336
Lucas, Paul R. Review of Harry M. Ward, *Statism in Plymouth Colony.* 228
Lunn, Eugene. *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer.* Reviewed by Carl Landauer. 1282
Luskin, John. *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Lyman, Princeton. Review of Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. *Communism in Korea,* 2 vols.. 260

Lyons, F. S. L. *Ireland since the Famine.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Lyons, William and David R. Morgan. *Communication: Multi-Level Analysis in State Politics.* 159

McAlister, John T., Jr. *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution.* Reviewed by Charles A. Joiner. 1384
McCann, Eamonn. *War and an Irish Town.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
McCann, Frank D., Jr. *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945.* Reviewed by Thomas E. Skidmore. 1007
McCarl, Steven R. and Richard M. Bank. *"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited.* 886
McClelland, J. S., ed. *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras).* Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
McConahay, John B. and David Sears. *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot.* Reviewed by Peter K. Eisinger. 985
McDonald, Ronald H. Review of Arturo C. Porzecanski, *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla.* 252
McDonough, Peter. Review of Marcio Moreira Alves, *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* 987
McFeely, William S. Review of Louis S. Gerteis, *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865.* 1309
McGowan, Patrick J. and Howard B. Shapiro. *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. . . 661
McGowan, Patrick J. and Robert M. Rood. *Communication: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 934
McKelvey, Richard D. and Peter C. Ordeshook. *Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.* 1172
Mackie, J. A. C. Review of Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946.* . . 1320
McKinlay, R. D. and A. S. Cohan. *Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems.* 850
McLane, Charles B. *Soviet-Asian Relations.* Reviewed by Kurt L. London. 286
McLaughlin, Charles H. Review of Henry G. Schermers, *International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order.* 1388
McMillen, Neil R. *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964.* Reviewed by James D. Thomas. 1313
McRoberts, Kenneth. Review of Vincent Lemieux, *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans.* 1281
Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. Richard W. Sterling. Reviewed by Kenneth N. Waltz. 296
McSeveney, Samuel T. *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896.* Reviewed by Richard Jensen. 980
Maddox, Robert J. *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Magee, John. *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Maggs, Peter B. Review of Richard J. Erickson, *International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law.* 675
Mahncke, Dieter. *Berlin im geteilten Deutschland.* Reviewed by Wolfgang F. Dexheimer. 663
A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election. Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. 753
The Making of an Australian Prime Minister. Laurie Oakes and David Solomon. Reviewed by H. V. Emy. 991
Malmgren, Harald B., ed. *Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests.* Reviewed by Donald C. Hellmann. 221
Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade. Farag Moussa. Reviewed by Francis O. Wilcox. 1010
Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings. K. Fan, ed. Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200
Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War. M. Rejai, ed. Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200
Marcum, John. Review of Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier, *Angola.* 1372
Marcus, Steven. *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class.* Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1283
Markel, Lester. *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Markowitz, Norman D. *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism 1941–1948.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Marquette, Jesse F. *Communication: Social Change and Political Mobility in the United States: A Methodological Note.* . . 545

Marshall, Dale Rogers. Review of Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals;* Si Kahn, *How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action;* Ralph Nader and Donald Ross, *Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing;* Dick Simpson, *Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics;* and Michael Walzer, *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics.* 620

Martin, John Barlow, Newton N. Minow and Lee M. Mitchell. *Presidential Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Martin, Robert E. Review of Ralph J. Bunche, *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR.* 211

Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. Frederick Jameson. Reviewed by Paul Picconne. . . . 1272

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung."* Reviewed by David-Hillel Ruben. 206

Mason, Philip. *Patterns of Dominance.* Reviewed by M. Mushkat, Jr. 1283

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, eds. Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. . . 202

Mathematical Approaches to Politics. Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600

A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller. Reviewed by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202

Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own. John Carroll, compiler. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285

Maxwell, Kenneth R. *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808.* Reviewed by Donna Guy. 1008

May, Ernest R. *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Donald E. Nuechterlein. 981

Medhurst, Kenneth, ed. *Allende's Chile.* Reviewed by Michael J. Francis. 249

Medhurst, Kenneth. Review of James Petras, ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution.* 250

Melko, Matthew. *52 Peaceful Societies.* Reviewed by Kenneth E. Boulding. 206

Melson, Robert. Review of David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* 265

Review of Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins, *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria.* 993

Mende, Tibor. *From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure.* Reviewed by Susan Aurelia Gitelson. 286

The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792. Alison Patrick. Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345

Merger Politics: Local Government in Tide-Water Virginia. David G. Temple. Reviewed by Chester W. Bain. 1316

Merrill, John C. *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Mezey, Michael L. Review of Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus.* 626

Micaud, Charles and Ernest Gellner, eds. *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* Reviewed by Jean-Claude Vatin. 1332

Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City. Edward L. Henry, ed. Reviewed by Russell D. Murphy. 219

Middleton, John and Ronald Cohen, eds. *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* Reviewed by Michael F. Lofchie. 238

Migdal, Joel S. Review of Yonah Alexander, *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects.* 664

Miles, Rufus E., Jr. *The Department of Health, Education and Welfare.* Reviewed by Harold Seidman. 222

Militari e Potere in America Latina. Gianfranco Pasquino. Reviewed by Torcuato S. Di Tella. 1359

Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World. Miles D. Wolpin. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. 297

Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis. Steven B. Canby. Reviewed by Gary L. Wamsley. 1301

Miller, Arthur H., Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753

Miller, Arthur H. and Warren E. Miller. *Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder.* 832

Miller, Jerry L. L., Robert L. Hamblin, and R. Brooke Jacobsen. *A Mathematical*

Theory of Social Change. Reviewd by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202

Miller, Kent S. and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds. *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303

Miller, Lynn H. Review of John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs, eds., *The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance.* 1011

Miller, Norman and Roderick Aya, eds. *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351

Miller, Raymond C. Review of Robert E. Hunter, ed., *The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action.* 679

Miller, Sally M. *Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920.* Reviewed by David Kettler. 215

Miller, Warren E., Arthur H. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753

Miller, Warren E. and Arthur H. Miller. *Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder.* 832

Minow, Newton N., John Barlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell. *Presidential Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. James T. Patterson. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith, in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* . . 560

Mitchell, Lee M., Newton N. Minow, and John Barlow Martin. *Presidential Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Mittlebeeler, Emmet V. Review of Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* 648

Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective. Lloyd D. Musolf. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin. 1354

Miyake, Ichiro. Review of Hiroshi Kitamura, *Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations.* 1006

Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas. John A. Armstrong. 393

Modern Australia in Documents. F. K. Crowley. Reviewed by Murray Clark Havens. 646

Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Guillermo A. O'Donnell. Reviewed by Thomas C. Bruneau. 992

Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience. Elie Adib Salem. Reviewed by Manfred Halpern. 1365

Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politco. Gianfranco Pasquino. Reviewed by Torcuato S. Di Tella. 1359

Mohapatra, Manindra K. Review of W. A. J. Archbold, *Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period).* 640

Moldenhauer, Joseph J., ed. *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295

Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution. Joseph Albert Ernst. Reviewed by Alan Tully. 635

Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws. Thomas L. Pangle. Reviewed by Anne M. Cohler. 962

Moore, Barrington, Jr. *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them.* Reviewed by Alan Stone. 1286

Moore, Clement Henry. *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* Reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr. 1353

Review of Ian Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria;* and Gérard Duprat, *Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie.* 1328

Morell, David. Review of Clark D. Neher, *Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* 1355

Morgan, David R. and William Lyons. *Communication: Multi-Level Analysis in State Politics.* 159

Morgenbesser, Sidney, Virginia Held and Thomas Nagel, eds. *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Morley, James William, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide.* Reviewed by Chalmers Johnson. 287

Morris, Bernard S. Review of David Caute, *Frantz Fanon;* and Peter Geismar, *Fanon.* 1258

Review of Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* 289

Morris, Cynthia Taft and Irma Adelman. *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries.* Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 232

Mortimer, Rex. Review of Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* 1338

The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation. Hedley Bull. Reviewed by Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. 1374

Moses, Carl C. Review of James D. Theberge, *Russia in the Caribbean.* 300

Mousnier, Roland. *Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present.* Peter Evans, trans. Reviewed by Joan Huber. 1009

Moussa, Farag. *Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade.* Reviewed by Francis O. Wilcox. 1010

Mowat, R. C. *Creating the European Community.* Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold. 288

Murphy, Irene L. *Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s.* Reviewed by Norma Noonan. 223

Murphy, Russell D. Review of Edward L. Henry, ed., *Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City.* 219

Murray, Richard. Review of Chandler Davidson, *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South.* . . . 1305

Mushkat, M., Jr. Review of Philip Mason, *Patterns of Dominance.* 1283

Musolf, Lloyd D. *Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective.* Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin. 1354

Muthayya, B. C. and I. Gnanakannan. *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Acoss Three States in India.* Reviewed by Dan Fritz. 988

Nader, Ralph and Donald Ross. *Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Nagel, Thomas, Marshall Cohen and Thomas Scanlon, eds. *War and Moral Responsibility.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Nagel, Thomas, Virginia Held, and Sidney Morgenbesser, eds. *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Nardin, Terry. *Philosophy and International Violence.* A review essay on Lewis White Beck, ed., *Philosophy of War;* Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., *War and Moral Responsibility;* Peter A. French, ed., *Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai;* Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds., *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs;*

Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality.* 952

Nash, A. E. Keir, ed. *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes.* Reviewed by R. Kenneth Godwin. 1288

Le nationalisme, facteur belligène. Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre. Reviewed by Pierre Hassner. . . . 203

The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia. Edward Allworth, ed. Reviewed by G. Jukes. 234

National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970. Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351

National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351

Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945. Peter F. Sugar, ed. Reviewed by Alex Pravda. 1002

The Nature of Human Values. Milton Rokeach. Reviewed by Robert E. Lane. 965

Negative Dialectics. Theodor W. Adorno. Reviewed by Gillian Rose. 598

Neher, Clark D. *Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* Reviewed by David Morell. 1355

Neiman, Max. *Communication: Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality.* 149

Neuburg, Paul. *The Nero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe.* Reviewed by Paul Hollander. 989

Nevitt, Della. Review of The Fabian Society, *Socialism and Affluence,* and *The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals.* 1264

The New Era in American Foreign Policy. John H. Gilbert, ed. Reviewed by Howard H. Lentner. 677

Newhouse, John. *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. Joseph M. Siracusa. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. Robert J. Maddox. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

News From Nowhere: Television and the News. Edward Jay Epstein. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

The News Twisters. Edith Efron. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Nexon, David. Review of Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life.* 986

Nienaber, Jeanne and Aaron Wildavsky. *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees.* Reviewed by Allen Schick. 1313

Nienaber, Jeanne. Review of Elmo Richardson, *Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era.* 983

Nie, Norman H. and Sidney Verba. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* Reviewed by Jerrold G. Rusk in *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* 583

Niewyk, Donald L. *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933.* Reviewed by Vernon L. Lidtke. 1356

1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics. Robert Paul Wolff, ed. Reviewed by Joseph A. Schlesinger. 229

The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History. Ray Jones. Reviewed by Keith Wilson. 1382

Nisbett, Richard E., Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617

Niskanen, William A. Review of Albert Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government.* 605

No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II. Bruce M. Russett. Reviewed by Morton J. Tenzer. 293

Noonan, Norma. Review of Irene L. Murphy, *Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s.* . . 223

Nordlinger, Eric A. *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.* Reviewed by Fred R. von der Mehden. 250

Norpoth, Helmut. *Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes.* 1156

Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict. John Magee. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* . . . 592

The Northern Ireland Problem. Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict. London *Sunday Times* Insight Team. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Nova, Fritz. *Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review.* 114

Nozick, Robert. *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* Reviewed by Douglas Rae. 1289

Nuechterlein, Donald E. Review of Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.* 981

Oakes, Laurie and David Solomon. *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister.* Reviewed by H. V. Emy. 991

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. *States of Ireland.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

O'Connor, Robert E. Review of John D. Buenker, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform.* 212

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics.* Reviewed by Thomas C. Bruneau. 992

Okuda, Kazuhiko. *Communication: The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.* . . 174

O'Leary, Cornelius and Ian Budge. *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years. Mikael Hidén. Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 655

On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Ralph Ross. A review essay on David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* . . . 939

Ordeshook, Peter C. and Richard D. McKelvey. *Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.* 1172

The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China. Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks. Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 272

Organski, A. F. K. Review of Alberto Aquarone, *Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano.* 666

Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano. Alberto Aquarone. Reviewed by A. F. K. Organski. 666

The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. Joseph Cooper. Reviewed by Richard E. Damon. 631
Ornstein, Norman J. Review of Congressional Quarterly Service, *Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972),* and *Guide to the Congress of the United States.* 628
Orren, Karen. *Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts.* . . 723
Ørvik, Nils. Review of Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present.* 1383
Outline History of the Communist International. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period). W. A. J. Archbold. Reviewed by Manindra K. Mohapatra. 640
Owen, Guillermo. *Communication: Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.* . . 1223
Owens, John R. Review of David W. Adamany, *Campaign Finance in America.* . . 1298

Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests. Harold B. Malmgren, ed. Reviewed by Donald C. Hellmann. 221
Packenham, Robert A. *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* Reviewed by Joseph LaPalombara. 1356
Page, Benjamin I. *The Theory of Political Ambiguity.* 742
Pakistan Crisis. David Loshak. Reviewed by George M. Platt. 660
Palmer, Stephen E., Jr. and Robert R. King. *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 1358
Paltiel, Khayyam Z. Review of Elaine Baldwin, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav.* 236
Pangle, Thomas L. *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws.* Reviewed by Anne M. Cohler. 962
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws. 1059
Parekh, Bhiku, ed. *Bentham's Political Thought.* Reviewed by Wilfrid Harrison. 963
Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans. Vincent Lemieux. Reviewed by Kenneth McRoberts. 1281
Parenti ,Michael. *The Anti-Communist Impulse.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. Reviewed by Jerrold G. Rusk in *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* 583
Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich. Paul Alpert. Reviewed by Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. 235
Party and Policy in West German Cities. Robert C. Fried. 11
Pasquino, Gianfranco. *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico,* and *Militari e Potere in America Latina.* Reviewed by Torcuato S. Di Tella. 1359
Paterson, Thomas G. *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 289
Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Patrick, Alison. *The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792.* Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345
Patterns of Dominance. Philip Mason. Reviewed by M. Mushkat, Jr. 1283
The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States. Enver M. Koury. Reviewed by Subhi Abu-Gosh. 1341
Patterson, James T. *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Patterson, Stephen E. *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts.* Reviewed by Ronald P. Formisano. 981
Paxman, John M. and George T. Boggs, eds. *The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance.* Reviewed by Lynn H. Miller. 1011
Payne, Stanley G. Review of A. James Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism.* 1266
Pearson, Frederic S. Review of Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* 661
Peasant Society in Koṅku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India. Brenda E. F. Beck. Reviewed by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 1322
Pease, Jane H. and William H. Pease. *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* Reviewed by Peter Kolchin. 224

Pease, William H. and Jane H. Pease. *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* Reviewed by Peter Kolchin. 224

Pelinka, Anton. *Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit.* Reviewed by George Schwab. 964

Pelissier, René and Douglas Wheeler. *Angola.* Reviewed by John Marcum. 1372

Penniman, Clara. Review of R. Alton Lee, *A History of Regulatory Taxation.* 978

Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems. R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan. 850

Peritore, N. Patrick. *Communication: The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.* 178

Perlmutter, Amos. Review of Shlomo Avineri, ed., *Israel and the Palestinians.* ... 1321

Perry, Glenn. Review of Lorenzo Kent Kimball, *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971.* 1341

Perry, James L. and Charles H. Levine. *An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining.* 1185

Perspectives on Urban America. Melvin T. Urofsky, ed. Reviewed by Betty H. Zisk. 227

Peterson, Paul E. Review of Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress.* 1318

Pétonnet, Colette. *Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project.* Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1344

Petras, James, ed. *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution.* Reviewed by Kenneth Medhurst. 250

Petshek, Kirk R. *The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia.* Reviewed by Miriam Ershkowitz. 224

Pettigrew, Thomas F. Review of Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman, *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks;* and Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds., *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* 1303

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and William R. Kintner, eds. *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* ... 1242

Phillips, Charles, Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, and Jeffrey A. Smith. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779

Philosophy and International Violence. Terry Nardin. A review essay on Lewis White Beck, ed., *Philosophy of War;* Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., *War and Moral Responsibility;* Peter A. French, ed., *Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai;* Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds., *Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs;* Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality.* 952

Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Philosophy of War. Lewis White Beck, ed. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Piccone, Paul. Review of Frederick Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature.* 1272

Pickles, Dorothy. Review of Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s.* 655

Pierce, Roy. Review of Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France;* and Alison Patrick, *The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792.* 1345

Pippin, Larry L. Review of Hugo Blanco, *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru.* N. Allen, trans. 643

Platt, George M. Review of David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis.* 660

Plax, Martin. Review of Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor, eds., *Politics and Deviance.* 1297

Poggi, Gianfranco. Review of Werner Fuchs et al., eds., *Lexikon Zur Soziologie.* 1265

Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics. Michael Walzer. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance. Neil R. Richardson. 1098

Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics. Dusan Sidjanski, ed. Reviewed by Linda P. Brady. 264

The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives. Robert Gilpin. A review essay on Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada;* Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order: From the 1970's to the 1990's;* and Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.* 184

The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro. Remigio E. Agpalo. Reviewed by Aprodicio A. Laquian. 639

Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review. Fritz Nova. 114

Political Participation in America: A Review Essay. Jerrold G. Rusk. Review of Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* 583

Political Participation in Modern Indonesia. R. William Liddle, ed. Reviewed by Donald Hindley. 1348

Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts. Stephen E. Patterson. Reviewed by Ronald P. Formisano. 981

Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government. R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard. 1127

The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws. Thomas L. Pangle. 1059

Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools. F. Chris Garcia. Reviewed by James W. Clarke. 218

The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR. Ralph J. Bunche. Reviewed by Robert E. Martin. 211

The Political Web of American Schools. Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst. Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 987

Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World. Robert W. Jackman. 1078

Politics of Central Asia. Ram Rahul. Reviewed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. 1385

The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896. Samuel T. McSeveney. Reviewed by Richard Jensen. 980

Politics and Deviance. Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor, eds. Reviewed by Martin Plax. 1297

The Politics of Electoral College Reform. Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun. Reviewed by Laurin L. Henry. 1311

Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies. Martin O. Heisler, ed. Reviewed by Norman Furniss. 243

The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate. Robert Griffith. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

The Politics of Health Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City. Herbert Harvey Hyman, ed. Reviewed by Eveline M. Burns. 220

Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930. Nathaniel S. Keith. Reviewed by W. Scott Ford. 220

The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952. Alan D. Harper. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Clement Henry Moore. Reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr. 1353

The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. George H. Quester. Reviewed by Alastair Buchan. 1012

Politics and the Press. Richard W. Lee, ed. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

The Politics of Progress. Raymond E. Wolfinger. Reviewed by Paul E. Peterson. 1318

The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA. Elizabeth A. Finch. Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 279

The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970. Werner G. Hahn. Reviewed by Linda L. Lubrano. 1336

The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot. David Sears and John B. McConahay. Reviewed by Peter K. Eisinger. 985

Pomerance, Michla. *The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and the U. N. Eras.* Reviewed by Edward Gordon. 291

Pool, Ithiel de Sola. *Government and the Media.* A review of Chris Argyris, *Behind the Front Page;* James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio* and *The Press and the Cold War;* Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media;* Lee Brown, *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America;* Robert Cirino, *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion;* Edith Efron, *The News Twisters;* Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere: Television and the News;* Robert E. Gilbert, *Television and Presidential Politics;* John Hohenberg, *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause;* Joseph Keeley, *The Left-Leaning An-*

tenna: Political Bias in Television; Richard W. Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press;* John Luskin, *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press;* Lester Markel, *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion;* John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy;* Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell, *Presidential Television;* William Rivers, *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press;* Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials;* William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World;* Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents;* Charles W. Whalen, Jr., *Your Right to Know;* George F. Will, ed., *Press, Politics and Popular Government.* 1234

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed. *Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology.* Reviewed by Doris Graber. 633

Popkin, Samuel, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779

Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research. Richard L. Clinton, ed. Reviewed by John G. Grumm. 608

Porzecanski, Arturo C. *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla.* Reviewed by Ronald H. McDonald. 252

Pospielovsky, D. Review of Abraham-Rothberg, ed., *The Heirs of Stalin:* Dissidence *and the Soviet Regime, 1953–1970.* 966

Post, Kenneth W. and George D. Jenkins. *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. 993

Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs. Charles A. Barker, ed. Reviewed by Adda B. Bozeman. 669

Power, Paul F. Review of *Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933–1955. Vols. I–XIX.* 651

Pravda, Alex. Review of Peter F. Sugar, ed., *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945.* 1002

Prediction Analysis in Political Research. David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal. 509

Preeg, Ernest H. *Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by W. Andrew Axline. 292

Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community. Rosemary Harris. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Premdas, Ralph R. Review of William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement.* 244

The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. James David Barber. Reviewed by Arnold A. Rogow. 1299

Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power. George C. Edwards III. 101

Presidential Television. Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin and Lee M. Mitchell. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

The Press and the Cold War. James Aronson. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Press, Politics and Popular Government. George F. Will, ed. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Prewitt, Kenneth and Heinz Eulau. *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* Reviewed by John H. Kessel. 1308

The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria. Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins. Reviewed by Robert Melson. 993

The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946. John Morton Blum, ed. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Primary Rules, Political Power ,and Social Change. James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer. 25

Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective. Fred H. Willhoite, Jr. 1110

Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience. Richard J. Regan, S.J. Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259

Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment. David G. Lawrence. 80

Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s. Sar H. Levitan. Reviewed by Harold M. Hochman. 979

Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer. Eugene Lunn. Reviewed by Carl Landauer. 1282

Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965. Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in

"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay. 560
The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States. Abderrahman Robana. Reviewed by Yassin El-Ayouty. 256
Pryor, Frederic L. *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 1361
Psychoanalysis and the Law. C. G. Schoenfeld. Reviewed by Stanley Rothman. 969
Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. Hiroshi Kitamura. Reviewed by Ichiro Miyake. 1006
Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon." Michael J. Robinson. 409
Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. Frederic L. Pryor. Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 1361
Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s. Irene L. Murphy. Reviewed by Norma Noonan. . . 223
Pugh, T. B. Review of Arthur J. Slavin, ed., *Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government.* 207
Putnam, Robert D. *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy.* Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 253

Quester, George H. *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation.* Reviewed by Alastair Buchan. 1012
The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. Isaiah Friedman. Reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman. . . 676
Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist. Robert Havemann. Reviewed by Paul Breines. . . 1271
Le Quotient Politique Vrai. Vincent Lemieux. Reviewed by Robert J. Jackson. . . 248

Rabinovich, Itamar. *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis.* Reviewed by Leonard Binder. 254
Rabinowitch, Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds. with Ladis K. D. Kristof. *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky.* Reviewed by Leonard Schapiro. 993
Rabinowitch, Janet and Alexander Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof. *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky.* Reviewed by Leonard Schapiro. 993
Race and Race History and Other Essays. Alfred Rosenberg. Robert Pois, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285
Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights. Gerald Benjamin. Reviewed by Stephen M. David. 624
Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization. Donald Rothchild. Reviewed by David K. Leonard. 258
The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy. Robert W. Tucker. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield. 1392
Rae, Douglas. Review of Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* 1289
Rahl, James A., ed. *Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict.* Reviewed by M. A. Adelman. 1384
Rahul, Ram. *Politics and Central Asia.* Reviewed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. . 1385
Rai, Kul B. Review of James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, eds., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII.* . . 202
Raine, Alden S., Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, and Thad A. Brown. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. Review of Ram Rahul, *Politics of Central Asia.* . . 1385
Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography. Jose V. Abueva. Reviewed by A. B. Villanueva. 597
Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings. Bernard Barker, ed. Reviewed by James G. Kellas. 604
Randolph, Lillian L. *Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice.* Reviewed by Carl Q. Christol. 1013
Ranis, Peter. Review of Robert J. Alexander, *Agrarian Reform in Latin America.* 233
Ranney, Austin. APSA Presidential Address, 1975: *"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture.* 140
Review of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of U.S. Political Parties.* . . . 1316
Rasmussen, Erik, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 7/1972.* Reviewed by Eric S. Einhorn. 255
The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present. Morton A. Kaplan. Reviewed by Nils Ørvik. . . . 1383
Ravenal, Earl C. Review of Charles W. Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II.* 302
A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana. Fred M. Hayward. 433

Recent Writing on Northern Ireland. John H. Whyte. Review of Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem;* Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970;* James Callaghan, *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland;* Liam de Paor, *Divided Ulster;* Garret FitzGerald, *Towards a New Ireland;* Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community;* The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict;* F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine;* Eamonn McCann, *War and an Irish Town;* John Magee, *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict;* Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland;* Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus; an Irish Perspective.* 592

Red Square at Noon. Natalia Gorbanevskaya. Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn. 1335

Reeve, Carl. *The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon.* Reviewed by David Kettler. .. 215

Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them. Barrington Moore, Jr. Reviewed by Alan Stone. 1286

Regan, Richard J., S.J. *Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience.* Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. .. 1259

Regionale Verflechtung Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme. Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Reviewed by Henri J. Warmenhoven. 1380

Rejai, M., ed. *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War.* Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Shlomo Avineri. David Resnick. 1150

The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America. Lee Brown. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Remmer, Karen L. *Communication: Development and Strategy in Latin America.* 548

Rémond, René. *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle.* Reviewed by D. B. Goldey. 1365

RePass, David E. *Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Interpretations of the 1972 Election.* 814

Reporters and Officials. Leon V. Sigal. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution. D. W. Fokkema. Reviewed by G. Eric Hansen. 239

Report of Robert H. Jackson: The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. Reviewed by John H. E. Fried in *The Great Nuremberg Trial.* .. 192

Rescher, Nicholas. *Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective.* Reviewed by Charles E. Gilbert. 1291

Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. Ralph Braibanti. Reviewed by Lawrence Ziring. 1323

Resnick, David. *Crude Communism and Revolution.* 1136

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Shlomo Avineri. 1150

Retzlaff, Ralph H. Review of A. H. Somjee, *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study.* 1369

Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie. Gérard Duprat. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328

The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Reviewed by David-Hillel Ruben. 206

Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky. Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof. Reviewed by Leonard Schapiro. 993

Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya. George M. Haddad. Reviewed by Abdo I. Baaklini. 241

Rhinelander, John B. and Mason Willrich, eds. *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

Richards, Alan R. and Fred W. Grupp, Jr. *Communication: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.* 930

Richardson, Elmo. *Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era.* Reviewed by Jeanne Nienaber. 983

Richardson, Neil R. *Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance.* 1098

Richman, Barry M. *Industrial Society in Communist China.* Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 1362

The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History. Frederic C. Jaher, ed. Reviewed by Suzanne Keller. 615

The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle. René Rémond. Reviewed by D. B. Goldey. 1365
Riley, Dennis D. *Communication: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power*. 929
The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948. Norman D. Markowitz. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Rittberger, Volker. *Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration*. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld. 1014
Ritterband, Paul. Review of Norman L. Zucker, *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy*. 273
Ritter, Gerhard. *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918*. Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig. 1363
Rivers, William. *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press*. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234
Robana, Abderrahman. *The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States*. Reviewed by Yassin El-Ayouty. 256
Robinson, Michael J. *Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon."* 409
Robinson, Thomas W. Review of Barry M. Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China*. 1362
  Review of Tai Sung An, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute*. 665
Rockman, Bert A. and Joel D. Aberbach. *Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy*. 456
Roeder, Phillip W. and John Wanat. *Communication: The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics."* 163
Rogow, Arnold A. Review of James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. 1299
Rokeach, Milton. *The Nature of Human Values*. Reviewed by Robert E. Lane. 965
Rokkan, Stein, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973*. Reviewed by Barbara G. Haskel. 995
The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects. Yonah Alexander. Reviewed by Joel S. Migdal. 664
Rolfe, Sidney E. and James Burtle. *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation*. Reviewed by Susan Strange. 1015
Rood, Robert M. and Patrick J. McGowan. *Communication: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. 934
Rosecrance, Richard, ed. *The Future of the International Strategic System*. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT*. 1242
Rose, Douglas D. *Communication: State Public Policy and Variance Analysis: A Reply to Wanat and Roeder and to Lyons and Morgan*. 166
  Communication: The States' Role in Public Policy: A Clarification. 926
Rose, Gillian. Review of Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*. 598
Rose, Lisle A. *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Rosenau, James N. *International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States*. Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 1016
Rosenau, James N., Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics*. Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1386
Rosenberg, Alfred. *Race and Race History and Other Essays*. Robert Pois, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285
Rosenn, Keith S. Review of Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751*. 262
Rosenthal, Howard, David K. Hildebrand, and James D. Laing. *Prediction Analysis in Political Research*. 509
Rose, Richard. *Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective*. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*. 592
Ross, Donald and Ralph Nader. *Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing*. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Ross, Jennie-Keith, Roger Cobb, and Marc Howard Ross. *Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process*. 126

Ross, Marc Howard, Roger Cobb, and Jennie-Keith Ross. *Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.* 126

Ross, Ralph. *On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* A review essay on David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* 939

Rossum, Ralph A. Review of Roger B. Canfield, *Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970.* 625

Rothberg, Abraham, ed. *The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Régime, 1953–1970.* Reviewed by D. Pospielovsky. 966

Rothchild, Donald. *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization.* Reviewed by David K. Leonard. 258

Rothman, Stanley. Review of C. G. Schoenfeld, *Psychoanalysis and the Law.* 969

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Government of Poland.* Wilmoore Kendall, trans. Reviewed by Richard B. Carter. 1292

Rowe, Lloyd A. Review of F. William Howton, *Functionaries.* 614

Ruben, David-Hillel. Review of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung."* 206

Rubinowitz, Leonard S. Review of W. Scott Ford, *Interracial Public Housing in Border City.* 217

Rules and Laws in Sociology. Robert Brown. Reviewed by Arthur L. Stinchcombe. 199

Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals. Saul D. Alinsky. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Clark D. Neher. Reviewed by David Morell. 1355

Rusk, Jerrold G. *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* Review of Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* 583

Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage. A. J. Ayer. Reviewed by David Berlinski. 1257

Russett, Bruce M. *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II.* Reviewed by Morton J. Tenzer. 293

Russia in the Caribbean. James D. Theberge. Reviewed by Carl C. Moses. 300

Sadik, Muhammad and William P. Snavely. *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects.* Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 259

St. Angelo, Douglas and Douglas Dobson. *Communication: Stability of Partisan Attachments.* 554

Salant, Walter S. and Lawrence B. Krause, eds. *European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States.* Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 284

Salem, Elie Adib. *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience.* Reviewed by Manfred Halpern. 1365

Salomon, Jean-Jacques. *Science and Politics.* Reviewed by Yaron Ezrahi. 967

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Détente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

SALT: Problems and Prospects. Morton A. Kaplan, ed. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

Sasseen, Robert F. Review of William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?;* Richard J. Regan, S.J., *Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience;* and Eliot M. Zashin, *Civil Disobedience and Democracy.* 1259

Sato, Hideo. Review of Nobuya Bamba, *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy.* 274

Saxton, Alexander. *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California.* Reviewed by Wen H. Kuo. 984

Scaff, Lawrence A. Review of Louis J. Halle, *The Ideological Imagination.* 1267

Scalapino, Robert A. and Chong-Sik Lee. *Communism in Korea,* 2 vols. Reviewed by Princeton Lyman. 260

Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *Elites in the People's Republic of China.* Reviewed by David M. Lampton. 1366

Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973. Stein Rokkan, ed. Reviewed by Barbara G. Haskel. 995

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 7/1972. Erik Rasmusson, ed. Reviewed by Eric S. Einhorn. 255

Scanlon, Thomas, Marshall Cohen, and Thomas Nagel, eds. *War and Moral Re-*

sponsibility. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence*. . . 952
Schantz, Harvey L. *Communication: Julius Turner Revisited: Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts*. 541
Schapiro, Leonard. Review of Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof, *Revolution and Politics in Russia. Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky*. 993
Schapsmeier, Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Schapsmeier, Frederick H. and Edward L. Schapsmeier. *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of R. C. Mowat, *Creating the European Community*. 288
Schermers, Henry G. *International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order*. Reviewed by Charles H. McLaughlin. 1388
Schick, Allen. Review of Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees*. 1313
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., ed. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Vol. I: 1789–1960, From Factions to Parties; Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change*. Reviewed by Austin Ranney. 1316
Schlesinger, Joseph A., Review of Robert Paul Wolff, ed., *1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics*. 229
Schmitt, Hans A., ed. *Historians of Modern Europe*. Reviewed by Robert Woito. . . . 1294
Schneider, Ronald M. Review of Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future*. 997
Schoenfeld, C. G. *Psychoanalysis and the Law*. Reviewed by Stanley Rothman. . . . 969
Schram, Stuart R. Review of K. Fan, ed., *Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings;* and M. Rejai, ed., *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War*. 200
Schurmann, Franz. *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics*. Reviewed by Richard A. Falk. 1390
Schwab, George. Review of Anton Pelinka, *Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit*. . . . 964
Schwartz, Mildred A. Review of Robin Winks. *The Blacks in Canada: A History*. 1004
Schwartz, Stuart B. *Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751*. Reviewed by Keith S. Rosenn. 262
Schwarzenberger, Georg and George W. Keeton, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973*. Reviewed by Peter R. Baehr. 283
Schwarzenberger, G. Review of Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management* and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment*. 670
Science and Politics. Jean-Jacques Salomon. Reviewed by Yaron Ezrahi. 967
Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis. J. Weinberger. 865
Scott, James C. *Comparative Political Corruption*. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 1368
Scoville, James G. and Adolf Sturmthal, eds. *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America*. Reviewed by E. M. Kassalow. 1001
Sears, David and John B. McConahay. *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot*. Reviewed by Peter K. Eisinger. 985
The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860. William L. Barney. Reviewed by LaWanda Cox. 623
Seeds of Repression: Harry S Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism. Athan Theoharis. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Segal, Aaron. Review of A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971*. 1347
Seiden, Martin H. *Cable Television U.S.A.* Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315
Seidman, Harold. Review of Rufus E. Miles, Jr., *The Department of Health, Education and Welfare*. 222
Sennett, Richard. *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life*. Reviewed by David Nexon. 986
Shafer, Byron and James I. Lengle. *Primary*

Rules, Political Power, and Social Change. 25

Shanab, Robert E. A. and Donald C. Hodges, eds. *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351

Shanley, J. Lyndon, ed. *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295

The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre. Robert C. Elliott. Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973

Shapiro, Howard B. and Patrick J. McGowan. *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. 661

Shawcross, William. *Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 263

Sheehan, James J. Review of Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition.* 1279

Sheeks, Robert B. and Yuan-li Wu. *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 272

Shepard, W. Bruce and R. Kenneth Godwin. *Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government.* . . . 1127

Shklar, Judith N. Review of John Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* 606

Sickels, Robert J. Review of Sidney R. Waldman, *Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics.* . . 975

Sidjanski, Dusan, ed. *Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics.* Reviewed by Linda P. Brady. 264

Sigal, Leon V. *Reporters and Officials.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Sigel, Roberta S. Review of Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings, eds., *Comparative Political Socialization.* 1329

Sigmund, Paul E. Review of Donald W. Hanson, *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought.* 1268

Silbey, Joel H. Review of William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert William Fogel, eds., *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* 603

Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada. Kari Levitt. Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184

Sills, David L., ed. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Reviewed by Ralph Ross in *On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* 939

Simon, Yves. *Work, Society and Culture.* Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273

Simpson, Dick. *Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. Tai Sung An. Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 665

Siracusa, Joseph M. *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Skidmore, Thomas E. Review of Frank D. McCann, Jr., *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945.* 1007

Sklar, Richard L. Review of A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970.* . . 247

Slavin, Arthur J., ed. *Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government.* Reviewed by T. B. Pugh. 207

Slonim, Solomon. *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute.* Reviewed by Marinus Wiechers. 294

Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development. Aprodicio A. Laquian. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. . . . 1344

Smalley, Beryl. *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century.* Reviewed by Ernest L. Fortin. 208

Small, William. *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Smith, Constance and Ann Freedman, *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature.* Reviewed by G. David Garson. 970

Smith, Geoffrey S. *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* Review of John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946;* Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948;* John Lewis Gaddis, *The*

United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947; Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate;* Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism;* Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S Truman and American Liberalism;* Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952;* Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress;* George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941–9146: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War;* Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972;* Robert J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War;* Norman D. Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948;* Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse;* Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War;* James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft;* Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta:America and the Origins of the Cold War;* Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965;* Joseph M. Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists;* Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism,* and *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955;* and Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism.* 560

Smith, Jeffrey A., Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, and Charles Phillips. Comment: *What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779

Smock, Audrey C. and David R. Smock. *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. . . 265

Smock, David R. and Audrey C. Smock. *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. . . 265

Snavely, William P. and Muhammad Sadik. *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects.* Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 259

Snetsinger, John. *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel.* Reviewed by Alan Fisher. 225

Sobin, Dennis P. *The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs.* Reviewed by Kathleen A. Frankovic. 226

Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present. Roland Mousnier. Peter Evans, trans. Reviewed by Joan Huber. 1009

Socialism and Affluence. The Fabian Society. Reviewed by Della Nevitt. 1264

Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933. Donald L. Niewyk. Reviewed by Vernon L. Lidtke. 1356

The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau. John Charvet. Reviewed by Judith N. Shklar. 606

Solomon, David and Laurie Oakes. *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister.* Reviewed by H. V. Emy. 991

Solomon, Peter H., Jr. Review of *Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes,* 2nd ed. Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, trans. 1371

Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. G. C. Harcourt. Reviewed by Leland B. Yeager. 1270

Somjee, A. H. *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study.* Reviewed by Ralph H. Retzlaff. 1369

South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970. James Barber. Reviewed by Leonard Thompson. 668

South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute. Solomon Slonim. Reviewed by Marinus Wiechers. 294

Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. Raymond Vernon. Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184

Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751. Stuart B. Schwartz. Reviewed by Keith S. Rosenn. 262

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. Thomas G. Paterson. Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 289
Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revi-*

sionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay. 560
Soviet-Asian Relations. Charles B. McLane. Reviewed by Kurt L. London. 286
Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes, 2nd ed. Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, trans. Reviewed by Peter H. Solomon, Jr. 1371
Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy. Helmut Gruber. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations. Roger E. Kanet, ed. Reviewed by Bernard P. Kiernan. 280
Spatt, Chester. *Communication: Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.* 1221
Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. *Work in America.* Prepared under the Auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism. Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Speier, Hans. Review of Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950.* 1276
Sperlich, Peter W. Review of Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds., *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* 617
Spielmann, Karl F., Jr. and Matthew P. Gallagher. *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Stahnke, Arthur A., ed. *China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis.* Reviewed by Daniel Tretiak. 295
Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893. Estelle F. Feinstein. Reviewed by Richard E. Welch, Jr. 636
Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts. Karen Orren. 723
States of Ireland. Conor Cruise O'Brien. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
The States and Their Indian Citizens. Theodore W. Taylor. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306
Statism in Plymouth Colony. Harry M. Ward. Reviewed by Paul R. Lucas. 228
Stavis, Benedict. Review of Shahid Javed Burki, *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965.* 1326
Steeper, Frederick T. and Robert M. Teeter. *Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray."* 806
Steiner, Jürg. Review of Benjamin R. Barber, *The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton.* 198
Stepan, Alfred, ed. *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future.* Reviewed by Ronald M. Schneider. 997
Stephens, Stephen V. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1224
Sterling, Richard W. *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society.* Reviewed by Kenneth N. Waltz. 296
Stetson, Dorothy M. Review of Edwin D. Driver, *World Population Policy: An Annotated Bibliography.* 648
Stillman, Richard J. II. Review of Arthur S. Link, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays.* 619
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. Review of Robert Brown, *Rules and Laws in Sociology.* .. 199
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The Arms Trade with the Third World.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. 297
Stoetzel, Antoine H., Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Karl W. Deutsch. *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600
Stone, Alan. Review of Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them.* 1286
Stone, Carl. *Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica.* Reviewed by Colin G. Clarke. 998
Storry, Richard. Review of John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes.* 649
Stover, Leon E. *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States.* Reviewed by John K. Fairbank. 266

Strange, Susan. Review of Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burtle, *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation.* 1015
The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise. Derek Channon. Reviewed by Stephen Blank. 1326
Strong, John W. Review of John Lewis Evans, *The Communist International, 1919–1943;* The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P. S.U., *Outline History of the Communist International;* and Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy.* 1377
Struve, Walter. *Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933.* Reviewed by Wayne C. Thompson. 1000
Stuckey, Sterling. *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism.* Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965. Shahid Javed Burki. Reviewed by Benedict Stavis. 1326
Sturmthal, Adolf and James G. Scoville, eds. *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America.* Reviewed by E. M. Kassalow. 1001
Sugar, Peter F., ed. *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945.* Reviewed by Alex Pravda. 1002
Suny, Ronald Grigor. *The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* Reviewed by Stanislav Kirschbaum. 971
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making. Jonathan D. Casper. 50
Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung. Walter Haller. Reviewed by Francis H. Heller. 637
Sutton, Antony C. *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945.* Reviewed by Carl B. Turner. 1017
Svensson, Frances. Review of Vine Deloria, Jr., *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties;* and Theodore W. Taylor, *The States and Their Indian Citizens.* 1306
Swanson, Roger Frank. Review of Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making.* 268
The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship — Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918. Gerhard Ritter. Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig. 1363
Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria. Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1172
Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis. Itamar Rabinovich. Reviewed by Leonard Binder. 254
Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. John J. Weltman. Reviewed by Jeffrey A. Hart. 975
System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. Anthony Wilden. Reviewed by Harold D. Lasswell. 976

Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore. Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger. Reviewed by Robert E. Gamer. 240
Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology. Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed. Reviewed by Doris A. Graber. 633
Tanaka, Kakuei. *Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.* Reviewed by Ardath W. Burks. 267
Taylor, Charles Lewis. Review of Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel, *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* 600
Taylor, Ian and Laurie Taylor, eds. *Politics and Deviance.* Reviewed by Martin Plax. 1297
Taylor, Laurie and Ian Taylor, eds. *Politics and Deviance.* Reviewed by Martin Plax. 1297
Taylor, Theodore W. *The States and Their Indian Citizens.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306
Teeter, Robert M. and Frederick T. Steeper. *Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray."* 806
Television and Presidential Politics. Robert E. Gilbert. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Temple, David G. *Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia.* Reviewed by Chester W. Bain. 1316
Tenzer, Morton J. Review of Bruce M. Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II.* 293
Theberge, James D. *Russia in the Caribbean.* Reviewed by Carl C. Moses. 300
Theoharis, Athan and Robert Griffith, eds. *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Theoharis, Athan. *Seeds of Repression: Harry*

S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism, and *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1955—A Review Essay.* 560

The Theory of Political Ambiguity. Benjamin I. Page. 742

Thimme, Annelise. *Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918.* Reviewed by Lewis Hertzman. 972

Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties. Herman Kahn and Barry Bruce-Briggs. Reviewed by Philip Hone Auerbach. 205

Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice. Lillian L. Randolph. Reviewed by Carl Q. Christol. 1013

Thomas, James D. Review of Neil R. McMillen, *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964.* 1313

Thompson, Kenneth W. Review of James N. Rosenau, *International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States.* 1016

Thompson, Leonard. Review of James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970.* 668

Thompson, Wayne C. Review of Walter Struve, *Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933.* 1000

Thompson, William R. Review of Norman Z. Alcock, *The War Disease.* 599

Thompson, W. Scott. Review of Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World;* and Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds., *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* 1351

Thordarson, Bruce. *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making.* Reviewed by Roger Frank Swanson. 268

Thoreau, Henry D. J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden;* Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods;* Wendell Glick, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295

Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project. Colette Pétonnet. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1344

Tignor, Robert L. Review of Richard D. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930.* 271

Tilly, Louise A. Review of Louis Chevalier, *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.* 644

To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform. Rubin G. Cohn. Reviewed by Byron W. Daynes. 628

To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World. William Small. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's. Judith M. Hughes. Reviewed by Jonathan M. House. 245

Totten, George O. Review of Ronald Dore, *British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations.* 1331

Towards a New Ireland. Garret FitzGerald. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon. Robert N. Kearney. Reviewed by Calvin A. Woodward. 1339

Tradition, Change, and Modernity. S. N. Eisenstadt. Reviewed by Marion J. Levy, Jr. 1261

Trebing, Harry M. Review of Richard Hellman, *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study.* 1310

Tretiak, Daniel. Review of Arthur A. Stahnke, ed., *China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis.* 295

The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946, with a new introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Reviewed by John H. E. Fried in *The Great Nuremberg Trial.* 192

Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making. Bruce Thordarson. Reviewed by Roger Frank Swanson. 268

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948. Richard M. Freeland. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Truman and the 80th Congress. Susan M. Hartmann. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel. John Snetsinger. Reviewed by Alan Fisher. 225

The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972. Richard S. Kirkendall, ed. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Tucker, Robert W. *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield. 1392
Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government. Arthur J. Slavin, ed. Reviewed by T. B. Pugh. 207
Tullock, Gordon. *Communication: What Gordon Tullock Really Said.* 924
Tully, Alan. Review of Joseph Albert Ernst, *Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution.* 635
Tunstall, Jeremy. *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Turner, Carl B. Review of Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945.* 1017
Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers. Carroll Hawkins. Reviewed by Robert J. Alexander. 242

Ulmer, S. Sidney and Bradley C. Canon. *Communication: The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent.* 1215
Uncommon Sense. James MacGregor Burns. Reviewed by Franklin L. Burdette. 213
The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future. James Barros, ed. Reviewed by Harold K. Jacobson. 275
The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance. John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs, eds. Reviewed by Lynn H. Miller. 1011
The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action. Robert E. Hunter, ed. Reviewed by Raymond C. Miller. 679
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. John Lewis Gaddis. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform. John D. Buenker. Reviewed by Robert E. O'Connor. 212
Urofsky, Melvin T., ed. *Perspectives on Urban America.* Reviewed by Betty H. Zisk. 227
Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla. Arturo C. Porzecanski. Reviewed by Ronald H. McDonald. 252
The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life. Richard Sennett. Reviewed by David Nexon. 986
Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment. Franco Venturi. Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Valins, Stuart, Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
van den Haag, Ernest. *Communication: More on Political Violence.* 556
van der Kroef, J. M. *Indonesia After Sukarno.* Reviewed by Michael Leifer. 1003
Vatin, Jean-Claude. Review of Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* 1332
Veit, Lawrence A. Review of Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s.* 1373
Venturi, Franco. *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment.* Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* Reviewed by Jerrold G. Rusk in *Political Participation in Ameica: A Review Essay.* 583
Vernon, Raymond. *Sovereignty at Bay:* The *Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.* Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* . . . 184
Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920. Sally M. Miller. Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution. John T. McAlister, Jr. Reviewed by Charles A. Joiner. 1384
Villanueva, A. B. Review of Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography.* 597
The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput. Gordon K. Lewis. Reviewed by Charles D. Ameringer. 1007
"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited. Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl. 886
Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature. Constance Smith and Ann Freedman. Reviewed by G. David Garson. 970
von der Mehden, Fred R. *Comparative Political Violence.* Reviewed by Cynthia H. Enloe. 269
Review of Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.* 250

Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972. Christopher Howe. Reviewed by Alexander Eckstein. 657
Waldman, Sidney R. *Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics.* Reviewed by Robert J. Sickels. 975
Walker, Thomas W. Review of Harold Eugene Davis, *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction*. 610
Walter, E. V. Review of Aprodicio A. Laquian, *Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development;* and Colette Pétonnet, *Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project*. 1344
  Review of Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class*. 1283
Walton, Hanes, Jr. *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis.* Reviewed by Carolyn Sue Williams. 1317
  Review of Sterling Stuckey, *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism;* and C. Eric Lincoln, *The Black Muslims in America*. 209
Waltz, Kenneth N. Review of Richard W. Sterling, *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society*. 296
Walzer, Michael. *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Wamsley, Gary L. Review of Steven B. Canby, *Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis*. 1301
Wanat, John and Phillip W. Roeder. *Communication: The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics."* 163
Ward, Alan J. Review of Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922;* and *Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922*. 1324
Ward, Harry M. *Statism in Plymouth Colony.* Reviewed by Paul R. Lucas. 228
The War Disease. Norman Z. Alcock. Reviewed by William R. Thompson. 599
War and an Irish Town. Eamonn McCann. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*. 592
Warmenhoven, Henri J. Review of Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, *Regionale Verflechtung Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme*. 1380
War and Morality. Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence*. 952
War and Moral Responsibility. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence*. 952
Wasserstrom, Richard A., ed. *War and Morality*. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence*. 952
The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971. Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman, eds. Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard. 278
Weber, Eugen. Review of J. S. McClelland, ed., *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras)*; Michael D. Biddis, ed., *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings;* John Carroll, compiler, *Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own;* Alfred Rosenberg, *Race and Race History and Other Essays,* Robert Pois, ed. 1284
Weinberger, J. *Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis*. 865
Weiner, Bernard, Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, and Stuart Valins, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Weisman, Carol Sachs and Robert L. Crain. *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Weissman, Stephen R. *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964.* Reviewed by M. Crawford Young. 300
Welch, Richard E., Jr. Review of Estelle F. Feinstein, *Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893*. 636
Welfare: The Social Issues in Philospohical Perspective. Nicholas Rescher. Reviewed by Charles E. Gilbert. 1291
Weltman, John J. *Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy.* Reviewed by Jeffrey A. Hart. 975
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*. 1392
Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945. Antony C. Sutton. Reviewed by Carl B. Turner. 1017
West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement. William Henderson. Reviewed by Ralph R. Premdas. 244
Whalen, Charles W., Jr. *Your Right to*

Know. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234

What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion. Lester Markel. Reviewed in Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Government and the Media*. 1234

Wheeler, Douglas and René Pelissier. *Angola*. Reviewed by John Marcum. 1372

Whitaker, Donald P. et al. *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic*. Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. 270

White, D. Gordon. Review of Charles Bettelheim, *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor*. 641

White, Irvin L., Don E. Kash, and others. *Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations*. Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 282

White, Lynn T. III. *Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case*. 479

Whiting, Allen S. *Communication: China and the Taiwan Question*. 552

Whyte, John H. *Recent Writings on Northern Ireland*. Review of Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem;* Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970;* James Callaghan, *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland;* Liam de Paor, Divided *Ulster;* Garret FitzGerald, *Towards a New Ireland;* Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community;* The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict;* F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine;* Eamonn McCann, *War and an Irish Town;* John Magee, *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict;* Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland;* Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective*. 592

Wiechers, Marinus. Review of Solomon Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute*. 294

Wilcox, Francis O. Review of Farag Moussa, *Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade*. 1010

Wildavsky, Aaron and Jeanne Nienaber. *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees*. Reviewed by Allen Schick. 1313

Wilden, Anthony. *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange*. Reviewed by Harold D. Lasswell. 976

Will, George F., ed. *Press, Politics and Popular Government*. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234

Willhoite, Fred H., Jr. *Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective*. 1110

Williams, Carolyn Sue. Review of Hanes Walton, Jr. *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis*. 1317

Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes. John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys. Reviewed by Richard Storry. 649

Willrich, Mason and John B. Rhinelander, eds. *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond*. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT*. 1242

Wilson, Keith. Review of Ray Jones, *The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History*. 1382

Winks, Robin. *The Blacks in Canada: A History*. Reviewed by Mildred A. Schwartz. 1004

Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics. Dick Simpson. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Wirsing, Robert G. Review of Lucius C. Caflisch, ed., *Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4 – 1973*. 1375

Wirt, Frederick and Michael W. Kirst. *The Political Web of American Schools*. Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 987

Woito, Robert. Review of Hans A. Schmitt, ed., *Historians of Modern Europe*. 1294

Wolfe, James H. Review of Dale Roy Herspring, *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72*. 654

Wolf, Frank. Review of Martin H. Seiden, *Cable Television U.S.A.;* and Harvey J. Levin, *The Invisible Resource*. 1315

Wolff, Richard D. *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930*. Reviewed by Robert L. Tignor. 271

Wolff, Robert Paul, ed. *1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics*. Reviewed by Joseph A. Schlesinger. 229

Wolfinger, Raymond E. *The Politics of Progress*. Reviewed by Paul E. Peterson. 1318

Wolpin, Miles D. *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World*. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. 297

Woodward, Calvin A. Review of Robert N. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon*. 1339

Work in America. Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-

fare. Prepared under the Auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Work, Creativity, and Social Justice. Elliot Jaques. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Workers' Self-Management in Algeria. Ian Clegg. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328
The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs. Dennis P. Sobin. Reviewed by Kathleen A. Frankovic. 226
Work, Society and Culture. Yves Simon. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
World Population Policy: An Annotated Bibliography. Edwin D. Driver. Reviewed by Dorothy M. Stetson. 648
Woshinsky, Oliver. *The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly.* Reviewed by William H. Hunt. 271
The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods. Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers. Wendell Glick, ed. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden. J. Lyndon Shanley, ed. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
Wu, Yuan-li and Robert B. Sheeks. *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 272
Wyner, Alan J., ed. *Executive Ombudsmen in the United States.* Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 230

The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955. Athan Theoharis. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Yarnell, Allen. *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Yeager, Leland B. Review of G. C. Harcourt, *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital.* 1270
The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973. George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds. Reviewed by Peter R. Baehr. 283
Yost, Charles W. *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II.* Reviewed by Earl C. Ravenal. 302
Young, M. Crawford. Review of Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964.* 300
Your Right to Know. Charles W. Whalen, Jr. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question. Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King. Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 1358

Zashin, Elliot M. *Civil Disobedience and Democracy.* Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Zeigler, Harmon. Review of Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *The Political Web of American Schools.* 987
Ziring, Lawrence. Review of Ralph Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.* 1323
Zisk, Betty H. Review of Melvin T. Urofsky, ed., *Perspectives on Urban America.* 227
Zucker, Norman L. *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy.* Reviewed by Paul Ritterband. 273

The American Political Science Review

EDITORIAL BOARD: NELSON W. POLSBY, *Managing Editor, University of California Berkeley;* CHARLES O. JONES, *Managing Editor Elect, University of Pittsburgh;* PHILIP SIEGELMAN, *Book Review Editor, San Francisco State University;* SHLOMO AVINERI, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* LUCIUS BARKER, *Washington University;* BRIAN BARRY, *University of British Columbia;* RICHARD A. BRODY, *Stanford Universiy;* SAMUEL D. COOK, *Dillard University;* ELMER E. CORNWELL, *Brown University;* S. RUFUS DAVIS, *Monash University;* ROBERT J. JACKSON, *Carleton University;* ROBERT JERVIS, *University of California, Los Angeles;* DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, *University of California, Davis;* RUSSELL D. MURPHY, *Wesleyan University;* JOAN M. NELSON, *Washington, D.C.;* J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College;* SAMUEL L. POPKIN, *University of California, San Diego;* ROBERT D. PUTNAM, *University of Michigan;* DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Yale University;* AUSTIN RANNEY, *American Enterprise Institute;* GIOVANNI SARTORI, *University of Florence;* MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of Hawaii;* JAY STARLING, *Southern Methodist University;* STEPHEN V. STEPHENS, *Baltimore, Maryland;* GEORGE E. VON DER MUHLL, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* RICHARD A. WATSON, *University of Missouri;* RICHARD WINTERS, *Dartmouth College.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** ELLEN Y. SIEGELMAN. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** BETSEY COBB, RITA WILLIAMS. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** ROBERT ARSENEAU, JONATHAN BENDOR, KENNETTE BENEDICT, BETH CAPELL, DON CHISHOLM, SHAI FELDMAN, STEPHEN GENCO, EVELYN DEBORAH JAY, JOHN Q. JOHNSON, ELAINE KAMARCK, PAUL D. KARPS, JAMES I. LENGLE, DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DAVID RICHMAN, JENNY RING, STEVEN ROSENSTONE, STUART A. ROSS, SERGE TAYLOR, PHILIP J. WILSON, JOHN ZALLER

VOL. LXX 1976

Copyright, 1976, by THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INC., MENASHA, WISCONSIN

CONTENTS

Number 1–March 1976

Party and Policy in West German Cities. *Robert C. Fried* 11
Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change. *James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer* 25
Elections and Public Policy. *Benjamin Ginsberg* 41
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making. *Jonathan D. Casper* 50
Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics. *Fred R. Dallmayr* 64
Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment. *David G. Lawrence* 80
Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power. *George C. Edwards III* 101
Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review. *Fritz Nova* 114
Agenda Building as A Comparative Political Process. *Roger Cobb, Jennie Keith-Ross, and Marc Howard Ross* 126

APSA Presidential Address

Introduction. *Pendleton Herring* 139
"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture. *Austin Ranney* 140
Communications 149
Editorial Comment 181
Book Reviews and Essays 184
The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives. *Robert Gilpin* 184
The Great Nuremberg Trial. *John H. E. Fried* 192

Number 2–June 1976

Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas. *John A. Armstrong* 393
Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon." *Michael J. Robinson* 409
A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana. *Fred M. Hayward* 433
Comment: Further Reassessment of the "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya. *Joel D. Barkan* 452
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy. *Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman* 456
Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974. *Paul R. Abramson* 469
Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case. *Lynn T. White III* 479
Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War. *John P. Diggins* 492
Prediction Analysis in Political Research. *David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal* 502
Communications 536
Editorial Comment 557
Book Reviews and Essays 560
"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954. A Review Essay. *Geoffrey S. Smith* 560
Political Participation in America: A Review Essay. *Jerrold G. Rusk* 583
Recent Writing on Northern Ireland. *John H. Whyte* 592

Number 3–September 1976

Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts. *Karen Orren* 723
The Theory of Political Ambiguity. *Benjamin I. Page* 742
A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election. *Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, Thad A. Brown* 753
Comment. *Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, Jeffrey A. Smith* 779
Comment. *Frederick T. Steeper and Robert M. Teeter* 806

Comment. *David E. RePass* 814
Rejoinder. *Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller* 832
Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems. *R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan* 850
Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis. J. Weinberger* 865
"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited. *Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl* 886
The Future of Community Control. *Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein* 905
Communications 924
Editorial Comment 937
Book Reviews and Essays 939
On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Ralph Ross* 939
Philosophy and International Violence. *Terry Nardin* 952

Number 4–December 1976

Editorial Comment 1030
Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies. *Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.* 1033
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws. Thomas L. Pangle* 1059
Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World. *Robert* W. *Jackman* 1078
Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance. *Neil R. Richardson* 1098
Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective. *Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.* 1110
Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government. *R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard* 1127
Crude Communism and Revolution. *David Resnick* 1136
Comment. *Shlomo Avineri* 1146
Rejoinder. *David Resnick.* 1150
Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes. *Helmut Norpoth* 1156
Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria. *Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook* 1172
An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public-Sector Collective Bargaining. *James L. Ferry and Charles H. Levine* 1185
Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition. *Russell Hardin* 1202
Communications 1215
Book Reviews and Essays 1234
Government and the Media. *Ithiel de Sola Pool* 1234
Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT. *Colin S. Gray* 1242
Index to Volume LXX 1394

Announcing
the Outstanding Candidate in '76

the new Third Edition of

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE
An Introduction to the American Political System

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR., The Johns Hopkins University
DAVID WISE

...the best-selling introduction to American government, acclaimed in its previous edition as "The most current, topical, and provocative introductory textbook of its kind."* *Democrarcy Under Pressure* offers a critical yet balanced examination of the processes and structures of the American political system written in a style that is at once scholarly, highly readable, and thought-provoking. And this new Third Edition—as current, topical, and provocative as its predecessors—analyzes such recent developments in American politics as:

- the 1976 presidential primaries, nominating conventions, and election
- election reforms and the workings of the new Federal Election Commission
- abuses of power by federal intelligence agencies; the Church and Pike committee investigations; the new Senate oversight committee and its proposed legislative reforms.
- the impact of the Burger Court on civil rights and civil liberties
- multinational corporations and their growing influence both at home and abroad
- our growing awareness of the limitations of governmental solutions to national problems
- our understanding of the restraints on American power throughout the world
- the issues raised by our energy needs vs. ecological stability

Publication: *Spring 1977*

*William J. Jervey, Florida Technological University

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE

...the winning candidate in '76

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

Low Cost Group Insurance Available to APSA Members

APSA INSURANCE PLANS

Group Life Insurance

$30,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50
Lifetime coverage as long as you are a member of APSA
Optional Dependent Life Coverage

Accidental Death and Specific Loss

Worldwide Coverage
Permanent Total Disability Benefits

Hospital Cash Plan

$20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized
Payable for up to 365 days for each
period of hospital confinement
Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization
Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer

For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

A Cricket in the Thorn Tree

Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party of South Africa

By Joanna Strangwayes-Booth

This biography of Helen Suzman, who for thirteen stormy years (1961-1974) was the sole representative of the Progressive Party in the South African parliament, summarizes the history of South African politics in recent years.

320 pages $12.50

FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Two Hundred Years of Democracy on Trial

Edited by George J. Graham, Jr., and Scarlett G. Graham

A most appropriate celebration of the United States Bicentennial is a serious assessment of the principles upon which the nation was founded and an investigation of how they have evolved and endured during two hundred years of experience.

384 pages $17.50

POLITICS AND BUDGETING IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

By Francis W. Hoole

This book approaches the WHO program in policy-making terms and focuses on the political struggle involved in the budgetary process. "[Hoole's] effort to test propositions through computer simulation is most successful." —Aaron Wildavsky

(International Development Research Center, Studies in Development, No. 11)

240 pages $10.00

DON'T MAKE NO WAVES… DON'T BACK NO LOSERS

An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine

By Milton L. Rakove

"A fascinating look at how the public's business has been handled in Chicago."—*New Republic*

". . . an authoritative and absorbing history of the Daley machine. . . . a comprehensive and refreshingly fair view of the Chicago organization." —*Chicago*

312 pages, photos paper $3.95 cloth $10.00

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

A Critique and Approach to the Study of Public Administration

By Gary L. Wamsley and Mayer N. Zald

"Wamsley and Zald have confronted the paradigm problem in public administration by proposing a framework that links the field's traditional concerns with politics and management to organizational sociology. . . . valuable reading for students of public organization." —*American Political Science Review*

128 pages (a reprint) paper $3.50

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Tenth and Morton Streets • Bloomington, Indiana 47401

HERE IS A "NUTS AND BOLTS" TEXT THAT REALLY DOES PROVIDE A FULL, FACTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. . . **leaving the instructor free to discuss the deeper questions of analysis and value!**

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Structure and Process

Michael A. Krasner, Queens College of the City University of New York;
Stephen G. Chaberski, City College of the City University of New York;
D. Kelly Jones, Davidson College

This **NEW** text is a *thorough, concise, objective,* and *lively* presentation of the basics of American national government and politics. For a book of its easily manageable size, it includes unusually detailed information on the actual workings of the presidency, the Congress and its committees, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy, as well as interest groups and political parties. Its comprehensiveness, straightforwardness, and relative brevity make it suitable for a wide variety of course approaches. A major departure from most brief texts is the book's inclusion of a chapter on the media, a case–study on policy making, and a chapter on current issues and trends.

OTHER OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THIS TEACHING TEXT INCLUDE —

- *Up–to–the–minute results* of the 1976 presidential and congressional elections.
- *Chapter contents* at the beginning of each chapter to facilitate the reader's grasp of the highlights and structure of the discussion.
- Key concepts, organizations, offices, etc., in *boldface* in the text.
- *End–of–chapter glossaries* of the boldface words, aiding the reader's study and review.
- A brief list of suggested supplementary readings for each chapter.
- The *Constitution* in the appendix.
- An *Instructor's Manual* with extensive test questions compiled by **Professor Thomas Scism** of Eastern Illinois University.

1977 384 pages (approx.) paper

$4.95

Macmillan

Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
100A Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

New and forthcoming additions to Little, Brown's distinguished Political Science list...

Politics in France

Third Edition

Henry W. Ehrmann

Since 1971, when the Second Edition of this leading study of politics in France appeared, that country has gone through one national referendum, one parliamentary election, one presidential election, and a rather drastic restructuring of its party system. This new Third Edition will help students understand these important events in both their new and old contexts. Prof. Ehrmann was also prompted to write this revision by the continuing, impressive output of studies on modern French politics. Ehrmann critically reviews the most important discussions and indicates major areas that remain open for further investigation.

Paper 372 pages August 1976 $5.95

Cases in Comparative Politics

Third Edition

James B. Christoph
Indiana University
Bernard E. Brown
City University of New York

Extensively revised and updated, this new Third Edition of CASES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS features eight case studies – two each on Britain, France, German, and the U.S.S.R. – that examine foreign and domestic policy-making in those countries. All of the cases were written by specialists expressly for this volume. New cases on university reform in France, codetermination in West Germany, and Ostpolitik have been added to this edition, and important new material has been incorporated into all the other cases. An introductory section deals with the case method in comparative politics and the concept of decision-making.

Paper 350 pages August 1976 $5.95

College Division
Little,
Brown
and Company
34 Beacon St.
Boston, Mass.
02106

Political Socialization

Second Edition

Richard E. Dawson
Washington University
Kenneth Prewitt
University of Chicago
Karen Dawson
Washington University

Designed to introduce students to the process of political socialization, this book is organized around three basic issues: (1) What is learned through political socialization? (2) When and how does political socialization take place? (3) Through what social relationships and associations does political learning take place? In the new Second Edition, the authors have maintained the successful format of the original, while making significant changes in content and chapter order. A chapter comparing system and hegemonic theories of political system stability replaces the chapter on political culture. Chapters IV and V offer a more specific interpretation of the sequence and development of political outlooks (especially through childhood and adolescence). The latest thinking and research findings have been incorporated throughout.

Paper approx. 250 pages March 1977
$5.95 tent.

Behind the Scenes in American Government

People, Personalities, and Politics

Peter Woll
Brandeis University

The premise of this new reader is that the character and style of political leaders and the people around them have a profound impact on the political process. Prof. Woll has culled highly readable selections from popular media sources that show how different personalities interact with political institutions and processes to shape government. There are fascinating vignettes on party politicos, a pressure group leader, a Washington lawyer, a political reporter, Presidents and First Ladies, judges, a Cabinet Secretary and presidential advisor, and a top-level bureaucrat. BEHIND THE SCENES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT was designed to bring politics alive for students. It is appropriate for use with any basic text. An Instructor's Manual is available.

Paper approx. 400 pages March 1977
$6.95 tent.

Power and Interdependence

World Politics in Transition

Robert O. Keohane
Stanford University
Joseph S. Nye
Harvard University

Two widely-known and highly-respected political scientists have developed a new theoretical approach to the analysis of contemporary world politics. This approach is based on the assumption that traditional, "realist" models of world politics are inadequate for understanding contemporary reality. Keohane and Nye argue that *transnational politics* – based on, or arising from, various economic interdependencies – is a force that tends to counteract, even negate, the nation-state thesis. This original approach is applied to the analysis of two issue-areas – international monetary policy and the oceans – plus two country relationships – the U.S./Canada and the U.S./Australia.

Paper approx. 300 pages
November 1976 $5.95 tent.

War, Peace, and International Politics

David W. Ziegler
Western Washington State College

Organized around the dramatic theme of war and its prevention, this new text provides an unusually coherent introduction to some of the basic concepts and propositions of international politics. The explicit intent of the author has not been to provide exhaustive coverage of the field, but rather to excite the interest of students. Ziegler takes a traditional, state-centered approach to his subject, providing a proper context for an understanding of the current literature that reacts against this orientation. Wherever possible he provides concrete illustrations of abstract concepts. An Instructor's Manual is available.

Paper approx. 464 pages
March 1977 $8.95 tent.

America in the Seventies

Problems, Policies, and Politics

Allan P. Sindler
University of California, Berkeley

AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES features six *original* case studies – written by outstanding experts in their respective fields – on American politics and policy. It covers the major institutions of national government, as well as major current issues: busing, crime, affirmative action, impeachment, congressional reform, party reform. Its purpose is to involve and stimulate students and to promote class discussion.

Paper approx. 320 pages February 1977
$6.95 tent.

76
College Division
Little, Brown
and Company
34 Beacon St.
Boston, Mass.
02106

Felony Justice

An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts

James Eisenstein
Pennsylvania State University
Herbert Jacob
Northwestern University

In this important new book James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob offer a comparative analysis of felony dispositions in three cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Baltimore. Their analysis is based on extensive observations and interviews in the field, as well as court and prosecutor file data on 4500 defendants. An explicit organizational approach facilitates understanding of the various patterns that emerge.

Paper approx. 280 pages
November 1976 $5.95 tent.

The Measure of Justice

An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Change

by RICHARD A. BERK, HAROLD BRACKMAN, and SELMA L. LESSER

A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series

The long, heated debate over the ultimate sources of our criminal law reflects a variety of competing and complementary theoretical perspectives, including pluralism, conflict, consensus, and others. This timely study attempts to empirically evaluate some of the merits of these different approaches, using longitudinal data on the California Penal Code from the years 1955 to 1971. In addition to a traditional qualitative historical analysis of the period, it codes nearly 700 revisions in the law and analyzes them through Time Series techniques. Longitudinal trends for 12 different kinds of criminal law, including law affecting defendant rights, person crimes, property crimes, and crime without victims are plotted and described.

Using both the qualitative analyses and the findings of multivariate statistical procedures, the book proposes and tests various explanations for the over time patterns discovered. It finds that all of the perspectives have serious problems in accounting for the empirical data, but that the consensus model has the least to offer. The study concludes that the detailed content of our criminal law has far more to do with the exercise of political power than with fundamental notions of what is morally correct.

1976, about 300 pp., in preparation
ISBN: 0-12-091550-2

The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experiment, VOLUME 1

Operations, Surveys, and Administration

edited by DAVID KERSHAW and JERILYN FAIR
with a Foreword to the Series by Robert J. Lampman

A Volume in the INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY MONOGRAPH Series

The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experiment is a three-volume series on the graduated work-incentive experiment dealing with a negative income tax and sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity from 1967 to 1972. The experiment is also noteworthy as an example of a critical cost-effectiveness study of a social program.

This first volume provides a nontechnical description of the experiment and its operations. It features: a summary of the history and results of the experiment; descriptions of the essential operating elements—selection of sample families, methods by which data were collected from the families, and the administration of the transfer payments; analysis of certain research and technical issues raised during the experiment; review of the more interesting and complex administrative problems faced as the experiment progressed.

1975, 246 pp., $15.00/£9.15
ISBN: 0-12-405050-6

Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force

A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa

by D. E. H. RUSSELL

A Volume in the STUDIES IN SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY Series

Recently banned in South Africa, this unique book is a systematic study of fourteen twentieth-century rebellions—seven successful and seven unsuccessful—with special emphasis on the behavior of the establishment armed forces in each instance. It begins by comparing the oppressiveness of the regimes of pre-rebellion Cuba and present-day South Africa. Finding the South African regime even more oppressive than the Cuban regime, the author argues that, according to most theories of the etiology of rebellion and revolution, a rebellion should have occurred in South Africa. This leads to a re-evaluation of prevailing theories of the nature of rebellion in the light of detailed analysis of the fourteen actual rebellions.

Written with precision and style, the volume contains such unusual features as: development of an original typology of rebellion, and redefinition of the terms "rebellion" and "revolution"; systematic examination of the concept of "regime oppressiveness"; emphasis on the importance of regime military variables rather than rebel military variables.

1974, 192 pp., $16.00/£9.75
ISBN: 0-12-785745-1

Send payment with order and save postage plus 50¢ handling charge.
Prices are subject to change without notice.

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.
A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers
111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003
24-28 OVAL ROAD, LONDON NW1 7DX


We the People
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S
Guide to Congress
SECOND EDITION
INTRODUCTION BY DONALD R. MATTHEWS
HISTORY, PROCEDURES, POWERS
PUBLISHED BY CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.
GUIDE TO CONGRESS

"The CQ ***Guide to Congress*** is not only an invaluable historical reference for students of Congress, but an indispensable daily working tool in my congressional office and in the House Republican Conference which I chair. The new edition is a critical update, covering as it does the jarring events and landmark accomplishments of the last half-decade: the Watergate and intelligence inquiries and revelations, the impeachment proceedings, the warpowers and budget reforms, and the major power shifts and institutional changes in the Congress over the past few years."

—John B. Anderson (R Ill.)
Chairman, House Republican Conference

Guide to Congress
SECOND EDITION

1,100 pages, 8½ x 11"
LC No. 76-41925
November 1976.
Clothbound. $49.50.

Just Published - Second Edition

Announcing publication of a second edition of the book widely accepted as *the* reference on the U.S. Congress. This is no coffee-table edition—**Guide to Congress, Second Edition** belongs in every public library, college and high school in the country.

The first edition, published in 1971, was selected by the American Library Association as one of the "Outstanding Reference Books of 1971." The late Paul H. Douglas, former senator from Illinois, wrote, "It is a magnificent work, the best of its kind—reliable, accurate and fair."

But new legislation and changes in procedure prompted by Watergate, Vietnam and an increasingly Democratic Congress have outdated this standard reference work—hence this extensively revised second edition.

All the recent reforms are included plus scholarly but easily understandable explanations of how Congress works, its powers and the pressures upon it. Charts, a 225-page Appendix and a 45-page Index.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.
Box 70, 1414 22nd St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

Please mail ________ copies at $49.50 each of Guide to Congress.
Enclose payment and CQ will pay shipping
Mail to ____
____
________________________________ **Zip** ________

The Finnish Dilemma

Neutrality in the Shadow of Power

George Maude. ☐ The author shows how consciousness of the basic dilemma inherent in Finland's security policy has led the country into an active foreign policy which seeks to promote multilateral relations and détente in the world without threatening the balance between the West and the Soviet Union. (Royal Institute of International Affairs)

1976 160 pp. $13.25

March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland

A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy

Simon Newman. ☐ Making full use of the new documents available, this work examines the origin and consequences of the British guarantee to Poland in March 1939. Although this study concentrates on an individual episode in the history of British foreign policy towards Hitler, the episode is used as a means of portraying a tenable, well-argued and well-documented interpretation of that policy in 1938 and 1939.

1976 264 pp. $14.25

On Capitalist Underdevelopment

André Gunder Frank. ☐ By presenting the history of underdevelopment in terms of political and economic changes which have affected it from its sixteenth-century beginning to the present, the author supports his thesis that underdevelopment is just as much a product and power of capitalism as is development.

1976 124 pp. paper $1.90

Second City Politics

Democratic Processes

and Decision-Making in Birmingham

Kenneth Newton. ☐ How effective are the political institutions and processes which are supposed to guarantee the responsiveness and responsibility of political élites to citizens? To answer this question, Kenneth Newton draws on recent research in Birmingham, England, using it to test some of the main theories of democracy in urban society.

1976 284 pp.; 32 tables; figs. paper $11.00

The District

A Study in Decentralization in West Malaysia

J.H. Beaglehole. ☐ Based on research on the State of Kelantan in Malaysia, this study examines the consequences of political change and development policies for the colonial administrative legacy. The author discusses the actual working of district administration, and explores the particular problems of the interaction of administration and politics in an opposition state within a federal system. (Hull Monographs on South-East Asia)

1976 128 pp.; tables; map paper $6.75

Prices are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y 10016

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE
UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
ANNOUNCE

A New Annual Reference Publication

UNITED STATES POLITICAL SCIENCE DOCUMENTS

United States Political Science Documents (USPSD) is the published version of a computer-based file of political science information being developed continually by the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the American Political Science Association.

Over the past ten years the political, social, and policy sciences have been inundated with an increasing flow of journal information. Not until now has a convenient sorting, filing, and evaluation process been developed to enable the academic community to keep up with the masses of information in a timely manner. This is why *USPSD* was created.

Volume I of *USPSD* will include between 2,000 and 2,500 documents published during 1975. The set will be available from UCIS Publications during the summer of 1976. For further information or to place your order, write to UCIS Publications at the address below.

USPSD will enable you conveniently to keep abreast of all the major journals in the field of political, social, and policy science, such as:

American Political Science Review
Comparative Political Studies
Comparative Politics
Economic Development and Cultural Change
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
International and Intercultural Communication Annual
International Development Review
International Education and Cultural Change
International Interaction
International Organization
International Relations
International Studies Quarterly
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of International Affairs
Policy Analysis
Policy Studies Journal
Studies in Comparative Communism
Studies in Comparative International Development
World Affairs
World Politics

USPSD will be an annual reference publication which examines and analyzes every article in over 120 major political, social and policy science journals.

Each entry in *USPSD* provides:

1. Author;
2. Title;
3. Journal Source and pagination;
4. An Abstract that describes the scope, purpose, methods employed, and results obtained in each article;
5. A listing of Special Features that include titles of all tables, graphs, figures, and maps used in each article;
6. A listing of Authors Cited in footnotes or references;
7. A listing of Key Subject Descriptors attributed to each article;
8. A listing of the major Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
9. A listing of Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article.

USPSD will be published annually in TWO PARTS. The abstracts of the journal articles will comprise PART II and include those items listed above. PART I consists of five indexes to all the articles abstracted in Part II; they are divided according to:

1. Author(s) of each article;
2. Descriptor Subjects that are attributed to each article (The descriptions are taken from over 3,000 terms listed in the Political Science Thesaurus);
3. Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
4. Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article;
5. Journal in which each article is published.

USPSD can be purchased as a two volume set—PARTS I & II—or PART I, the indexes, can be purchased separately. Prices for both are as follows:

	Regular price	APSA-member price
PARTS I & II (Index & documents)	$90.00	$75.00
PART I (Index only)	$75.00	$60.00

University Center for International Studies
Publications Section
University of Pittsburgh
G-6 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
USA

The Political


the politics of power
the politics of power
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Ira Katznelson
Mark Kesselman
Dilemmas of Democracy
READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
edited by PETER COLLIER
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGERS
★ A Conservative View of America's Government
M. STANTON EVANS

The Politics of Power

A Critical Introduction to American Government

IRA KATZNELSON,
University of Chicago
MARK KESSELMAN,
Columbia University

"This is precisely the book I have been seeking for introductory courses in American politics and as a supplement for more advanced courses. It is a first-rate job, making valuable and sophisticated criticisms of American politics and social science and making them in a convincing and sophisticated manner."
—MARGARET LEVI, University of Washington

"An excellent book...presents an exciting and penetrating analysis of America's crisis in democratic rule. It has ignited terrific class discussions."
—WILLIAM J. STEVENSON, University of Wisconsin

Paperbound. 513 pages

Dilemmas of Democracy

Readings in American Government

Edited by PETER COLLIER

"*Dilemmas of Democracy* is the perfect reader for our American Government courses. I am greatly impressed."
—PAUL B. DAVIS, University of Utah

"This is an excellent collection indeed. The emphasis of this reader is in the right place for our times. Rather than trying to encompass the vast complexity or the minutiae of our vast governmental enterprise, this reader goes selectively into key issues and problems for citizens as they face the whole baffling confusion of government from day to day."
—REED M. SMITH, Wright State University

Paperbound. 385 pages

Clear and Present Dangers

A Conservative View of America's Government

M. STANTON EVANS,
Chairman, American Conservative Union

"Stan Evans has written an extraordinary book, sound in principle and insightful in analysis, that promises to be among the foremost conservative writings of the decade."
—PHILIP M. CRANE, U.S. House of Representatives

"This excellent book makes it possible for the first time to provide students with a responsible conservative analysis of U.S. government and politics."
—ANTHONY BOUSCAREN, Le Moyne College

"Virtually guarantees lively class discussions and student participation."
—ROBERT E. BARTLETT, Jr., Southeast Missouri State College

Paperbound. 433 pages

Winners in '76



The Chief Executive

THIRD EDITION

LOUIS W. KOENIG,
New York University

Described in its previous edition as "the best full-length study of the Presidency we now have,"* this Third Edition of *The Chief Executive* has again earned a reputation as the preeminent textbook in its field. The voting record: instructors at more than 200 colleges and universities, coast-to-coast, have adopted it for their courses this year.

*quoted in *U.S. News & World Report*, December 2, 1968

Paperbound. 452 pages

Cold War and Détente

The American Foreign Policy Process Since 1945

PAUL Y. HAMMOND,
University of Pittsburgh

"This is an excellent work, concise, yet well researched. Rather than merely being another postwar history, Hammond's narrative is decidedly analytical, enabling the reader to discern those underlying political dynamics affecting foreign policy choices. Enriching the text are Hammond's penetrating critiques of presidential failures and successes in handling international demands...In short, *Cold War and Détente* is a fine source for anyone who wishes to grasp the essentials of the American foreign policy process in the postwar era."
–LARRY ELOWITZ, Georgia College
from a review in *Military Affairs*

Paperbound. 370 pages

Congressional Power

Congress and Social Change

GARY ORFIELD,
The Brookings Institution

"It's just excellent. It will really help to stimulate new interest in Congress. It puts Congress in a whole new dynamic context."
–JAMES DAVID BARBER, Duke University

"...excellent–readable, intelligent, and a welcome addition to the literature on the Congress."
–NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, *Washington Post*, February 2, 1975

"The reader should find the treatment of popular stereotypes of Congress and the numerous criticisms of Congress refreshing."
–WESTON H. ANGOR, *Perspective*, June 1975

Paperbound. 339 pages

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY

The Organizational Connection

Graham Allison and Peter Szanton

"The most searching look at organizational issues in foreign affairs we have had for a generation. Must reading for scholars, commentators and, above all, new administrators. Allison and Szanton break new ground."—RICHARD E. NEUSTADT. This thoughtful critique of the foreign policy establishment shows how time and again—in Viet Nam, during the Middle East crisis, in the nuclear disarmament talks—*organizational* weaknesses led to failures in policy and implementation. If the dismal record of the past decade is to be improved, profound restructuring of the lines of information and authority must occur; the authors' recommendations are concrete and certain to provoke controversy.
Just published $10.95

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Walter Berns

In this provocative new interpretation of the First Amendment, Professor Berns argues that democracy depends on the *character* of the people and that law should help foster "those decent habits required for self-government." Thus, concludes Berns, the Supreme Court has strayed from the intentions of the Founding Fathers in, for example, extending freedom of speech to pornography, or in withholding public aid from parochial schools. "Powerful. . . . Hits the mark. . . . A contribution beyond measure."—HON. JOSEPH T. SNEED, *United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.*
Just published $12.50

THE GOVERNMENTAL HABIT

Controlling the Economy from Colonial Times to the Present

Jonathan R. T. Hughes

In this first history of governmental control of the American economy, Professor Hughes (author of the widely acclaimed *The Vital Few*) demonstrates that, contrary to common belief, interference with our economic affairs enjoys a long and popular history in this country and that, despite its patchwork inefficiency, it is unlikely that Americans will replace it with rational public policy any time soon.
Due January $11.95

KISSINGER

The European Mind in American Policy

Bruce Mazlish

Cutting through the gossip and polemics, this sensitive profile probes Kissinger's background—his childhood, his family's expulsion from Nazi Germany, his "Americanization" in the U.S. Army, his unusual patrons and connections—and looks at his "Europeanization," in turn, of U.S. foreign policy. "A first-rate job. . . . Mazlish puts his finger on the key factors in Kissinger's career . . . and he discusses these factors in a dispassionate, intelligent, provocative fashion."—STANLEY KARNOW, *Washington Post Book World.*
Just published $10.95

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay by Allan Bloom

A classic text currently used in leading colleges and universities.
Cloth $15.00, Paper $5.75

NEW. SIGNIFICANT.

BASIC

BASIC BOOKS INC.
10 EAST 53RD ST., NEW YORK 10022

MASSACHUSETTS

Corporatism and Development
The Portuguese Experience
Howard J. Wiarda,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Professor Wiarda argues that corporatism——distinct from both liberalism and totalitarianism—is the Iberic-Latin American response to the major twentieth-century issues of capitalism, industrialization, and mass society. He examines the development of corporatist political ideology from Greek and Roman times to the present, using Portugal as a case study of corporatist practice. He documents the growth, transformation, and decline of Portugal's modern corporate state, concluding that though corporatism has failed to live up to its theoretical promises, it must not be dismissed as a model of analysis.

February 1977, 375 pp., cloth, $20.00

The Politics of Autonomy
A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's
Social Contract
Andrew Levine,
University of Wisconsin, Madison

This volume is organized around three propositions: that resolution of the conflict between moral autonomy and legitimate state authority is the central problem in the *Social Contract*; that Rousseau understood this conflict better than the other contract theorists, notably Hobbes and Locke; and that Rousseau anticipated the attempt by Marx and other nineteenth-century thinkers to transcend traditional contractarian thought.

"The book is undogmatic, original and very easily understood. . . . In short, this is a first-rate book. . . "—Robert Paul Wolff.

December 1976, 208 pp., cloth, $12.00

University of Massachusetts Press Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

Problem selecting a text for your course?

Duxbury Press has the answer

Politics, Change and the Urban Crisis

by Bryan T. Downes, *Chairperson, Division of Public Affairs, School of Community Service and Public Affairs at the University of Oregon*

Downes develops a dynamic alternative to the Banfield-Moynihan model of urban politics. The first of the 'new generation' urban texts to organize on an anti-pluralist base, it treats change as both a goal and a perspective.

The emphasis is on *policy* — past, present and future — and citizen participation.

September 1976. 6½ x 9¼. 325 pages. Paperbound.

Public Bureaucracy:
Perspectives and Values

by James A. Medeiros, *U.S. Public Health Service and* David E. Schmitt, *Northeastern University*

A brief, lucidly written "invitation to public administration" kind of text. Medeiros and Schmitt explore the major issues and controversies in modern public administration within a three-pronged integrated framework — It evaluates strategies for: 1.) improving upon the *technical* base of bureaucracy (machine bureaucracy); 2.) improving organizational performance by improving its *human* base (*humane* bureaucracy); 3.) improving organizational performance by improving its *political* base (*political* bureaucracy).

December 1976. 6½ x 9¼. 200 pages. Paperbound.

The Chicano Political Experience: Three Perspectives

by F. Chris Garcia, *University of New Mexico and* Rudolph O. de la Garza, *The Colorado College*

The first text to provide a balanced, concise overview and analysis of the Chicano in the United States political system, past and present. The book assumes no previous knowledge of the American political system or of the Mexican-American people. Three dominant and competing theories of power distribution in the U.S. are employed to form the framework for the text — *pluralist, elite* and *internal colonialism* perspectives are provided on each aspect of the Chicano political experience.

December 1976. 6½ x 9¼. 200 pages. Paperbound.

In the problems lie the answers

Begin with the problems, how they are defined and confronted, then follow them through the formidable machinery of public policy.

That's the strategy behind the success of AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY. It has given the students a clear perception of the organic, shifting nature of the public policy process.

When the Jones text first appeared in 1970, the resurgence of interest in focusing on public policy as the key to understanding American politics was just emerging. The book was a pathbreaker.

Now Duxbury Press is proud to announce

An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy, 2nd edition

by Charles O. Jones, *Maurice Falk Professor of Politics, University of Pittsburgh, and Editor of the American Political Science Review*

- 4/5 of the text rewritten, infusing new conceptual material throughout
- New cases in energy, pollution, education, mental health, poverty
- An added chapter examining appropriations
- Research input from the author's recent book CLEAN AIR
- Equally provocative for introductory and advanced courses in American Politics and public policy

A framework-setting core text. February 1977. 5⅞ x 9. 272 pages. Paperbound.

Duxbury Press has the answers to your course needs. For more information on these and other Duxbury texts write:

Duxbury Press Box JA-12, 6 Bound Brook Court, N. Scituate, MA 02060

Announcing publication of:



CAREERS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

A Guide for Undergraduates

MARY H. CURZAN, editor

A Publication sponsored by
The Departmental Services Program
and
The Division of Educational Affairs

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Second Edition

ORDER FORM

Enclosed please find my check for $__________ for __________ copies.

Please bill my office $__________ for __________ copies.

Bulk Orders	APSA Departmental Service Member	Non-Member
10 copies	$ 3.00	$ 4.00
50 copies	12.50	17.50
100 copies	20.00	30.00

(Single copies are available for fifty cents each, prepaid.)

SEND TO: ______________________________

____

______________________________ Zip__________

Return this form with check to:
Departmental Services Program
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Voting behavior... threat of nuclear mishap ... treatment of criminals and the mentally ill

America Votes:

What You Should Know About Elections Today

by Kevin Mulcahy and Richard Katz, both of Queens College, C.U. N.Y.

Here is an examination of the who, what, why, and how of American voting patterns today.

Drawing from Presidential, Congressional, state, and local election data, the authors explore the impact of issues, education, age, class, section of country, party identification, and a host of other variables to show why people vote the way they do.

Ready Paper $2.95 (02378-8)
Cloth $8.95 (02379-6)

The Nuclear Power Controversy

An American Assembly Book

Edited by Arthur Murphy, Columbia University

Nuclear power—is it the answer to an energy-hungry nations's prayer or a spectre of technological disaster?

In *The Nuclear Power Controversy,* seven authorities from the fields of atomic energy, economics, science, law, and technology offer information on key aspects of the current nuclear energy debate.

Ready Paper $3.95 (62557-4)
Cloth $9.95 (62558-2)

Decarceration:

Community Treatment and the Deviant—A Radical View

by Andrew Scull, University of Pennsylvania

Are early release programs, community rehabilitation centers, and half-way houses effective in treating criminals and the mentally ill? Or are such programs a danger to society and to the deviants themselves?

In *Decarceration,* Andrew Scull answers these and other questions, showing how the real reason behind these "reforms" is the state's urgent need to cut the cost of social control and its increasing ability to substitute welfare for institutionalization.

Ready Paper $3.95 (19764-0)
Cloth $8.95 (19765-7)

Spectrum Books on issues that matter.

At your bookstore.

Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632

Teachers: for examination copies, contact your local Prentice-Hall field representative.

What's New from Winthrop
Politics, and

Available December 3 . . .

THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2nd Edition
Steven Rosen — The Australian National University and Brandeis University;
Walter Jones — Northeastern University

This new edition of a widely adopted international relations text maintains its reputation for clarity, readability and lucid organization as well as its theoretical organization, which stresses perceptual theory (views of major actors in the contemporary international system and its components). *New in this Second Edition* is a chapter on America's major allies — Western Europe, Canada, Japan — with perspectives on them woven throughout the book. Also includes updated information on arms technology and national attitudes.
1977 448 pp. Paper $7.95

Available Now . . .

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: EUROPE
Alexander J. Groth, Robert J. Lieber, Nancy I. Lieber — all of The University of California, Davis

New in 1976 and already acclaimed as the most innovative, up-to-date comparative government text available. A rare and excellent introduction to public policy questions and processes. Covers *standard* countries usually treated in most comparative government courses (Britain, France, Germany, Soviet Union) plus the *alternative* systems of government (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia). 1976 512 pp. Cloth $12.50

Available March 15 . . .

DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY:
AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Fred A. Kramer — University of Massachusetts, Amherst

A new basic text, with strong focus on organization theory and attention to modern management techniques. 1977 320 pp. Cloth $10.95 (est.)

Available March 15 . . .

PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, 2nd Edition
Fred A. Kramer — University of Massachusetts, Amherst

New revision of a unique set of readings with appeal to political science, public administration, business, and social welfare courses.
1977 200 pp. Paper $4.95 (est.)

Available March 15 . . .

AMERICAN POLITICS IN A BUREAUCRATIC AGE:
CITIZENS, CONSTITUENTS, CLIENTS, AND VICTIMS
Eugene Lewis — Hamilton College

Dynamic, provocative text, which argues that control of the public policy process has shifted to the public bureaucracy.
1977 250 pp. Paper $6.95 (est.)

in International Relations, Bureaucracy...

Available March 15...

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS
David Apter — Yale University

This much-needed introductory political science text reviews the several schools of thought in the growth of the discipline — Political Philosophy, Institutionalism, Behavioralism, Pluralism, Structuralism, and Developmentalism — and discusses the future of Political Science.

1977 400 pp. (est.) Cloth $11.95 (est.)

Available February 1...

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: A RADICAL APPROACH
Edward S. Greenberg — University of Colorado

This new interpretation of our political system goes further than other 'alternative' texts for American Government courses. It is also the first text in political science which uses a Marxist approach to the study of American political life within a modern textbook format. Instructor's Manual by Steven Quick (Holy Cross College) available.

1977 480 pp. Paper $7.95

Available Now...

LEADERSHIP AND CHANGE:
THE NEW POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE
Warren E. Miller and **Teresa E. Levitin** — both of Center for Political Studies, The University of Michigan

This just-published, already widely acclaimed text is the most recent, up-to-date analysis of American voting behavior over the past quarter century. An excellent candidate for your courses on Electoral and Voting Behavior, Public Opinion and Participation, Political Behavior, Political Sociology, and Political Parties.

1976 256 pp. Paper $6.95 Cloth $12.50

Prices subject to change without notice.

For further information, or to order examination copies of any of these texts, please write to:
Richard J. Marran, Dept. WJ-089,
Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 17
Dunster Street, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138.

WP Winthrop Publishers

Montesquieu and the Old Regime

Mark Hulliung

Was Montesquieu an "aristocratic liberal" or a "feudal reactionary?" In this reinterpretation Hulliung suggests that both characterizations are mistakes, in that they assume that Montesquieu was the supporter of aristocracy, of feudalism, of "intermediate bodies." Against these views the author argues that Montesquieu vigorously attacked the old social order, extolling England as the most free and progressive of nations. In sum, far from being an apologist for the old regime, Montesquieu was perhaps its most formidable critic. Hulliung draws upon all of Montesquieu's writings in highlighting the themes that were his lifelong concerns, and examines Montesquieu's relationship to other thinkers, especially Aristotle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Richelieu, and Bossuet.

272 pages, $11.50

Bail Reform in America

Wayne H. Thomas, Jr.

This is a study of major national efforts in the past 15 years to reduce the impact of money, and the lack of it, in determining whether a criminal defendant obtains freedom prior to trial. Thomas offers the results of a national study on bail reform since its beginning with the Manhatten Bail Project of 1961 and a survey of the major operational changes in the bail system since then. The successful use of release on own recognizance in the Manhatten Bail Project sparked bail reform legislation and lead to the development of other pretrial release mechanisms. Thomas concludes that the challenge of bail reform is to integrate existing pretrial release options in a comprehensive plan to provide the quickest, least restrictive form of release for defendants consistent with maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.

288 pages, $10.00

Reform and Revolution in China

The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei

Joseph W. Esherick

The 1911 revolution marked the end of the Chinese empire, but the ensuing years of warlordism demonstrated the weakness of republican institutions. Esherick seeks the political and social origins of the Revolution in two provinces, Hunan and Hubei, which throughout the period 1895-1913 were important centers of reform. Previous studies have stressed the vitality of the late imperial reform movement, and have suggested that, but for a failure in imperial leadership, the reforms could have become a viable alternative to revolution. Esherick sees the reforms as having facilated the creation of a new urban elite, which was as much interested in inhancing its own power as in reviving China.

335 pages, $15.00

Now in paperback

Curing the Mischiefs of Faction

Party Reform in America

Austin Ranney

"Ranney . . . is considered one of the most penetrating commentators on American party politics. His work combines a deep understanding of the workings of a two-party system in a complexly divided nation and a continuing preoccupation with the effects on democracy of different possible ways of organizing political parties . . . Presented with clarity, perspective, and fluency in a way that makes the book . . . must reading for students of American parties." —*Choice*

230 pages, $3.25

At bookstores

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY 94720

Social Limits to Growth
A Twentieth Century Fund Study

Fred Hirsch

$10.00

Fred Hirsch argues brilliantly that the limits on extension of welfare through growth are social as well as economic. In the future the debates should not be couched in terms of "how much growth" or of "no growth," but of why the affluent compete among themselves and how they create social scarcity. Kenneth Boulding comments, "(This) is an important book and a major contribution to social thinking and economics."

The Dynamics of Soviet Politics

Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, *Editors*

Russian Research Center Studies, 76

$17.50

Expert authors offer here an inside view of the workings of a closed political system. Their work, building upon the achievements of Soviet studies over the last thirty years, covers new ground that will enable future studies of Soviet politics and social practices to move ahead unencumbered by stereotypes and mystification.

The African Diaspora
Interpretive Essays

Martin L. Kilson and Robert I. Rotberg, *Editors*

$18.50

Since 1500, ten million Africans have left their homelands for destinations in the old and new worlds. *The African Diaspora* is the first book to chronicle and interpret this long, painful, but sometimes rewarding exodus. The editors, leading authorities on African, Caribbean, and black American history and politics, have assembled sixteen essays that delve into the ways in which Africans became exiles and how they responded to their new environment. This long-needed book corrects many myths of exodus and adaptation.

The United States and the Southern Cone
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile

Arthur P. Whitaker

American Foreign Policy Library

$20.00

"As fine as anything Whitaker has ever written. . . . I think that it will rank for many years to come as among the most successful general syntheses that the Latin American field has produced since World War II."—Fredrick B. Pike

Whitaker writes about the closely linked cone countries from the time of their liberation to the present. He also treats each nation as a separate entity and traces its relations with the United States.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science:

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis.

Seven SETUPS: American Politics
Are Available Now for Class Use

1. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby.
2. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson.
3. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn.
4. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate.
5. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes.
6. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle and Peter J. Hartjens.
7. *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation* by Marvin K. Hoffman.

Four SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics Will Be Available for Class Use, Winter 1977

1. *Comparative Voting Behavior* by Herbert B. Asher, Bradley Richardson.
2. *The Budgetary Process in Cross-National Perspective* by John Creighton Campbell, John M. Echols.
3. *Conflict in the Middle East: A Public Policy Simulation* by Karen Ann Feste.
4. *Are Political Values Really Changing?* by Charles Taylor.

Each SETUPS is a module that can be taught in one to two weeks. SETUPS were designed to supplement instruction in introductory courses. But SETUPS have been field tested successfully in upper division courses. SETUPS were developed by faculty in workshops supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the American Political Science Association and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, summer, 1974 and summer 1975.

Each SETUPS Module Includes a Monograph and a Data Set

The monograph is a 5½" x 8½" paperback of approximately 100 pages with:

1. A substantive essay on the topic.
2. Analytical exercises.
3. Instructions about how to do the exercises.
4. Suggestions for further readings and exercises.
5. A code book for the data set.

The data sets are prepared and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. SETUPS data can be ordered for use with SPSS, OSIRIS or as card image.

Each SETUPS will cost $3.50. Lower prices are arranged for bulk orders. An order for 25 or more SETUPS will entitle you to the data sets for *all the SETUPS* at no extra charge.

To Order SETUPS

Order the SETUPS monographs from the American Political Science Association through your bookstore. Ask your bookstore to include your name when they place the SETUPS order with APSA. When we confirm the bookstore order, we shall send you a data-specification form if your school does not have the SETUPS data set already.

Announcing

Giovanni Sartori's

PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

A Framework for Analysis

"The appearance of the first volume of Giovanni Sartori's *Parties and Party Systems* is the most important event in political parties' scholarship since Ostrogorski opened the subject to systematic inquiry at the turn of the century. It draws on a remarkable historical depth and systematizes and interprets contemporary knowledge of parties and party systems in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. It is theoretically subtle and profound, methodologically sophisticated and rigorous. It will be the leading work in the field for a long time to come."—GABRIEL ALMOND, *Stanford University*

"Readers of Professor Sartori's long awaited book on political parties will not be disappointed. It will be for the next generation of scholarly work on parties what Duverger's was for the last. One may agree or disagree with what Sartori has to say but for many years to come his will serve as the authoritative statement that every serious discussion of political parties will have to take into account."—ROBERT A. DAHL, *Yale University*

"The first major general book on its topic in two decades. Required reading for all who seek to understand political parties."
—FRED GREENSTEIN, *Princeton University*

This first volume of Giovanni Sartori's two-volume work is fully self-contained. The second volume is in preparation.

Cloth $32.50 Paper $10.95

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

MASS SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

Towards a Reconstruction of Theory

SANDOR HALEBSKY

This volume critically analyzes, and offers alternatives to, one of the major contemporary interpretations of the origin of support for radical or extremist political behavior—the political theory of mass society. Cloth $19.95 Paper $6.95

THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS

RICHARD E. FLATHMAN

Professor Flathman sets forth a systematic theory of individual rights based on concepts of practice or sets of practices. He challenges aspects of both traditional liberal thought and communitarian conceptions of the relationship between the individual and political society. $15.95

CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

HUGH STRETTON

The author presents a theory of socialism which includes a radical revision of socialist ideas of alienation and puts questions of land, city and environmental use at the center of its social-democratic program. Cloth $19.95 Paper $6.95

THE MAKING OF MODERN BELIZE

Politics, Society and British Colonialism in Central America

C. H. GRANT

The most detailed study of Belizean politics ever attempted, examining the processes and institutions from the seventeenth century through the 1974 general election. $32.50

LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

An Essay in Comparative Politics

CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM $10.95

THE CRITICAL PHASE IN TANZANIA 1945-1968

Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy

CRANFORD PRATT $19.95

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Existential Marxism in Postwar France

From Sartre to Althusser

MARK POSTER

"Poster has construed his subject in so wide a fashion as to have written a virtual intellectual history of modern France. His book articulates the resources and dilemmas of two of the most significant modes of thought in the modern world. . . . No other English-language study covers so much ground."—*Fredric Jameson, University of California* $17.50

On War • CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

Edited and Translated by MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET
With Commentaries by PETER PARET,
MICHAEL HOWARD, and BERNARD BRODIE

On War constitutes the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work first appeared in 1832 it has influenced generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals. The present edition for the first time returns to the original German to make a classic of Western thought available to the English-speaking world in a reliable and readable text. *Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University* • $18.50

The Irish Triangle

Conflict in Northern Ireland

ROGER H. HULL

"This is the first major analytic study of the Irish conflict that develops guidelines for appraisal and settlement. It promises to be an exceedingly useful volume."—*Richard A. Falk, Princeton University.* In his examination of the struggle, Hull sympathetically presents the views from Dublin, London, and Belfast, his analysis of them, and his own conclusions. $15.00

Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution

H. GORDON SKILLING

For about eight months in 1968 Czechoslovakia underwent rapid and radical changes that were unparalleled in the history of communist reform; in the eight months that followed, those changes were dramatically reversed. Skilling provides a comprehensive analysis of the events of 1968, assessing their significance both for Czechoslovakia and for communism generally. *Written under the auspices of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto*
Cloth, $45.00 • Limited Paperback Edition, $15.00

Imperial Germany and a World Without War

The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914

ROGER CHICKERING

This book provides the first thorough examination of the peace movement in pre-World War I Germany, concentrating on the factors in German politics and society that account for the movement's weakness. The author draws on a wide range of documents to survey the history, organization, and ideologies of the peace groups, placing them in their social and political context.
Cloth, $27.50 • Limited Paper back Edition, $10.50

Now in Paperback

DÉTENTE IN EUROPE: Real or Imaginary?
JOSEF KORBEL • Paper, $3.95 • Cloth, $12.50

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU
ROGER D. MASTERS • Paper, $4.95 • Cloth, $17.50

Princeton University Press • Princeton, New Jersey 08540

W
DE
G

Walter de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Parliaments of the World

A Reference Compendium
Prepared by Valentine Herman with the collaboration of Françoise Mendel
Edited by Inter-Parliamentary Union
1976. Large-octavo. XII, 985 pages. Bound DM 168,–; $70.00
ISBN 3 11 006975 X

Parliaments of the World is an exhaustive survey of all aspects of the composition, organisation and operation of 56 Parliaments as well as their legislative, budgetary and control functions. It takes the form of a series of 70 tables with country-by-country entries, each table being preceded by explanatory text.

The book contains material gathered during an international enquiry conducted by the International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation, a department of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Parliaments of the World is deliberately conceived as a compilation of data displayed for each country in turn, avoiding judgements and evaluations. The result is a reference compendium of lasting interest to scholars as well as to parliamentarians, politicians, journalists and all people involved in the work and life of parliamentary institutions.

$-price is subject to change without further notice.

For USA send orders to
Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 3 Westchester Plaza, Elmsford, New York 10523

New Editions of Distinguished Texts

Democracy for the Few

Second Edition

Michael Parenti

- A best-selling analysis and critique of American government and politics, *Democracy for the Few* has been hailed as:

> *"By far the best American government text I've seen."*
> —*William A. Barnes, Ohio State University—Lima*
>
> *"...a first class study—a creative piece of work beyond what one normally refers to as a textbook."*
> —*H. H. Wilson, Princeton University*
>
> *"An outstanding book which launches an intelligent, well-reasoned, frontal assault on the sacred cows of American politics."*
> —*H. Michael Erisman, Mercyhurst College*

- The Second Edition, while retaining the basic structure and size of the First, includes updated materials and examples, and expanded chapters on the media, law and order, and political economy.

February 1977 approx. 320 pages, illustrated
paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

State Politics in the United States

Second Edition

Kenneth T. Palmer, *University of Maine—Orono*

- Widely used in courses on state and local government and American government, *State Politics in the United States* has been cited as:

> *"The best short text on state politics I have seen."*
> —*Paul C. Schmidt, California State University*
>
> *"Concise and penetrating analysis of the fundamental patterns of state politics."* —*Bill Jackson, Mobile College*

- This thoroughly revised and updated edition features helpful chapter summaries and includes new material on intergovernmental relations, public policymaking, public opinion, state bureaucracies, and state environmental differences.

February 1977 approx. 240 pages, illustrated
paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

from St. Martin's Press

American Government

A Brief Introduction

Second Edition

Max Skidmore, *Southwest Missouri State University*
and
Helen Marshall Carter, *University of Texas at El Paso*

- Brief, comprehensive, and flexible, here is the second edition of a highly successful, provocative core text for courses in American government.

  "Exactly what I've been looking for—a short, pithy book that lays out the broad outlines of American government and how it actually performs ... an ideal core book."
  —William Jenkins, Wayne State University

- Thoroughly updated, the Second Edition includes material on Watergate, congressional reform, the Ford presidency, and the 1976 elections.
- A revised and expanded Instructor's Manual is available.

  February 1977 approx. 256 pages, illustrated
  paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

Technology and Man's Future

Second Edition

edited by
Albert H. Teich, *George Washington University*

- A new, extensively revised edition of a highly acclaimed text—

  "An important, provocative work, particularly useful in the study of change." *—Avtar Singh, East Carolina University*

  "In a class by itself as a selection of readings on the subject."
  —Lester G. Hawkins, SUNY at Albany

- Organized to provide maximum flexibility, the articles include some of the most significant contemporary thought on the relationship between technology and society—the only book now available that gives thorough coverage of the "limits of growth" debate and issues of assessment and control.

  February 1977 approx. 300 pages paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

For complimentary examination copies, please write (specifying course titles and approximate enrollments) to:

St. Martin's Press
P.O. Box 5352
New York, N.Y. 10017

FREE THE GSS 76

THE 1976 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY

contains 1,499 souls willing to tell all about:

- Party Identification
- Presidential Vote
- Political Ideology
- Confidence in Institutions
- Political Toleration
- Spending Priorities
- Abortion,Busing,Crime, Drugs, Foreign Affairs, Gun Control, Taxes, etc.

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS:

* 5th Annual National Survey
* Replicates Many Earlier Surveys
* NORC conducted, NSF funded
* Available to All Researchers
* Proven Teaching Aid
* $200 for Data Set (13¢ a Respondent)

To help liberate the 1976 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY contact

Roper Public Opinion Research Cntr
Williamstown, MA. 01267

From the "Red Scare" to Women's Rights, the fight for civil liberties goes on...

THE PULSE OF FREEDOM: *American Liberties, 1920-1970s* spans five decades of this country's struggle to maintain and enlarge basic human rights. Six scholar-historians chart the course of this often bitter struggle: the amnesty drive for World War I conscientious objectors; the Scopes "monkey trial"; the curbs on liberty during World War II; the McCarthy years; the beginnings of school desegregation in the 50s; and the large-scale civil rights advances and student protests.

THE PULSE OF FREEDOM tells the stories behind the fight by the American Civil Liberties Union and others against suppression of or injustice for men and ideas of the widest possible spectrum: for black sharecroppers and members of the Ku Klux Klan; for an accused murderer and an antiwar demonstrator; for a dismissed teacher and a member of the American Nazi Party. "'There is no better survey of this kind in print!" —*The Nation.* "Fine and authoritative." —*Library Journal*

THE PULSE OF FREEDOM **AMERICAN LIBERTIES: 1920-1970s**

Edited by Alan Reitman
Foward by Ramsey Clark
Ⓜ A Mentor Book MJ1484/$1.95

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
EDUCATION
120 Woodbine Street
Bergenfield, New Jersey 07621

NAL
TIMES MIRROR



TIRED OF ELECTION YEAR HOOPLA?



OUR TEXTS PROMISE REASON, NOT RHETORIC

AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
Thirteenth Edition
1977, 512 pages, $12.95*

AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
Thirteenth Edition
1977, 640 pages, $14.95*

John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry

The most thorough revision in the thirty-year history of these highly successful texts. More than 50% rewritten, both books have been reduced in length, and the writing has been made simpler, clearer, and more readable for today's student.

Features you'll find in both texts

- Results of the 1976 presidential election are analyzed
- Traditional political concepts and practices are re-examined in light of current issues
- Thoughtful coverage is given to revenue sharing, election financing, Congressional reform and counter-reform, the energy crisis and the Federal response to it, and other contemporary issues

Features you'll find in AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

- Increased emphasis on citizen participation at the local level
- New discussion of finances and services including state and local debt
- Five chapters that explore in depth state and local government and the problems and challenges they face

College Division
McGraw-Hill Book Company
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN POLITICS THROUGH FICTION,
Second Edition
Myles L. Clowers,
San Diego City College,
and **Lorin Letendre,**
CTB/McGraw-Hill and Cabrillo College

Organized to accommodate either the topical (institutions) or the systems approach, this paperback features writers from the entire political spectrum. *New to this edition:* A new chapter on the Constitution; a new chapter on policy; and new selections on political polling, political campaigning, interest groups, nativism and ethnic politics, bureaucratic discretion of the CIA, and plea bargaining. 1977, 356 pages, paper, $4.95*

POLICE ADMINISTRATION,
Fourth Edition
The late **Orlando W. Wilson**
and **Roy Clinton McLaren,**
Chief of Police, Arlington, Virginia
and former Director, Field Operations Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police

This text covers all aspects of police administration, establishing a coherent system which is internally consistent. *New to this edition:* A new chapter on team policing; a new chapter on management theory and organizational behavior; and new material on the impact of women and minorities in law enforcement, the implications of several important pieces of recent legislation, management by objectives, zero-base budgeting, enhancement of productivity, crime resistance, SWAT, hostage negotiation, and technological advances. 1977, 768 pages, $13.95

*Instructor's manuals are available for these texts.

Prices subject to change.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
Third Edition
C. Herman Pritchett,
University of California, Santa Barbara

Now in its third edition -- the classic analytical examination of the Constitution. More than 1,000 Supreme Court cases are analyzed or cited. *New to this edition:* Coverage of every important constitutional issue that has arisen, since the last edition -- including capital punishment, affirmative action, exclusionary zoning, abortion, and executive privilege, 1977, 704 pages, $16.50

GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA,
Fifth Edition
Charles R. Adrian,
University of California, Riverside,
and **Charles Press,**
Michigan State University

Written with sympathy for the problems of local government officials, this text presents a realistic appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of both government and citizens. *New to this edition:* New approaches to urban financing, especially revenue sharing; analysis of the trend toward structural change; reorganized and rewritten chapters on urban public and metropolitan areas; coverage of recent developments such as "neighborhood" government and minority and women candidates. 1977, 512 pages, $12.95

College Division
McGraw-Hill Book Company

1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

DAVID McKAY COMPANY, INC.
publishers
750 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017
949-1500
Cable: DAVMACAY NEW YORK

Edward Artinian
Vice President / Director
College Department

1 December 1976

Dear Political Scientist:

David McKay is proud to announce the publication in April of THE ELECTION OF 1976 by Gerald M. Pomper, chairman of the political science department at Rutgers University. This book offers an early interpretation of the crucial election of 1976 by five specialists in American politics.

In seven chapters the authors will analyze the Presidential nominations, the Presidential election, the issues of the campaign, the Congressional election and legislative prospects, the likely course of the new administration, important state and local elections, and the significance of the 1976 contest in the long-term development of American history.

The contributors of the essays include Ross K. Baker, Wilson Carey McWilliams, Jr., Henry A. Plotkin, Charles E. Jacob, and Gerald M. Pomper.

This volume will supplement every American politics text and bring it up-to-date. It will be 176 pages and priced at only $3.95 in paperback, be sure to order your desk copy now.

Sincerely,

Edward Artinian

EDWARD ARTINIAN

EA/su



A Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science 1976

Revised Fifth Edition

including names and fields of specialization of faculty.

NOW AVAILABLE

The 5th edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science is completely revised and now contains the *names and fields of specialization of all faculty in graduate departments.*

$4.00 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PUBLICATIONS FROM UNITED NATIONS

DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1974



The twenty-sixth issue of the Demographic Yearbook contains 1974 statistics of area, population, natality, mortality, nuptiality and divorce for every country of the world, latest available data on expectation of life and a 7-year trend of international arrivals and departures. Data on the economic characteristics of the population are shown, including labour force participation rates by age and sex as well as various cross-classifications of population by industry occupation, status, age and sex. The Special Topic for this edition is: Mortality Statistics.

Order No.E/F.75.XIII.1
Clothbound $42.00



STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1975

Important compilation of statistics from countries throughout the world covering a wide range of economic and social subjects, including: population, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, trade, balance of payments, national income, education and culture. Improved statistical coverage has enabled the YEARBOOK to widen the territorial scope of many of its tables and to provide more comprehensive and accurate world and continental aggregates.

Order No.E/F.76.XVII.1
Clothbound $42.00

United Nations Publications
Room LX-2300
New York, N.Y. 10017

or

United Nations Publications
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Freedom and the Court
Third Edition

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, University of Virginia. This well-known work articulates the role of the United States Supreme Court in its continuing endeavor to identify and justify the lines and limits that our democratic system imposes in an effort to reconcile the rights of individuals and society. In this Third Edition, the author focuses on major issues of public law, such as freedom of expression, racial and political equality, criminal justice, and religion.

February 1977 480 pp. cloth $17.95 paper $4.50

Karl Marx Reader

Edited by DAVID McLELLAN, University of Kent. This volume provides a full account of the thought of Karl Marx. The arrangement of the readings is chronological, thus emphasizing the development of Marxian thought. Much of the material in this book has never been published in English or found in popular volumes of Marx readings.

Spring 1977 752 pp. cloth $12.00 paper $5.95

Party Dynamics
The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change

RICHARD L. RUBIN, Columbia University. A penetrating analysis of the weakening of past relationships within the Democratic party, this book also provides insights into the dynamics of the American party system. ". . . Professor Rubin has rendered great service in this taut, fact-laden book. He does not waste or mince words." —George Daly in **New York Law Journal**

1976 220 pp. cloth $9.95 paper $4.00

Secrecy and Foreign Policy

Edited by THOMAS M. FRANCK, New York University; and EDWARD WEISBAND, State University of New York, Binghamton. In this collection of twenty-four readings, leading legislators, policy makers, lawyers, and journalists probe the delicate balance between the people's right to know and the government's need for confidentiality, as seen in such cases as Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and the question of "executive privilege."

1974 (paper, 1976) 480 pp. cloth $15.95 paper $4.00

The Brazilian Communist Party
Conflict and Integration 1922 - 1972

RONALD H. CHILCOTE, University of California, Riverside. The author examines the history, structure, and potential of the Communist Party of Latin America's largest nation in "an invaluable book for those interested in understanding the Latin American Left." —Joseph A. Ellis, City College of New York. "I think this will stand as the definitive work on the Brazilian Communist Party in English." —James Nelson Goodsell, **Christian Science Monitor**

1974 380 pp. $17.50

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

Listing and Order Form for Publications of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $10.50 per copy; $42.00 per volume.

PS

Quarterly journal of Association news and articles of professional concern. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $2.00 per copy; $8.00 per volume.

DEA NEWS FOR TEACHERS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Newspaper on education and the curriculum. Included in APSA membership.

ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

Final program for APSA Annual Meeting. Included in Annual Meeting Registration. Extra copies: $.50.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS**

Hard copies, $3.00 each.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS**

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1901-1912; 1956-present. $22.00 per reel. (approx. 7 reels per meeting.)

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**

1906-1968, $6.50.

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS**

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings for 1904-1912; 1956-1970: $18.50.

WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: STUDIES AND REPORTS, 1969-71 OF THE APSA COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION**

PB 486, $6.00 microfilm; $16.50 Xerographic reprint (U.S. prices).

POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS

A major reference tool in political science; this volume represents the terminology control device for a computer-based information retrieval service. Individuals: Hardback: $20.00; Paper: $15.00. Institutions: Hardback: $30.00; Paper: $25.00.

APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY (Sixth Edition, 1973)

Biographical information on over 7,000 Association members, plus names and addresses for approximately 12,500 members. Members: Hardback: $7.50; Paper: $5.00. Non-Members: Hardback: $12.50; Paper: $10.00.

APSA DIRECTORY OF MEMBERS: ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY

Names and current addresses of all APSA members. $3.00 each.

GUIDE TO PUBLICATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Co-sponsored by the APSA Committee on the Status of Women and the Women's Caucus for Political Science. $1.00.

ROSTER OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (4th edition)

Biographical information on women political scientists. $3.00 each for members; $5.00 for non-members.

ANNUAL APSA DIRECTORY OF DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS

Names and addresses of Chairpersons of departments offering political science at four-year institutions. $20.00 each.

PERSONNEL SERVICE GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYERS AND APPLICANTS

Pamphlet containing information and guidelines for members of the APSA Personnel Service and for employers listing their vacancies in the Personnel Service Newsletter. No charge.

PERSONNEL SERVICE NEWSLETTER

Monthly listing of positions for political scientists. APSA Members: $8.00 subscription.

CAREERS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: A GUIDE FOR UNDERGRADUATES

A monograph discussing the relationship between political science knowledge and skills and careers in law, government, business, journalism, teaching, etc. $.50 each; bulk rates available.

**Order from: Customer Service Department, University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

CAREER ALTERNATIVES FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: A GUIDE FOR FACULTY AND GRADUATE STUDENTS by Thomas E. Mann

A monograph containing practical advice for obtaining nonacademic employment. $1.00 each.

GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science. The 1976 Guide is revised and expanded to include listings of faculty and fields of specialization. $4.00 each.

SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: RESEARCH EDUCATION, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BULLETIN 1: SUPPORT FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: FELLOWSHIPS AND TRAINEESHIPS

Information on post-doctoral fellowships, internship programs, special training support and foreign travel grants available to faculty and advanced graduate students. $1.00 each.

GLOBAL DIMENSIONS IN U.S. EDUCATION

A joint publication of the APSA Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, the Education Commission of the International Studies Association, and the Center for War/Peace Studies of the N.Y. Friends Group, Inc. Four publications: The Elementary School, The Secondary School, The University, The Community. $1.50 each, $5.00 per set.

COMPARING POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

Complete description of an alternative course for high school government instruction. $2.75 each.

SETUPS: AMERICAN POLITICS

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle, Peter G. Hartjens. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes. *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation* by Marvin K. Hoffman. For information and price list write: APSA Division of Educational Affairs. $3.50 each; lower price on bulk orders.

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

Guides on materials and methods for teaching and learning in political science. *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government* by Clement E. Vose. $6.50 hardback; $4.00 paperback. *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle Jr. $3.50 paperback. *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott. $3.50 paperback. *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool. $4.00 paperback. *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide*, $4.00, and *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Student Manual*, $2.50, both by Phyllis G. Carter. *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays* by Lloyd S. Etheredge, $1.00 each.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE PROJECT MANUALS

Individual manuals available for: Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island. $2.50 each.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A volume on the current and future state of research and educational programs in the field of state and local government. $3.75 each.

APSA MEMBERSHIP MAILING LISTS AND LABELS

For information and price list, contact Membership Secretary, APSA.

APSA POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS MAILING LABELS

For information and price list, contact APSA Departmental Services Program.

Order Form

I am enclosing a check for $______________, for ______________________________

____ (list publications).

Name ____

Address ____

City ______________________ State ______________ Zip ______________

Order from: American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(All orders must be prepaid)

TWO VITAL TOPICS FOR TODAY FROM
SAGE PUBLICATIONS


TED ROBERT GURR
Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers
A Political History of Urban Crime and Conflict

$10.00

- **How much can the crime rate be reduced by changing the police, the courts, the prisons, or the law?**

Criminologists, sociologists, politicians, and citizens have argued this question for years. But what if the question is itself meaningless? What if neither repression *nor* reform is an effective response to crime—because *neither* makes a difference in the crime rate!

This sobering conclusion is suggested by ROGUES, REBELS, AND REFORMERS, a landmark analysis of urban crime and conflict. Drawing on a major comparative study of the last 150 years of crime and punishment, this book is dramatic evidence that not only is there no easy solution to the dilemma of crime in our times, but that for modern democratic societies crime may well be one of the inevitable prices we pay for freedom. This important new study, written by Ted Robert Gurr—professor of political science at Northwestern University, author of *Why Men Rebel* and coauthor of *Violence in America*—draws on data from London, Stockholm, Sydney, and Calcutta—with important implications for the rest of the world.

192 pp. L.C. 76-17370

- **The Soviets will have preclusive first-strike capability by 1981.**
- **The U.S. will be forced to choose between surrender—or war!**

These are some of the controversial conclusions of PEACE ENDANGERED by R. J. Rummel, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii. An analysis of international behavior and the strategic arms balance, this compelling book cannot be ignored by anyone interested in foreign affairs, détente, deterrence, or world peace. Dr. Rummel's thought-provoking conclusions, based on in-depth analysis and research, will have to be taken seriously even by the most devoted proponents of détente.

A selection of the Library of Political and International Affairs.

189 pp. L.C. 76-17372



$10.00

SAGE Publications

The Publishers of Professional Social Sciences
275 South Beverly Drive • Beverly Hills • California 90212

New from Columbia

THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION
"China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971
STANLEY D. BACHRACK

Stanley Bachrack tells the story of the "Committee of One Million," a foreign policy interest group formed to pressure the American government *not* to recognize the People's Republic of China or accept its membership in the United Nations. Here is a disturbing account of a group which continued its self-imposed role as "watchdog" of American China policy up to the admission of the People's Republic of China in the UN in 1971. $14.95

SKEPTICAL SOCIOLOGY
DENNIS H. WRONG

This unique volume contains the finest and most enduring essays by Dennis H. Wrong, one of America's best-known sociologists. Among the topics discussed by this vital and stimulating thinker are the Freudian, Marxian, and Weberian heritages in sociology; social class in America; power and politics; and the sociology of the future. $14.95

PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY
WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH and
FRANCIS P. KING

This new book examines in-depth the public policy issues surrounding the three major old-age income support systems in the U.S. today—Social Security, pension plans of private employers, and public employee retirement plans. Legislators, decision-makers in business, government and labor, and individuals covered under one or more of these retirement systems will appreciate this cogent analysis of how business and public policy can significantly affect the ability of pension plans to meet economic and social objectives in the post-ERISA era. $15.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

3rd Edition

A textbook for the 70's *Flexible binding*

on GOVERNMENT and POLITICS

KOUSOULAS

This lucid, comprehensive and balanced introduction to Political Science, now available in a thoroughly revised, updated new edition. Widely used.

Discussion Questions
Annotated Bibliography
Glossary of terms
Instructor's Manual

DUXBURY PRESS
A Division of Wadsworth
6 Bound Brook Court
North Scituate, Mass. 02060

Cornell
University
Press

Timely new books...

The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief

By **CLINTON ROSSITER. With an introductory note and additional text by RICHARD P. LONGAKER.** This classic study of presidential power is once again made available with the reissue of this book in a new, expanded edition. New material brings the book up to date, covering vital events of the past 25 years. Cloth, $15.00; Paper, $3.95

Political Violence

By TED HONDERICH. *Is political violence justifiable?* Taking a philosophical rather than an activist view, Ted Honderich deals with moral and philosophical arguments that have been offered for and against political violence. He offers an elegantly written, lively critique of certain presuppositions and inconsistencies of liberal-democratic thinking about political violence. Cloth, $7.95

Energy Supply and Government Policy

Edited by ROBERT J. KALTER and WILLIAM A. VOGELY. In fourteen essays written from different perspectives, nationally known specialists offer perceptive analyses of our energy-supply problems and realistic proposals for solving them.
Cloth, $18.50; Paper, $5.95

America as an Ordinary Country

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future

Edited by RICHARD ROSECRANCE. "Timely and forceful.... Knowledgeable, temperate and lucidly written, the essays range from *detente* and multinational corporations to the European Community and the Far East. A constructive international effort that deserves a wide readership."—*Publishers Weekly.* Cloth, $9.75

Disaster by Decree

The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools

By LINO A. GRAGLIA. This provocative book takes a sharply critical view of the Supreme Court rulings that led to forced busing. "A telling critique of the difficulties inherent in our major social and, of course, legal dilemma."—*Library Journal.* "An acute analysis of ...the most important decisions that the Court has composed in this century."—*Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago.*
Cloth, $11.50

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

JOIN APSA

Membership includes:

The American Political Science Review—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science;

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern;

DEA News—quarterly newspaper on educational materials and methods;

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 1-4, 1977, Washington, D.C.

Name ____

Mailing Address __________________________________

____

_________________________________ Zip ____________

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the *American Political Science Review* and *PS.*

Student	$12	☐
Annual:		
If your annual income is under $12,000	$25	☐
$12,000-14,999	$30	☐
$15,000-19,999	$35	☐
$20,000-24,999	$40	☐
$25,000-29,999	$45	☐
Over $30,000	$50	☐

Add $2 for foreign postage.

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES

THE POLITICS OF DIVISION, PARTITION, AND UNIFICATION
Edited by RAY EDWARD JOHNSTON
128 pp. Oct., 1976 LC 75-23973 ISBN 0-275-55660-3 $16.50

POLITICAL CULTURE IN ISRAEL
Cleavage and Integration among Israeli Jews
EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY
ca. 350 pp. Feb., 1977 LC 76-24350 ISBN 0-275-23790-7 ca. $21.50

CURRENT RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
An Analysis and Bibliographic Guide to the Soviet System
LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN
172 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 76-19553 ISBN 0-275-23550-5 $16.50

SOVIET-ASIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970s AND BEYOND
An Interperceptional Study
BHABANI SEN GUPTA
384 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 76-24368 ISBN 0-275-23740-0 $25.00

WELFARE POLICY MAKING AND CITY POLITICS
SHARON PERLMAN KREFETZ
238 pp. Nov., 1976 LC 76-12860 ISBN 0-275-23140-2 $18.50

URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORITIES
Edited by HERRINGTON J. BRYCE
238 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 75-44875 ISBN 0-275-23500-9 $18.50

PLURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Edited by MELVIN M. TUMIN and WALTER PLOTCH
ca. 240 pp. Jan., 1977 LC 76-12877 ISBN 0-275-23310-3 ca. $15.00

A FULL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM FOR THE 1970s
Edited by ALAN GARTNER, WILLIAM LYNCH, JR., and FRANK RIESSMAN
160 pp. May, 1976 LC 75-36408 ISBN 0-275-22810-X $15.00
PSS Student Edition: ISBN 0-275-89560-2 $4.95

ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING AND DECISION MAKING
The United States Experience
HOLCOMB RESEARCH INSTITUTE
ca. 176 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 76-28798 ISBN 0-275-24190-4 $16.50

Praeger Publishers 200 Park Avenue, N.Y., N.Y. 10017

Red, White, and Blue Power

American Government and Politics Today
Second Edition

Charles P. Sohner, El Camino College

Covering national and state government, this text emphasizes those aspects of government which personally concern the potential voters in your class—civil rights and political participation. In the new Sohner, you'll find an even more readable text for your students in addition to an exciting new chapter that introduces material on social, economic, and foreign policy. The revision includes additional material on population shifts, church-state relations, ethnic politics, domestic spying, impeachment, and recent developments in other areas. Instructor's Manual containing test questions and summaries of topics in each chapter available.
January 1976, 385 pages, illustrated, paper, approx. $7.50

California Government and Politics Today
Second Edition

Charles P. Sohner
January 1976, 68 pages, paper, approx. $1.75

Scott Foresman College Division

For further information write to
Jack Bevington, Department SA
Scott, Foresman College Division
1900 East Lake Avenue Glenview, Illinois 60025

A Rationale for Innovation . . .

University Press of America presents a new concept in academic publishing that addresses directly two of this industry's foremost challenges:

The demands of a volatile environment.

As curriculums require more frequent revisions due to advances in the social and technical sciences, the traditional text, with its lengthy gestation period, can become quickly outdated.

The needs of a competitive academic profession.

Due to conventional processes that are becoming ever more costly, the traditional publishing industry no longer affords adequate opportunity for deserving professors to become published.

An Innovative Alternative.

The University Press of America's new concept is a vastly simplified approach to publishing, developed by academics, that effectively counters these growing challenges.

Its acceptance is best evidenced by the more than 100 new University Press of America titles to be found in a growing number of respected colleges and universities.

For complete details, including titles now available in the various disciplines, please write: James E. Lyons, Editor-in-Chief, University Press of America, 4710 Auth Place S.E., Washington, D.C. 20023—or phone (301) 899-9600.

New from University Press of America

■ **COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: PAPERS ON A REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM,** *edited by Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard,* Dalhousie University. Contributors include: Douglas Anglin, Larry Bowman, Zdenek Cervenka, Ken Grundy, Charles Harvey, Christopher Hill, Sheridan Johns, Arthur Keppel-Jones, Christian Potholm, Don Rothchild, Tim Thahane, and J. E. Spence.
479 pp. 0-8191-0005-6 **$9.45**

■ **CHICANO POLITICS: A THEORETICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF CHICANOS IN AMERICAN POLITICS,** *by Maurilio E. Vigil,* New Mexico Highlands University. A groundbreaking attempt to explore the social and political currents of Chicano life—historical origins, political culture, voting behavior, Mexican-American organizations and the influence of Chicano leaders. 370 pp.
370 pp. 0-8191-0110-9 **$9.45**

University Press of America™

Established for Academics, by academics.

International Arms Control

Issues and Agreements

Edited for The Stanford Arms Control Group by John H. Barton & Lawrence D. Weiler. This is an exhaustive analysis of national and international arms control: its history, philosophy, cultural context, technology, economic and political ramifications, achievements, and future prospects. The book will assist the general reader in understanding and forming intelligent opinions on such issues as the role of doctrine in the military, difficulties posed by rapidly changing technology, and the value and limitations of arms control as a way to prevent war. An appendix contains the text of eighteen major arms control agreements, and the volume concludes with discussion questions and suggestions for further reading. Cloth, $18.50; paper, $12.95

Holistic Thought in Social Science

D. C. Phillips. This book is a highly readable synthesis and critical examination of the character, history, and utility of holism ("A part cannot be understood in isolation from the whole"), especially as seen in its long conflict with the mechanistic or analytic method of viewing reality. After identifying the points at issue, the author examines holism as manifested in various social scientific systems of thought, notably general systems theory, structuralism, functionalism, and Gestalt psychology. He concludes that "the analytic or mechanistic method . . . is such a moderate and reasonable position that no scientist, not even a holist, can avoid putting it into practice. By contrast, holism—taken seriously—is an eminently unworkable doctrine." $8.50

Stanford University Press

Thomas Y. Crowell Company

1977

Political Reform

Compelling . . . Original . . . Realistic . . .

William J. Crotty

Northwestern University

For a number of years, issues of political reform have been at the forefront of our politics, disrupting old alliances and fostering new ones. Much furor has arisen over the three areas that Professor Crotty, a widely known student of our political system, brilliantly discusses in his important new book. They are, in order, **voter registration, campaign finance,** and **political parties and the nominating system.**

The approach is appropriately historical in part. Equally important are Crotty's evaluation of current proposals and his own recommendations for specific reforms placed in the broad context of evolving change within the American democratic experiment.

Illustrative material culled from the Watergate scandals shows us how deep, serious, and urgent our problems are.

American Legislative Processes

Behavioral... Comprehensive... Empirical...

Jack R. Van Der Slik

Southern Illinois University

How do legislators interact with the public, the political system, and each other to form policy? To answer this and related questions, Van Der Slik looks at the interrelationships among legislatures and legislators, the people, other actors and institutions in the society, and foreign political systems. Not content with analyzing decision making and intralegislative behavior at only the national level, Van Der Slik includes material on state and local legislatures as well. He treats his subject matter empirically—what legislators are like, how they make decisions, and how they organize themselves. Van Der Slik writes for students: he uses jargon-free, clear, readable English.

Don't overlook . . .

FOR YOUR POLITICAL PARTIES COURSE

Joyce Gelb & Marian L. Palley

TRADITION AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS

1975 $10.50 323 pp.

For further information,
write to Joan H. Greene,
Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
666 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York 10019

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS
INTEREST GROUPS
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations

UNIVERSITETSFORLAGET
PUBLISHERS TO THE NORWEGIAN
UNIVERSITIES

ELITE STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY
John Higley, G. Lowell Field and Knut Grøholt
A general theory of how elites and non-elites have interacted in dozens of historical and contemporary societies to produce specifiable political outcomes.
82-00-01498-1 367 pp., charts, bibliog. U.S. rights: Columbia University Press.

INTEREST GROUPS IN NORWEGIAN POLITICS
Robert B. Kvavik
The purpose of this book is threefold: to provide a descriptive survey of interest groups and the interest group system in Norway, to contribute to the theory of interest groups in general, and to foster the debate on democratic processes in Norway in particular.
82-00-01477-0 206 pp., charts, bibliog. $ 11.00

AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen
Explores the consequences of ambiguity for decision-making processes in organizations. The book contains important contributions by Søren Christensen, Michael D. Cohen, Harald Enderud, Kristian Kreiner, Pierre Romelaer, Kåre Rommetveit, Per Stava and Stephen S. Weiner. $ 20.00

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS
Martin Saeter and Ian Smart
What kind of basis for cooperation should be adopted by North Sea states: a cooperative framework limited to North Sea states alone, or an adaption of already existing organizations?
U.K. and U.S. rights: IPC Science and Technology Press, Ltd., Guildford, U.K.

THE SCANDINAVIAN OPTION. Opportunities and Opportunity Costs in Postwar Scandinavian Policies
Barbara G. Haskel
The study is of foreign policy decisions and the process of international bargaining. This is the first comprehensive political analysis of the major cases in postwar Scandinavian relations and the decision of Norway and Denmark to join NATO.
82-00-01561-0 Approx. 250 pp. Forthcoming Sept. Approx. $ 13.00

BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS
To motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace.
Since 1970. One volume a year, 4 issues per volume. Subscription $ 15.00

INQUIRY
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
Since 1958. One volume a year, 4 issues per volume.
Subscriptions: Institutions $ 15.00, Individuals $ 12.00
ISSN 0020-174X

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH
Since 1964. One volume a year, 4 issue per volume.
Subscription $ 15.00
ISSN 0022-3433

Distribution offices:

UNITED KINGDOM
Global Book Resources Ltd.
37 Queen Street
Henley on Thames
Oxfordshire, RG9 1AJ

NORWAY
Box 307
Blindern
Oslo 3

UNITED STATES
Box 142
Boston, Mass. 02113

Japan: The Paradox of Progress

edited by Lewis Austin

The essays in this interdisciplinary volume examine the effects of rapid change on the character of Japanese society. Augmenting description with analysis and prediction, they sketch a composite portrait of a country in which old and new coexist, sometimes ironically. The discussion of Japan's experience suggests hypotheses about the future of advanced industrial society in general. $20.00



Rural Responses to Industrialization

A Study of Village Zambia

Robert H. Bates

"Bates handles a wide range of fundamental problems concerning the place of rural society in political development. In particular, he connects the socioeconomic with the political and governmental in a way thoroughly unprecedented. Nothing comparable to the richness of Bates's data can be found in any extant study I'm aware of. A major breakthrough."—Martin Kilson $20.00

The Donegal Mafia

An Irish Political Machine

Paul M. Sacks

"This is the first study which analyzes contemporary Irish politics using the techniques of contemporary political science. An interesting and thoughtful study."
—Richard Rose

"An important contribution to the general study of machine politics and a valuable corrective to certain prevailing assumptions."—Conor Cruise O'Brien $15.00

The Moral Economy of the Peasant

Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia

James C. Scott

Demonstrates that the fear of food shortages explains many otherwise puzzling technical, social, and moral arrangements in peasant society. Using lower Burma and Vietnam as examples, Scott shows how the transformations of the colonial era systematically violated the peasants' "moral economy" and created a situation of potential rebellion. $15.00

Yale University Press **New Haven and London**

From Halsted Press,

A Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

WEST GERMANY:

An Introduction

By Gunther Kloss, University of Manchester.

1976 180 pp. $19.75

Provides a wealth of statistical material, integrated with clear narrative and analysis.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT:

Conflict, Confrontation and Diplomacy

By Philip Williams, University of Aberdeen.

1976 240 pp. $17.50

Combines theoretical analysis and actual case studies to examine both pre-nuclear and nuclear crises in detail.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARMS RACE

Edited by D. Carlton and C. Schaerf.

1975 244 pp. $17.95

BRAZIL SINCE 1964:

Modernisation under a Military Regime

By Georges-Andre Fiechter.

1975 296 pp. $30.00

Examines the impact of the professional military on the politics and policies of a developing country.

THE U.K. IN 1980:

The Hudson Report

By the Hudson Institute.

1975 127 pp. $12.50

Prices are subject to change without notice.

OPEC AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

By M.S. Al-Otaiba, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, United Arab Emirates.

1975 187 pp. $14.50

Provides a rare insight into the thinking of the men who control an industry vital to the prosperity of today's world.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:

A Psychological Analysis

By J. Thibaut and L. Walker, both of the University of North Carolina.

1975 150 pp. Cloth $9.95; Paper $4.95

(A Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publication)

Focuses on the comparative effects of systems and procedures, and the use of scientific method in assessing studies done in the U.S., England, France, and Germany.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND ITS ENEMIES:

A Normative Approach to Social Problems

By T.F. Hoult, Arizona State University.

1975 450 pp. Cloth $18.95; Paper $8.95

(A Schenkman publication)

Offers a multidisiciplinary view of social problems, illustrating systematically the idea that social problems are created to the degree that injustice prevails.

EXPLORATIONS IN GOVERNMENT:

Collected Papers 1951–1968

By W.J.M. Mackenzie.

1975 350 pp. $17.75

HALSTED PRESS

These books are available for **30 days free examination**
from Dept. 31, Halsted Press, A Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

A5694-67

New Concepts in Poli Sci from DORSEY

available March

MANAGING THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Grover Starling, University of Houston (Clear Lake City)

Completely new, this practitioner-oriented text blends relevant theory with how-to-do-it techniques drawn from an exciting variety of sources. It provides a coherent, up-to-date, and highly readable overview of public administration.

available February

COMPARATIVE POLITICS: Notes and Readings, Fifth Edition

Edited by **Roy C. Macridis,** Brandeis University, and **Bernard E. Brown,** City University of New York (Graduate School and Lehman)

This classic reader has been expanded and updated, 50 per cent of the material in this edition is new. The authors provide the best presentation of the basic building blocks in the systematic study of comparative politics. **(paperbound)**

available March

COMPARING PUBLIC POLICIES: United States, Soviet Union, and Europe

Richard L. Siegel and **Leonard B. Weinberg,** University of Nevada (Reno)

Presents a comprehensive study of the sources, content and results of government policy in the United States, Soviet Union, and six European countries. The text uses a dual organizational framework: (a) distributive, regulative, and extra-active policies, and (b) welfare, warfare, and post-industrial policies. **(paperbound)**

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request; please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS • Homewood, Illinois 60430

Write for our complete catalog



UTOPIA AND REVOLUTION
Melvin J. Lasky

In this remarkable intellectual history, Lasky charts five centuries of confrontation between visions of utopia and movements toward violent social change.

736 pages Cloth $29.95 to 12/31/76
$35.00 thereafter

LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice
Friedrich A. Hayek

Hayek argues in the second volume of his comprehensive three-part study of law and liberty that the unexamined pursuit of "social justice" will contribute to the erosion of personal liberties.

240 pages Cloth $10.00

THE PEASANTS OF THE MONTES
The Roots of Rural Rebellion in Spain
Michael R. Weisser

Through wide-ranging and imaginative scholarship, Weisser shows that rural Spanish anarchism was not a reaction to modernization, but a search for an alternative to the benefits of urban life.

168 pages Cloth $11.50

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago 60637

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire

From the First Century A.D. to the Third

Edward N. Luttwak

"A wide-ranging historical analysis of Roman strategy and the changing patterns of Roman statecraft — including both intriguing analogies and suggestive contrasts to the evolving international position of the United States." — *James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense*

Edward N. Luttwak is a professional defense analyst who has served as a consultant to the secretary of defense. In the light of his knowledge of modern strategic analysis, he here undertakes the first systematic and sustained investigation of Roman strategy during the period of imperial autocracy. Of great sophistication, the strategies of the empire are still eminently worth studying, he believes. The Romans undoubtedly had a genius for governance that was expressed most of all in their very subtle and economical use of military force. $12.95

America's Mass Media Merchants

William H. Read

A seasoned newsman charts the rise of the American mass media and examines the implications of their global penetration. He documents in detail the transnational development of AP and UPI, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post-Los Angeles Times* news services, the *International Herald Tribune, Newsweek, Time,* and *Reader's Digest.* The international distribution of American movies and television programs is also scrutinized. But how the world came to love Lucy represents to many third world, Communist, and even Western countries a disturbing intrusion of American values into ethnic cultures. While sensitive to fears of "cultural imperialism," Read finds *information sovereignty* to be an unacceptable alternative to the *free flow* principle. His lively and argumentative book is the first contribution to the dialogue from a liberal, critical, but not anti-media stance. $12.50

Prelude to Power

The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791

Jack Richard Censer

The Parisian radical press was born of the turmoil of 1789, which spawned both the political journalists and the political factions. Treating the events from the perspective of popular culture, Censer provides an in-depth analysis of the influence of the press on the populace which will be of great interest to political scientists. He combines a quantitative measurement of ideas with an examination of the more impressionistic examples of press technique. $12.50

Johns Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

From GLP . . .

texts designed to keep students on target


bureaucracy and the modern world
victor a. thompson

BUREAUCRACY AND THE MODERN WORLD

Victor A. Thompson (University of Florida)

This comprehensive text offers a moral or philosophical basis for organization without sacrificing the behavioral understanding gained in recent years. It sets forth the moral assumptions of modern institutions, especially those engaged in providing goods and services, both public and private.

1976 150 pages paper, $5.95


Corruption in the American Political System
Larry L. Berg
Harlan Hahn
John R. Schmidhauser

CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Larry L. Berg (University of Southern California), Harlan Hahn (University of Southern California), John R. Schmidhauser (University of Southern California)

The purpose of this book is to assist students and other citizens in a reappraisal of the sources of—and reasons for—the systemic corruption found in the very structure of American politics.

1976 224 pages paper, $4.50


CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES
LEROY N. RIESELBACH

CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES

Leroy N. Rieselbach (Indiana University)

Indicating why Congress has not initiated public policy and suggesting that beneath this surface deference lies Congress' spirit of independence, this text discusses the first serious reform movement in the United States Congress in nearly three decades.

1977 160 pages paper, $3.95

For examination copies, write Director of Marketing

GENERAL LEARNING PRESS
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Available in Canada from GLC Publishers, Ltd., Agincourt, Ontario

ELSEVIER

Scholarly publishing since 1581

Painters and Politics

The European Avant-Garde and Society, 1900-1925

Theda Shapiro, *University of California-Riverside*

Based largely on unpublished materials, some unknown to art historians, PAINTERS AND POLITICS examines the political activities and social attitudes of a generation of avant-garde painters in Western Europe: the French Fauves and Cubists, the German Expressionists, and the Italian Futurists.

A landmark study for both art and social historians, this tastefully illustrated book will also fascinate anyone interested in avant-garde art and the European cultural scene.

1976 300 pages $15.00

Revolutions and Revolutionaries

Four Theories

Barbara Salert, *Washington University*

This study of revolution is a critical evaluation of four theories of revolution: rational choice theory, psychological theory, structural functionalism, and Marxism. These theories range from psychological explanations of motivations that induce people to join revolutionary movements to broad social explanations that focus on the socioeconomic and political conditions of societies that experience widespread violence. **1976 170 pages $12.95**

Power, Politics and Progress

Social Change in Rural Peru

William Foote Whyte, *Cornell University and* **Giorgio Alberti,** *University of Bologna*

A description and analysis of peasant movements and the politics of community and regional change in a developing nation. Based on a 10-year research program, the story is told in simple, straightforward language. The field research is then examined in order to draw general conclusions on peasant movements and revolutionary theory; conflict, cooperation and power in peasant communities, and planned change and political processes. The authors also show how to examine developments at the community level in the context of major national changes in the distribution of power. **1976 336 pages $15.00**

Hitler Among the Germans

Rudolph Binion, *Brandeis University*

HILTER AMONG THE GERMANS is a unique investigation of the psychodynamics of Adolf Hitler's rise and rule. The inner sources of Hitler's control over the German people are carefully uncovered as Binion traces the origins of Hitler's anti-Semitism and his extraordinary power to excite enthusiasm and disarm opposition. The wealth of new facts and insights presented in HITLER AMONG THE GERMANS makes it a landmark of historical scholarship.

"A remarkable book, notable in particular for its formidable scholarship and original research."
— John Toland **1976 224 pages $12.00**

ELSEVIER NORTH-HOLLAND INC
NEW YORK 52 VANDERBILT AVENUE NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

CAREER ALTERNATIVES FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

A Guide for Faculty and Graduate Students

Thomas E. Mann

A Publication of the
Departmental Services Program

$1.00 (prepaid) 20 pages

Available direct from:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Announcing the new, thoroughly updated

Revised Second Edition of

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By KENNETH PREWITT
& SIDNEY VERBA

The Second Edition of this widely used text is being revised for publication in February in order to incorporate political developments through the 1976 elections. Chapters 9, 10, and 11, on political parties and elections, congress, and the presidency, are completely rewritten to reflect campaign events and election results. The remainder of the book will stand as published last February.

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT is well-known for its unique focus on political capitalism which considers how capitalism has shaped American democracy. The book stresses the recurring patterns, structures, and processes that give meaning to political activity, providing students with a clear analytical understanding of the institutional and behavioral aspects of American government.

Tentative: 585 pages; $12.95. February 1977. ISBN 0-06-045281-1. Study Guide: $4.95; ISBN 0-045288-9. Instructor's Manual.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 354. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

1817

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Harper & Row

STAR PERFORMERS

in Urban Government courses

NEW Third Edition—POLITICAL POWER & THE URBAN CRISIS

Alan Shank, SUNY at Geneseo. A concise, up-to-date reader, this new edition maintains an emphasis on urban policy as it relates to urban political power. The articles concentrate on the 1970's, reflecting such new factors in the urban situation as environmental and energy demands, population trends, and public employee unions. Citizen participation and trends in local government are included. 1976, paperbound, 5-1/2 x 8-1/2, 570 pp.

in State-Local courses

STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS

David R. Berman, Arizona State University. This introductory text examines such traditional concerns of political science as federalism, constitutional relations, and governmental institutions in light of behavioral research. State and local governments in various parts of the country are discussed with regard to espoused values and the current issues confronting political systems. Includes name index, subject index, bibliography, and listing of selected readings. 1975, hardbound, 7 x 9-1/4, 301 pp.

Holbrook Press, Inc.

Dept. A93, 470 Atlantic Ave.
Boston, Massachusetts 02210

New Editions of Well-Known Texts

The most widely used text in undergraduate and graduate public administration courses

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

FOURTH EDITION

Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro

No other text so succinctly covers the theoretical and conceptual elements of the field and then so clearly relates these aspects to concrete examples from present practices and current relationships. The new Fourth Edition is thoroughly revised to reflect recent developments in the theory, practice, and problems of public administration. Tentative: 480 pages; $12.95. January 1977. ISBN 0-06-044843-1. *New!—Instructor's Manual.*

Emphasizes principles and broad methodologies rather than detailed procedures

PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

SEVENTH EDITION

O. Glenn Stahl

"The great majority of U.S. public personnel managers and many abroad have been brought up on one or another edition of this classic text."—*Public Personnel Review*/The Seventh Edition gives increased attention to unionization, relations between public management and unions, issues of equal opportunity and affirmative action, and environmental considerations. 575 pages; $16.95. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-046387-2.

Reorganized to provide an ideal introduction to public administration

THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY

SECOND EDITION

Alan A. Altshuler and Norman C. Thomas

This reader for graduate courses in federal politics, bureaucracy, and public administration explores the problems involved in reconciling American society's dependence on large-scale public bureaucracy with the ideals and processes of mass democracy. The forty articles in this edition (of which 27 are new) are organized to parallel standard course presentations. Tentative: 400 pages; $9.95/paper. January 1977. ISBN 0-06-040246-6.

A unique comparative approach to the study of American government

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE

FOURTH EDITION

William Ebenstein, C. Herman Pritchett, Henry A. Turner, and Dean Mann

515 pages; $10.95/paper. January 1976. ISBN 0-06-041866-4. *Instructor's Manual.*

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 354. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

New from Texas Press

Science and Ceremony

The Institutional Economics of C. E. Ayres
Edited by William Breit
and William Patton Culbertson, Jr.
Here is the first major appraisal of the work and influence of C. E. Ayres, the leading American institutionalist economist in the post–World War II era.
"The essays in this volume are not meant as a monument to Ayres. They are meant to tell what he thought and what he did. They do show his range of interests, his diligence, his originality of mind and method."—from the Foreword by John Kenneth Galbraith
210 pages $14.95

Also Available:

Toward a Reasonable Society
The Values of Industrial Civilization
By C. E. Ayres
301 pages $10.50

A Search for Solvency
Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971
By Alfred E. Eckes, Jr.
355 pages $10.00

University of Texas Press
P.O. Box 7819
Austin 78712

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government
by Clement E. Vose

Information and evaluation for teachers, librarians, and students on U.S. government publications, general reference books, library facilities, and their utilization.

PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics
edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr.

As a guide to the development of an alternative (to lecture and discussion sections) method of teaching and learning, this monograph is a collection of essays on the objectives, organization and impact of using the personalized system of instruction in political science. Examples are given on topics in American politics.

Simple Simulations
by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott

A selective guide to the development, applicability and impact of simulations and games, with examples for the design of original role playing exercises.

Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science
edited by Jonathan Pool

A guide to the theory, design and application of computer-assisted instruction for interactive teaching and learning in political science. Examples from several subfields, including political philosophy.

U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide
by Phyllis G. Carter

A guide to the acquisition—in print and on computer tape—and instructional application of U.S. Census Bureau data on: population and housing, governments, economy, Congressional districts. Also, answers to the exercises in the Students Manual.

U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: Students Manual
by Phyllis G. Carter

A guide and exercise book, student instruction in basic data analysis for solving problems on political and social questions, with references to data on population, housing, governments, and Congressional districts, gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau.

ORDER FORM

______ *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government*, by Clement E. Vose ($4.00 paperback, $6.50 hard cover).

______ *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr. ($3.50 paperback).

______ *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott ($3.50 paperback).

______ *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool ($4.00 paperback).

______ *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide*, by Phyllis G. Carter ($4.00, or $2.50 when accompanied by a note that 10 or more copies will be ordered by student).

______ *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: Students Manual*, by Phyllis G. Carter ($2.50 paperback).

Name ______________________________

Address ______________________________

City ____________________ State ____________ Zip __________

Send form prepaid to: Division of Educational Affairs, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Critical Choices for Americans

Critical Choices for Americans, a fourteen-volume work on urgent problems that face the United States and the world at the beginning of America's third century, will appear through 1976 and into 1977 under the imprint of Lexington Books.

A wide range of subjects is covered including: energy, the environment, and economics; population, food, and land use; raw materials; criminal justice and the law; education; and foreign relations and national defense. A major portion of the work concerns ideas about America, extensive analyses of different regions of the world, and the quality of life of communities and individuals.

The Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, brought together by Nelson A. Rockefeller in 1973, commissioned 128 of the best minds in the world to highlight alternatives facing America. Their subjects include energy, the environment, population, food, land use, criminal justice, education, defense, and extensive analyses of regions of the world.

About the series in general, **TIME Magazine** said:

"NEW STARTS FOR AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY . . . What emerges from these essays is the sense that in nearly every important field, ideas that dominated for half a century or more are giving way. New notions are being pursued and older ideas, discarded earlier in the 20th century, are being re-examined . . . Different though the various views of human nature may be, the very use of the term implies that there is something permanent and irreducible in man and that his resistance to outside manipulation is a kind of triumph."

The books are:

Volume I	**Vital Resources. 288pp. $14.95**
Volume II	**The Americans: 1976. 400pp. $15.95**
Volume III	**How Others See Us. 144pp. $11.95**
Volume IV	**Power & Security. 240pp. $12.95**
Volume V	**Trade, Inflation & Ethics. 320pp. $15.95**
Volume VI	**Values of Growth. 192pp. $10.95**
Volume VII	**Qualities of Life. 544pp. $20.95**
Volume VIII	**Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership. 448pp. $19.95**
Volume IX	**The Soviet Empire: Expansion & Detente. 480pp. $19.95**
Volume X	**The Middle East: Oil, Conflict & Hope. 544pp. $22.95**
Volume XI	**Africa: From Mystery to Maze. 480pp. $19.95**
Volume XII	**China & Japan: A New Balance of Power. 352pp. $16.95**
Volume XIII	**Southern Asia: The Politics of Poverty & Peace. 384pp. $16.95**
Volume XIV	**Latin America: Struggle for Progress. 224pp. $13.95**

Special Series Price—$200.00

For additional information, please contact:
Lexington Books, 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Massachusetts 02173,
or call (617) 862-6650 or (212) 924-6460.

A Raytheon Company


The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays
Lloyd S. Etheredge

A concise guide to theories on motivation used in the analysis of political behavior. Exercises are included on the applications of the theories to political events and situations.

$1.00 (prepaid)

ORDER FORM

Please send me __________ copies of *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays.*

Name ____

Address ____

____

Send form prepaid to:

DIVISION OF EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Our Books in Political Science: *And what your colleagues are saying about them*

AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Concepts and Cases

NEW in '76

Carl E. Lutrin and Allen K. Settle

In this lively, issues-oriented basic text, case studies help illustrate the concepts and scope of public administration, the controversies, and the practical problems plaguing this nation's public servants.

1976. 392 pages. $12.95 cloth.

LUTRIN AND SETTLE PROVIDE A THOROUGH, AND INTERESTING, COVERAGE OF THE FIELD. I WAS QUITE IMPRESSED WITH THEIR PRESENTATION. NORMALLY YOU SIMPLY LEAF THROUGH AN EXAMINATION TEXT, BUT I CAUGHT MYSELF READING THIS ONE. CASE STUDIES ARE QUITE APPROPRIATE AND WELL COORDINATED AS WELL.

William R. Mangun, Salisbury State College, Maryland

THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY

NEW in '76

Richard C. Cortner

This text is an in-depth review of six seminal cases representing the most important fields in which the U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated significant civil liberties policies in recent years.

1976. 225 pages. $4.95 paper.

An excellent book that fills a major gap between casebooks and single-issue case studies. It is well-written, quite comprehensible to the average students. The cases used are exciting to the student audience.

S. Eugene Clark, California State College at Bakersfield

WOMEN: A Feminist Perspective

Jo Freeman (ed.)

Edited by a political scientist, WOMEN is a collection of scholarly writings on women by women from a wide range of academic disciplines.

1975. 487 pages. $7.50 paper.

I think it's excellent. Freeman is one of the best scholars on women currently – if not the best. It is one of the few anthologies that is scholarly yet from a feminist perspective. Although my name is Freeman, she is not a relative. I just happen to admire her work a great deal.

Bonnie Cook Freeman, University of Texas

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS: A Developmental Approach

Edward J. Williams and Freeman J. Wright

The authors provide fresh insight by analyzing the development of Latin America as a whole rather than taking the usual country-by-country approach, and address the sociological and economic questions that have affected its politics.

1975. 480 pages. $12.95 cloth.

I was particularly impressed by the lucid, readable writing style. The clear presentation of the developmental process provided in the opening chapter should be most helpful in "setting the scene". The essential historic background is clearly and concisely summarized. The developmental process in Latin America is fully and understandably presented

Louis G. Kahle, University of Missouri – Columbia

INSIDE FOREIGN POLICY: The Department of State Political System and Its Subsystems

John H. Esterline and Robert B. Black

Drawing upon their 40 years of experience, the authors give an insider's view of struggles for power in Washington and our embassies abroad, contradicting the commonly held view that the importance of the State Department in foreign policy formulation has declined.

1975. 271 pages. $5.95 paper.

"Those who study the conduct of America's foreign affairs . . . will be exposed to sharp analysis and shrewd observations of the 'realities' seldom alluded to in the customary and more ponderously written text on foreign policy."

USIA WORLD, June '75

PUBLIC OPINION: Its Formation, Measurement, and Impact

Susan Welch and John Comer (eds.)

Written primarily from a political science perspective, this book analyzes the influence of the government, society, and the media on public opinion, and the impact public opinion has on policy making.

1975. 541 pages. $7.50 paper.

This is a very distinguished collection of readings containing studies and theoretical articles by some of the more prestigious researchers in the field.

John Norton, Lebanon Valley College, Pennsylvania

THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP: The Dynamics of Federal, State and Urban Relations

Richard D. Feld and Carl Grafton (eds.)

A practical analysis of urban problems: welfare, the environment, technology, and high education – how these problems impact on the federal system and vice versa.

1973. 322 pages. $5.95 paper.

Lucid presentation of the federal system. A developmental view of great usefulness to first time students of public administration.

Frances E. Winslow, Kean College, New Jersey

for examination copies, please write:
MAYFIELD PUBLISHING COMPANY
285 Hamilton Avenue / Palo Alto, California 94301

ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

AN EXPOSITION AND INTERPRETATION

RAMON M. LEMOS

In his detailed analyses of *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men*, *Discourse on Political Economy*, and *The Social Contract*, Lemos refutes the claims of some critics that Rousseau's writings abound with obscurities and inconsistencies. By providing a detailed clarification of the development of the philosopher's political theory, the difficulties presented by the successive texts, and the apparent contradictions between them, the book presents Rousseau's work as an intelligible and coherent system of thought. 344 pages / $14.50

THE SHOTGUN BEHIND THE DOOR

LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

PHILIP ABBOTT

Foreword by Russell Kirk

Plagued by the image of the state as a shotgun behind the door, the liberal has justified government by the only appeal available to him, prudence. Philip Abbott reformulates the liberal response to the problem of political obligation by accepting the initial premises of liberal ethical theory and the political impluses which emerge from it while discarding the theories of political obligation that have been attached to it.
"A very stimulating and timely work"—*Library Journal.*
"This is a well-written, stimulating, thoughtful essay. It is well worth the time invested in carefully reading it through"—*Virginia Quarterly Review.* 212 pages / $8.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA PRESS
ATHENS 30602

★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★

". . . the most thorough and the most convincing study of the emergent elites of the 'new politics' that I have seen. . . . This study is an example of contemporary political science at its best."

—Nelson W. Polsby


The New Presidential Elite
Men and Women in National Politics
Jeane Kirkpatrick
NIXON '72
McGOVERN PRESIDENT

The New Presidential Elite

Men and Women in National Politics

By **Jeane Kirkpatrick**

Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University

American politics, suggests the author of **The New Presidential Elite,** is being transformed in important and fundamental ways. She believes that a "new breed" of men and women are actively involved in the majority party, and that their motives, goals, ideals, and patterns of organizational behavior are different from those of the people who have dominated American politics in the past. This book provides an in-depth study of these new managers and the new politics they champion.

The New Presidential Elite is the first large-scale study of convention delegates in two decades. It is based on interviews with 1,300 delegates to the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions and mail questionnaires completed by some 55 percent of the delegates. It deals with the political backgrounds and experience, the attitudes and perceptions, and the orientations toward issues, candidates, parties, and male-female roles of a large number of active political participants.

The study, which was funded jointly by Russell Sage Foundation and The Twentieth Century Fund, suggests that new political types and patterns of participation were present among the delegates to the 1972 Democratic convention. Jeane Kirkpatrick identifies women as one part of the new "presidential elite," and discusses their present role in American politics. She analyzes the social, cultural, psychological, and political characteristics of the women who have become active, and explores some of the potential consequences of their activity.

"I want to state as strongly as I possibly can my conviction that The New Presidential Elite *is one of the very few truly outstanding works I have ever read that genuinely meld the micro with the macro and the empirical with the theoretical. I believe its publication will constitute a major event in political science scholarship."* —Austin Ranney

"The interview data are skillfully examined in the light of significant modes of political analysis, and I am sure that the richness of the result will be widely appreciated by social scientists, commentators and active political advisors of every kind." —Harold D. Lasswell

1976. 606 pages. $20.00

Published by **Russell Sage Foundation** and **The Twentieth Century Fund.**

Order directly from the distributor:
Basic Books, Inc., 10 East 53 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★


Have you checked...
TIAA's new life insurance rates?

The traditional "best buy" in life insurance is now even better, and you'll be startled to find how little it costs to own all the family protection you need. To illustrate,

at *any* issue age below 35 for men and 40 for women, a $50,000 TIAA policy now costs less than $100; and $100,000 policies are under $180.

These are yearly net costs after current dividends (dividends not guaranteed) for policies issued on the popular 20-Year Decreasing Term plan. For exact information on this plan and what $50,000 or $100,000 immediate coverage would cost at your age,

Either telephone collect...
the TIAA LIFE INSURANCE ADVISORY CENTER at (212) 490-9000 and ask for an Insurance Counselor:

or send this coupon...
to receive information by mail.
In either case there are no strings attached and no one will call on you.

Life Insurance Advisory Center
TEACHERS INSURANCE & ANNUITY ASSOC.
730 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Without obligating me in any way, please send full information on TIAA's new rates, including personal illustrations of TIAA policies issued at my age. G1276

Name and Title Date of Birth

Address

City, State, Zip

Nonprofit Employer (college, university, private school, etc.)

Eligibility for TIAA life insurance is extended to persons employed by colleges, universities, private schools, and certain other nonprofit educational or scientific institutions.

TIAA CREF *The College World's Insurance Company*

In the 1990's:

A World Federation Of Cultures

In this attempt to outline a "preferred world" for the end of this century, noted African scholar Ali A. Mazrui writes about a global culture that is tragically out of balance, that ignores most of the civilizations of the world and elevates only the Western heritage. If we are to move towards a better future, we must maintain the trend towards a world culture, making that culture less Eurocentric and more representative of the riches of the human race.

> "Ali A. Mazrui proposes...a world federation of cultures. There are to be five 'world languages'—English, French, Russian, Chinese and Arabic...Each country is to declare its allegiance to one of these five. Each schoolchild is to learn three languages—a world language, a 'regional' language, and a national or subnational language...The idea warrants serious discussion."
>
> —*Political Science Quarterly*

> "Makes the case that the human community might be better off if it could free itself from the domination of a Eurocentric world culture, and urges the establishment of a global political system that will represent people by cultures as well as power."
>
> —*The Humanist*

A world Federation of Cultures is the latest in a series of books produced by the World Order models Project of the Institute for World Order. WOMP is a five-year effort to bring together scholars from eight regions of the world to apply world order science to the current planetary predicament and to address the issues of militarism, famine, loss of freedom and ecological deterioration through a humane perspective. Of WOMP, *Foreign Affairs* wrote:

> "...The first fruits of the ambitious World Order Models Project of the Institute for World Order...Consciously highly normative, they present both a diagnosis of the present human condition and proposals for the radical transformation of global society...An important and obviously highly controversial series."

Books in the series:

ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER *Edited by Saul H. Mendlovitz, President, Institute for World Order*	**$9.95**
A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS *By Richard Falk, Albert E. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University*	**$15.00, paper $6.95**
FOOTSTEPS INTO THE FUTURE *By Rajni Kothari, Founder and Director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi*	**$8.95, paper $3.95**
A WORLD FEDERATION OF CULTURES *By Ali A. Mazrui, noted African scholar*	**$14.95**


World Order Models Project
A WORLD FEDERATION OF CULTURES
AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE
Ali A. Mazrui
Mendlovitz
ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER
Falk
A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS
Kothari
FOOTSTEPS INTO THE FUTURE

Soon to be published:
Books by Horacio Godoy and
Gustavo Lagos of Latin America,
Johan Galtung (a transnational perspective)
and Yoshikazu Sakamoto of Japan.

To order, write to:

The Free Press
A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
200 D Brown Street
Riverside, New Jersey 08075

INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ORDER
1140 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036